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Implement ResponseInstruction Usage in OnionMessage Handling
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
80 use {
81         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85         crate::sign::KeysManager,
86 };
87 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
88 use {
89         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
91 };
92
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
94
95 use crate::io;
96 use crate::prelude::*;
97 use core::{cmp, mem};
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
99 use crate::io::Read;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
104
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
108
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
110 //
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
114 //
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
119 //
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
125
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
131         Forward {
132                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133                 /// do with the HTLC.
134                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
136                 ///
137                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
143         },
144         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
145         ///
146         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
148         Receive {
149                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
154                 ///
155                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159                 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
160                 /// blinded path was not used.
161                 ///
162                 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
163                 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
164                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
165                 ///
166                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
167                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
168                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
169                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
170                 /// instructions.
171                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
173                 ///
174                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
175                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
176                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
177                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
178                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
179                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
180         },
181         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
182         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
183         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
184         ReceiveKeysend {
185                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
186                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
187                 ///
188                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
189                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
190                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
192                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
193                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
194                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
195                 ///
196                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
197                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
198                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
199                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
200                 ///
201                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
202                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
203                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
204                 ///
205                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
206                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
207                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
208                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
209                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
210         },
211 }
212
213 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
214 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
215 pub struct BlindedForward {
216         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
217         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
218         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
219         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
220         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
221         /// the introduction node.
222         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
223 }
224
225 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
226         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
227         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
228                 match self {
229                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
230                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
231                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232                         _ => None,
233                 }
234         }
235 }
236
237 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
238 /// should go next.
239 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
240 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
241 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
242         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
243         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
244         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
245         ///
246         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
247         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
248         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
249         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
250         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
251         ///
252         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
253         /// versions.
254         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
255         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
256         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
257         ///
258         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
259         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
260         /// it along another path).
261         ///
262         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
263         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
264         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
265         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
266         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
267         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
268         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
269         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
270         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
271         ///
272         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
273         /// HTLC.
274         ///
275         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
276         ///
277         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
278         /// shoulder them.
279         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
280 }
281
282 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
283 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
284         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
285         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
286 }
287
288 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
289 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
290 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
291         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
292         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
293 }
294
295 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
296 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
297         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
298
299         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
300         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
301         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
302         // HTLCs.
303         //
304         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
305         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
306         prev_htlc_id: u64,
307         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
308         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
309         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
310 }
311
312 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
313 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
314         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
315         FailHTLC {
316                 htlc_id: u64,
317                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
318         },
319         FailMalformedHTLC {
320                 htlc_id: u64,
321                 failure_code: u16,
322                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
323         },
324 }
325
326 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
327 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
328 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
329 pub enum BlindedFailure {
330         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
331         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
332         FromIntroductionNode,
333         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
334         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
335         FromBlindedNode,
336 }
337
338 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
339 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
340 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
341         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
342         short_channel_id: u64,
343         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
344         htlc_id: u64,
345         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
346         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
347         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
348         channel_id: ChannelId,
349
350         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
351         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
352         outpoint: OutPoint,
353 }
354
355 enum OnionPayload {
356         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
357         Invoice {
358                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
359                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
360                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
361         },
362         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
363         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
364 }
365
366 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
367 struct ClaimableHTLC {
368         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
369         cltv_expiry: u32,
370         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
371         value: u64,
372         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
373         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
374         sender_intended_value: u64,
375         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
376         timer_ticks: u8,
377         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
378         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
379         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
380         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
381         total_msat: u64,
382         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
383         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
384 }
385
386 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
387         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
388                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
389                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
390                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
391                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
392                         value_msat: val.value,
393                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
394                 }
395         }
396 }
397
398 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
399 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
400 ///
401 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
402 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
403 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
404
405 impl PaymentId {
406         /// Number of bytes in the id.
407         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
408 }
409
410 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
411         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
412                 self.0.write(w)
413         }
414 }
415
416 impl Readable for PaymentId {
417         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
418                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
419                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
420         }
421 }
422
423 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
424         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
425                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
426         }
427 }
428
429 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
430 ///
431 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
432 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
433 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
434
435 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
436         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
437                 self.0.write(w)
438         }
439 }
440
441 impl Readable for InterceptId {
442         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
443                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
444                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
445         }
446 }
447
448 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
449 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
450 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
451         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
452         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
453 }
454 impl SentHTLCId {
455         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
456                 match source {
457                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
458                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
459                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
460                         },
461                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
462                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
463                 }
464         }
465 }
466 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
467         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
468                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
469                 (2, htlc_id, required),
470         },
471         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
472                 (0, session_priv, required),
473         };
474 );
475
476
477 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
478 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
479 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
480 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
481         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
482         OutboundRoute {
483                 path: Path,
484                 session_priv: SecretKey,
485                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
486                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
487                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
488                 payment_id: PaymentId,
489         },
490 }
491 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
492 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
493         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
494                 match self {
495                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
496                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
497                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
498                         },
499                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
500                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
501                                 path.hash(hasher);
502                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
503                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
504                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505                         },
506                 }
507         }
508 }
509 impl HTLCSource {
510         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
511         #[cfg(test)]
512         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
513                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
514                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
515                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
516                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
517                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
518                 }
519         }
520
521         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
522         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
523         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
524         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
525                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
526                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
527                 } else {
528                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529                         true
530                 }
531         }
532 }
533
534 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
535 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
536 ///
537 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
538 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
539 pub enum FailureCode {
540         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
541         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
542         TemporaryNodeFailure,
543         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
544         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
545         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
546         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
547         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
548         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
549         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
550         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
551         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
552         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
553         ///
554         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
555         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
556         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
557 }
558
559 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
560     fn into(self) -> u16 {
561                 match self {
562                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
563                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
564                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
565                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
566                 }
567         }
568 }
569
570 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
571 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
572 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
573 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
574 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
575
576 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
577         err: msgs::LightningError,
578         closes_channel: bool,
579         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
580 }
581 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
582         #[inline]
583         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
584                 Self {
585                         err: LightningError {
586                                 err: err.clone(),
587                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
588                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589                                                 channel_id,
590                                                 data: err
591                                         },
592                                 },
593                         },
594                         closes_channel: false,
595                         shutdown_finish: None,
596                 }
597         }
598         #[inline]
599         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
600                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
601         }
602         #[inline]
603         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
604                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
605                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
606                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
607                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
608                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
609                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
610                 } else {
611                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
612                 };
613                 Self {
614                         err: LightningError { err, action },
615                         closes_channel: true,
616                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
617                 }
618         }
619         #[inline]
620         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
621                 Self {
622                         err: match err {
623                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
624                                         err: msg.clone(),
625                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
626                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
627                                                         channel_id,
628                                                         data: msg
629                                                 },
630                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
631                                         },
632                                 },
633                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
634                                         err: msg,
635                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
636                                 },
637                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
638                                         err: msg.clone(),
639                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
640                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
641                                                         channel_id,
642                                                         data: msg
643                                                 },
644                                         },
645                                 },
646                         },
647                         closes_channel: false,
648                         shutdown_finish: None,
649                 }
650         }
651
652         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
653                 self.closes_channel
654         }
655 }
656
657 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
658 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
659 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
660 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
661 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
662
663 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
664 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
665 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
666 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
667 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
668 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
669         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
670         CommitmentFirst,
671         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
672         RevokeAndACKFirst,
673 }
674
675 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
676 struct ClaimingPayment {
677         amount_msat: u64,
678         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
679         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
680         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
681         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
682 }
683 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
684         (0, amount_msat, required),
685         (2, payment_purpose, required),
686         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
687         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
688         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
689 });
690
691 struct ClaimablePayment {
692         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
693         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
694         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
695 }
696
697 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
698 struct ClaimablePayments {
699         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
700         /// failed/claimed by the user.
701         ///
702         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
703         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
704         ///
705         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
706         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
707         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
708
709         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
710         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
711         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
712         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
713 }
714
715 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
716 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
717 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
718 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
719 #[derive(Debug)]
720 enum BackgroundEvent {
721         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
722         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
723         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
724         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
725         ///
726         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
727         /// are regenerated on startup.
728         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
729         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
730         /// channel to continue normal operation.
731         ///
732         /// In general this should be used rather than
733         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
734         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
735         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
736         ///
737         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
738         /// are regenerated on startup.
739         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
740                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
741                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
742                 channel_id: ChannelId,
743                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
744         },
745         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
746         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
747         /// on a channel.
748         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
749                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
750                 channel_id: ChannelId,
751         },
752 }
753
754 #[derive(Debug)]
755 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
756         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
757         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
758         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
759         /// event can be generated.
760         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
761         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
762         /// operation of another channel.
763         ///
764         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
765         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
766         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
767         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
768         /// outbound edge.
769         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
770                 event: events::Event,
771                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
772         },
773         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
774         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
775         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
776         ///
777         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
778         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
779         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
780         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
781         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
782         ///
783         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
784         /// stored for later processing.
785         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
786                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
787                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
788                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
789                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
790         },
791 }
792
793 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
794         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
795         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
796         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
797         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
798                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
799                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
800                 (4, blocking_action, required),
801                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
802                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
803                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
804         },
805         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
806                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
807                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
808                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
809                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
810                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
811                 // downgrades to prior versions.
812                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
813         },
814 );
815
816 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
817 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
818         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
819                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
820                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
821                 channel_id: ChannelId,
822         },
823 }
824 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
825         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
826                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
827                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
828                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
829                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
830                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
831         };
832 );
833
834 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
835 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
836 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
837 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
838         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
839         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
840         /// durably to disk.
841         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
842                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
843                 channel_id: ChannelId,
844                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
845                 htlc_id: u64,
846         },
847 }
848
849 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
850         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
851                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
852                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
853                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
854                 }
855         }
856 }
857
858 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
859         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
860 ;);
861
862
863 /// State we hold per-peer.
864 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
865         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
866         ///
867         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
868         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
869         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
870         ///
871         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
872         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
873         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
874         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
875         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
876         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
877         latest_features: InitFeatures,
878         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
879         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
880         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
881         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
882         /// user but which have not yet completed.
883         ///
884         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
885         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
886         /// for a missing channel.
887         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
888         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
889         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
890         ///
891         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
892         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
893         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
894         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
895         ///
896         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
897         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
898         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
899         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
900         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
901         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
902         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
903         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
904         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
905         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
906         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
907         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
908         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
909         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
910         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
911         pub is_connected: bool,
912 }
913
914 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
915         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
916         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
917         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
918         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
919                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
920                         return false
921                 }
922                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
923                         match phase {
924                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
925                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
926                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
927                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
928                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
929                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
930                         }
931                 )
932                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
933                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
934         }
935
936         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
937         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
938                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
939         }
940
941         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
942         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
943                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
944                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
945         }
946 }
947
948 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
949 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
950 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
951         /// The original OpenChannel message.
952         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
953         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
954         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
955 }
956
957 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
958 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
959 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
960
961 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
962 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
963 ///
964 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
965 /// here.
966 ///
967 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
968 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
969 struct PendingInboundPayment {
970         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
971         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
972         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
973         /// this payment being removed.
974         expiry_time: u64,
975         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
976         user_payment_id: u64,
977         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
978         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
979         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
980 }
981
982 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
983 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
984 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
985 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
986 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
987 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
988 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
989 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
990 ///
991 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
992 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
993 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
994         Arc<M>,
995         Arc<T>,
996         Arc<KeysManager>,
997         Arc<KeysManager>,
998         Arc<KeysManager>,
999         Arc<F>,
1000         Arc<DefaultRouter<
1001                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1002                 Arc<L>,
1003                 Arc<KeysManager>,
1004                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1005                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1006                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1007         >>,
1008         Arc<L>
1009 >;
1010
1011 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1012 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1013 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1014 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1015 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1016 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1017 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1018 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1019 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1020 ///
1021 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1022 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1023 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1024         ChannelManager<
1025                 &'a M,
1026                 &'b T,
1027                 &'c KeysManager,
1028                 &'c KeysManager,
1029                 &'c KeysManager,
1030                 &'d F,
1031                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1032                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1033                         &'g L,
1034                         &'c KeysManager,
1035                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1036                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1037                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1038                 >,
1039                 &'g L
1040         >;
1041
1042 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1043 ///
1044 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1045 /// languages.
1046 pub trait AChannelManager {
1047         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1048         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1049         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1050         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1051         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1052         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1053         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1054         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1055         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1056         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1057         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1058         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1059         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1060         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1061         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1062         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1063         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1064         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1065         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1066         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1067         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1068         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1069         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1070         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1071         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1072         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1073         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1074         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1075         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1076         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1077         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1078         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1079         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1080         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1081         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1082         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1083 }
1084
1085 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1086 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1087 where
1088         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1089         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1090         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1091         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1092         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1093         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1094         R::Target: Router,
1095         L::Target: Logger,
1096 {
1097         type Watch = M::Target;
1098         type M = M;
1099         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1100         type T = T;
1101         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1102         type ES = ES;
1103         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1104         type NS = NS;
1105         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1106         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1107         type SP = SP;
1108         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1109         type F = F;
1110         type Router = R::Target;
1111         type R = R;
1112         type Logger = L::Target;
1113         type L = L;
1114         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1115 }
1116
1117 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1118 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1119 ///
1120 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1121 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1122 ///   channel
1123 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1124 ///   closing channels
1125 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1126 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1127 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1128 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1129 ///   timely manner
1130 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1131 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1132 ///
1133 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1134 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1135 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1136 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1137 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1138 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1139 ///
1140 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1141 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1142 ///
1143 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1144 ///
1145 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1146 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1147 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1148 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1149 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1150 ///
1151 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1152 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1153 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1154 ///
1155 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1156 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1157 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1158 ///
1159 /// # Initialization
1160 ///
1161 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1162 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1163 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1164 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1165 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1166 ///
1167 /// ```
1168 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1169 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1170 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1171 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1172 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1173 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1174 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1175 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1176 ///
1177 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1178 /// # fn example<
1179 /// #     'a,
1180 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1181 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1182 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1183 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1184 /// #     SP: Sized,
1185 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1186 /// # >(
1187 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1188 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1189 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1190 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1191 /// #     logger: &L,
1192 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1193 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1194 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1195 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1196 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1197 /// #     mut reader: R,
1198 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1199 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1200 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1201 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1202 ///     best_block,
1203 /// };
1204 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1205 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1206 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1207 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1208 /// );
1209 ///
1210 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1211 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1212 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1213 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1214 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1215 /// );
1216 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1217 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1218 ///
1219 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1220 /// // ...
1221 ///
1222 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1223 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1224 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1225 /// }
1226 /// # Ok(())
1227 /// # }
1228 /// ```
1229 ///
1230 /// # Operation
1231 ///
1232 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1233 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1234 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1235 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1236 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1237 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1238 ///   as documented by those traits
1239 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1240 ///   every minute
1241 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1242 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1243 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1244 ///
1245 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1246 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1247 ///
1248 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1249 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1250 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1251 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1252 ///
1253 /// # Channels
1254 ///
1255 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1256 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1257 /// currently open channels.
1258 ///
1259 /// ```
1260 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1261 /// #
1262 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1263 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1264 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1265 /// for details in channels {
1266 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1267 /// }
1268 /// # }
1269 /// ```
1270 ///
1271 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1272 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1273 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1274 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1275 ///
1276 /// ## Opening Channels
1277 ///
1278 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1279 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1280 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1281 ///
1282 /// ```
1283 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1284 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1285 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1286 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1287 /// #
1288 /// # trait Wallet {
1289 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1290 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1291 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1292 /// # }
1293 /// #
1294 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1295 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1296 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1297 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1298 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1299 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1300 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1301 /// }
1302 ///
1303 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1304 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1305 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1306 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1307 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1308 ///     } => {
1309 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1310 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1311 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1312 ///         );
1313 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1314 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1315 ///         ) {
1316 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1317 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1318 ///         }
1319 ///     },
1320 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1321 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1322 ///         println!(
1323 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1324 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1325 ///         );
1326 ///     },
1327 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1328 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1329 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1330 ///     },
1331 ///     // ...
1332 /// #     _ => {},
1333 /// });
1334 /// # }
1335 /// ```
1336 ///
1337 /// ## Accepting Channels
1338 ///
1339 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1340 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1341 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1342 ///
1343 /// ```
1344 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1345 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1346 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1347 /// #
1348 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1349 /// #     // ...
1350 /// #     unimplemented!()
1351 /// # }
1352 /// #
1353 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1354 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1355 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1356 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1357 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1358 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1359 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1360 ///             ) {
1361 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1362 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1363 ///             }
1364 ///             return;
1365 ///         }
1366 ///
1367 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1368 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1369 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1370 ///         ) {
1371 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1372 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1373 ///         }
1374 ///     },
1375 ///     // ...
1376 /// #     _ => {},
1377 /// });
1378 /// # }
1379 /// ```
1380 ///
1381 /// ## Closing Channels
1382 ///
1383 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1384 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1385 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1386 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1387 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1388 ///
1389 /// ```
1390 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1391 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1392 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1393 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1394 /// #
1395 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1396 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1397 /// # ) {
1398 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1399 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1400 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1401 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1402 /// }
1403 ///
1404 /// // On the event processing thread
1405 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1406 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1407 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1408 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1409 ///     },
1410 ///     // ...
1411 /// #     _ => {},
1412 /// });
1413 /// # }
1414 /// ```
1415 ///
1416 /// # Payments
1417 ///
1418 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1419 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1420 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1421 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1422 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1423 /// HTLCs.
1424 ///
1425 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1426 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1427 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1428 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1429 ///
1430 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1431 ///
1432 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1433 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1434 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1435 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1436 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1437 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1438 ///
1439 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1440 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1441 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1442 ///
1443 /// ```
1444 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1445 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1446 /// #
1447 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1448 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1449 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1450 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1451 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1452 /// ) {
1453 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1454 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1455 ///         payment_hash
1456 ///     },
1457 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1458 /// };
1459 ///
1460 /// // On the event processing thread
1461 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1462 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1463 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1464 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1465 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1466 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1467 ///         },
1468 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1469 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1470 ///         },
1471 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1472 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1473 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1474 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1475 ///         },
1476 ///         // ...
1477 /// #         _ => {},
1478 ///     },
1479 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1480 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1481 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1482 ///     },
1483 ///     // ...
1484 /// #     _ => {},
1485 /// });
1486 /// # }
1487 /// ```
1488 ///
1489 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1490 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1491 ///
1492 /// ```
1493 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1494 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1495 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1496 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1497 /// #
1498 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1499 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1500 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1501 /// # ) {
1502 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1503 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1504 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1505 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1506 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1507 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1508 /// ) {
1509 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1510 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1511 /// }
1512 ///
1513 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1514 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1515 /// assert!(
1516 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1517 ///         details,
1518 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1519 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1520 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1521 ///             ..
1522 ///         }
1523 ///     )).is_some()
1524 /// );
1525 ///
1526 /// // On the event processing thread
1527 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1528 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1529 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1530 ///     // ...
1531 /// #     _ => {},
1532 /// });
1533 /// # }
1534 /// ```
1535 ///
1536 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1537 ///
1538 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1539 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1540 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1541 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1542 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1543 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1544 ///
1545 /// ```
1546 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1547 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1548 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1549 /// #
1550 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1551 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1552 /// let offer = channel_manager
1553 ///     .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1554 /// # ;
1555 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1556 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1557 /// # let offer = builder
1558 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1559 ///     .build()?;
1560 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1561 ///
1562 /// // On the event processing thread
1563 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1564 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1565 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1566 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1567 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1568 ///         },
1569 ///         PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1570 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1571 ///         },
1572 ///         // ...
1573 /// #         _ => {},
1574 ///     },
1575 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1576 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1577 ///     },
1578 ///     // ...
1579 /// #     _ => {},
1580 /// });
1581 /// # Ok(())
1582 /// # }
1583 /// ```
1584 ///
1585 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1586 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1587 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1588 ///
1589 /// ```
1590 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1591 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1592 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1593 /// #
1594 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1595 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1596 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1597 /// # ) {
1598 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1599 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1600 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1601 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1602 /// ) {
1603 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1604 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1605 /// }
1606 ///
1607 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1608 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1609 /// assert!(
1610 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1611 ///         details,
1612 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1613 ///     )).is_some()
1614 /// );
1615 ///
1616 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1617 /// assert!(
1618 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1619 ///         details,
1620 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1621 ///     )).is_some()
1622 /// );
1623 ///
1624 /// // On the event processing thread
1625 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1626 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1627 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1628 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1629 ///     // ...
1630 /// #     _ => {},
1631 /// });
1632 /// # }
1633 /// ```
1634 ///
1635 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1636 ///
1637 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1638 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1639 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1640 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1641 ///
1642 /// ```
1643 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1644 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1645 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1646 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1647 /// #
1648 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1649 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1650 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1651 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1652 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1653 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1654 /// let refund = channel_manager
1655 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1656 ///         "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1657 ///         max_total_routing_fee_msat
1658 ///     )?
1659 /// # ;
1660 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1661 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1662 /// # let refund = builder
1663 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1664 ///     .build()?;
1665 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1666 ///
1667 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1668 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1669 /// assert!(
1670 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1671 ///         details,
1672 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1673 ///     )).is_some()
1674 /// );
1675 ///
1676 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1677 /// assert!(
1678 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1679 ///         details,
1680 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1681 ///     )).is_some()
1682 /// );
1683 ///
1684 /// // On the event processing thread
1685 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1686 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1687 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1688 ///     // ...
1689 /// #     _ => {},
1690 /// });
1691 /// # Ok(())
1692 /// # }
1693 /// ```
1694 ///
1695 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1696 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1697 ///
1698 /// ```
1699 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1700 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1701 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1702 /// #
1703 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1704 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1705 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1706 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1707 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1708 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1709 ///         payment_hash
1710 ///     },
1711 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1712 /// };
1713 ///
1714 /// // On the event processing thread
1715 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1716 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1717 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1718 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1719 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1720 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1721 ///         },
1722 ///             PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1723 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1724 ///             },
1725 ///         // ...
