1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureDescriptor};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for MppId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for MppId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
206 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
209 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
219 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
230 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244 err: msgs::LightningError,
245 chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
262 shutdown_finish: None,
266 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
268 err: LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
273 shutdown_finish: None,
277 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
281 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
283 err: LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
297 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
304 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
308 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
328 shutdown_finish: None,
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
347 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375 /// commitment transaction.
376 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
382 latest_features: InitFeatures,
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394 /// this payment being removed.
396 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397 user_payment_id: u64,
398 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
403 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
404 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
405 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
406 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
407 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
408 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
409 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
410 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
412 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
413 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
414 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
415 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
416 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
417 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
418 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
419 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
420 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
422 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
423 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
425 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
426 /// to individual Channels.
428 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
429 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
430 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
431 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
433 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
434 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
435 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
436 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
437 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
438 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
439 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
441 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
442 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
443 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
444 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
447 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
448 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
449 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
450 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
451 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
453 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
454 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
455 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
456 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
458 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
459 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
461 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
465 default_configuration: UserConfig,
466 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
472 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
474 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
475 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
477 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
478 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
480 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
482 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
483 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
484 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
485 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
486 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
487 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
489 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
490 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
491 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
492 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
493 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
494 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
495 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
496 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
498 /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
499 /// payments over a single path).
501 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
502 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
504 our_network_key: SecretKey,
505 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
507 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
508 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
509 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
511 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
512 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
513 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
514 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
516 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
517 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
518 /// are currently open with that peer.
519 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
520 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
523 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
524 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
526 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
527 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
528 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
529 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
530 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
531 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
532 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
533 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
534 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
536 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
543 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
545 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
546 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
547 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
548 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
549 pub struct ChainParameters {
550 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
551 pub network: Network,
553 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
555 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
556 pub best_block: BestBlock,
559 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
565 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
566 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
567 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
568 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
569 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
570 /// updates are ready for persistence).
572 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
573 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
574 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
575 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
576 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
578 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
579 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
582 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
583 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
587 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
588 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
590 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
591 persistence_notifier: notifier,
592 should_persist: persist_check,
593 _read_guard: read_guard,
598 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
600 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
601 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
607 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
611 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
612 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
613 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
614 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
615 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
617 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
618 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
620 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
622 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
623 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
624 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
625 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
626 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
627 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
628 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
630 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
631 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
633 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
634 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
635 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
636 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
638 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
639 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
640 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
641 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
642 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
643 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
646 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
648 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
649 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
652 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
657 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
658 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
659 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
660 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
661 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
662 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
663 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
664 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
668 /// to better separate parameters.
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
671 /// The node_id of our counterparty
672 pub node_id: PublicKey,
673 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
674 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
675 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
676 pub features: InitFeatures,
677 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
678 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
679 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
681 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
683 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686 /// payments to us through this channel.
687 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
690 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
692 pub struct ChannelDetails {
693 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
694 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
695 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
696 /// lifetime of the channel.
697 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
698 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
699 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
700 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
701 /// our counterparty already.
703 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
704 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
705 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
706 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
707 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
708 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
709 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
710 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
711 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
712 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
713 /// this value on chain.
715 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
719 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
720 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
721 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
723 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
724 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
725 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
726 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
728 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
729 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
730 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
731 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
732 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
733 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
734 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
735 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
736 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
738 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
739 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
740 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
741 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
742 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
743 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
744 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
748 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
750 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
753 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
754 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
755 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
756 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
757 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
758 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
760 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
761 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
762 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
763 pub is_outbound: bool,
764 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
765 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
766 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
767 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
768 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
770 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
771 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
781 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
782 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
785 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
786 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
787 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
788 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
789 ParameterError(APIError),
790 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
791 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
792 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
795 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
797 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
798 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
799 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
800 /// paths than the ones selected).
801 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
802 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
803 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
804 /// in over-/re-payment.
806 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
807 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
808 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
810 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
811 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
812 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
813 /// with the latest update_id.
814 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
817 macro_rules! handle_error {
818 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
821 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
822 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
824 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
825 // entering the macro.