1726 /// #         _ => {},
1727 ///     },
1728 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1729 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1730 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1731 ///     },
1732 ///     // ...
1733 /// #     _ => {},
1734 /// });
1735 /// # }
1736 /// ```
1737 ///
1738 /// # Persistence
1739 ///
1740 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1741 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1742 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1743 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1744 ///
1745 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1746 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1747 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1748 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1749 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1750 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1751 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1752 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1753 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1754 ///
1755 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1756 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1757 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1758 ///
1759 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1760 ///
1761 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1762 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1763 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1764 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1765 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1766 ///
1767 /// # DoS Mitigation
1768 ///
1769 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1770 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1771 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1772 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1773 ///
1774 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1775 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1776 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1777 ///
1778 /// # Type Aliases
1779 ///
1780 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1781 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1782 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1783 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1784 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1785 ///
1786 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1787 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1788 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1789 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1790 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1791 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1792 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1793 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1794 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1795 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1796 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1797 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1798 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1799 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1800 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1801 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1802 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1803 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1804 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1805 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1806 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1807 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1808 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1809 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1810 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1811 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1812 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1813 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1814 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1815 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1816 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1817 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1818 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1819 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1820 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1821 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1822 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1823 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1824 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1825 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1826 //
1827 // Lock order:
1828 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1829 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1830 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1831 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1832 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1833 //
1834 // Lock order tree:
1835 //
1836 // `pending_offers_messages`
1837 //
1838 // `total_consistency_lock`
1839 //  |
1840 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1841 //  |   |
1842 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1843 //  |
1844 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1845 //  |
1846 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1847 //      |
1848 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1849 //          |
1850 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1851 //          |
1852 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1853 //              |
1854 //              |__`peer_state`
1855 //                  |
1856 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1857 //                  |
1858 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1859 //                  |
1860 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1861 //                  |
1862 //                  |__`best_block`
1863 //                  |
1864 //                  |__`pending_events`
1865 //                      |
1866 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1867 //
1868 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1869 where
1870         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1871         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1872         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1873         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1874         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1875         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1876         R::Target: Router,
1877         L::Target: Logger,
1878 {
1879         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1880         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1881         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1882         chain_monitor: M,
1883         tx_broadcaster: T,
1884         #[allow(unused)]
1885         router: R,
1886
1887         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1888         #[cfg(test)]
1889         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1890         #[cfg(not(test))]
1891         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1892         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1893
1894         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1895         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1896         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1897         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1898         ///
1899         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1900         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1901
1902         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1903         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1904         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1905         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1906         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1907         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1908         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1909         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1910         ///
1911         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1912         ///
1913         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1914         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1915
1916         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1917         ///
1918         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1919         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1920         /// and via the classic SCID.
1921         ///
1922         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1923         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1924         ///
1925         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926         #[cfg(test)]
1927         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1928         #[cfg(not(test))]
1929         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1930         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1931         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1932         ///
1933         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1934         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1935
1936         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1937         ///
1938         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1939         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1940         /// and via the classic SCID.
1941         ///
1942         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1943         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1944         ///
1945         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1947
1948         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1949         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1950         ///
1951         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1952         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1953
1954         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1955         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1956         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1957         /// active channel list on load.
1958         ///
1959         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1960         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1961
1962         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1963         ///
1964         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1965         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1966         /// the handling of the events.
1967         ///
1968         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1969         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1970         ///
1971         /// TODO:
1972         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1973         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1974         /// would break backwards compatability.
1975         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1976         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1977         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1978         ///
1979         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1980         #[cfg(not(test))]
1981         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1982         #[cfg(test)]
1983         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1984
1985         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1986         ///
1987         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1988         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1989         /// confirmation depth.
1990         ///
1991         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1992         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1993         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1994         ///
1995         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1996         #[cfg(test)]
1997         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1998         #[cfg(not(test))]
1999         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2000
2001         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2002
2003         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2004
2005         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2006         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2007         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2008         ///
2009         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2010         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2011
2012         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2013         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2014         /// keeping additional state.
2015         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2016
2017         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2018         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2019         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2020         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2021
2022         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2023         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2024         ///
2025         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2026         /// are currently open with that peer.
2027         ///
2028         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2029         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2030         /// channels.
2031         ///
2032         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2033         ///
2034         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2035         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2036         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2037         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2038         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2039
2040         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2041         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2042         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2043         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2044         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2045         ///
2046         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2047         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2048         ///
2049         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2050         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2051         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2052         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2053         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2054
2055         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2056         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2057
2058         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2059         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2060         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2061         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2062         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2063         ///
2064         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2065         ///
2066         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2067         ///
2068         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2069         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2070         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2071         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2072         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2073         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2074         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2075         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2076         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2077         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2078         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2079         ///
2080         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2081         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2082         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2083
2084         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2085
2086         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2087         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2088
2089         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2090
2091         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2092         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2093
2094         entropy_source: ES,
2095         node_signer: NS,
2096         signer_provider: SP,
2097
2098         logger: L,
2099 }
2100
2101 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2102 ///
2103 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2104 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2105 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2106 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2107 pub struct ChainParameters {
2108         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2109         pub network: Network,
2110
2111         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2112         ///
2113         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2114         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2115 }
2116
2117 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2118 #[must_use]
2119 enum NotifyOption {
2120         DoPersist,
2121         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2122         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2123 }
2124
2125 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2126 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2127 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2128 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2129 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2130 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2131 ///
2132 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2133 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2134 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2135 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2136         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2137         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2138         should_persist: F,
2139         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2140         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2141 }
2142
2143 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2144         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2145         /// events to handle.
2146         ///
2147         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2148         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2149         /// isn't ideal.
2150         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2151                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2152         }
2153
2154         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2155         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2156                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2157                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2158
2159                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2160                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2161                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2162                         should_persist: move || {
2163                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2164                                 // processing and return that.
2165                                 let notify = persist_check();
2166                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2167                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2168                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2169                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2170                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2171                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2172                                 }
2173                         },
2174                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2175                 }
2176         }
2177
2178         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2179         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2180         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2181         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2182         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2183                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184
2185                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2186                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2187                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2188                         should_persist: persist_check,
2189                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2190                 }
2191         }
2192 }
2193
2194 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2195         fn drop(&mut self) {
2196                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2197                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2198                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2199                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2200                         },
2201                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2202                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2203                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2204                 }
2205         }
2206 }
2207
2208 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2209 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2210 ///
2211 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2212 ///
2213 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2214 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2215 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2216 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2217 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2218
2219 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2220 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2221 ///
2222 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2223 ///
2224 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2225 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2226 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2227 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2228 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2229 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2230 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2231 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2232 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2233 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2234 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2235 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2236 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2237
2238 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2239 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2240 /// this value.
2241 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2242 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2243 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2244 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2245
2246 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2247 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2248 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2249 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2250 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2251 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2252 #[allow(dead_code)]
2253 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2254
2255 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2256 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2257 #[allow(dead_code)]
2258 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2259
2260 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2261 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2262
2263 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2264 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2265 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2266
2267 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2268 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2269 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2270
2271 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2272 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2273 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2274 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2275
2276 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2277 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2278 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2279
2280 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2281 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2282 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2283
2284 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2285 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2286 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2287         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2288         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2289         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2290         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2291         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2292         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2293         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2294         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2295 }
2296
2297 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2298 /// to better separate parameters.
2299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2300 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2301         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2302         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2303         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2304         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2305         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2306         pub features: InitFeatures,
2307         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2308         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2309         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2310         ///
2311         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2312         ///
2313         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2314         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2315         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2316         /// payments to us through this channel.
2317         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2318         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2319         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2320         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2321         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2322         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2323         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2324 }
2325
2326 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2327 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2328 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2329         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2330         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2331         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2332         /// lifetime of the channel.
2333         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2334         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2335         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2336         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2337         /// our counterparty already.
2338         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2339         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2340         ///
2341         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2342         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2343         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2344         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2345         ///
2346         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2347         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2348         ///
2349         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2350         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2351         ///
2352         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2353         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2354         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2355         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2356         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2357         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2358         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2359         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2360         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2361         /// `Some(0)`).
2362         ///
2363         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2364         ///
2365         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2366         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2367         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2368         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2369         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2370         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2371         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2372         ///
2373         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2374         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2375         ///
2376         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2377         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2378         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2379         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2380         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2381         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2382         /// this value on chain.
2383         ///
2384         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2385         ///
2386         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2387         ///
2388         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2389         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2390         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2391         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2392         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2393         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2394         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2395         ///
2396         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2397         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2398         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2399         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2400         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2401         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2402         ///
2403         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2404         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2405         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2406         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2407         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2408         ///
2409         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2410         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2411         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2412         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2413         ///
2414         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2415         pub balance_msat: u64,
2416         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2417         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2418         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2419         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2420         ///
2421         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2422         ///
2423         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2424         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2425         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2426         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2427         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2428         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2429         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2430         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2431         ///
2432         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2433         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2434         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2435         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2436         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2437         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2438         /// route which is valid.
2439         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2440         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2441         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2442         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2443         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2444         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2445         ///
2446         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2447         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2448         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2449         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2450         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2451         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2452         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2453         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2454         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2455         ///
2456         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2457         ///
2458         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2459         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2460         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2461         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2462         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2463         ///
2464         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2465         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2466         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2467         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2468         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2469         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2470         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2471         ///
2472         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2473         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2474         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2475         pub is_outbound: bool,
2476         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2477         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2478         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2479         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2480         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2481         ///
2482         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2483         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2484         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2485         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2486         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2487         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2488         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2489         ///
2490         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2491         pub is_usable: bool,
2492         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2493         pub is_public: bool,
2494         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2495         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2496         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2497         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2498         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2499         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2500         ///
2501         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2502         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2503         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2504         ///
2505         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2506         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2507         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2508         ///
2509         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2510         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2511 }
2512
2513 impl ChannelDetails {
2514         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2515         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2516         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2517         ///
2518         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2519         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2520         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2521                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2522         }
2523
2524         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2525         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2526         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2527         ///
2528         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2529         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2530         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2531                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2532         }
2533
2534         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2535                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2536                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2537         ) -> Self
2538         where
2539                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2540                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2541         {
2542                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2543                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2544                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2545                 ChannelDetails {
2546                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2547                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2548                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2549                                 features: latest_features,
2550                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2551                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2552                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2553                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2554                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2555                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2556                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2557                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2558                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2559                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2560                         },
2561                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2562                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2563                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2564                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2565                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2566                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2567                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2568                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2569                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2570                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2571                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2572                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2573                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2574                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2575                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2576                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2577                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2578                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2579                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2580                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2581                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2582                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2583                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2584                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2585                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2586                         config: Some(context.config()),
2587                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2588                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2589                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2590                 }
2591         }
2592 }
2593
2594 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2595 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2596 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2597 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2598 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2599 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2600 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2601 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2602         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2603         NotShuttingDown,
2604         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2605         ShutdownInitiated,
2606         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2607         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2608         ResolvingHTLCs,
2609         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2610         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2611         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2612         /// to drop the channel.
2613         ShutdownComplete,
2614 }
2615
2616 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2617 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2618 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2619 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2620         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2621         AwaitingInvoice {
2622                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2623                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2624                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2625         },
2626         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2627         Pending {
2628                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2629                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2630                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2631                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2632                 /// abandoned.
2633                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2634                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2635                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2636                 total_msat: u64,
2637         },
2638         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2639         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2640         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2641         Fulfilled {
2642                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2643                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2644                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2645                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2646                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2647                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2648         },
2649         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2650         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2651         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2652         Abandoned {
2653                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2654                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2655                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2656                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2657                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2658         },
2659 }
2660
2661 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2662 ///
2663 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2664 #[derive(Clone)]
2665 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2666         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2667         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2668         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2669         /// route hints.
2670         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2671         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2672         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2673 }
2674
2675 macro_rules! handle_error {
2676         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2677                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2678                 // entering the macro.
2679                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2680                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2681
2682                 match $internal {
2683                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2684                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2685                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2686
2687                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2688                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2689                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2690                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2691                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2692                                         );
2693                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2694
2695                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2696                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2697                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2698                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2699                                                         msg: update
2700                                                 });
2701                                         }
2702                                 } else {
2703                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2704                                 }
2705
2706                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2707                                 } else {
2708                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2709                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2710                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2711                                         });
2712                                 }
2713
2714                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2715                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2716                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2717                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2718                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2719                                         }
2720                                 }
2721
2722                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2723                                 Err(err)
2724                         },
2725                 }
2726         } };
2727 }
2728
2729 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2730         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2731                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2732                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2733                 }
2734                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2735                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2736                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2737                 } else {
2738                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2739                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2740                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2741                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2742                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2743                         // stage.
2744                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2745                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2746                 }
2747                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2748         }}
2749 }
2750
2751 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2752 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2753         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2754                 match $err {
2755                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2756                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2757                         },
2758                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2759                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2760                         },
2761                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2762                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2763                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2764                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2765                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2766                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2767                                 let err =
2768                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2769                                 (true, err)
2770                         },
2771                 }
2772         };
2773         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2774                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2775         };
2776         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2777                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2778         };
2779         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2780                 match $channel_phase {
2781                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2782                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2783                         },
2784                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2785                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2786                         },
2787                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2788                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2789                         },
2790                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2791                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2792                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2793                         },
2794                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2795                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2796                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2797                         },
2798                 }
2799         };
2800 }
2801
2802 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2803         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2804                 match $res {
2805                         Ok(res) => res,
2806                         Err(e) => {
2807                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2808                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2809                                 if drop {
2810                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2811                                 }
2812                                 break Err(res);
2813                         }
2814                 }
2815         }
2816 }
2817
2818 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2819         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2820                 match $res {
2821                         Ok(res) => res,
2822                         Err(e) => {
2823                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2824                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2825                                 if drop {
2826                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2827                                 }
2828                                 return Err(res);
2829                         }
2830                 }
2831         }
2832 }
2833
2834 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2835         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2836                 {
2837                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2838                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2839                         channel
2840                 }
2841         }
2842 }
2843
2844 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2845         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2846                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2847                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2848                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2849                 });
2850                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2851                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2852                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2853                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2854                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2855                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2856                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2857                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2858                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2859                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2860                 }
2861         }}
2862 }
2863
2864 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2865         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2866                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2867                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2868                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2869                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2870                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2871                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2872                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2873                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2874                         }, None));
2875                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2876                 }
2877         }
2878 }
2879
2880 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2881         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2882                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2883                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2884                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2885                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2886                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2887                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2888                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2889                         }, None));
2890                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2891                 }
2892         }
2893 }
2894
2895 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2896         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2897                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2898                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2899                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2900                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2901                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2902                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2903                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2904                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2905                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2906                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2907                         // now.
2908                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2909                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2910                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2911                                         msg,
2912                                 })
2913                         } else { None }
2914                 } else { None };
2915
2916                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2917                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2918
2919                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2920                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2921                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2922                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2923                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2924                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2925                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2926                 }
2927
2928                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2929                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2930                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2931                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2932
2933                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2934                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2935                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2936                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2937                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2938                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2939                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2940                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2941                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2942                                 ));
2943                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2944                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2945                                 } else {
2946                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2947                                 }
2948                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2949                         } else {
2950                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2951                         }
2952
2953                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2954                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2955                         if batch_completed {
2956                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2957                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2959                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2960                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2961                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2962                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2963                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2964                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2965                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2966                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2967                                                 }
2968                                         }
2969                                 }
2970                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2971                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2972                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2973                                 }
2974                         }
2975                 }
2976
2977                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2978
2979                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2980                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2981                 }
2982                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2983                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2984                 }
2985                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2986                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2987                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2988                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2989                 }
2990         } }
2991 }
2992
2993 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2994         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2995                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2996                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2997                 match $update_res {
2998                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2999                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3000                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3001                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
3002                         },
3003                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3004                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3005                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
3006                                 false
3007                         },
3008                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3009                                 $completed;
3010                                 true
3011                         },
3012                 }
3013         } };
3014         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3015                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3016                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3017         };
3018         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3019                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3020                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3021                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3022                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3023                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3024                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3025                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3026                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3027                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3028                         });
3029                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3030                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3031                         {
3032                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3033                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3034                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3035                                 }
3036                         })
3037         } };
3038 }
3039
3040 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3041         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3042                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3043                 while !processed_all_events {
3044                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3045                                 return;
3046                         }
3047
3048                         let mut result;
3049
3050                         {
3051                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3052                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3053                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3054
3055                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3056                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3057                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3058
3059                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3060                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3061                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3062                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3063                                 }
3064                         }
3065
3066                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3067                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3068                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3069                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3070                         }
3071
3072                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3073
3074                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3075                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3076                                 $handle_event;
3077                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3078                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3079                                 }
3080                         }
3081
3082                         {
3083                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3084                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3085                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3086                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3087                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3088                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3089                         }
3090
3091                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3092                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3093                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3094                                 processed_all_events = false;
3095                         }
3096
3097                         match result {
3098                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3099                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3100                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3101                                 },
3102                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3103                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3104                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3105                         }
3106                 }
3107         }
3108 }
3109
3110 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3111 where
3112         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3113         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3114         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3115         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3116         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3117         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3118         R::Target: Router,
3119         L::Target: Logger,
3120 {
3121         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3122         ///
3123         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3124         ///
3125         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3126         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3127         ///
3128         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3129         ///
3130         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3131         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3132         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3133         /// more details.
3134         ///
3135         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3136         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3137         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3138         pub fn new(
3139                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3140                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3141                 current_timestamp: u32,
3142         ) -> Self {
3143                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3144                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3145                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3146                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3147                 ChannelManager {
3148                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3149                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3150                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3151                         chain_monitor,
3152                         tx_broadcaster,
3153                         router,
3154
3155                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3156
3157                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3158                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3159                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3160                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3161                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3162                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3163                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3165                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3166
3167                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3168                         secp_ctx,
3169
3170                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3171                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3172
3173                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3174
3175                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3176
3177                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3178
3179                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3180                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3181                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3182                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3183                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3184                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3185                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3186                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3187
3188                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3189                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3190
3191                         entropy_source,
3192                         node_signer,
3193                         signer_provider,
3194
3195                         logger,
3196                 }
3197         }
3198
3199         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3200         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3201                 &self.default_configuration
3202         }
3203
3204         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3205                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3206                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3207                 let mut i = 0;
3208                 loop {
3209                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3210                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3211                         } else {
3212                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3213                         }
3214                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3215                                 break;
3216                         }
3217                         i += 1;
3218                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3219                 }
3220                 outbound_scid_alias
3221         }
3222
3223         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3224         ///
3225         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3226         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3227         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3228         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3229         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3230         ///
3231         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3232         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3233         ///
3234         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3235         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3236         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3237         ///
3238         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3239         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3240         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3241         ///
3242         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3243         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3244         ///
3245         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3246         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3247         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3248         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3249         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3250         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3251         ///
3252         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3253         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3254         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3255         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3256                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3257                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3258                 }
3259
3260                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3261                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3262                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3263
3264                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3265
3266                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3267                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3268
3269                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3270
3271                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3272                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3273                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3274                         }
3275                 }
3276
3277                 let channel = {
3278                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3279                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3280                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3281                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3282                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3283                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3284                         {
3285                                 Ok(res) => res,
3286                                 Err(e) => {
3287                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3288                                         return Err(e);
3289                                 },
3290                         }
3291                 };
3292                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3293
3294                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3295                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3296                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3297                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3298                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3299                                 } else {
3300                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3301                                 }
3302                         },
3303                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3304                 }
3305
3306                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3307                         node_id: their_network_key,
3308                         msg: res,
3309                 });
3310                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3311         }
3312
3313         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3314                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3315                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3316                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3317                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3318                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3319                 // the same channel.
3320                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3321                 {
3322                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3323                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3324                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3325                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3326                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3327                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3328                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3329                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3330                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3331                                                 _ => None,
3332                                         })
3333                                         .filter(f)
3334                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3335                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3336                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3337                                         })
3338                                 );
3339                         }
3340                 }
3341                 res
3342         }
3343
3344         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3345         /// more information.
3346         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3347                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3348                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3349                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3350                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3351                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3352                 // the same channel.
3353                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3354                 {
3355                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3356                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3357                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3358                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3359                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3360                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3361                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3362                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3363                                         res.push(details);
3364                                 }
3365                         }
3366                 }
3367                 res
3368         }
3369
3370         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3371         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3372         ///
3373         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3374         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3375         /// are.
3376         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3377                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3378                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3379                 // really wanted anyway.
3380                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3381         }
3382
3383         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3384         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3385                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3386                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3387
3388                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3389                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3390                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3391                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3392                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3393                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3394                         };
3395                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3396                                 .iter()
3397                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3398                                 .map(context_to_details)
3399                                 .collect();
3400                 }
3401                 vec![]
3402         }
3403
3404         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3405         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3406         ///
3407         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3408         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3409         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3410         ///
3411         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3412         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3413                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3414                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3415                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3416                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3417                                 },
3418                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3419                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3420                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3421                                 },
3422                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3423                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3424                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3425                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3426                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3427                                         })
3428                                 },
3429                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3430                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3431                                 },
3432                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3433                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3434                                 },
3435                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3436                         })
3437                         .collect()
3438         }
3439
3440         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3441                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3442
3443                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3444                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3445
3446                 {
3447                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3448
3449                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3450                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3451
3452                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3453                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3454
3455                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3456                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3457                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3458                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3459                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3460                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3461                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3462                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3463
3464                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3465                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3466                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3467                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3468                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3469                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3470                                                 });
3471
3472                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3473                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3474
3475                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3476                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3477                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3478                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3479                                                 }
3480                                         } else {
3481                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3482                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3483                                         }
3484                                 },
3485                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3486                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3487                                                 err: format!(
3488                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3489                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3490                                                 )
3491                                         });
3492                                 },
3493                         }
3494                 }
3495
3496                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3497                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3498                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3499                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3500                 }
3501
3502                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3503                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3504                 }
3505
3506                 Ok(())
3507         }
3508
3509         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3510         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3511         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3512         ///
3513         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3514         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3515         ///    fee estimate.