826 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
827 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
830 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
832 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
833 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
834 if let Some(update) = update_option {
835 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
839 if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
840 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
844 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
845 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
847 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
848 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
849 action: err.action.clone()
853 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
854 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
857 // Return error in case higher-API need one
864 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
865 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
866 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
868 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
869 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
871 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
873 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
874 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
876 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
877 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
878 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
879 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
881 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
882 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
884 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
885 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
886 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
887 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
889 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
890 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
896 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
897 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
901 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
903 $entry.remove_entry();
911 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
912 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
916 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
918 $entry.remove_entry();
926 macro_rules! remove_channel {
927 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
929 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
930 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
931 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
938 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
939 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
940 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
942 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
944 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
945 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
946 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
947 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
949 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
950 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
951 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
952 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
953 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
954 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
955 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
956 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
957 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
958 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
959 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
962 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
963 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
964 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
965 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
967 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
968 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
970 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
971 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
973 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
974 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
975 if !$resend_commitment {
976 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
979 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
981 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
982 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
986 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
987 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
989 $entry.remove_entry();
995 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
996 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
997 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
999 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1000 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1004 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1005 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1006 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1007 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1008 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1011 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1016 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1017 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1018 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1019 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1020 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1021 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1023 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1024 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1026 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1027 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1028 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1029 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1032 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1033 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1034 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1035 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1036 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1037 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1038 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1039 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1040 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1041 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1042 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1043 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1046 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1047 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1048 // before it should be allowed to.
1049 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1050 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1051 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1054 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1055 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1056 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1057 msg: announcement_sigs,
1060 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1063 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1064 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1065 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1066 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1067 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1068 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1069 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1070 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1071 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1072 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1073 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1074 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1075 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1076 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1077 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1078 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1079 let mut order = $order;
1081 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1083 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1087 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1088 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1089 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1090 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1095 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1096 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1097 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1098 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1099 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1104 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1108 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1113 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1114 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1115 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1120 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1121 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1122 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1123 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1124 assert!(res.is_ok());
1127 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1131 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1132 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1133 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1135 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1137 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1138 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1143 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1144 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1145 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1146 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1147 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1150 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1152 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1153 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1155 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1157 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1159 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1160 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1161 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1162 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1163 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1164 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1167 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1168 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1169 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1173 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1175 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1176 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1177 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1178 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1179 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1180 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1182 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1183 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1185 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1186 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1189 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1190 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1192 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1194 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1195 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1196 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1197 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1205 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1206 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1207 &self.default_configuration
1210 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1212 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1213 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1214 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1215 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1216 /// otherwise ignored.
1218 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1219 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1221 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1222 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1224 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1225 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1226 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1227 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1228 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1229 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1233 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1234 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1235 Some(peer_state) => {
1236 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1237 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1238 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1239 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1241 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1244 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1246 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1247 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1248 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1250 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1253 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1254 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1256 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1261 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1262 node_id: their_network_key,
1268 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1269 let mut res = Vec::new();
1271 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1272 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1273 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1274 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1275 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1276 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1277 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1278 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1279 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1280 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1281 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1282 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1283 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1285 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1286 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1287 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1288 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1289 inbound_capacity_msat,
1290 outbound_capacity_msat,
1291 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1292 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1293 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1294 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1295 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1296 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1297 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1302 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1303 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1304 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1310 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1311 /// more information.
1312 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1313 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1316 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1317 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1319 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1320 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1322 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1323 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1324 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1325 // really wanted anyway.
1326 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1329 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1332 let counterparty_node_id;
1333 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1334 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1335 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1339 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1341 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1342 Some(peer_state) => {
1343 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1344 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1345 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1347 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1349 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1351 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1352 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1353 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1354 let (result, is_permanent) =
1355 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1357 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1364 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1368 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1369 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1370 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1371 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1382 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1383 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1386 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1390 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1391 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1392 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1394 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1395 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1397 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1398 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1399 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1400 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1402 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1404 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1405 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1406 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1407 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1408 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1411 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1412 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1413 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1415 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1416 /// the channel being closed or not:
1417 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1418 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1419 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1420 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1421 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1422 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1423 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1425 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1427 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1428 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1429 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1430 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1431 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1435 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1436 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1437 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1438 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1439 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1441 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1442 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1443 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1444 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1445 // ignore the result here.