3516         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3517         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3518         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3519         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3520         ///
3521         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3522         ///
3523         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3524         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3525         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3526         /// channel.
3527         ///
3528         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3529         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3530         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3531         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3532         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3533                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3534         }
3535
3536         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3537         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3538         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3539         ///
3540         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3541         /// the channel being closed or not:
3542         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3543         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3544         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3545         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3546         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3547         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3548         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3549         ///
3550         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3551         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3552         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3553         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3554         ///
3555         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3556         ///
3557         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3558         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3559         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3560         /// channel.
3561         ///
3562         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3563         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3564         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3565         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3566                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3567         }
3568
3569         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3570                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3571                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3572                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3573                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3574                 }
3575
3576                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3577                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3578                 );
3579
3580                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3581                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3582                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3583                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3584                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3585                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3586                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3587                 }
3588                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3589                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3590                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3591                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3592                         // ignore the result here.
3593                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3594                 }
3595                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3596                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3597                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3598                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3599                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3600                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3601                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3602                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3603                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3604                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3605                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3606                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3607                                         }
3608                                 }
3609                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3610                         }
3611                         debug_assert!(
3612                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3613                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3614                         );
3615                 }
3616
3617                 {
3618                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3619                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3620                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3621                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3622                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3623                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3624                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3625                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3626                         }, None));
3627
3628                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3629                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3630                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3631                                 }, None));
3632                         }
3633                 }
3634                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3635                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3636                 }
3637         }
3638
3639         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3640         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3641         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3642         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3643                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3644                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3645                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3646                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3647                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3648                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3649                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3650                         } else {
3651                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3652                         };
3653                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3654                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3655                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3656                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3657                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3658                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3659                                 match chan_phase {
3660                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3661                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3662                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3663                                         },
3664                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3665                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3666                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3667                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3668                                         },
3669                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3670                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3671                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3672                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3673                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3674                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3675                                         },
3676                                 }
3677                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3678                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3679                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3680                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3681                                 // events anyway.
3682                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3683                         } else {
3684                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3685                         }
3686                 };
3687                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3688                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3689                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3690                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3691                                 msg: update
3692                         });
3693                 }
3694
3695                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3696         }
3697
3698         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3699                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3700                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3701                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3702                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3703                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3704                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3705                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3706                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3707                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3708                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3709                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3710                                                         },
3711                                                 }
3712                                         );
3713                                 }
3714                                 Ok(())
3715                         },
3716                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3717                 }
3718         }
3719
3720         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3721         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3722         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3723         /// channel.
3724         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3725         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3726                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3727         }
3728
3729         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3730         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3731         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3732         ///
3733         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3734         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3735         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3736         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3737                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3738         }
3739
3740         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3741         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3742         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3743                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3744                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3745                 }
3746         }
3747
3748         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3749         /// local transaction(s).
3750         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3751                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3752                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3753                 }
3754         }
3755
3756         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3757                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3758         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3759                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3760                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3761                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3762                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3763                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3764                 }
3765                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3766                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3767                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3768                         // we don't have the channel here.
3769                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3770                 }
3771
3772                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3773                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3774                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3775                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3776                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3777                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3778                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3779                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3780                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3781                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3782                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3783                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3784                         } else {
3785                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3786                         }
3787                 }
3788                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3789                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3790                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3791                 }
3792                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3793                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3794                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3795                 }
3796
3797                 Ok(())
3798         }
3799
3800         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3801         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3802         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3803                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3804         ) -> Option<X> {
3805                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3806                         None => return None,
3807                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3808                 };
3809                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3810                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3811                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3812                         return None;
3813                 }
3814                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3815                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3816                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3817                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3818                 ) {
3819                         None => None,
3820                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3821                 }
3822         }
3823
3824         fn can_forward_htlc(
3825                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3826         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3827                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3828                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3829                 }) {
3830                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3831                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3832                         None => {
3833                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3834                                 // intercept forward.
3835                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3836                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3837                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3838                                 {} else {
3839                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3840                                 }
3841                         }
3842                 }
3843
3844                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3845                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3846                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3847                 ) {
3848                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3849                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3850                         }).flatten();
3851                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3852                 }
3853
3854                 Ok(())
3855         }
3856
3857         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3858                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3859                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3860                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3861         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3862                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3863                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3864                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3865                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3866                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3867                         }
3868                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3869                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3870                         }
3871                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3872                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3873                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3874                         }
3875                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3876                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3877                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3878                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3879                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3880                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3881                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3882                         // instead.
3883                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3884                 }
3885
3886                 log_info!(
3887                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3888                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3889                 );
3890                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3891                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3892                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3893                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3894                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3895                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3896                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3897                         });
3898                 }
3899
3900                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3901                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3902                 } else {
3903                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3904                 };
3905                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3906                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3907                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3908                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3909                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3910                 })
3911         }
3912
3913         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3914                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3915         ) -> Result<
3916                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3917         > {
3918                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3919                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3920                 )?;
3921
3922                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3923                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3924                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3925                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3926                 };
3927
3928                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3929                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3930                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3931                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3932                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3933                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3934                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3935                         )
3936                 })?;
3937
3938                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3939         }
3940
3941         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3942                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3943                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3944                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3945         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3946                 macro_rules! return_err {
3947                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3948                                 {
3949                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3950                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3951                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3952                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3953                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3954                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3955                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3956                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3957                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3958                                                         }
3959                                                 ))
3960                                         }
3961                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3962                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3963                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3964                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3965                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3966                                         }));
3967                                 }
3968                         }
3969                 }
3970                 match decoded_hop {
3971                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3972                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3973                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3974                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3975                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3976                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3977                                 {
3978                                         Ok(info) => {
3979                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3980                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3981                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3982                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3983                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3984                                         },
3985                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3986                                 }
3987                         },
3988                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3989                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3990                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3991                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3992                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3993                                 }
3994                         }
3995                 }
3996         }
3997
3998         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3999         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4000         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4001         ///
4002         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4003         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4004         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4005         ///
4006         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4007         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4008         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4009                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4010                         return Err(LightningError {
4011                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4012                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4013                         });
4014                 }
4015                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4016                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4017                 }
4018                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4019                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4020                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4021         }
4022
4023         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4024         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4025         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4026         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4027         ///
4028         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4029         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4030         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4031         ///
4032         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4033         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4034         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4035                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4036                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4037                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4038                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4039                         Some(id) => id,
4040                 };
4041
4042                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4043         }
4044
4045         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4046                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4047                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4048                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4049
4050                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4051                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4052                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4053                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4054                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4055                 };
4056
4057                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4058                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4059                         short_channel_id,
4060                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4061                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4062                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4063                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4064                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4065                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4066                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4067                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4068                 };
4069                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4070                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4071                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4072                 // channel.
4073                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4074
4075                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4076                         signature: sig,
4077                         contents: unsigned
4078                 })
4079         }
4080
4081         #[cfg(test)]
4082         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4083                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4084                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4085                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4086                         session_priv_bytes
4087                 })
4088         }
4089
4090         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4091                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4092                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4093                         session_priv_bytes
4094                 } = args;
4095                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4096                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4097                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4098                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4099
4100                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4101                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4102                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4103                 ).map_err(|e| {
4104                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4105                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4106                         e
4107                 })?;
4108
4109                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4110                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4111                                 None => {
4112                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4113                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4114                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4115                                 },
4116                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4117                         };
4118
4119                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4120                         log_trace!(logger,
4121                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4122                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4123
4124                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4125                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4126                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4127                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4128                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4129                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4130                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4131                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4132                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4133                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4134                                                 }
4135                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4136                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4137                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4138                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4139                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4140                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4141                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4142                                                                 payment_id,
4143                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4144                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4145                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4146                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4147                                                                         false => {
4148                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4149                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4150                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4151                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4152                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4153                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4154                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4155                                                                         },
4156                                                                         true => {},
4157                                                                 }
4158                                                         },
4159                                                         None => {},
4160                                                 }
4161                                         },
4162                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4163                                 };
4164                         } else {
4165                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4166                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4167                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4168                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4169                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4170                         }
4171                         return Ok(());
4172                 };
4173                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4174                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4175                         Err(e) => {
4176                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4177                         },
4178                 }
4179         }
4180
4181         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4182         ///
4183         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4184         /// fields for more info.
4185         ///
4186         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4187         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4188         ///
4189         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4190         ///
4191         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4192         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4193         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4194         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4195         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4196         ///
4197         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4198         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4199         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4200         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4201         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4202         ///
4203         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4204         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4205         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4206         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4207         ///
4208         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4209         ///
4210         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4211         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4212         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4213         ///
4214         /// In general, a path may raise:
4215         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4216         ///    node public key) is specified.
4217         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4218         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4219         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4220         ///    relevant updates.
4221         ///
4222         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4223         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4224         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4225         ///
4226         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4227         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4228         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4229         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4230         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4231         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4232         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4233                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4234                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4235                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4236                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4237                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4238                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4239         }
4240
4241         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4242         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4243         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4244                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4245                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4246                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4247                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4248                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4249                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4250                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4251         }
4252
4253         #[cfg(test)]
4254         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4255                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4256                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4257                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4258                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4259                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4260         }
4261
4262         #[cfg(test)]
4263         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4264                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4265                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4266         }
4267
4268         #[cfg(test)]
4269         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4270                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4271         }
4272
4273         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4274                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4275                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4276                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4277                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4278                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4279                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4280                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4281                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4282                         )
4283         }
4284
4285         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4286         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4287         /// retries are exhausted.
4288         ///
4289         /// # Event Generation
4290         ///
4291         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4292         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4293         ///
4294         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4295         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4296         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4297         ///
4298         /// # Requested Invoices
4299         ///
4300         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4301         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4302         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4303         /// once the invoice has been received.
4304         ///
4305         /// # Restart Behavior
4306         ///
4307         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4308         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4309         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4310         ///
4311         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4312         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4313                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4314                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4315         }
4316
4317         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4318         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4319         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4320         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4321         /// never reach the recipient.
4322         ///
4323         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4324         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4325         ///
4326         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4327         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4328         ///
4329         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4330         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4331                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4332                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4333                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4334                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4335                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4336         }
4337
4338         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4339         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4340         ///
4341         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4342         /// payments.
4343         ///
4344         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4345         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4346                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4347                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4348                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4349                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4350                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4351                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4352         }
4353
4354         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4355         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4356         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4357         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4358                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4359                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4360                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4361                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4362                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4363         }
4364
4365         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4366         /// payment probe.
4367         #[cfg(test)]
4368         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4369                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4370         }
4371
4372         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4373         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4374         ///
4375         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4376         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4377                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4378                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4379         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4380                 let payment_params =
4381                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4382
4383                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4384
4385                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4386         }
4387
4388         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4389         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4390         ///
4391         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4392         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4393         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4394         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4395         ///
4396         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4397         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4398         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4399         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4400         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4401         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4402         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4403                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4404         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4405                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4406
4407                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4408                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4409                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4410                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4411
4412                 let route = self
4413                         .router
4414                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4415                         .map_err(|e| {
4416                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4417                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4418                         })?;
4419
4420                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4421
4422                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4423
4424                 for mut path in route.paths {
4425                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4426                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4427                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4428                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4429                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4430                                         break;
4431                                 } else {
4432                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4433                                         log_debug!(
4434                                                 self.logger,
4435                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4436                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4437                                         );
4438                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4439                                         path.hops.pop();
4440                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4441                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4442                                         }
4443                                 }
4444                         }
4445
4446                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4447                                 log_debug!(
4448                                         self.logger,
4449                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4450                                 );
4451                                 continue;
4452                         }
4453
4454                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4455                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4456                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4457                                 }) {
4458                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4459                                         let used_liquidity =
4460                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4461
4462                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4463                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4464                                         {
4465                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4466                                                 continue;
4467                                         } else {
4468                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4469                                         }
4470                                 }
4471                         }
4472
4473                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4474                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4475                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4476                         })?);
4477                 }
4478
4479                 Ok(res)
4480         }
4481
4482         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4483         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4484         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4485                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4486                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4487         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4488                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4489                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4490                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4491
4492                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4493                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4494                 let funding_txo;
4495                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4496                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4497                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4498
4499                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4500                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4501                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4502                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4503                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4504                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4505                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4506                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
4507                                 match funding_res {
4508                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4509                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
4510                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4511                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4512                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4513                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4514                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4515                                                 });
4516                                         },
4517                                 }
4518                         },
4519                         Some(phase) => {
4520                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4521                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4522                                         err: format!(
4523                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4524                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4525                                 })
4526                         },
4527                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4528                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4529                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4530                                 }),
4531                 };
4532
4533                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4534                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4535                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4536                                 msg,
4537                         });
4538                 }
4539                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4540                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4541                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4542                         },
4543                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4544                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4545                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4546                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4547                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4548                                                 let err = format!(
4549                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4550                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4551                                                 );
4552                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4553                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4554                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4555                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4556                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4557                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4558                                         }
4559                                 }
4560                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4561                         }
4562                 }
4563                 Ok(())
4564         }
4565
4566         #[cfg(test)]
4567         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4568                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4569                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4570                 })
4571         }
4572
4573         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4574         ///
4575         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4576         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4577         ///
4578         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4579         /// across the p2p network.
4580         ///
4581         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4582         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4583         ///
4584         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4585         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4586         /// keys per-channel).
4587         ///
4588         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4589         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4590         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4591         ///
4592         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4593         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4594         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4595         ///
4596         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4597         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4598         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4599         /// for more details.
4600         ///
4601         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4602         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4603         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4604                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4605         }
4606
4607         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4608         ///
4609         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4610         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4611         ///
4612         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4613         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4614         /// signature for each channel.
4615         ///
4616         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4617         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4618                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4619                 let mut result = Ok(());
4620
4621                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4622                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4623                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4624                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4625                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4626                                         }));
4627                                 }
4628                         }
4629                 }
4630                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4631                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4632                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4633                         }));
4634                 }
4635                 {
4636                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4637                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4638                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4639                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4640                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4641                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4642                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4643                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4644                         {
4645                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4646                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4647                                 }));
4648                         }
4649                 }
4650
4651                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4652                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4653                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4654                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4655                 } else {
4656                         None
4657                 };
4658                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4659                         match states.entry(txid) {
4660                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4661                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4662                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4663                                         }));
4664                                         None
4665                                 },
4666                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4667                         }
4668                 });
4669                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4670                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4671                                 temporary_channel_id,
4672                                 counterparty_node_id,
4673                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4674                                 is_batch_funding,
4675                                 |chan, tx| {
4676                                         let mut output_index = None;
4677                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4678                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4679                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4680                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4681                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4682                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4683                                                                 });
4684                                                         }
4685                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4686                                                 }
4687                                         }
4688                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4689                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4690                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4691                                                 });
4692                                         }
4693                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4694                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4695                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4696                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4697                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4698                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4699                                         }
4700                                         Ok(outpoint)
4701                                 })
4702                         );
4703                 }
4704                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4705                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4706                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4707                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4708                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4709                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4710                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4711                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4712                         );
4713                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4714                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4715                         );
4716                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4717                         {
4718                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4719                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4720                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4721                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4722                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4723                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4724                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4725                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4726                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4727                                                 });
4728                                 }
4729                         }
4730                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4731                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4732                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4733                         }
4734                 }
4735                 result
4736         }
4737
4738         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4739         ///
4740         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4741         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4742         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4743         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4744         ///
4745         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4746         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4747         ///
4748         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4749         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4750         ///
4751         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4752         ///
4753         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4754         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4755         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4756         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4757         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4758         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4759         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4760         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4761                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4762         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4763                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4764                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4765                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4766                         });
4767                 }
4768
4769                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4770                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4771                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4772                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4773                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4774                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4775
4776                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4777                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4778                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4779                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4780                                 });
4781                         };
4782                 }
4783                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4784                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4785                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4786                                 config.apply(config_update);
4787                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4788                                         continue;
4789                                 }
4790                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4791                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4792                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4793                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4794                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4795                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4796                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4797                                                         msg,
4798                                                 });
4799                                         }
4800                                 }
4801                                 continue;
4802                         } else {
4803                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4804                                 debug_assert!(false);
4805                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4806                                         err: format!(
4807                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4808                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4809                                 });
4810                         };
4811                 }
4812                 Ok(())
4813         }
4814
4815         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4816         ///
4817         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4818         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4819         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4820         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4821         ///
4822         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4823         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4824         ///
4825         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4826         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4827         ///
4828         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4829         ///
4830         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4831         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4832         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4833         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4834         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4835         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4836         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4837         pub fn update_channel_config(
4838                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4839         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4840                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4841         }
4842
4843         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4844         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4845         ///
4846         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4847         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4848         ///
4849         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4850         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4851         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4852         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4853         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4854         ///
4855         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4856         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4857         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4858         /// than expected.
4859         ///
4860         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4861         /// backwards.
4862         ///
4863         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4864         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4865         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4866         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4867         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4868         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4869                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4870
4871                 let next_hop_scid = {
4872                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4873                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4874                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4875                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4876                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4877                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4878                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4879                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4880                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4881                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4882                                                 })
4883                                         }
4884                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4885                                 },
4886                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4887                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4888                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4889                                 }),
4890                                 None => {
4891                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4892                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4893                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4894                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4895                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4896                                                 err: error
4897                                         })
4898                                 }
4899                         }
4900                 };
4901
4902                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4903                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4904                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4905                         })?;
4906
4907                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4908                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4909                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4910                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4911                                 }
4912                         },
4913                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4914                 };
4915                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4916                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4917                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4918                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4919                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4920                 };
4921
4922                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4923                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4924                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4925                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4926                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4927                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4928                 )];
4929                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4930                 Ok(())
4931         }
4932
4933         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4934         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4935         ///
4936         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4937         /// backwards.
4938         ///
4939         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4940         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4941                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4942
4943                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4944                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4945                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4946                         })?;
4947
4948                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4949                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4950                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4951                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4952                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4953                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4954                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4955                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4956                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4957                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4958                         });
4959
4960                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4961                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4962                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4963                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4964
4965                 Ok(())
4966         }
4967
4968         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4969                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4970                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4971
4972                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4973                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4974                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4975                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4976                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4977                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4978                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4979                                                 },
4980                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4981                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4982                                         },
4983                                 }
4984                         } else {
4985                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4986                         }
4987                 };
4988
4989                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4990                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4991                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4992                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4993                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4994                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4995                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4996                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4997                         });
4998                         let (
4999                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5000                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5001                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5002                                 incoming_channel_details
5003                         } else {
5004                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5005                                 continue;
5006                         };
5007
5008                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5009                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5010                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5011                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5012                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5013                                 ) {
5014                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5015                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5016                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5017                                                 continue;
5018                                         },
5019                                 };
5020
5021                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5022                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5023
5024                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5025                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5026                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5027                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5028                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5029                                         )
5030                                 }) {
5031                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5032                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5033                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5034                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5035                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5036                                                         }).flatten()
5037                                                 } else {
5038                                                         None
5039                                                 };
5040                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5041                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5042                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5043                                                 );
5044                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5045                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5046                                                 continue;
5047                                         },
5048                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5049                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5050                                 }
5051
5052                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5053                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5054                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5055                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5056                                         ) {
5057                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5058                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5059                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5060                                                 );
5061                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5062                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5063                                                 continue;
5064                                         }
5065                                 }
5066
5067                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5068                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5069                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5070                                 ) {
5071                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5072                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5073                                         },
5074                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5075                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5076                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5077                                         },
5078                                 }
5079                         }
5080
5081                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5082                         // proposed to as a batch.
5083                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5084                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5085                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5086                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5087                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5088                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5089                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5090                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5091                                         },
5092                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5093                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5094                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5095                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5096                                         },
5097                                 };
5098                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5099                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5100                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5101                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5102                                 }, None));
5103                         }
5104                 }
5105         }
5106
5107         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5108         ///
5109         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5110         /// Will likely generate further events.
5111         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5112                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5113
5114                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5115
5116                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5117                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5118                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5119                 {
5120                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5121                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5122
5123                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5124                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5125                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5126                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5127                                                 () => {
5128                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5129                                                                 match forward_info {
5130                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5131                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5132                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5133                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5134                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5135                                                                                 }
5136                                                                         }) => {
5137                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5138                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5139                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5140                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5141
5142                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5143                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5144                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5145                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5146                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5147                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5148                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5149                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5150                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5151                                                                                                 });
5152
5153                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5154                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5155                                                                                                 } else {
5156                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5157                                                                                                 };
5158
5159                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5160                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5161                                                                                                         reason
5162                                                                                                 ));
5163                                                                                                 continue;
5164                                                                                         }
5165                                                                                 }
5166                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5167                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5168                                                                                                 {
5169                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5170                                                                                                 }
5171                                                                                         }
5172                                                                                 }
5173                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5174                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5175                                                                                                 {
5176                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5177                                                                                                 }
5178                                                                                         }
5179                                                                                 }
5180                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5181                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5182                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5183                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5184                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5185                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5186                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5187                                                                                                 ) {
5188                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5189                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5190                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5191                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5192                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5193                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5194                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5195                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5196                                                                                                         },
5197                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5198                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5199                                                                                                         },
5200                                                                                                 };
5201                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5202                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5203                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5204                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5205                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5206                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5207                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5208                                                                                                                 {
5209                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5210                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5211                                                                                                                 }
5212                                                                                                         },
5213                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5214                                                                                                 }
5215                                                                                         } else {
5216                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5217                                                                                         }
5218                                                                                 } else {
5219                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5220                                                                                 }
5221                                                                         },
5222                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5223                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5224                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5225                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5226                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5227                                                                         }
5228                                                                 }
5229                                                         }
5230                                                 }
5231                                         }
5232                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5233                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5234                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5235                                                 None => {
5236                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5237                                                         continue;
5238                                                 }
5239                                         };
5240                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5241                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5242                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5243                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5244                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5245                                                 continue;
5246                                         }
5247                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5248                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5249                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5250                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5251                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5252                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5253                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5254                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5255                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5256                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5257                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5258                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5259                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5260                                                                         },
5261                                                                 }) => {
5262                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5263                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5264                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5265                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5266                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5267                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5268                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5269                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5270                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5271                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5272                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5273                                                                         });
5274                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5275                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5276                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5277                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5278                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5279                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5280                                                                                 ).ok()
5281                                                                         });
5282                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5283                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5284                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5285                                                                                 &&logger)
5286                                                                         {
5287                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5288                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5289                                                                                 } else {
5290                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5291                                                                                 }
5292                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5293                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5294                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5295                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5296                                                                                 ));
5297                                                                                 continue;
5298                                                                         }
5299                                                                         None
5300                                                                 },
5301                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5302                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5303                                                                 },
5304                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5305                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5306                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5307                                                                 },
5308                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5309                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5310                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5311                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5312                                                                         );
5313                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5314                                                                 },
5315                                                         };
5316                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5317                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5318                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5319                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5320                                                                         } else {
5321                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5322                                                                         }
5323                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5324                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5325                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5326                                                                         continue;
5327                                                                 }
5328                                                         }
5329                                                 }
5330                                         } else {
5331                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5332                                                 continue;
5333                                         }
5334                                 } else {
5335                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5336                                                 match forward_info {
5337                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5338                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5339                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5340                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5341                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5342                                                                 }
5343                                                         }) => {
5344                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5345                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5346                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5347                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5348                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5349                                                                                 requires_blinded_error: _
5350                                                                         } => {
5351                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5352                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5353                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5354                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5355                                                                                         Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5356                                                                         },
5357                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5358                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5359                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5360                                                                         } => {
5361                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5362                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5363                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5364                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5365                                                                                 };
5366                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5367                                                                                         payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5368                                                                         },
5369                                                                         _ => {
5370                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5371                                                                         }
5372                                                                 };
5373                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5374                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5375                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5376                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5377                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5378                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5379                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5380                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5381                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5382                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5383                                                                         },
5384                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5385                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5386                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5387                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5388                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5389                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5390                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5391                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5392                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5393                                                                         onion_payload,
5394                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5395                                                                 };
5396
5397                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5398
5399                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5400                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5401                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5402                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5403                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5404                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5405                                                                                 );
5406                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5407                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5408                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5409                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5410                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5411                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5412                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5413                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5414                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5415                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5416                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5417                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5418                                                                                 ));
5419                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5420                                                                         }
5421                                                                 }
5422                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5423                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5424                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5425                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5426                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5427                                                                 }
5428
5429                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5430                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5431                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5432                                                                                 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5433                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5434                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5435                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5436                                                                                 }
5437                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5438                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5439                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5440                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5441                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5442                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5443                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5444                                                                                                 }
5445                                                                                         });
5446                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5447                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5448                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5449                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5450                                                                                 }
5451                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5452                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5453                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5454                                                                                 }
5455                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5456                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5457                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5458                                                                                         }
5459                                                                                 } else {
5460                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5461                                                                                 }
5462                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5463                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5464                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5465                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5466                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5467                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5468                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5469                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5470                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5471                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5472                                                                                         }
5473                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5474                                                                                 }
5475                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5476                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5477                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5478                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5479                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5480                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5481                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5482                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5483                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5484                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5485                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5486                                                                                         }
5487                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5488                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5489                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5490                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5491                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5492                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5493                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5494                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5495                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5496                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5497                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5498                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5499                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5500                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5501                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5502                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5503                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5504                                                                                         }, None));
5505                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5506                                                                                 } else {
5507                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5508                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5509                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5510                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5511                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5512                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5513                                                                                         }
5514                                                                                 }
5515                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5516                                                                         }}
5517                                                                 }
5518
5519                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5520                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5521                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5522                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5523                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5524                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5525                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5526                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5527                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5528                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5529                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5530                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5531                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5532                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5533                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5534                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5535                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5536                                                                                                         }
5537                                                                                                 };
5538                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5539                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5540                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5541                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5542                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5543                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5544                                                                                                         }
5545                                                                                                 }
5546                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5547                                                                                                         payment_preimage,
5548                                                                                                         payment_data.payment_secret,
5549                                                                                                         payment_context,
5550                                                                                                 );
5551                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5552                                                                                         },
5553                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5554                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5555                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5556                                                                                         }
5557                                                                                 }
5558                                                                         },
5559                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5560                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5561                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5562                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5563                                                                                 }
5564                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5565                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5566                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5567                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5568                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5569                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5570                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5571                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5572                                                                                 } else {
5573                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5574                                                                                                 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5575                                                                                                 payment_data.payment_secret,
5576                                                                                                 payment_context,
5577                                                                                         );
5578                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5579                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5580                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5581                                                                                         }
5582                                                                                 }
5583                                                                         },
5584                                                                 };
5585                                                         },
5586                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5587                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5588                                                         }
5589                                                 }
5590                                         }
5591                                 }
5592                         }
5593                 }
5594
5595                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5596                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5597                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5598                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5599
5600                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5601                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5602                 }
5603                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5604
5605                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5606                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5607                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5608                 // network stack.
5609                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5610
5611                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5612                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5613                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5614         }
5615
5616         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5617         ///
5618         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5619         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5620                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5621
5622                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5623
5624                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5625                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5626                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5627                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5628                 }
5629
5630                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5631                         match event {
5632                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5633                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5634                                         // monitor updating completing.
5635                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5636                                 },
5637                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5638                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5639                                         {
5640                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5641                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5642                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5643                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5644                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5645                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5646                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5647                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5648                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5649                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5650                                                                         } else {
5651                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5652                                                                         }
5653                                                                 },
5654                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5655                                                         }
5656                                                 }
5657                                         }
5658                                         if !updated_chan {
5659                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5660                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5661                                         }
5662                                 },
5663                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5664                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5665                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5666                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5667                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5668                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5669                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5670                                                 } else {
5671                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5672                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5673                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5674                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5675                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5676                                                 }
5677                                         }
5678                                 },
5679                         }
5680                 }
5681                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5682         }
5683
5684         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5685         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5686         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5687                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5688                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5689         }
5690
5691         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5692                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5693
5694                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5695
5696                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5697                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5698                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5699                 }
5700                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5701                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5702                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5703                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5704                 }
5705                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5706                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5707
5708                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5709                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5710         }
5711
5712         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5713         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5714         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5715         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5716         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5717         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5718                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5719                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5720
5721                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5722                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5723
5724                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5725                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5726                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5727                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5728                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5729                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5730                                 ) {
5731                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5732                                                 anchor_feerate
5733                                         } else {
5734                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5735                                         };
5736                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5737                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5738                                 }
5739                         }
5740
5741                         should_persist
5742                 });
5743         }
5744
5745         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5746         ///
5747         /// This currently includes:
5748         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5749         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5750         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5751         ///    the channel.
5752         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5753         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5754         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5755         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5756         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5757         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5758         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5759         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5760         ///
5761         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5762         /// estimate fetches.
5763         ///
5764         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5765         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5766         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5767                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5768                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5769
5770                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5771                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5772
5773                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5774                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5775                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5776                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5777
5778                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5779                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5780                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5781                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5782                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5783                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5784                         | {
5785                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5786                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5787                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5788                                         log_error!(logger,
5789                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5790                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5791                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5792                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5793                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5794                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5795                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5796                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5797                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5798                                                         },
5799                                                 },
5800                                         });
5801                                         false
5802                                 } else {
5803                                         true
5804                                 }
5805                         };
5806
5807                         {
5808                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5809                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5810                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5811                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5812                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5813                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5814                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5815                                                 match phase {
5816                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5817                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5818                                                                         anchor_feerate
5819                                                                 } else {
5820                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5821                                                                 };
5822                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5823                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5824
5825                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5826                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5827                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5828                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5829                                                                 }
5830
5831                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5832                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5833                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5834                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5835                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5836                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5837                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5838                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5839                                                                                 n += 1;
5840                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5841                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5842                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5843                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5844                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5845                                                                                                         msg: update
5846                                                                                                 });
5847                                                                                         }
5848                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5849                                                                                 } else {
5850                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5851                                                                                 }
5852                                                                         },
5853                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5854                                                                                 n += 1;
5855                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5856                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5857                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5858                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5859                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5860                                                                                                         msg: update
5861                                                                                                 });
5862                                                                                         }
5863                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5864                                                                                 } else {
5865                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5866                                                                                 }
5867                                                                         },
5868                                                                         _ => {},
5869                                                                 }
5870
5871                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5872
5873                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5874                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5875                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5876                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5877                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5878                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5879                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5880                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5881                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5882                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5883                                                                                         },
5884                                                                                 },
5885                                                                         });
5886                                                                 }
5887
5888                                                                 true
5889                                                         },
5890                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5891                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5892                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5893                                                         },
5894                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5895                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5896                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5897                                                         },
5898                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5899                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5900                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5901                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5902                                                         },
5903                                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5904                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5905                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5906                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5907                                                         },
5908                                                 }
5909                                         });
5910
5911                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5912                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5913                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5914                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5915                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5916                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5917                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5918                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5919                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5920                                                                         },
5921                                                                 }
5922                                                         );
5923                                                 }
5924                                         }
5925                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5926
5927                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5928                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5929                                         }
5930                                 }
5931                         }
5932
5933                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5934                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5935                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5936                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5937                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5938                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5939                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5940                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5941                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5942                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5943                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5944                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5945                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5946                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5947                                                         let remove_entry = {
5948                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5949                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5950                                                         };
5951                                                         if remove_entry {
5952                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5953                                                         }
5954                                                 },
5955                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5956                                         }
5957                                 }
5958                         }
5959
5960                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5961                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5962                                         // This should be unreachable
5963                                         debug_assert!(false);
5964                                         return false;
5965                                 }
5966                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5967                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5968                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5969                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5970                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5971                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5972                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5973                                         {
5974                                                 return true;
5975                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5976                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5977                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5978                                         }) {
5979                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5980                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5981                                                 return false;
5982                                         }
5983                                 }
5984                                 true
5985                         });
5986
5987                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5988                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5989                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5990                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5991                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5992                         }
5993
5994                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5995                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5996                         }
5997
5998                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5999                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6000                         }
6001
6002                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6003                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6004                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6005                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6006                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6007                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6008                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6009                         );
6010
6011                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6012                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6013                         );
6014
6015                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6016                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6017                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6018                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6019                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6020                         }
6021
6022                         should_persist
6023                 });
6024         }
6025
6026         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6027         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6028         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6029         ///
6030         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6031         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6032         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6033         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6034         ///
6035         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6036         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6037         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6038         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6039         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6040                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6041         }
6042
6043         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6044         /// reason for the failure.
6045         ///
6046         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6047         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6048                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6049
6050                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6051                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6052                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6053                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6054                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6055                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6056                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6057                         }
6058                 }
6059         }
6060
6061         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6062         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6063                 match failure_code {
6064                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6065                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6066                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6067                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6068                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6069                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6070                         },
6071                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6072                                 let fail_data = match data {
6073                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6074                                         None => Vec::new(),
6075                                 };
6076                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6077                         }
6078                 }
6079         }
6080
6081         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6082         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6083         ///
6084         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6085         /// forwarding
6086         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6087                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6088                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6089                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6090                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6091                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6092                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6093                 } else {
6094                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6095                 };
6096                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6097                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6098                 } else {
6099                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6100                 }
6101         }
6102
6103
6104         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6105         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6106         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6107                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6108                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6109                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6110                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6111                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6112                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6113                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6114                         }
6115                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6116                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6117                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6118                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6119                 } else {
6120                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6121                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6122                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6123                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6124                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6125                 }
6126         }
6127
6128         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6129         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6130         // be surfaced to the user.
6131         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6132                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6133                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6134         ) {
6135                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6136                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6137                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6138                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6141                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6142                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6143                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6144                                                 } else {
6145                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6146                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6147                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6148                                                 }
6149                                         },
6150                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6151                                 }
6152                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6153                 };
6154
6155                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6156                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6157                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6158                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6159                 }
6160         }
6161
6162         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6163                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6164                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6165         }
6166
6167         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6168         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6169         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6170                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6171                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6172                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6173                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6174                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6175                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6176                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6177                 }
6178
6179                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6180                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6181                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6182                 //timer handling.
6183
6184                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6185                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6186                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6187                 let mut push_forward_event;
6188                 match source {
6189                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6190                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6191                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6192                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6193                         },
6194                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6195                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6196                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6197                         }) => {
6198                                 log_trace!(
6199                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6200                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6201                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6202                                 );
6203                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6204                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6205                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6206                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6207                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6208                                                 );
6209                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6210                                         },
6211                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6212                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6213                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6214                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6215                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6216                                                 }
6217                                         },
6218                                         None => {
6219                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6220                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6221                                                 );
6222                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6223                                         }
6224                                 };
6225
6226                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6227                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6228                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6229                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6230                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6231                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6232                                         },
6233                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6234                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6235                                         }
6236                                 }
6237                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6238                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6239                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6240                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6241                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6242                                 }, None));
6243                         },
6244                 }
6245                 push_forward_event
6246         }
6247
6248         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6249         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6250         ///
6251         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6252         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6253         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6254         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6255         ///
6256         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6257         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6258         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6259         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6260         ///
6261         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6262         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6263         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6264         ///
6265         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6266         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6267         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6268         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6269         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6270         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6271         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6272         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6273                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6274         }
6275
6276         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6277         /// even type numbers.
6278         ///
6279         /// # Note
6280         ///
6281         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6282         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6283         ///
6284         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6285         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6286                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6287         }
6288
6289         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6290                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6291
6292                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6293
6294                 let mut sources = {
6295                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6296                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6297                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6298                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6299                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6300                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6301                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6302                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6303                                                 break;
6304                                         }
6305                                 }
6306
6307                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6308                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6309                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6310                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6311                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6312                                 });
6313                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6314                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6315                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6316                                                 &payment_hash);
6317                                 }
6318
6319                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6320                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6321                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6322                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6323                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6324                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6325                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6326                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6327                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6328                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6329                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6330                                                 }
6331                                                 return;
6332                                         }
6333                                 }
6334
6335                                 payment.htlcs
6336                         } else { return; }
6337                 };
6338                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6339
6340                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6341                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6342                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6343                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6344                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6345                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6346                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6347                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6348                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6349                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6351                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6352                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6353                                 debug_assert!(false);
6354                                 valid_mpp = false;
6355                                 break;
6356                         }
6357                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6358
6359                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6360                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6361                                 debug_assert!(false);
6362                                 valid_mpp = false;
6363                                 break;
6364                         }
6365                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6366                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6367                 }
6368                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6369                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6370                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6371                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6372                         return;
6373                 }
6374                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6375                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6376                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6377                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6378                         return;
6379                 }
6380                 if valid_mpp {
6381                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6382                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6383                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6384                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6385                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6386                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6387                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6388                                         }
6389                                 ) {
6390                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6391                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6392                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6393                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6394                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6395                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6396                                 }
6397                         }
6398                 }
6399                 if !valid_mpp {
6400                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6401                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6402                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6403                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6404                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6405                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6406                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6407                         }
6408                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6409                 }
6410
6411                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6412                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6413                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6414                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6415                 }
6416         }
6417
6418         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6419                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6420         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6421                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6422
6423                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6424                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6425                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6426                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6427
6428                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6429                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6430                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6431                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6432
6433                 {
6434                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6435                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6436                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6437                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6438                                 None => None
6439                         };
6440
6441                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6442                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6443                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6444                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6445
6446                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6447                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6448                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6449                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6450                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6451                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6452                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6453                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6454
6455                                                 match fulfill_res {
6456                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6457                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6458                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6459                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6460                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6461                                                                 }
6462                                                                 if !during_init {
6463                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6464                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6465                                                                 } else {
6466                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6467                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6468                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6469                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6470                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6471                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6472                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6473                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6474                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6475                                                                                 });
6476                                                                 }
6477                                                         }
6478                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6479                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6480                                                                         action
6481                                                                 } else {
6482                                                                         return Ok(());
6483                                                                 };
6484                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6485
6486                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6487                                                                         chan_id, action);
6488                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6489                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6490                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6491                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6492                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6493                                                                 } = action {
6494                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6495                                                                 } else {
6496                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6497                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6498                                                                         return Ok(());
6499                                                                 };
6500                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6501                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6502                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6503                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6504                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6505                                                                         {
6506                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6507                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6508                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6509                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6510                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6511                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6512                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6513                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6514                                                                                 });
6515                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6516                                                                         }
6517                                                                 } else {
6518                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6519                                                                 }
6520                                                         }
6521                                                 }
6522                                         }
6523                                         return Ok(());
6524                                 }
6525                         }
6526                 }
6527                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6528                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6529                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6530                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6531                                 payment_preimage,
6532                         }],
6533                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6534                 };
6535
6536                 if !during_init {
6537                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6538                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6539                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6540                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6541                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6542                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6543                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6544                                 // again on restart.
6545                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6546                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6547                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6548                         }
6549                 } else {
6550                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6551                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6552                         // event.
6553                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6554                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6555                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6556                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6557                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6558                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6559                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6560                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6561                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6562                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6563                                 )));
6564                 }
6565                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6566                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6567                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6568                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6569                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6570                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6571                 Ok(())
6572         }
6573
6574         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6575                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6576         }
6577
6578         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6579                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6580                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6581                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6582         ) {
6583                 match source {
6584                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6585                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6586                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6587                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6588                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6589                                 }
6590                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6591                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6592                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6593                                 };
6594                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6595                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6596                                         &self.logger);
6597                         },
6598                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6599                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6600                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6601                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6602                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6603                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6604                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6605                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6606                                                 let chan_to_release =
6607                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6608                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6609                                                         } else {
6610                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6611                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6612                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6613                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6614                                                                 // closed.
6615                                                                 None
6616                                                         };
6617
6618                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6619                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6620                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6621                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6622                                                         // in the background.
6623                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6624                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6625                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6626                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6627                                                                         match ev {
6628                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6629                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6630                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6631                                                                                 } => {
6632                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6633                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6634                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6635                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6636                                                                                                         } = upd {
6637                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6638                                                                                                         } else { false }
6639                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6640                                                                                                 true
6641                                                                                         } else { false }
6642                                                                                 },
6643                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6644                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6645                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6646                                                                                 ) => {
6647                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6648                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6649                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6650                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6651                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6652                                                                                                 ));
6653                                                                                                 true
6654                                                                                         } else { false }
6655                                                                                 },
6656                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6657                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6658                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6659                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6660                                                                                 } =>
6661                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6662                                                                         }
6663                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6664                                                         }
6665                                                         None
6666                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6667                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6668                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6669                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6670                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6671                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6672                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6673                                                                 })
6674                                                         } else { None }
6675                                                 } else {
6676                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6677                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6678                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6679                                                                 } else { None }
6680                                                         } else { None };
6681                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6682                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6683                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6684                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6685                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6686                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6687                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6688                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6689                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6690                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6691                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6692                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6693                                                                 },
6694                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6695                                                         })
6696                                                 }
6697                                         });
6698                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6699                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6700                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6701                                 }
6702                         },
6703                 }
6704         }
6705
6706         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6707         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6708                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6709         }
6710
6711         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6712                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6713                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6714                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6715
6716                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6717                         match action {
6718                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6719                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6720                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6721                                                 amount_msat,
6722                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6723                                                 receiver_node_id,
6724                                                 htlcs,
6725                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6726                                         }) = payment {
6727                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6728                                                         payment_hash,
6729                                                         purpose,
6730                                                         amount_msat,
6731                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6732                                                         htlcs,
6733                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6734                                                 }, None));
6735                                         }
6736                                 },
6737                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6738                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6739                                 } => {
6740                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6741                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6742                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6743                                         }
6744                                 },
6745                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6746                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6747                                 } => {
6748                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6749                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6750                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6751                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6752                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6753                                         );
6754                                 },
6755                         }
6756                 }
6757         }
6758
6759         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6760         /// update completion.
6761         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6762                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6763                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6764                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6765                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6766                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6767         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6768                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6769                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6770                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6771                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6772                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6773                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6774                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6775                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6776                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6777
6778                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6779                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6780
6781                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6782                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6783                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6784                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6785                 }
6786                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6787                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6788                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6789                 }
6790
6791                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6792                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6793                 }
6794                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6795                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6796                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6797                                 msg,
6798                         });
6799                 }
6800
6801                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6802                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6803                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6804                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6805                                         updates: update,
6806                                 });
6807                         }
6808                 } }
6809                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6810                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6811                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6812                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6813                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6814                                 });
6815                         }
6816                 } }
6817                 match order {
6818                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6819                                 handle_cs!();
6820                                 handle_raa!();
6821                         },
6822                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6823                                 handle_raa!();
6824                                 handle_cs!();
6825                         },
6826                 }
6827
6828                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6829                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6830                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6831                 }
6832
6833                 {
6834                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6835                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6836                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6837                 }
6838
6839                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6840         }
6841
6842         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6843                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6844
6845                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6846                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6847                         None => {
6848                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6849                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6850                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6851                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6852                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6853                                         None => return,
6854                                 }
6855                         }
6856                 };
6857                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6859                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6860                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6861                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6862                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6863                 let channel =
6864                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6865                                 chan
6866                         } else {
6867                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6868                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6869                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6870                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6871                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6872                                 return;
6873                         };
6874                 let remaining_in_flight =
6875                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6876                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6877                                 pending.len()
6878                         } else { 0 };
6879                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6880                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6881                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6882                         remaining_in_flight);
6883                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6884                         return;
6885                 }
6886                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6887         }
6888
6889         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6890         ///
6891         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6892         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6893         /// the channel.