1446 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1450 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1454 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1455 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1456 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1457 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1460 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1461 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1463 chan.remove_entry().1
1465 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1468 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1469 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1470 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1471 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1472 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1476 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::ForceClosed { peer_msg: if peer_msg.is_some() { Some(peer_msg.unwrap().clone()) } else { None }}});
1478 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1481 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1482 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1483 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1485 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1486 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1487 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1488 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1489 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1490 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1491 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1501 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1502 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1503 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1504 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1505 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1509 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1510 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1511 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1513 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1514 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1515 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1516 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1517 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1518 failure_code: $err_code,
1519 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1524 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1525 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1528 let shared_secret = {
1529 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1530 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1533 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1535 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1536 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1537 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1538 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1539 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1540 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1541 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1542 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1545 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1546 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1547 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1548 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1549 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1552 let mut channel_state = None;
1553 macro_rules! return_err {
1554 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1556 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1557 if channel_state.is_none() {
1558 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1560 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1561 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1562 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1563 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1564 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1569 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1570 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1571 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1572 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1574 let error_code = match err {
1575 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1576 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1577 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1578 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1579 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1581 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1584 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1585 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1586 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1593 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1596 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1597 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1598 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1599 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1600 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1601 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1602 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1603 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1604 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1605 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1606 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1607 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1611 // final_expiry_too_soon
1612 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1613 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1614 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1615 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1616 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1617 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1618 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1620 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1621 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1622 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1624 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1625 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1626 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1629 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1630 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1631 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1632 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1633 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1634 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1635 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1636 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1638 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1640 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1641 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1642 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1643 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1644 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1645 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1646 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1647 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1648 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1651 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1653 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1656 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1661 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1662 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1663 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1664 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1666 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1668 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1669 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1670 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1671 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1674 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1675 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1676 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1678 // Check two things:
1679 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1680 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1681 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1683 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1685 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1686 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1687 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1689 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1691 let blinding_factor = {
1692 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1693 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1694 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1695 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1698 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1700 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1702 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1705 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1706 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1709 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1710 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1711 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1712 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1713 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1717 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1718 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1719 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1722 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1723 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1724 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1725 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1729 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1730 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1731 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1732 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1733 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1734 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1735 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1736 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1737 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1738 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1739 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1741 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1744 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1746 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1747 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1748 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1749 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1750 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1753 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1754 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1755 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1756 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1757 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1758 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1759 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1761 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1762 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1764 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1765 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1766 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1767 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1768 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1770 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1771 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1773 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1774 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1775 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1776 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1777 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1779 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1780 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1782 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1783 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1784 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1785 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1791 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1792 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1793 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1794 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1796 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1797 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1799 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1800 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1801 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1803 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1805 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1810 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1813 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1814 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1815 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1817 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1818 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1819 if !chan.should_announce() {
1820 return Err(LightningError {
1821 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1822 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1825 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1826 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1829 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1830 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1831 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1832 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1833 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1834 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1835 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1836 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1837 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1841 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1843 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1844 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1846 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1847 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1848 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1849 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1850 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1851 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1852 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1853 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1856 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1857 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1859 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1865 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1866 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1867 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1868 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1869 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1870 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1872 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1873 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1874 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1875 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1876 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1878 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1881 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1882 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1883 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1885 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1886 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1887 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1888 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1889 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1892 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1893 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1895 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1896 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1898 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1899 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1901 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1903 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1904 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1906 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1908 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1909 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1910 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1911 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1912 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1913 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1914 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1915 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1916 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1919 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1920 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1921 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1922 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1923 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1924 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1925 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1926 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1934 } else { unreachable!(); }
1938 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1939 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1941 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1946 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1948 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1949 /// fields for more info.
1951 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1952 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1953 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1954 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1955 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1956 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1958 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1960 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1961 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1962 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1964 /// In general, a path may raise:
1965 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1966 /// node public key) is specified.
1967 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1968 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1970 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1971 /// relevant updates.
1973 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1974 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1975 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1977 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1978 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1979 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1980 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1982 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1983 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1984 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1985 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1986 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1989 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1990 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1991 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1993 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1994 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1995 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1996 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1997 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1999 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2000 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2002 let mut total_value = 0;
2003 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2004 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2005 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2006 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2007 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2008 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2009 continue 'path_check;
2011 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2012 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2013 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2014 continue 'path_check;
2017 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2018 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2020 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2021 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2024 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2025 let mut results = Vec::new();
2026 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2027 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2029 let mut has_ok = false;
2030 let mut has_err = false;
2031 for res in results.iter() {
2032 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2033 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2034 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2035 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2042 if has_err && has_ok {
2043 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2045 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2051 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2052 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2053 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2054 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2055 /// never reach the recipient.
2057 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2059 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2060 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2062 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2064 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2065 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2066 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2068 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2070 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2071 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2072 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2077 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2078 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2079 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2080 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2082 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2084 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2086 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2087 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2088 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2089 } else { unreachable!(); })
2092 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2094 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2095 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2098 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2099 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2104 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2105 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2106 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2109 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2111 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2113 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2121 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2122 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2123 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2127 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2129 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2130 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2132 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2134 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2135 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2136 /// keys per-channel).