6894         ///
6895         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6896         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6897         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6898         ///
6899         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6900         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6901         /// used to accept such channels.
6902         ///
6903         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6904         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6905         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6906                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6907         }
6908
6909         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6910         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6911         ///
6912         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6913         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6914         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6915         ///
6916         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6917         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6918         ///
6919         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6920         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6921         ///
6922         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6923         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6924         ///
6925         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6926         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6927         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6928                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6929         }
6930
6931         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6932
6933                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6934                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6935
6936                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6937                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6938                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6939                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6940                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6941                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6942                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6943
6944                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6945                 })?;
6946                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6947                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6948                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6949
6950                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6951                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6952                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6953                 // succeed.
6954                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6955                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6956                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6957                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6958                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6959                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6960                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6961                         },
6962                         _ => {
6963                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6964                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6965
6966                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6967                         }
6968                 };
6969
6970                 match res {
6971                         Err(err) => {
6972                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6973                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6974                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6975                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6976                                         Err(e) => {
6977                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6978                                         },
6979                                 }
6980                         }
6981                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6982                                 if accept_0conf {
6983                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6984                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6985                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6986                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6987                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6988                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6989                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6990                                                 }
6991                                         };
6992                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6993                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6994                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6995
6996                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6997                                 } else {
6998                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6999                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7000                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7001                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7002                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7003                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7004                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7005                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7006                                                         }
7007                                                 };
7008                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7009                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7010                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7011
7012                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7013                                         }
7014                                 }
7015
7016                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7017                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7018                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7019
7020                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7021                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7022                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7023                                 });
7024
7025                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7026
7027                                 Ok(())
7028                         },
7029                 }
7030         }
7031
7032         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7033         /// or 0-conf channels.
7034         ///
7035         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7036         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7037         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7038         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7039                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7040                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7041                 {
7042                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7043                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7044                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7045                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7046                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7047                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7048                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7049                                 }
7050                         }
7051                 }
7052                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7053         }
7054
7055         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7056                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7057         ) -> usize {
7058                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7059                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7060                         match phase {
7061                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7062                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7063                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7064                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7065                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7066                                         {
7067                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7068                                         }
7069                                 },
7070                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7071                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7072                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7073                                         }
7074                                 },
7075                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7076                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7077                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7078                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7079                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7080                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7081                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7082                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7083                                         }
7084                                 },
7085                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7086                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7087                                         continue;
7088                                 },
7089                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7090                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7091                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7092                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7093                                         continue;
7094                                 }
7095                         }
7096                 }
7097                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7098         }
7099
7100         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7101                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7102                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7103                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7104                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7105                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7106                 }
7107
7108                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7109                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7110                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7111                 }
7112
7113                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7114                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7115                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7116                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7117                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7118
7119                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7120                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7121                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7122                                 debug_assert!(false);
7123                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7124                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7125                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7126                         })?;
7127                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7128                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7129
7130                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7131                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7132                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7133                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7134                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7135                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7136                 {
7137                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7138                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7139                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7140                 }
7141
7142                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7143                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7145                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7146                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7147                 }
7148
7149                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7150                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7151                 if channel_exists {
7152                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7153                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7154                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7155                 }
7156
7157                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7158                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7159                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7160                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7161                                 ).map_err(|e|
7162                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7163                                 )?;
7164                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7165                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7166                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7167                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7168                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7169                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7170                                 channel_type,
7171                         }, None));
7172                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7173                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7174                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7175                         });
7176                         return Ok(());
7177                 }
7178
7179                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7180                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7181                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7182                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7183                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7184                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7185                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7186                 {
7187                         Err(e) => {
7188                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7189                         },
7190                         Ok(res) => res
7191                 };
7192
7193                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7194                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7195                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7196                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7197                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7198                 }
7199                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7200                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7201                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7202                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7203                 }
7204
7205                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7206                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7207
7208                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7209                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7210                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7211                 });
7212                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7213                 Ok(())
7214         }
7215
7216         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7217                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7218                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7219                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7220                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7221                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7222                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7223                                         debug_assert!(false);
7224                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7225                                 })?;
7226                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7227                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7228                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7229                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7230                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7231                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7232                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7233                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7234                                                 },
7235                                                 _ => {
7236                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7237                                                 }
7238                                         }
7239                                 },
7240                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7241                         }
7242                 };
7243                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7244                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7245                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7246                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7247                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7248                         output_script,
7249                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7250                 }, None));
7251                 Ok(())
7252         }
7253
7254         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7255                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7256
7257                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7258                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7259                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7260                                 debug_assert!(false);
7261                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7262                         })?;
7263
7264                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7265                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7266                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7267                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7268                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7269                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7270                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7271                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7272                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7273                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7274                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7275                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7276                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7277                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7278                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7279                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7280                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7281                                                 },
7282                                         }
7283                                 },
7284                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7285                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7286                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7287                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7288                                 },
7289                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7290                         };
7291
7292                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7293
7294                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7295                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7296                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7297                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7298                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7299                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7300                         // on the channel.
7301                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7302                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7303                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7304                 } } }
7305
7306                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7307                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7308                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7309                         },
7310                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7311                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7312                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7313                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7314                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7315                                         },
7316                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7317                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7318                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7319                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7320                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7321
7322                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7323                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7324                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7325                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7326                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7327                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7328                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7329                                                                         msg,
7330                                                                 });
7331                                                         }
7332
7333                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7334                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7335                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7336                                                         } else {
7337                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7338                                                         }
7339                                                         Ok(())
7340                                                 } else {
7341                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7342                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7343                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7344                                                 }
7345                                         }
7346                                 }
7347                         }
7348                 }
7349         }
7350
7351         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7352                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7353                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7354                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7355                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7356                                 debug_assert!(false);
7357                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7358                         })?;
7359
7360                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7361                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7362                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7363                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7364                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7365                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7366                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7367                                                 &self.logger,
7368                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7369                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7370                                         );
7371                                         let res =
7372                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7373                                         match res {
7374                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7375                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7376                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7377                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7378                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7379                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7380                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7381                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7382                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7383                                                                 Ok(())
7384                                                         } else {
7385                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7386                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7387                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7388                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7389                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7390                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7391                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7392                                                         }
7393                                                 },
7394                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7395                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7396                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7397                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7398                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7399                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7400                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7401                                                 }
7402                                         }
7403                                 } else {
7404                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7405                                 }
7406                         },
7407                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7408                 }
7409         }
7410
7411         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7412                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7413                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7414                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7415                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7416                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7417                                 debug_assert!(false);
7418                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7419                         })?;
7420                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7421                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7422                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7423                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7424                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7425                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7426                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7427                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7428                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7429                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7430                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7431                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7432                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7433                                                 });
7434                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7435                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7436                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7437                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7438                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7439                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7440                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7441                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7442                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7443                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7444                                                                 msg,
7445                                                         });
7446                                                 }
7447                                         }
7448
7449                                         {
7450                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7451                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7452                                         }
7453
7454                                         Ok(())
7455                                 } else {
7456                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7457                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7458                                 }
7459                         },
7460                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7461                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7462                         }
7463                 }
7464         }
7465
7466         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7467                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7468                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7469                 {
7470                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7471                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7472                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7473                                         debug_assert!(false);
7474                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7475                                 })?;
7476                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7477                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7478                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7479                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7480                                 match phase {
7481                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7482                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7483                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7484                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7485                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7486                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7487                                                 }
7488
7489                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7490                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7491                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7492                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7493
7494                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7495                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7496                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7497                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7498                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7499                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7500                                                                 msg,
7501                                                         });
7502                                                 }
7503                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7504                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7505                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7506                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7507                                                 }
7508                                         },
7509                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7510                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7511                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7512                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7513                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7514                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7515                                         },
7516                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7517                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7518                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7519                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7520                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7521                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7522                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7523                                         },
7524                                 }
7525                         } else {
7526                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7527                         }
7528                 }
7529                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7530                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7531                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7532                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7533                 }
7534                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7535                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7536                 }
7537
7538                 Ok(())
7539         }
7540
7541         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7542                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7543                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7544                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7545                                 debug_assert!(false);
7546                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7547                         })?;
7548                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7549                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7550                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7551                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7552                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7553                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7554                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7555                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7556                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7557                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7558                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7559                                                                 msg,
7560                                                         });
7561                                                 }
7562                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7563                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7564                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7565                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7566                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7567                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7568                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7569                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7570                                         } else {
7571                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7572                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7573                                         }
7574                                 },
7575                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7576                         }
7577                 };
7578                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7579                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7580                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7581                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7582                 }
7583                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7584                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7585                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7586                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7587                                         msg: update
7588                                 });
7589                         }
7590                 }
7591                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7592                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7593                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7594                 }
7595                 Ok(())
7596         }
7597
7598         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7599                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7600                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7601                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7602                 //
7603                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7604                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7605                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7606                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7607
7608                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7609                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7610
7611                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7612                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7613                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7614                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7615                                 debug_assert!(false);
7616                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7617                         })?;
7618                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7619                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7620                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7621                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7622                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7623                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7624                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7625                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7626                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7627                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7628                                                         ),
7629                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7630                                         };
7631                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7632                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7633                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7634                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7635                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7636                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7637                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7638                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7639                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7640                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7641                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7642                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7643                                                                 }
7644                                                         ))
7645                                                 } else {
7646                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7647                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7648                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7649                                                                 }) => {
7650                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7651                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7652                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7653                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7654                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7655                                                                         } else {
7656                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7657                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7658                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7659                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7660                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7661                                                                                 reason
7662                                                                         };
7663                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7664                                                                 },
7665                                                                 _ => {},
7666                                                         }
7667                                                 }
7668                                         }
7669                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7670                                 } else {
7671                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7672                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7673                                 }
7674                         },
7675                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7676                 }
7677                 Ok(())
7678         }
7679
7680         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7681                 let funding_txo;
7682                 let next_user_channel_id;
7683                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7684                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7685                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7686                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7687                                         debug_assert!(false);
7688                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7689                                 })?;
7690                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7691                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7692                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7693                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7694                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7695                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7696                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7697                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7698                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7699                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7700                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7701                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7702                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7703                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7704                                                 }
7705                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7706                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7707                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7708                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7709                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7710                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7711                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7712                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7713                                                 res
7714                                         } else {
7715                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7716                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7717                                         }
7718                                 },
7719                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7720                         }
7721                 };
7722                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7723                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7724                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7725                 );
7726
7727                 Ok(())
7728         }
7729
7730         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7731                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7732                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7733                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7734                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7735                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7736                                 debug_assert!(false);
7737                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7738                         })?;
7739                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7740                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7741                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7742                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7743                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7744                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7745                                 } else {
7746                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7747                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7748                                 }
7749                         },
7750                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7751                 }
7752                 Ok(())
7753         }
7754
7755         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7756                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7757                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7758                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7759                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7760                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7761                                 debug_assert!(false);
7762                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7763                         })?;
7764                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7765                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7766                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7767                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7768                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7769                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7770                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7771                                 }
7772                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7773                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7774                                 } else {
7775                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7776                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7777                                 }
7778                                 Ok(())
7779                         },
7780                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7781                 }
7782         }
7783
7784         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7785                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7786                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7787                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7788                                 debug_assert!(false);
7789                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7790                         })?;
7791                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7792                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7793                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7794                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7795                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7796                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7797                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7798                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7799                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7800                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7801                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7802                                         }
7803                                         Ok(())
7804                                 } else {
7805                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7806                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7807                                 }
7808                         },
7809                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7810                 }
7811         }
7812
7813         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7814                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7815                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7816                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7817                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7818                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7819                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7820                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7821                 }
7822                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7823         }
7824
7825         #[inline]
7826         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7827                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7828                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7829         }
7830
7831         #[inline]
7832         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7833                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7834                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7835                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7836                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7837                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7838                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7839                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7840                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7841                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7842                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7843                                         };
7844                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7845                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7846
7847                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7848                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7849                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7850                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7851                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7852                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7853                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7854                                                 },
7855                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7856                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7857                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7858                                                         {
7859                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7860                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7861                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7862                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7863                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7864                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7865                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7866                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7867                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7868                                                                                         intercept_id
7869                                                                                 }, None));
7870                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7871                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7872                                                                         },
7873                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7874                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7875                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7876                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7877                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7878                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7879                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7880                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7881                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7882                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7883                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7884                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7885                                                                                 });
7886
7887                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7888                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7889                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7890                                                                                 ));
7891                                                                         }
7892                                                                 }
7893                                                         } else {
7894                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7895                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7896                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7897                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7898                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7899                                                         }
7900                                                 }
7901                                         }
7902                                 }
7903                         }
7904
7905                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7906                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7907                         }
7908
7909                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7910                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7911                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7912                         }
7913                 }
7914                 push_forward_event
7915         }
7916
7917         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7918                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7919                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7920                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7921                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7922                 ).count();
7923                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7924                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7925                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7926                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7927                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7928                 // real by taking more time.
7929                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7930                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7931                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7932                         }, None));
7933                 }
7934         }
7935
7936         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7937         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7938         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7939         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7940         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7941                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7942                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7943         ) -> bool {
7944                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7945                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7946                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7947                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7948                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7949                                 channel_id,
7950                                 counterparty_node_id,
7951                         })
7952                 })
7953         }
7954
7955         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7956         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7957                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7958         ) -> bool {
7959                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7960                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7961                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7962                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7963
7964                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7965                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7966                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7967                         }
7968                 }
7969                 false
7970         }
7971
7972         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7973                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7974                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7975                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7976                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7977                                         debug_assert!(false);
7978                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7979                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7980                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7981                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7982                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7983                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7984                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7985                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7986                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7987                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7988                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7989                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
7990                                                 } else { false };
7991                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7992                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7993                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7994                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7995                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7996                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7997                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7998                                                 }
7999                                                 htlcs_to_fail
8000                                         } else {
8001                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8002                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8003                                         }
8004                                 },
8005                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8006                         }
8007                 };
8008                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8009                 Ok(())
8010         }
8011
8012         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8013                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8014                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8015                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8016                                 debug_assert!(false);
8017                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8018                         })?;
8019                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8020                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8021                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8022                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8023                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8024                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8025                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8026                                 } else {
8027                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8028                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8029                                 }
8030                         },
8031                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8032                 }
8033                 Ok(())
8034         }
8035
8036         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8037                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8038                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8039                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8040                                 debug_assert!(false);
8041                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8042                         })?;
8043                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8044                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8045                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8046                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8047                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8048                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8049                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8050                                         }
8051
8052                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8053                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8054                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8055                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8056                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8057                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8058                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8059                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8060                                         });
8061                                 } else {
8062                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8063                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8064                                 }
8065                         },
8066                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8067                 }
8068                 Ok(())
8069         }
8070
8071         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8072         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8073                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8074                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8075                         None => {
8076                                 // It's not a local channel
8077                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8078                         }
8079                 };
8080                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8081                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8082                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8083                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8084                 }
8085                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8086                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8087                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8088                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8089                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8090                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8091                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8092                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8093                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8094                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8095                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8096                                                 }
8097                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8098                                         }
8099                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8100                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8101                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8102                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8103                                         } else {
8104                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8105                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8106                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8107                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8108                                                 // persisting.
8109                                                 if !did_change {
8110                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8111                                                 }
8112                                         }
8113                                 } else {
8114                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8115                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8116                                 }
8117                         },
8118                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8119                 }
8120                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8121         }
8122
8123         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8124                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8125                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8126
8127                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8128                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8129                                         debug_assert!(false);
8130                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8131                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8132                                                 msg.channel_id
8133                                         )
8134                                 })?;
8135                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8136                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8137                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8138                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8139                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8140                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8141                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8142                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8143                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8144                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8145                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8146                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8147                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8148                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8149                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8150                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8151                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8152                                                                 msg,
8153                                                         });
8154                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8155                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8156                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8157                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8158                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8159                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8160                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8161                                                                         msg,
8162                                                                 });
8163                                                         }
8164                                                 }
8165                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8166                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8167                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8168                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8169                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8170                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8171                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8172                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8173                                                 }
8174                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8175                                         } else {
8176                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8177                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8178                                         }
8179                                 },
8180                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8181                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8182                                                 msg.channel_id);
8183                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8184                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8185                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8186                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8187                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8188                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8189                                         //
8190                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8191                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8192                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8193                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8194                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8195                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8196                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8197                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8198                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8199                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8200                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8201                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8202                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8203                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8204                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8205                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8206                                                 },
8207                                         });
8208                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8209                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8210                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8211                                         )
8212                                 }
8213                         }
8214                 };
8215
8216                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8217                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8218                 }
8219                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8220         }
8221
8222         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8223         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8224                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8225
8226                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8227                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8228                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8229                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8230                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8231                                 match monitor_event {
8232                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8233                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8234                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8235                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8236                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8237                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8238                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8239                                                 } else {
8240                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8241                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8242                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8243                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8244                                                 }
8245                                         },
8246                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8247                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8248                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8249                                                         None => {
8250                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8251                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8252                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8253                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8254                                                         }
8255                                                 };
8256                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8257                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8258                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8259                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8260                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8261                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8262                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8263                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8264                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8265                                                                                         reason
8266                                                                                 } else {
8267                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8268                                                                                 };
8269                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8270                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8271                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8272                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8273                                                                                                 msg: update
8274                                                                                         });
8275                                                                                 }
8276                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8277                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8278                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8279                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8280                                                                                         },
8281                                                                                 });
8282                                                                         }
8283                                                                 }
8284                                                         }
8285                                                 }
8286                                         },
8287                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8288                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8289                                         },
8290                                 }
8291                         }
8292                 }
8293
8294                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8295                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8296                 }
8297
8298                 has_pending_monitor_events
8299         }
8300
8301         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8302         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8303         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8304         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8305         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8306                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8307                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8308         }
8309
8310         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8311         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8312         /// update was applied.
8313         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8314                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8315                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8316
8317                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8318                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8319                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8320                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8321                 'peer_loop: loop {
8322                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8323                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8324                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8325                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8326                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8327                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8328                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8329                                         ) {
8330                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8331                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8332                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8333                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8334                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8335                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8336                                                 }
8337                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8338                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8339
8340                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8341                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8342                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8343                                                 }
8344                                         }
8345                                         break 'chan_loop;
8346                                 }
8347                         }
8348                         break 'peer_loop;
8349                 }
8350
8351                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8352                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8353                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8354                 }
8355
8356                 has_update
8357         }
8358
8359         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8360         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8361         ///
8362         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8363         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8364         ///
8365         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8366         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8367         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8368                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8369
8370                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8371                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8372                         match phase {
8373                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8374                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8375                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8376                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8377                                                         node_id,
8378                                                         updates,
8379                                                 });
8380                                         }
8381                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8382                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8383                                                         node_id,
8384                                                         msg,
8385                                                 });
8386                                         }
8387                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8388                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8389                                         }
8390                                 }
8391                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8392                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8393                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8394                                                         node_id,
8395                                                         msg,
8396                                                 });
8397                                         }
8398                                 }
8399                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8400                         }
8401                 };
8402
8403                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8404                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8405                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8406                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8407                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8408                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8409                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8410                                 }
8411                         }
8412                 } else {
8413                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8414                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8415                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8416                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8417                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8418                                 }
8419                         }
8420                 }
8421         }
8422
8423         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8424         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8425         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8426         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8427                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8428                 let mut has_update = false;
8429                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8430                 {
8431                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8432
8433                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8434                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8435                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8436                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8437                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8438                                         match phase {
8439                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8440                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8441                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8442                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8443                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8444                                                                                 has_update = true;
8445                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8446                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8447                                                                                 });
8448                                                                         }
8449                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8450                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8451                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8452                                                                         }
8453                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8454                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8455                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8456                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8457                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8458                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8459                                                                                                 msg: update
8460                                                                                         });
8461                                                                                 }
8462
8463                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8464                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8465                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8466                                                                                 false
8467                                                                         } else { true }
8468                                                                 },
8469                                                                 Err(e) => {
8470                                                                         has_update = true;
8471                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8472                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8473                                                                         !close_channel
8474                                                                 }
8475                                                         }
8476                                                 },
8477                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8478                                         }
8479                                 });
8480                         }
8481                 }
8482
8483                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8484                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8485                 }
8486
8487                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8488                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8489                 }
8490
8491                 has_update
8492         }
8493
8494         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8495         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8496         /// Channel object.
8497         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8498                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8499                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8500                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8501                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8502                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8503                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8504                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8505                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8506                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8507                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8508                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8509                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8510                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8511                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8512                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8513                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8514                                         });
8515                         }
8516                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8517                 }
8518         }
8519 }
8520
8521 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8522         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8523         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8524         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8525         ///
8526         /// # Privacy
8527         ///
8528         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8529         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8530         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8531         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8532         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8533         ///
8534         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8535         ///
8536         /// # Limitations
8537         ///
8538         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8539         /// reply path.
8540         ///
8541         /// # Errors
8542         ///
8543         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8544         ///
8545         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8546         ///
8547         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8548         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8549         pub fn create_offer_builder(
8550                 &$self, description: String
8551         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8552                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8553                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8554                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8555                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8556
8557                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8558                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8559                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8560                 )
8561                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8562                         .path(path);
8563
8564                 Ok(builder.into())
8565         }
8566 } }
8567
8568 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8569         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8570         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8571         ///
8572         /// # Payment
8573         ///
8574         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8575         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8576         ///
8577         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8578         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8579         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8580         /// expired.
8581         ///
8582         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8583         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8584         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8585         ///
8586         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8587         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8588         ///
8589         /// # Privacy
8590         ///
8591         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8592         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8593         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8594         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8595         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8596         ///
8597         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8598         ///
8599         /// # Limitations
8600         ///
8601         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8602         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8603         ///
8604         /// # Errors
8605         ///
8606         /// Errors if:
8607         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8608         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8609         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8610         ///
8611         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8612         ///
8613         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8614         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8615         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8616         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8617         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8618                 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8619                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8620         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8621                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8622                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8623                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8624                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8625
8626                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8627                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8628                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8629                 )?
8630                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8631                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8632                         .path(path);
8633
8634                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8635
8636                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8637                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8638                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8639                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8640                         )
8641                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8642
8643                 Ok(builder.into())
8644         }
8645 } }
8646
8647 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8648 where
8649         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8650         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8651         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8652         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8653         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8654         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8655         R::Target: Router,
8656         L::Target: Logger,
8657 {
8658         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8659         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8660         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8661         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8662
8663         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8664         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8665         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8666         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8667
8668         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8669         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8670         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8671         ///
8672         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8673         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8674         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8675         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8676         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8677         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8678         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8679         ///
8680         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8681         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8682         ///
8683         /// # Payment
8684         ///
8685         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8686         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8687         /// been sent.
8688         ///
8689         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8690         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8691         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8692         ///
8693         /// # Privacy
8694         ///
8695         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8696         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8697         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8698         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8699         ///
8700         /// # Limitations
8701         ///
8702         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8703         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8704         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8705         ///
8706         /// # Errors
8707         ///
8708         /// Errors if:
8709         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8710         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8711         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8712         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8713         ///   request.
8714         ///
8715         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8716         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8717         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8718         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8719         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8720         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8721         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8722         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8723                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8724                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8725                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8726         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8727                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8728                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8729                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8730
8731                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8732                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8733                         .into();
8734                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8735
8736                 let builder = match quantity {
8737                         None => builder,
8738                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8739                 };
8740                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8741                         None => builder,
8742                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8743                 };
8744                 let builder = match payer_note {
8745                         None => builder,
8746                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8747                 };
8748                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8749                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8750
8751                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8752
8753                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8754                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8755                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8756                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8757                         )
8758                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8759
8760                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8761                 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8762                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8763                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8764                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8765                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8766                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8767                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8768                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8769                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8770                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8771                                 );
8772                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8773                         }
8774                 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8775                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8776                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8777                                 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8778                                 Some(reply_path),
8779                         );
8780                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8781                 } else {
8782                         debug_assert!(false);
8783                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8784                 }
8785
8786                 Ok(())
8787         }
8788
8789         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8790         /// message.
8791         ///
8792         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8793         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8794         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8795         ///
8796         /// # Limitations
8797         ///
8798         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8799         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8800         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8801         /// received and no retries will be made.
8802         ///
8803         /// # Errors
8804         ///
8805         /// Errors if:
8806         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8807         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8808         ///   the invoice.
8809         ///
8810         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8811         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8812                 &self, refund: &Refund
8813         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8814                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8815                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8816                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8817
8818                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8819                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8820
8821                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8822                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8823                 }
8824
8825                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8826
8827                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8828                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8829                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8830                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8831                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8832                                 )
8833                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8834
8835                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8836                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8837                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8838                                 )?;
8839                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8840                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8841                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8842                                 );
8843                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8844                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8845                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8846                                 )?;
8847                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8848                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8849                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8850                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8851
8852                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8853                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8854                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8855                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8856                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8857                                                 Some(reply_path),
8858                                         );
8859                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8860                                 } else {
8861                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8862                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8863                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8864                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8865                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8866                                                 );
8867                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8868                                         }
8869                                 }
8870
8871                                 Ok(invoice)
8872                         },
8873                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8874                 }
8875         }
8876
8877         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8878         /// to pay us.
8879         ///
8880         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8881         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8882         ///
8883         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8884         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8885         /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8886         ///
8887         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8888         ///
8889         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8890         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8891         ///
8892         /// # Note
8893         ///
8894         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8895         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8896         ///
8897         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8898         ///
8899         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8900         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8901         ///
8902         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8903         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8904         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8905         /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8906         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8907         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8908                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8909                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8910                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8911                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8912         }
8913
8914         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8915         /// stored external to LDK.
8916         ///
8917         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8918         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8919         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8920         ///
8921         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8922         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8923         /// payments.
8924         ///
8925         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8926         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8927         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8928         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8929         ///
8930         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8931         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8932         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8933         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8934         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8935         ///
8936         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8937         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8938         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8939         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8940         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8941         ///
8942         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8943         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8944         ///
8945         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8946         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8947         ///
8948         /// # Note
8949         ///
8950         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8951         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8952         ///
8953         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8954         ///
8955         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8956         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8957         ///
8958         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8959         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8960         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8961                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8962                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8963                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8964                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8965         }
8966
8967         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8968         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8969         ///
8970         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8971         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8972                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8973         }
8974
8975         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8976         ///
8977         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8978         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8979                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8980                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8981
8982                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8983                         .iter()
8984                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8985                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8986                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8987
8988                 self.router
8989                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8990                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8991         }
8992
8993         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8994         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8995         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8996                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8997         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8998                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8999
9000                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9001                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9002                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9003                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9004                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9005                         payment_secret,
9006                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9007                                 max_cltv_expiry,
9008                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9009                         },
9010                         payment_context,
9011                 };
9012                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9013                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9014                 )
9015         }
9016
9017         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9018         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9019         ///
9020         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9021         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9022                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9023                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9024                 loop {
9025                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9026                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9027                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9028                                 Some(_) => continue,
9029                                 None => return scid_candidate
9030                         }
9031                 }
9032         }
9033
9034         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9035         ///
9036         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9037         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9038                 PhantomRouteHints {
9039                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9040                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9041                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9042                 }
9043         }
9044
9045         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9046         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9047         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9048         ///
9049         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9050         /// times to get a unique scid.
9051         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9052                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9053                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9054                 loop {
9055                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9056                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9057                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9058                         return scid_candidate
9059                 }
9060         }
9061
9062         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9063         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9064         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9065                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9066
9067                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9068                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9069                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9070                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9071                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9072                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9073                         ) {
9074                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9075                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9076                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9077                                         }
9078                                 }
9079                         }
9080                 }
9081
9082                 inflight_htlcs
9083         }
9084
9085         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9086         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9087                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9088                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9089                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9090                 events.into_inner()
9091         }
9092
9093         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9094         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9095                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9096                 events.push_back((event, None));
9097         }
9098
9099         #[cfg(test)]
9100         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9101                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9102                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9103         }
9104
9105         #[cfg(test)]
9106         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9107                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9108         }
9109
9110         #[cfg(test)]
9111         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9112                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9113         }
9114
9115         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9116         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9117         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9118         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9119         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9120                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9121                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9122
9123                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9124                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9125                 );
9126                 loop {
9127                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9128                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9129                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9130                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9131                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9132                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9133                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9134                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9135                                         {
9136                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9137                                         }
9138                                 }
9139
9140                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9141                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9142                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9143                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9144                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9145                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9146                                                 &channel_id);
9147                                         break;
9148                                 }
9149
9150                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9151                                         channel_id) {
9152                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9153                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9154                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9155                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9156                                                                 channel_id);
9157                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9158                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9159                                                         if further_update_exists {
9160                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9161                                                                 // top of the loop.
9162                                                                 continue;
9163                                                         }
9164                                                 } else {
9165                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9166                                                                 channel_id);
9167                                                 }
9168                                         }
9169                                 }
9170                         } else {
9171                                 log_debug!(logger,
9172                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9173                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9174                         }
9175                         break;
9176                 }
9177         }
9178
9179         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9180                 for action in actions {
9181                         match action {
9182                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9183                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9184                                 } => {
9185                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9186                                 }
9187                         }
9188                 }
9189         }
9190
9191         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9192         /// using the given event handler.
9193         ///
9194         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9195         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9196                 &self, handler: H
9197         ) {
9198                 let mut ev;
9199                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9200         }
9201 }
9202
9203 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9204 where
9205         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9206         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9207         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9208         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9209         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9210         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9211         R::Target: Router,
9212         L::Target: Logger,
9213 {
9214         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9215         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9216         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9217         /// is always placed next to each other.
9218         ///
9219         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9220         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9221         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9222         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9223         ///
9224         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9225         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9226         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9227         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9228                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9229                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9230                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9231
9232                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9233                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9234                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9235                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9236                         }
9237
9238                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9239                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9240                         }
9241                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9242                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9243                         }
9244
9245                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9246                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9247                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9248                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9249                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9250                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9251                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9252                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9253                                 }
9254                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9255                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9256                                 }
9257                         }
9258
9259                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9260                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9261                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9262                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9263                         }
9264
9265                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9266                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9267                         }
9268
9269                         result
9270                 });
9271                 events.into_inner()
9272         }
9273 }
9274
9275 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9276 where
9277         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9278         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9279         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9280         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9281         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9282         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9283         R::Target: Router,
9284         L::Target: Logger,
9285 {
9286         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9287         ///
9288         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9289         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9290         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9291                 let mut ev;
9292                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9293         }
9294 }
9295
9296 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9297 where
9298         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9299         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9300         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9301         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9302         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9303         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9304         R::Target: Router,
9305         L::Target: Logger,
9306 {
9307         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9308                 {
9309                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9310                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9311                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9312                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9313                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9314                 }
9315
9316                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9317                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9318         }
9319
9320         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9321                 let _persistence_guard =
9322                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9323                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9324                 let new_height = height - 1;
9325                 {
9326                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9327                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9328                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9329                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9330                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9331                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9332                 }
9333
9334                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9335         }
9336 }
9337
9338 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9339 where
9340         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9341         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9342         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9343         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9344         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9345         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9346         R::Target: Router,
9347         L::Target: Logger,
9348 {
9349         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9350                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9351                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9352                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9353
9354                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9355                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9356
9357                 let _persistence_guard =
9358                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9359                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9360                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9361                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9362
9363                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9364                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9365                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9366                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9367                 }
9368         }
9369
9370         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9371                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9372                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9373                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9374
9375                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9376                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9377
9378                 let _persistence_guard =
9379                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9380                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9381                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9382
9383                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9384
9385                 macro_rules! max_time {
9386                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9387                                 loop {
9388                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9389                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9390                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9391                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9392                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9393                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9394                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9395                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9396                                                 break;
9397                                         }
9398                                 }
9399                         }
9400                 }
9401                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9402                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9403                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9404                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9405                 });
9406         }
9407
9408         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9409                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9410                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9411                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9412                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9413                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9414                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9415                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9416                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9417                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9418                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9419                                 }
9420                         }
9421                 }
9422                 res
9423         }
9424
9425         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9426                 let _persistence_guard =
9427                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9428                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9429                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9430                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9431                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9432                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9433                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9434                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9435                 });
9436         }
9437 }
9438
9439 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9440 where
9441         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9442         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9443         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9444         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9445         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9446         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9447         R::Target: Router,
9448         L::Target: Logger,
9449 {
9450         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9451         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9452         /// the function.
9453         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9454                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9455                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9456                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9457                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9458
9459                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9460                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9461                 {
9462                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9463                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9464                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9465                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9466                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9467
9468                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9469                                         match phase {
9470                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9471                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9472                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9473                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9474                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9475                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9476                                                         let res = f(channel);
9477                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9478                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9479                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9480                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9481                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9482                                                                 }
9483                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9484                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9485                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9486                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9487                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9488                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9489                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9490                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9491                                                                                                 msg,
9492                                                                                         });
9493                                                                                 }
9494                                                                         } else {
9495                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9496                                                                         }
9497                                                                 }
9498
9499                                                                 {
9500                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9501                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9502                                                                 }
9503
9504                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9505                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9506                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9507                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9508                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9509                                                                         });
9510                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9511                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9512                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9513                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9514                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9515                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9516                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9517                                                                                         });
9518                                                                                 }
9519                                                                         }
9520                                                                 }
9521                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9522                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9523                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9524                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9525                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9526                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9527                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9528                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9529                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9530                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9531                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9532                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9533                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9534                                                                         }
9535                                                                 }
9536                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9537                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9538                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9539                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9540                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9541                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9542                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9543                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9544                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9545                                                                                 msg: update
9546                                                                         });
9547                                                                 }
9548                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9549                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9550                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9551                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9552                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9553                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9554                                                                                 })
9555                                                                         },
9556                                                                 });
9557                                                                 return false;
9558                                                         }
9559                                                         true
9560                                                 }
9561                                         }
9562                                 });
9563                         }
9564                 }
9565
9566                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9567                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9568                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9569                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9570                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9571                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9572                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9573                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9574                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9575                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9576
9577                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9578                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9579                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9580                                                 false
9581                                         } else { true }
9582                                 });
9583                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9584                         });
9585
9586                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9587                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9588                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9589                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9590                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9591                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9592                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9593                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9594                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9595                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9596                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9597                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9598                                         });
9599
9600                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9601                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9602                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9603                                         };
9604                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9605                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9606                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9607                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9608                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9609                                         );
9610                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9611                                         false
9612                                 } else { true }
9613                         });
9614                 }
9615
9616                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9617
9618                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9619                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9620                 }
9621         }
9622
9623         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9624         /// may have events that need processing.
9625         ///
9626         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9627         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9628         ///
9629         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9630         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9631         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9632                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9633         }
9634
9635         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9636         ///
9637         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9638         /// indicates this should be checked.
9639         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9640                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9641         }
9642
9643         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9644         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9645                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9646         }
9647
9648         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9649         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9650         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9651                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9652         }
9653
9654         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9655         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9656         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9657                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9658         }
9659
9660         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9661         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9662         ///
9663         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9664         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9665         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9666         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9667                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9668         }
9669
9670         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9671         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9672         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9673                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9674         }
9675
9676         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9677         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9678         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9679                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9680         }
9681
9682         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9683         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9684         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9685                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9686         }
9687
9688         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9689         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9690         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9691                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9692         }
9693 }
9694
9695 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9696         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9697 where
9698         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9699         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9700         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9701         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9702         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9703         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9704         R::Target: Router,
9705         L::Target: Logger,
9706 {
9707         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9708                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9709                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9710                 // change to the contents.
9711                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9712                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9713                         let persist = match &res {
9714                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9715                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9716                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9717                                 },
9718                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9719                         };
9720                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9721                         persist
9722                 });
9723         }
9724
9725         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9726                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9727                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9728                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9729         }
9730
9731         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9732                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9733                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9734                 // change to the contents.
9735                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9736                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9737                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9738                 });
9739         }
9740
9741         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9742                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9743                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9744                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9745         }
9746
9747         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9748                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9749                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9750         }
9751
9752         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9753                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9754                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9755         }
9756
9757         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9758                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9759                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9760                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9761                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9762                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9763                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9764                         let persist = match &res {
9765                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9766                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9767                         };
9768                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9769                         persist
9770                 });
9771         }
9772
9773         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9774                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9775                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9776                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9777         }
9778
9779         #[cfg(splicing)]
9780         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9781                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9782                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9783                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9784         }
9785
9786         #[cfg(splicing)]
9787         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9788                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9789                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9790                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9791         }
9792
9793         #[cfg(splicing)]
9794         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9795                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9796                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9797                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9798         }
9799
9800         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9801                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9802                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9803         }
9804
9805         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9806                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9807                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9808         }
9809
9810         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9811                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9812                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9813                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9814                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9815                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9816                         let persist = match &res {
9817                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9818                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9819                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9820                         };
9821                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9822                         persist
9823                 });
9824         }
9825
9826         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9827                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9828                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9829         }
9830
9831         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9832                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9833                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9834                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9835                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9836                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9837                         let persist = match &res {
9838                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9839                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9840                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9841                         };
9842                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9843                         persist
9844                 });
9845         }
9846
9847         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9848                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9849                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9850                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9851                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9852                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9853                         let persist = match &res {
9854                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9855                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9856                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9857                         };
9858                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9859                         persist
9860                 });
9861         }
9862
9863         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9864                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9865                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9866         }
9867
9868         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9869                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9870                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9871         }
9872
9873         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9874                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9875                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9876                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9877                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9878                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9879                         let persist = match &res {
9880                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9881                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9882                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9883                         };
9884                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9885                         persist
9886                 });
9887         }
9888
9889         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9890                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9891                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9892         }
9893
9894         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9895                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9896                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9897                                 persist
9898                         } else {
9899                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9900                         }
9901                 });
9902         }
9903
9904         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9905                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9906                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9907                         let persist = match &res {
9908                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9909                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9910                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9911                         };
9912                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9913                         persist
9914                 });
9915         }
9916
9917         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9918                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9919                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9920                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9921                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9922                 let remove_peer = {
9923                         log_debug!(
9924                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9925                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9926                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9927                         );
9928                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9929                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9930                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9931                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9932                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9933                                         let context = match phase {
9934                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9935                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9936                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9937                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9938                                                                 return true;
9939                                                         }
9940                                                         &mut chan.context
9941                                                 },
9942                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9943                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9944                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9945                                                         return true;
9946                                                 },
9947                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9948                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9949                                                         &mut chan.context
9950                                                 },
9951                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9952                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9953                                                         &mut chan.context
9954                                                 },
9955                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9956                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9957                                                         &mut chan.context
9958                                                 },
9959                                         };
9960                                         // Clean up for removal.
9961                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9962                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9963                                         false
9964                                 });
9965                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9966                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9967                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9968                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9969                                         match msg {
9970                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9971                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9972                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9973                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9974                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9975                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9976                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9977                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9978                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9979                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9980                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9981                                                 // Quiescence
9982                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9983                                                 // Splicing
9984                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9985                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9986                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9987                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9988                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9991                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9992                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9993                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9994                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9995                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9996                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9997                                                 // Channel Operations
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10003                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10004                                                 // Gossip
10005                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10006                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10007                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10008                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10009                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10010                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10011                                                         false
10012                                                 },
10013                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10014                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10015                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10016                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10017                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10018                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10019                                         }
10020                                 });
10021                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10022                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10023                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10024                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10025                 };
10026                 if remove_peer {
10027                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10028                 }
10029                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10030
10031                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10032                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10033                 }
10034         }
10035
10036         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10037                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10038                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10039                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10040                         return Err(());
10041                 }
10042
10043                 let mut res = Ok(());
10044
10045                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10046                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10047                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10048                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10049                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10050                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10051                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10052
10053                         {
10054                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10055                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10056                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10057                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10058                                                         res = Err(());
10059                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10060                                                 }
10061                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10062                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10063                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10064                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10065                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10066                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10067                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10068                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10069                                                         is_connected: true,
10070                                                 }));
10071                                         },
10072                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10073                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10074                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10075
10076                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10077                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10078                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10079                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10080                                                 {
10081                                                         res = Err(());
10082                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10083                                                 }
10084
10085                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10086                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10087                                         },
10088                                 }
10089                         }
10090
10091                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10092
10093                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10094                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10095                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10096                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10097                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10098
10099                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10100                                         match phase {
10101                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10102                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10103                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10104                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10105                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10106                                                         });
10107                                                 }
10108
10109                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10110                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10111                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10112                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10113                                                         });
10114                                                 }
10115
10116                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10117                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10118                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10119                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10120                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10121                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10122                                                         });
10123                                                 },
10124
10125                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10126                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10127                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10128                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10129                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10130                                                 }
10131
10132                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10133                                                 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10134                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10135                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10136                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10137                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10138                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10139                                                 },
10140                                         }
10141                                 }
10142                         }
10143
10144                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10145                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10146                 });
10147                 res
10148         }
10149
10150         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10151                 match &msg.data as &str {
10152                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10153                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10154                         {
10155                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10156                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10157                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10158                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10159                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10160                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10161                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10162                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10163                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10164                                                 self,
10165                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10166                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10167                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10168                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10169                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10170                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10171                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10172                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10173                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10174                                                                                 msg,
10175                                                                         });
10176                                                                 }
10177                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10178                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10179                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10180                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10181                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10182                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10183                                                                                 },
10184                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10185                                                                         }
10186                                                                 });
10187                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10188                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10189                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10190                                                         }
10191                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10192                                                 }
10193                                         );
10194                                 }
10195                                 return;
10196                         }
10197                         _ => {}
10198                 }
10199
10200                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10201
10202                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10203                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10204                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10205                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10206                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10207                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10208                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10209                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10210                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10211                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10212                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10213                         };
10214                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10215                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10216                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10217                         }
10218                 } else {
10219                         {
10220                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10221                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10222                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10223                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10224                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10225                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10226                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10227                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10228                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10229                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10230                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10231                                                                 msg,
10232                                                         });
10233                                                         return;
10234                                                 }
10235                                         },
10236                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10237                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10238                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10239                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10240                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10241                                                                 msg,
10242                                                         });
10243                                                         return;
10244                                                 }
10245                                         },
10246                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10247                                         #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10248                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10249                                 }
10250                         }
10251
10252                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10253                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10254                 }
10255         }
10256
10257         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10258                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10259         }
10260
10261         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10262                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10263         }
10264
10265         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10266                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10267         }
10268
10269         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10270                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10271                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10272                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10273         }
10274
10275         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10276                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10277                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10278                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10279         }
10280
10281         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10282                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10283                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10284                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10285         }
10286
10287         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10288                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10289                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10290                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10291         }
10292
10293         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10294                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10295                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10296                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10297         }
10298
10299         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10300                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10301                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10302                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10303         }
10304
10305         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10306                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10307                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10308                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10309         }
10310
10311         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10312                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10313                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10314                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10315         }
10316
10317         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10318                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10319                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10320                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10321         }
10322 }
10323
10324 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10325 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10326 where
10327         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10328         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10329         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10330         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10331         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10332         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10333         R::Target: Router,
10334         L::Target: Logger,
10335 {
10336         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10337                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10338                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10339
10340                 match message {
10341                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10342                                 let responder = match responder {
10343                                         Some(responder) => responder,
10344                                         None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10345                                 };
10346                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10347                                         &invoice_request
10348                                 ) {
10349                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10350                                         Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10351                                 };
10352                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10353                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10354                                         Err(()) => {
10355                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10356                                                 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10357                                         },
10358                                 };
10359
10360                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10361                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10362                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10363                                 ) {
10364                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10365                                         Err(()) => {
10366                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10367                                                 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10368                                         },
10369                                 };
10370
10371                                 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10372                                         offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10373                                         invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10374                                 });
10375                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10376                                         amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10377                                 ) {
10378                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10379                                         Err(()) => {
10380                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10381                                                 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10382                                         },
10383                                 };
10384
10385                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10386                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10387                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10388                                 );
10389
10390                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10391                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10392                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10393                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10394                                         );
10395                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10396                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10397                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10398                                         );
10399                                         builder
10400                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10401                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10402                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10403                                 } else {
10404                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10405                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10406                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10407                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10408                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10409                                         );
10410                                         builder
10411                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10412                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10413                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10414                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10415                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10416                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10417                                                         invoice
10418                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10419                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10420                                                                 )
10421                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10422                                                 })
10423                                 };
10424
10425                                 match response {
10426                                         Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10427                                         Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10428                                 }
10429                         },
10430                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10431                                 let response = invoice
10432                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10433                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10434                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10435                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10436                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10437                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10438                                                 } else {
10439                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10440                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10441                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10442                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10443                                                                 })
10444                                                 }
10445                                         });
10446
10447                                 match (responder, response) {
10448                                         (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10449                                         (None, Err(_)) => {
10450                                                 log_trace!(
10451                                                         self.logger,
10452                                                         "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10453                                                 );
10454                                                 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10455                                         }
10456                                         _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10457                                 }
10458                         },
10459                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10460                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10461                                 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10462                         },
10463                 }
10464         }
10465
10466         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10467                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10468         }
10469 }
10470
10471 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10472 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10473 where
10474         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10475         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10476         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10477         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10478         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10479         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10480         R::Target: Router,
10481         L::Target: Logger,
10482 {
10483         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10484                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10485         }
10486 }
10487
10488 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10489 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10490 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10491         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10492         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10493         node_features
10494 }
10495
10496 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10497 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10498 ///
10499 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10500 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10501 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10502 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10503         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10504 }
10505
10506 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10508 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10509         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10510 }
10511
10512 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10513 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10514 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10515         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10516 }
10517
10518 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10519 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10520 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10521         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10522 }
10523
10524 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10525 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10526 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10527         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10528         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10529         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10530         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10531         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10532         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10533         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10534         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10535         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10536         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10537         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10538         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10539         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10540         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10541         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10542         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10543         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10544                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10545         }
10546         features
10547 }
10548
10549 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10550 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10551
10552 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10553         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10554         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10555         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10556 });
10557
10558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10559         (2, node_id, required),
10560         (4, features, required),
10561         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10562         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10563         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10564         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10565 });
10566
10567 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10568         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10569                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10570                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10571                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10572                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10573                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10574                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10575                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10576                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10577                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10578                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10579                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10580                         (7, self.config, option),
10581                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10582                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10583                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10584                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10585                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10586                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10587                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10588                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10589                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10590                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10591                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10592                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10593                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10594                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10595                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10596                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10597                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10598                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10599                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10600                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10601                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10602                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10603                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10604                 });
10605                 Ok(())
10606         }
10607 }
10608
10609 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10610         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10611                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10612                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10613                         (2, channel_id, required),
10614                         (3, channel_type, option),
10615                         (4, counterparty, required),
10616                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10617                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10618                         (7, config, option),
10619                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10620                         (9, confirmations, option),
10621                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10622                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10623                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10624                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10625                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10626                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10627                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10628                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10629                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10630                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10631                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10632                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10633                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10634                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10635                         (30, is_usable, required),
10636                         (32, is_public, required),
10637                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10638                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10639                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10640                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10641                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10642                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10643                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10644                 });
10645
10646                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10647                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10648                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10649                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10650                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10651
10652                 Ok(Self {
10653                         inbound_scid_alias,
10654                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10655                         channel_type,
10656                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10657                         outbound_scid_alias,
10658                         funding_txo,
10659                         config,
10660                         short_channel_id,
10661                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10662                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10663                         user_channel_id,
10664                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10665                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10666                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10667                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10668                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10669                         confirmations_required,
10670                         confirmations,
10671                         force_close_spend_delay,
10672                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10673                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10674                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10675                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10676                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10677                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10678                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10679                         channel_shutdown_state,
10680                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10681                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10682                 })
10683         }
10684 }
10685
10686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10687         (2, channels, required_vec),
10688         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10689         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10690 });
10691
10692 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10693         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10694         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10695 });
10696
10697 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10698         (0, Forward) => {
10699                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10700                 (1, blinded, option),
10701                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10702         },
10703         (1, Receive) => {
10704                 (0, payment_data, required),
10705                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10706                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10707                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10708                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10709                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10710                 (9, payment_context, option),
10711         },
10712         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10713                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10714                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10715                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10716                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10717                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10718                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10719         },
10720 ;);
10721
10722 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10723         (0, routing, required),
10724         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10725         (4, payment_hash, required),
10726         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10727         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10728         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10729         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10730 });
10731
10732
10733 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10734         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10735                 match self {
10736                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10737                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10738                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10739                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10740                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10741                         },
10742                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10743                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10744                         }) => {
10745                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10746                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10747                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10748                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10749                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10750                         },
10751                 }
10752                 Ok(())
10753         }
10754 }
10755
10756 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10757         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10758                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10759                 match id {
10760                         0 => {
10761                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10762                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10763                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10764                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10765                                 }))
10766                         },
10767                         1 => {
10768                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10769                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10770                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10771                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10772                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10773                                 }))
10774                         },
10775                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10776                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10777                         // messages contained in the variants.
10778                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10779                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10780                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10781                         2 => {
10782                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10783                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10784                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10785                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10786                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10787                         },
10788                         3 => {
10789                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10790                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10791                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10792                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10793                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10794                         },
10795                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10796                 }
10797         }
10798 }
10799
10800 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10801         (0, Forward),
10802         (1, Fail),
10803 );
10804
10805 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10806         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10807         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10808 );
10809
10810 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10811         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10812         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10813         (2, outpoint, required),
10814         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10815         (4, htlc_id, required),
10816         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10817         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10818         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10819         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10820         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10821 });
10822
10823 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10824         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10825                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10826                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10827                                 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10828                         },
10829                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10830                 };
10831                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10832                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10833                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10834                         (2, self.value, required),
10835                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10836                         (4, payment_data, option),
10837                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10838                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10839                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10840                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10841                 });
10842                 Ok(())
10843         }
10844 }
10845
10846 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10847         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10848                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10849                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10850                         (1, total_msat, option),
10851                         (2, value_ser, required),
10852                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10853                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10854                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10855                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10856                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10857                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10858                 });
10859                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10860                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10861                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10862                         Some(p) => {
10863                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10864                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10865                                 }
10866                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10867                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10868                                 }
10869                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10870                         },
10871                         None => {
10872                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10873                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10874                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10875                                         }
10876                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10877                                 }
10878                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10879                         },
10880                 };
10881                 Ok(Self {
10882                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10883                         timer_ticks: 0,
10884                         value,
10885                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10886                         total_value_received,
10887                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10888                         onion_payload,
10889                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10890                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10891                 })
10892         }
10893 }
10894
10895 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10896         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10897                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10898                 match id {
10899                         0 => {
10900                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10901                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10902                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10903                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10904                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10905                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10906                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10907                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10908                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10909                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10910                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10911                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10912                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10913                                 });
10914                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10915                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10916                                         // instead.
10917                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10918                                 }
10919                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10920                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10921                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10922                                 }
10923                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10924                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10925                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10926                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10927                                                 }
10928                                         }
10929                                 }
10930                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10931                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10932                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10933                                         path,
10934                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10935                                 })
10936                         }
10937                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10938                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10939                 }
10940         }
10941 }
10942
10943 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10944         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10945                 match self {
10946                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10947                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10948                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10949                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10950                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10951                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10952                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10953                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10954                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10955                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10956                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10957                                  });
10958                         }
10959                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10960                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10961                                 field.write(writer)?;
10962                         }
10963                 }
10964                 Ok(())
10965         }
10966 }
10967
10968 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10969         (0, forward_info, required),
10970         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10971         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10972         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10973         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10974         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10975         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10976         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10977 });
10978
10979 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10980         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10981                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10982                 match self {
10983                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10984                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10985                                 info.write(w)?;
10986                         },
10987                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10988                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10989                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10990                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10991                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10992                                 });
10993                         },
10994                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10995                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10996                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10997                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10998                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10999                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11000                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11001                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11002                                         (1, failure_code, required),
11003                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11004                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11005                                 });
11006                         },
11007                 }
11008                 Ok(())
11009         }
11010 }
11011
11012 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11013         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11014                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11015                 Ok(match id {
11016                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11017                         1 => {
11018                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11019                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
11020                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11021                                         (2, err_packet, required),
11022                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11023                                 });
11024                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11025                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11026                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11027                                                 failure_code,
11028                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11029                                         }
11030                                 } else {
11031                                         Self::FailHTLC {
11032                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11033                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11034                                         }
11035                                 }
11036                         },
11037                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11038                 })
11039         }
11040 }
11041
11042 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11043         (0, payment_secret, required),
11044         (2, expiry_time, required),
11045         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11046         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11047         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11048 });
11049
11050 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11051 where
11052         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11053         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11054         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11055         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11056         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11057         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11058         R::Target: Router,
11059         L::Target: Logger,
11060 {
11061         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11062                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11063
11064                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11065
11066                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11067                 {
11068                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11069                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11070                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11071                 }
11072
11073                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11074
11075                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11076                 {
11077                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11078                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11079                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11080                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11081                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11082                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11083                                 }
11084
11085                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11086                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11087                                 ).count();
11088                         }
11089
11090                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11091
11092                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11093                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11094                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11095                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11096                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11097                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11098                                         } else { None }
11099                                 ) {
11100                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11101                                 }
11102                         }
11103                 }
11104
11105                 {
11106                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11107                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11108                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11109                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11110                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11111                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11112                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11113                                 }
11114                         }
11115                 }
11116
11117                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11118                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11119                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11120                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11121                 }
11122
11123                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11124                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11125                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11126
11127                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11128                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11129                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11130                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11131                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11132                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11133                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11134                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11135                         }
11136                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11137                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11138                 }
11139
11140                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11141                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11142                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11143                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11144                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11145                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11146                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11147                 }
11148
11149                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11150                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11151                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11152                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11153                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11154                         // no channels.
11155                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11156                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11157                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11158                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11159                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11160                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11161                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11162                                 }
11163                         }
11164                 }
11165
11166                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11167                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11168                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11169                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11170                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11171                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11172                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11173                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11174                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11175                 } else {
11176                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11177                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11178                                 event.write(writer)?;
11179                         }
11180                 }
11181
11182                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11183                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11184                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11185                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11186                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11187                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11188
11189                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11190                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11191                 // likely to be identical.
11192                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11193                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11194
11195                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11196                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11197                         hash.write(writer)?;
11198                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11199                 }
11200
11201                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11202                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11203                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11204                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11205                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11206                         }
11207                 }
11208                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11209                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11210                         match outbound {
11211                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11212                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11213                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11214                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11215                                         }
11216                                 }
11217                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11218                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11219                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11220                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11221                         }
11222                 }
11223
11224                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11225                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11226                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11227                         match outbound {
11228                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11229                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11230                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11231                                 },
11232                                 _ => {},
11233                         }
11234                 }
11235
11236                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11237                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11238                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11239                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11240                 }
11241
11242                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11243                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11244                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11245                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11246                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11247                 }
11248
11249                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11250                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11251                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11252                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11253                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11254                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11255                                 }
11256                         }
11257                 }
11258
11259                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11260                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11261                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11262                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11263                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11264                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11265                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11266                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11267                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11268                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11269                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11270                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11271                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11272                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11273                 });
11274
11275                 Ok(())
11276         }
11277 }
11278
11279 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11280         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11281                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11282                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11283                         event.write(w)?;
11284                         action.write(w)?;
11285                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11286                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11287                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11288                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11289                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11290                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11291                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11292                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11293                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11294                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11295                         }
11296                 }
11297                 Ok(())
11298         }
11299 }
11300 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11301         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11302                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11303                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11304                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11305                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11306                         len) as usize);
11307                 for _ in 0..len {
11308                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11309                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11310                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11311                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11312                         } else if action.is_some() {
11313                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11314                         }
11315                 }
11316                 Ok(events)
11317         }
11318 }
11319
11320 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11321         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11322         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11323         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11324         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11325         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11326 );
11327
11328 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11329 ///
11330 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11331 /// is:
11332 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11333 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11334 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11335 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11336 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11337 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11338 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11339 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11340 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11341 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11342 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11343 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11344 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11345 ///    the next step.
11346 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11347 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11348 ///
11349 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11350 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11351 ///
11352 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11353 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11354 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11355 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11356 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11357 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11358 ///
11359 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11360 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11361 where
11362         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11363         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11364         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11365         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11366         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11367         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11368         R::Target: Router,
11369         L::Target: Logger,
11370 {
11371         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11372         pub entropy_source: ES,
11373
11374         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11375         pub node_signer: NS,
11376
11377         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11378         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11379         /// signing data.
11380         pub signer_provider: SP,
11381
11382         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11383         ///
11384         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11385         pub fee_estimator: F,
11386         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11387         ///
11388         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11389         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11390         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11391         pub chain_monitor: M,
11392
11393         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11394         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11395         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11396         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11397         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11398         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11399         ///
11400         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11401         pub router: R,
11402         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11403         /// deserialization.
11404         pub logger: L,
11405         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11406         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11407         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11408
11409         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11410         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11411         ///
11412         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11413         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11414         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11415         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11416         ///
11417         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11418         /// this struct.
11419         ///
11420         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11421         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11422 }
11423
11424 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11425                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11426 where
11427         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11428         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11429         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11430         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11431         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11432         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11433         R::Target: Router,
11434         L::Target: Logger,
11435 {
11436         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11437         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11438         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11439         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11440                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11441                 Self {
11442                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11443                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11444                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11445                         ),
11446                 }
11447         }
11448 }
11449
11450 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11451 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11452 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11453         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11454 where
11455         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11456         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11457         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11458         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11459         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11460         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11461         R::Target: Router,
11462         L::Target: Logger,
11463 {
11464         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11465                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11466                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11467         }
11468 }
11469
11470 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11471         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11472 where
11473         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11474         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11475         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11476         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11477         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11478         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11479         R::Target: Router,
11480         L::Target: Logger,
11481 {
11482         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11483                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11484
11485                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11486                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11487                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11488
11489                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11490
11491                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11492                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11493                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11494                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11495                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11496                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11497                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11498                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11499                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11500                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11501                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11502                         ))?;
11503                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11504                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11505                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11506                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11507                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11508                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11509                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11510                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11511                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11512                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11513                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11514                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11515                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11516                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11517                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11518                                         }
11519                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11520                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11521                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11522                                         }
11523                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11524                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11525                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11526                                         }
11527                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11528                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11529                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11530                                         }
11531                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11532                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11533                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11534                                         }
11535                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11536                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11537                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11538                                                 });
11539                                         }
11540                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11541                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11542                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11543                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11544                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11545                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11546                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11547                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11548                                         }, None));
11549                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11550                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11551                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11552                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11553                                                 }
11554                                                 if !found_htlc {
11555                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11556                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11557                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11558                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11559                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11560                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11561                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11562                                                         log_info!(logger,
11563                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11564                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11565                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11566                                                 }
11567                                         }
11568                                 } else {
11569                                         channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11570                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11571                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11572                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11573                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11574                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11575                                         }
11576                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11577                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11578                                         }
11579                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11580                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11581                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11582                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11583                                                 },
11584                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11585                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11586                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11587                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11588                                                 }
11589                                         }
11590                                 }
11591                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11592                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11593                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11594                                 // safely discard the channel.
11595                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11596                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11597                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11598                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11599                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11600                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11601                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11602                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11603                                 }, None));
11604                         } else {
11605                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11606                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11607                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11608                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11609                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11610                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11611                         }
11612                 }
11613
11614                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11615                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11616                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11617                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11618                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11619                                         &channel_id);
11620                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11621                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11622                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11623                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11624                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11625                                 };
11626                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11627                         }
11628                 }
11629
11630                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11631                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11632                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11633                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11634                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11635                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11636                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11637                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11638                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11639                         }
11640                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11641                 }
11642
11643                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11644                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11645                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11646                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11647                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11648                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11649                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11650                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11651                         }
11652                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11653                 }
11654
11655                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11656                         PeerState {
11657                                 channel_by_id,
11658                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11659                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11660                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11661                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11662                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11663                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11664                                 is_connected: false,
11665                         }
11666                 };
11667
11668                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11669                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11670                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11671                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11672                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11673                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11674                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11675                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11676                 }
11677
11678                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11679                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11680                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11681                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11682                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11683                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11684                                 None => continue,
11685                         }
11686                 }
11687
11688                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11689                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11690                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11691                                 0 => {
11692                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11693                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11694                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11695                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11696                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11697                                 }
11698                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11699                         }
11700                 }
11701
11702                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11703                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11704
11705                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11706                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11707                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11708                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11709                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11710                         }
11711                 }
11712
11713                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11714                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11715                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11716                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11717                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11718                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11719                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11720                         };
11721                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11722                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11723                         };
11724                 }
11725
11726                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11727                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11728                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11729                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11730                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11731                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11732                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11733                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11734                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11735                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11736                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11737                 let mut events_override = None;
11738                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11739                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11740                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11741                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11742                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11743                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11744                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11745                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11746                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11747                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11748                         (8, events_override, option),
11749                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11750                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11751                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11752                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11753                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11754                 });
11755                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11756                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11757                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11758                 }
11759
11760                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11761                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11762                 }
11763
11764                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11765                         pending_events_read = events;
11766                 }
11767
11768                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11769                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11770                 }
11771
11772                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11773                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11774                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11775                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11776                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11777                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11778                         }
11779                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11780                 }
11781                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11782                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11783                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11784                 };
11785
11786                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11787                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11788                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11789                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11790                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11791                 //
11792                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11793                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11794                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11795                 //
11796                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11797                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11798                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11799                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11800                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11801                         ) => { {
11802                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11803                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11804                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11805                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11806                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11807                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11808                                         pending_background_events.push(
11809                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11810                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11811                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11812                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11813                                                         update: update.clone(),
11814                                                 });
11815                                 }
11816                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11817                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11818                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11819                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11820                                         pending_background_events.push(
11821                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11822                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11823                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11824                                                 });
11825                                 }
11826                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11827                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11828                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11829                                 }
11830                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11831                         } }
11832                 }
11833
11834                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11835                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11836                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11837                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11838                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11839                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11840
11841                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11842                                         // discarded.
11843                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11844                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11845                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11846                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11847                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11848                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11849                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11850                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11851                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11852                                                 }
11853                                         }
11854                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11855                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11856                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11857                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11858                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11859                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11860                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11861                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11862                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11863                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11864                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11865                                         }
11866                                 } else {
11867                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11868                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11869                                         debug_assert!(false);
11870                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11871                                 }
11872                         }
11873                 }
11874
11875                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11876                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11877                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11878                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11879                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11880                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11881                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11882                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11883                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11884                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11885                                         });
11886                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11887                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11888                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11889                                 } else {
11890                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11891                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11892                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11893                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11894                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11895                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11896                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11897                                         log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11898                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11899                                 }
11900                         }
11901                 }
11902
11903                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11904                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11905
11906                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11907                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11908                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11909                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11910
11911                 {
11912                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11913                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11914                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11915                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11916                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11917                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11918                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11919                         // 0.0.102+
11920                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11921                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11922                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11923                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11924                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11925                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11926                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11927                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11928                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11929                                                         }
11930
11931                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11932                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11933                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11934                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11935                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11936                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11937                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11938                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11939                                                                 },
11940                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11941                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11942                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11943                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11944                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11945                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11946                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11947                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11948                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11949                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11950                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11951                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11952                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11953                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11954                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11955                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11956                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11957                                                                         });
11958                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11959                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11960                                                                 }
11961                                                         }
11962                                                 }
11963                                         }
11964                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11965                                                 match htlc_source {
11966                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11967                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11968                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11969                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11970                                                                 };
11971                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11972                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11973                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11974                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11975                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11976                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11977                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11978                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11979                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11980                                                                                 if matches {
11981                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11982                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11983                                                                                 }
11984                                                                                 !matches
11985                                                                         });
11986                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11987                                                                 });
11988                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11989                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11990                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11991                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11992                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11993                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11994                                                                                                 false
11995                                                                                         } else { true }
11996                                                                                 } else { true }
11997                                                                         });
11998                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
11999                                                                 });
12000                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12001                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12002                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12003                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12004                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12005                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12006                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
12007                                                                                         } else { true }
12008                                                                                 });
12009                                                                                 false
12010                                                                         } else { true }
12011                                                                 });
12012                                                         },
12013                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12014                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12015                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12016                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12017                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12018                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12019                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12020                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12021                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12022                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12023                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12024                                                                         let compl_action =
12025                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12026                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12027                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12028                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12029                                                                                 };
12030                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12031                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12032                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12033                                                                 }
12034                                                         },
12035                                                 }
12036                                         }
12037                                 }
12038
12039                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12040                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12041                                 // payments.
12042                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12043                                         .into_iter()
12044                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12045                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12046                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12047                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12048                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12049                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12050                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12051                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12052                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12053                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12054                                                         } else { None }
12055                                                 } else {
12056                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12057                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12058                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12059                                                         // channel still live case here.
12060                                                         None
12061                                                 }
12062                                         });
12063                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12064                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12065                                 }
12066                         }
12067                 }
12068
12069                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12070                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12071                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12072                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12073                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12074                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12075                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12076                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12077                         }, None));
12078                 }
12079
12080                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12081                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12082
12083                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12084                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12085                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12086                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12087                         }
12088                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12089                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12090                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12091                                 }
12092                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12093                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12094                                 {
12095                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12096                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12097                                         });
12098                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12099                                 }
12100                         } else {
12101                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12102                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12103                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12104                                         });
12105                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12106                                 }
12107                         }
12108                 } else {
12109                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12110                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12111                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12112                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12113                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12114                                 }
12115                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12116                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12117                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12118                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12119                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12120                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12121                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12122                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12123                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12124                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12125                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12126                                                                                 }
12127                                                                         }
12128                                                                 },
12129                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12130                                                         }
12131                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12132                                         },
12133                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12134                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12135                                 };
12136                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12137                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12138                                 });
12139                         }
12140                 }
12141
12142                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12143                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12144
12145                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12146                         Ok(key) => key,
12147                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12148                 };
12149                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12150                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12151                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12152                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12153                         }
12154                 }
12155
12156                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12157                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12158                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12159                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12160                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12161                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12162                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12163                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12164                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12165                                                 loop {
12166                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12167                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12168                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12169                                                 }
12170                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12171                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12172                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12173                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12174                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12175                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12176                                         }
12177                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12178                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12179                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12180                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12181                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12182                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12183                                                 }
12184                                         }
12185                                 } else {
12186                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12187                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12188                                         debug_assert!(false);
12189                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12190                                 }
12191                         }
12192                 }
12193
12194                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12195
12196                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12197                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12198                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12199                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12200                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12201                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12202                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12203                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12204                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12205                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12206                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12207                                         }
12208                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12209                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12210
12211                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12212                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12213                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12214                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12215                                                 //
12216                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12217                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12218                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12219                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12220                                                 // reason to.
12221                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12222                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12223                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12224                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12225                                                 // restart.
12226                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12227                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12228                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12229                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12230                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12231                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12232                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12233                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12234                                                         }
12235                                                 }
12236                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12237                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12238                                                 }
12239                                         }
12240                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12241                                                 receiver_node_id,
12242                                                 payment_hash,
12243                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12244                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12245                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12246                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12247                                         }, None));
12248                                 }
12249                         }
12250                 }
12251
12252                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12253                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12254                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12255                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12256                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12257                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12258                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12259                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12260                                                 } = action {
12261                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12262                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12263                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12264                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12265                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12266                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12267                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12268                                                         } else {
12269                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12270                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12271                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12272                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12273                                                                 // anymore.
12274                                                         }
12275                                                 }
12276                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12277                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12278                                                 }
12279                                         }
12280                                 }
12281                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12282                         } else {
12283                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12284                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12285                         }
12286                 }
12287
12288                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12289                         chain_hash,
12290                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12291                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12292                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12293                         router: args.router,
12294
12295                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12296
12297                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12298                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12299                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12300                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12301
12302                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12303                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12304                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12305                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12306                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12307                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12308                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12309
12310                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12311
12312                         our_network_pubkey,
12313                         secp_ctx,
12314
12315                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12316
12317                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12318
12319                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12320                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12321                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12322                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12323                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12324
12325                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12326                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12327
12328                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12329
12330                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12331
12332                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12333
12334                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12335                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12336                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12337
12338                         logger: args.logger,
12339                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12340                 };
12341
12342                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12343                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12344                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12345                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12346                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12347                 }
12348
12349                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12350                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12351                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12352                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12353                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12354                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12355                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12356                         );
12357                 }
12358
12359                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12360                 //connection or two.
12361
12362                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12363         }
12364 }
12365
12366 #[cfg(test)]
12367 mod tests {
12368         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12369         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12370         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12371         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12372         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12373         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12374         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12375         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12376         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12377         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12378         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12379         use crate::prelude::*;
12380         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12381         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12382         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12383         use crate::util::test_utils;
12384         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12385         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12386
12387         #[test]
12388         fn test_notify_limits() {
12389                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12390                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12391                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12392                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12393                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12394                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12395
12396                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12397                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12398                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12399                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12400                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12401
12402                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12403
12404                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12405                 // to connect messages with new values
12406                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12407                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12408                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12409                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12410                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12411                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12412
12413                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12414                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12415                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12416                 // ... but the last node should not.
12417                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12418                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12419                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12420                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12421
12422                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12423                 // about the channel.
12424                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12425                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12426                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12427
12428                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12429                 // parties.
12430                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12431                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12432                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12433                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12434                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12435                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12436
12437                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12438                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12439                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12440
12441                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12442                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12443                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12444                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12445                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12446                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12447
12448                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12449                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12450                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12451                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12452                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12453                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12454                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12455                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12456
12457                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12458                 // the channel info has updated.
12459                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12460                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12461                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12462                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12463                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12464                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12465         }
12466
12467         #[test]
12468         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12469                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12470                 // expected.
12471                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12472                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12473                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12474                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12475                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12476
12477                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12478                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12479                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12480                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12481
12482                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12483                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12484                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12485                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12486                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12487                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12488                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12489                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12490                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12491                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12492                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12493                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12494
12495                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12496                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12497                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12498                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12499                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12500                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12501                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12502                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12503                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12505                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12506                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12507                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12508                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12509                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12510                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12511                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12512                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12513                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12514                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12515                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12516                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12517                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12518
12519                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12520                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12521                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12523                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12524                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12525                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12526
12527                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12528                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12529                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12530                 // lightning messages manually.
12531                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12532                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12533                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12534
12535                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12536                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12537                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12538                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12539                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12540                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12541                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12542                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12543                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12544                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12545                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12546                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12547                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12548                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12550                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12551                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12552                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12553                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12554                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12555                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12556                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12557                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12558                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12559                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12560                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12561
12562                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12563                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12564                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12565                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12566                 match events[0] {
12567                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12568                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12569                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12570                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12571                         },
12572                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12573                 }
12574                 match events[1] {
12575                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12576                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12577                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12578                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12579                         },
12580                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12581                 }
12582         }
12583
12584         #[test]
12585         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12586                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12587                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12588         }
12589
12590         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12591                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12592                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12593                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12594                 //      fails as expected.
12595                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12596                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12597                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12598                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12599                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12600                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12601                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12602                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12603                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12604                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12605                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12606                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12607                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12608                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12609                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12610
12611                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12612                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12613                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12614
12615                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12616                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12617                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12618                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12619                 let route = find_route(
12620                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12621                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12622                 ).unwrap();
12623                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12624                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12625                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12626                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12627                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12628                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12629                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12630                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12631                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12632                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12633                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12634                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12635                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12636                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12637                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12638                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12639                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12640                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12641                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12642                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12643                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12644                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12645                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12646                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12647
12648                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12649                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12650
12651                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12652                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12653                 let route = find_route(
12654                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12655                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12656                 ).unwrap();
12657                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12658                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12659                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12660                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12661                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12662                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12663                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12664                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12665
12666                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12667                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12668                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12669                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12670                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12671                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12672                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12673                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12674                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12675                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12676                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12677                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12678                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12679                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12681                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12682                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12683                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12684                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12685                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12686                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12687                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12688                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12689                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12690
12691                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12692                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12693
12694                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12695                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12696                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12697                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12698                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12699                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12700                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12701                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12702                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12703                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12704
12705                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12706                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12707                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12708                         100_000
12709                 );
12710                 let route = find_route(
12711                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12712                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12713                 ).unwrap();
12714                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12715                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12716                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12717                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12718                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12719                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12720                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12721                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12722                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12724                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12725                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12726                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12727                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12728                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12729                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12730                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12731                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12732                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12733                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12734                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12735                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12736                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12737
12738                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12739                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12740         }
12741
12742         #[test]
12743         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12744                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12745                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12746                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12747                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12748                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12749                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12750
12751                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12752                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12753
12754                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12755                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12756                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12757                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12758                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12759                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12760                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12761                 let route = find_route(
12762                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12763                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12764                 ).unwrap();
12765
12766                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12767                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12768                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12769                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12770                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12771                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12772                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12773
12774                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12775                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12776                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12777                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12778                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12779                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12780                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12781
12782                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12783         }
12784
12785         #[test]
12786         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12787                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12788                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12789                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12790                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12791                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12792                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12793                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12794                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12795
12796                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12797                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12798
12799                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12800                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12801                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12802                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12803                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12804                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12805                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12806                 let route = find_route(
12807                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12808                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12809                 ).unwrap();
12810
12811                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12812                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12813                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12814                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12815                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12816                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12817                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12818                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12819                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12820
12821                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12822                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12823                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12824                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12825                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12826                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12827                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12828
12829                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12830         }
12831
12832         #[test]
12833         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12834                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12835                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12836                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12837                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12838
12839                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12840                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12841                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12842                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12843
12844                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12845                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12846                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12847                 route.paths.push(path);
12848                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12849                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12850                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12851                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12852                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12853                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12854
12855                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12856                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12857                 .unwrap_err() {
12858                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12859                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12860                         },
12861                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12862                 }
12863         }
12864
12865         #[test]
12866         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12867                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12868                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12869                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12870                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12871
12872                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12873
12874                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12875                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12876                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12877
12878                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12879                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12880                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12881
12882                 {
12883                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12884                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12885                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12886                 }
12887
12888                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12889                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12890                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12891
12892                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12893                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12894
12895                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12896                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12897
12898                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12899                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12900                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12901                 }, true).unwrap();
12902                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12903                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12904                 }, false).unwrap();
12905
12906                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12907                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12908                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12909                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12910                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12911                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12912                 }
12913                 {
12914                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12915                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12916                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12917                 }
12918         }
12919
12920         #[test]
12921         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12922                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12923                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12924                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12925                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12926
12927                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12928
12929                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12930                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12931
12932                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12933                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12934                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12935                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12936
12937                 {
12938                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12939                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12940                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12941                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12942                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12943                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12944                 }
12945
12946                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12947
12948                 {
12949                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12950                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12951                 }
12952         }
12953
12954         #[test]
12955         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12956                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12957                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12958                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12959                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12960                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12961
12962                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12963                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12964                         payment_secret,
12965                         total_msat: 100_000,
12966                 };
12967
12968                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12969                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12970                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12971                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12972                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12973                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12974                         Err(()) => {
12975                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12976                         }
12977                 }
12978
12979                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12980                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12981         }
12982
12983         #[test]
12984         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12985                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12986                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12987                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12988                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12989                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12990                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12991                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12992
12993                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12994                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12995                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12996                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12997                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12998
12999                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13000                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13001                 {
13002                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13003                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13004                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13005                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13006                 }
13007
13008                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13009                 {
13010                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13011                         // as it has the funding transaction.
13012                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13013                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13014                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13015                 }
13016
13017                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13018
13019                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13020
13021                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13022                 {
13023                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13024                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13025                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13026                 }
13027                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13028
13029                 {
13030                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13031                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13032                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13033                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13034                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13035                 }
13036                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13037                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13038                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13039                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13040                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13041                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13042                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13043                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13044
13045                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13046                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13047                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13048                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13049
13050                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13051                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13052                 {
13053                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13054                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13055                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13056                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13057                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13058                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13059                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13060                 }
13061
13062                 {
13063                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13064                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13065                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13066                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13067                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13068                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13069                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13070                 }
13071
13072                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13073                 {
13074                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13075                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13076                         // closing transaction).
13077                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13078                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13079                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13080
13081                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13082                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13083                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13084                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13085                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13086                 }
13087
13088                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13089
13090                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13091                 {
13092                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13093                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13094                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13095                 }
13096                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13097
13098                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13099                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13100         }
13101
13102         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13103                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13104                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13105         }
13106
13107         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13108                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13109                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13110         }
13111
13112         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13113                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13114                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13115         }
13116
13117         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13118                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13119                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13120         }
13121
13122         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13123                 match res_err {
13124                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13125                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13126                         },
13127                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13128                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13129                         },
13130                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13131                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13132                 }
13133         }
13134
13135         #[test]
13136         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13137                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13138                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13139                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13140                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13141                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13142                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13143                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13144
13145                 // Dummy values
13146                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13147                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13148                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13149
13150                 // Test the API functions.
13151                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13152
13153                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13154
13155                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13156
13157                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13158
13159                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13160
13161                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13162
13163                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13164         }
13165
13166         #[test]
13167         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13168                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13169                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13170                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13171                 // the given `channel_id`.
13172                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13173                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13174                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13175                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13176
13177                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13178
13179                 // Dummy values
13180                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13181
13182                 // Test the API functions.
13183                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13184
13185                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13186
13187                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13188
13189                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13190
13191                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13192
13193                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13194         }
13195
13196         #[test]
13197         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13198                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13199                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13200                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13201                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13202                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13203
13204                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13205
13206                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13207                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13208
13209                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13210                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13211                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13212                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13213
13214                         if idx == 0 {
13215                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13216                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13217                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13218                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13219                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13220
13221                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13222                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13223                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13224
13225                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13226
13227                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13228                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13229                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13230                         }
13231                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13232                 }
13233
13234                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13235                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13236                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13237                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13238                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13239                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13240
13241                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13242                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13243                 // limit.
13244                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13245                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13246                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13247                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13248                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13249                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13250                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13251                         }, true).unwrap();
13252                 }
13253                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13254                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13255                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13256                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13257                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13258
13259                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13260                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13261                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13262                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13263                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13264                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13265                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13266                 }
13267                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13268                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13269                 }, true).unwrap();
13270                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13271                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13272                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13273
13274                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13275                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13276                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13277                 }, false).unwrap();
13278                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13279
13280                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13281                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13282                 // open channels.
13283                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13284                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13285                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13286                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13287                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13288                 }
13289                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13290                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13291                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13292
13293                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13294                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13295                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13296
13297                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13298                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13299                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13300                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13301                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13302                 }, true).unwrap();
13303                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13304
13305                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13306                 // last_random_pk.
13307                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13308                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13309         }
13310
13311         #[test]
13312         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13313                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13314                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13315                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13316                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13317                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13318
13319                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13320
13321                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13322                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13323
13324                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13325                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13326                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13327                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13328                 }
13329
13330                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13331                 // rejected.
13332                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13333                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13334                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13335
13336                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13337                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13338                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13339
13340                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13341                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13342                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13343                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13344         }
13345
13346         #[test]
13347         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13348                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13349                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13350                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13351                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13352                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13353                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13354                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13355                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13356
13357                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13358
13359                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13360                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13361
13362                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13363                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13364                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13365                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13366                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13367                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13368                         }, true).unwrap();
13369
13370                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13371                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13372                         match events[0] {
13373                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13374                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13375                                 }
13376                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13377                         }
13378                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13379                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13380                 }
13381
13382                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13383                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13384                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13385                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13386                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13387                 }, true).unwrap();
13388                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13389                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13390                 match events[0] {
13391                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13392                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13393                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13394                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13395                                         _ => panic!(),
13396                                 }
13397                         }
13398                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13399                 }
13400                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13401                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13402
13403                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13404                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13405                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13406                 match events[0] {
13407                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13408                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13409                         }
13410                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13411                 }
13412                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13413         }
13414
13415         #[test]
13416         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13417                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13418                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13419                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13420                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13421                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13422                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13423                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13424                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13425                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13426                         payment_metadata: None,
13427                         keysend_preimage: None,
13428                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13429                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13430                         }),
13431                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13432                 };
13433                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13434                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13435                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13436                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13437                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13438                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13439                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13440                 {
13441                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13442                 } else { panic!(); }
13443
13444                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13445                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13446                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13447                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13448                         payment_metadata: None,
13449                         keysend_preimage: None,
13450                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13451                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13452                         }),
13453                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13454                 };
13455                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13456                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13457                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13458                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13459         }
13460
13461         #[test]
13462         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13463                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13464                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13465                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13466                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13467
13468                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13469                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13470                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13471                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13472                         payment_metadata: None,
13473                         keysend_preimage: None,
13474                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13475                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13476                         }),
13477                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13478                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13479                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13480
13481                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13482                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13483                 // is not satisfied.
13484                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13485         }
13486
13487         #[test]
13488         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13489                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13490                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13491                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13492                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13493
13494                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13495                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13496
13497                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13498                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13499                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13500                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13501                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13502
13503                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13504                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13505
13506                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13507                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13508                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13509                 match &msg_events[0] {
13510                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13511                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13512                                 match action {
13513                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13514                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13515                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13516                                 }
13517                         }
13518                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13519                 }
13520
13521                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13522                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13523                 match events[0] {
13524                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13525                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13527                 }
13528                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13529         }
13530
13531         #[test]
13532         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13533                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13534                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13535                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13536                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13537                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13538                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13539                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13540                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13541                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13542                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13543
13544                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13545                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13546                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13547
13548                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13549                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13550                 match events[0] {
13551                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13552                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13553                         }
13554                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13555                 }
13556
13557                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13558                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13559
13560                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13561                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13562
13563                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13564                 // not have generated any events.
13565                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13566         }
13567
13568         #[test]
13569         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13570                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13571                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13572                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13573                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13574                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13575                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13576                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13577
13578                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13579                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13580                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13581
13582                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13583                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13584                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13585                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13586                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13587                 match &events[0] {
13588                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13589                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13590                 }
13591
13592                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13593                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13594                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13595
13596                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13597                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13598                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13599                         ..Default::default()
13600                 }).unwrap();
13601                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13602                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13603                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13604                 match &events[0] {
13605                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13606                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13607                 }
13608
13609                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13610                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13611                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13612                         ..Default::default()
13613                 }).unwrap();
13614                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13615                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13616                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13617                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13618                 match &events[0] {
13619                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13620                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13621                 }
13622
13623                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13624                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13625                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13626                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13627                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13628                 assert!(
13629                         matches!(
13630                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13631                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13632                                         ..Default::default()
13633                                 }),
13634                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13635                         )
13636                 );
13637                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13638                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13639                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13640                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13641         }
13642
13643         #[test]
13644         fn test_payment_display() {
13645                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13646                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13647                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13648                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13649                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13650                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13651         }
13652
13653         #[test]
13654         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13655                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13656                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13657                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13658                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13659                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13660
13661                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13662                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13663                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13664                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13665                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13666                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13667                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13668                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13669                 {
13670                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13671                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13672                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13673                 }
13674
13675                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13676                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13677                 // their side.
13678                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13679                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13680                 }, true).unwrap();
13681                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13682                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13683                 }, false).unwrap();
13684                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13685                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13686                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13687                 );
13688                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13689
13690                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13691                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13692                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13693                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13694                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13695                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13696                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13697                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13698                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13699                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13700                 } else { panic!() };
13701                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13702                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13703                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13704                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13705                 };
13706                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13707                 {
13708                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13709                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13710                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13711                 }
13712         }
13713
13714         #[test]
13715         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13716                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13717                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13718                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13719                 let persister;
13720                 let chain_monitor;
13721                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13722                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13723                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13724
13725                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13726                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13727                 };
13728                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13729                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13730                 };
13731
13732                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13733                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13734                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13735                         } else {
13736                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13737                         }
13738                 }).collect();
13739
13740                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13741                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13742                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13743                         } else {
13744                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13745                         }
13746                 }).collect();
13747
13748
13749                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13750                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13751                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13752                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13753
13754                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13755                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13756                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13757
13758                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13759
13760                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13761                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13762                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13763                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13764                 }
13765                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13766                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13767
13768                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13769         }
13770 }
13771
13772 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13773 pub mod bench {
13774         use crate::chain::Listen;
13775         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13776         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13777         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13778         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13779         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13780         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13781         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13782         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13783         use crate::util::test_utils;
13784         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13785
13786         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13787         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13788         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13789         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13790
13791         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13792
13793         use criterion::Criterion;
13794
13795         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13796                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13797                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13798                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13799                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13800                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13801                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13802
13803         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13804                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13805         }
13806         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13807                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13808                 #[inline]
13809                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13810                 #[inline]
13811                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13812         }
13813
13814         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13815                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13816         }
13817
13818         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13819                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13820                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13821                 // calls per node.
13822                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13823                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13824
13825                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13826                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13827                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13828                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13829                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13830
13831                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13832                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13833                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13834
13835                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13836                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13837                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13838                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13839                         network,
13840                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13841                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13842                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13843
13844                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13845                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13846                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13847                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13848                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13849                         network,
13850                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13851                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13852                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13853
13854                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13855                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13856                 }, true).unwrap();
13857                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13858                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13859                 }, false).unwrap();
13860                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13861                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13862                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13863
13864                 let tx;
13865                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13866                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13867                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13868                         }]};
13869                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13870                 } else { panic!(); }
13871
13872                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13873                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13874                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13875                 match events_b[0] {
13876                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13877                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13878                         },
13879                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13880                 }
13881
13882                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13883                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13884                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13885                 match events_a[0] {
13886                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13887                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13888                         },
13889                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13890                 }
13891
13892                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13893
13894                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13895                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13896                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13897
13898                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13899                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13900                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13901                 match msg_events[0] {
13902                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13903                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13904                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13905                         },
13906                         _ => panic!(),
13907                 }
13908                 match msg_events[1] {
13909                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13910                         _ => panic!(),
13911                 }
13912
13913                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13914                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13915                 match events_a[0] {
13916                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13917                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13918                         },
13919                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13920                 }
13921
13922                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13923                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13924                 match events_b[0] {
13925                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13926                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13927                         },
13928                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13929                 }
13930
13931                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13932                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13933                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13934                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13935                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13936                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13937                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13938                                 payment_count += 1;
13939                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13940                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13941
13942                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13943                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13944                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13945                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13946                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13947                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13948                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13949                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13950                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13951                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13952                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13953
13954                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13955                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13956                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13957                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13958
13959                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13960                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13961                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13962                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13963                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13964                                         },
13965                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13966                                 }
13967
13968                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13969                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13970                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13971                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13972
13973                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13974                         }
13975                 }
13976
13977                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13978                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13979                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13980                 }));
13981         }
13982 }