2138 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2139 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2140 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2142 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2143 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2144 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2146 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2147 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2150 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2151 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2152 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2153 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2157 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2158 let mut output_index = None;
2159 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2160 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2161 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2162 if output_index.is_some() {
2163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2164 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2167 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2168 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2169 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2172 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2175 if output_index.is_none() {
2176 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2177 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2180 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2184 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2185 if !chan.should_announce() {
2186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2190 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2192 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2194 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2195 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2197 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2198 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2199 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2200 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2201 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2206 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2207 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2208 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2210 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2213 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2214 // smaller than 500:
2215 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2217 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2218 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2219 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2220 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2221 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2222 /// our network addresses.
2224 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2225 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2227 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2228 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2229 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2230 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2232 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2234 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2235 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2238 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2239 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2242 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2243 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2244 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2246 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2247 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2248 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2249 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2250 rgb, alias, addresses,
2251 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2252 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2254 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2255 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2257 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2258 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2260 let mut announced_chans = false;
2261 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2262 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2263 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2265 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2270 announced_chans = true;
2272 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2273 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2274 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2278 if announced_chans {
2279 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2280 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2281 signature: node_announce_sig,
2282 contents: announcement
2288 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2290 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2291 /// Will likely generate further events.
2292 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2295 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2296 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2297 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2299 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2300 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2302 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2303 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2304 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2305 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2307 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2308 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2309 match forward_info {
2310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2311 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2312 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2313 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2314 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2315 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2316 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2318 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2319 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2322 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2323 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2324 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2325 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2326 // problem, not ours.
2333 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2334 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2335 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2336 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2337 match forward_info {
2338 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2339 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2341 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2342 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2344 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2345 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2346 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2347 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2348 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2350 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2352 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2355 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2357 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2358 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2359 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2365 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2367 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2368 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2369 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2370 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2371 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2372 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2373 // this channel currently :/.
2379 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2380 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2382 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2384 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2386 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2389 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2391 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2392 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2393 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2396 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2398 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2399 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2400 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2401 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2402 // messages when we can.
2403 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2404 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2405 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2412 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2413 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2416 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2417 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2418 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2419 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2420 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2421 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2423 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2425 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2426 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2427 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2429 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_errors for us.
2430 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2432 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2434 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2438 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2439 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2442 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2443 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2445 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2446 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2447 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2448 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2449 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2452 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2460 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2461 match forward_info {
2462 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2463 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2464 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2465 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2466 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2467 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2468 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2469 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2471 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2474 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2475 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2476 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2477 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2478 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2479 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2481 value: amt_to_forward,
2486 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2488 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2489 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2490 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2492 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2493 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2494 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2495 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2496 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2498 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2503 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2504 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2505 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2506 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2507 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2508 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2509 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2510 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2512 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2513 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2514 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2515 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2517 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2518 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2520 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2521 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2523 amt: amt_to_forward,
2524 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2529 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2537 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2540 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2541 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2544 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2546 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2547 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2549 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2552 let mut total_value = 0;
2553 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2554 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2555 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2556 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2562 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2563 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2564 total_value += htlc.value;
2565 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2566 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2567 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2569 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2570 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2572 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2574 _ => unreachable!(),
2577 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2578 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2579 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2580 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2583 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2584 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2586 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2587 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2588 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2589 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2593 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2594 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2596 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2598 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2599 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2606 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2607 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2615 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2616 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2619 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2620 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2623 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2624 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2625 events.append(&mut new_events);
2628 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2630 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2631 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2633 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2634 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2635 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2636 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2637 if background_events.is_empty() {
2641 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2643 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2644 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2645 // monitor updating completing.
2646 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2653 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2654 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2655 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2656 self.process_background_events();
2659 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2660 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2661 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2662 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2664 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2665 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2667 if !chan.is_live() {
2668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2669 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2670 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2673 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2675 let mut retain_channel = true;
2676 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2679 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2680 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2684 let ret_err = match res {
2685 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2686 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2687 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2688 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2691 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2692 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2693 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2694 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2695 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2696 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2697 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2698 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2708 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2712 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2713 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2714 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2715 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2716 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2717 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2718 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2720 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2722 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2724 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2725 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2726 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2727 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2728 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2729 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2730 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2732 handle_errors.push(err);
2742 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2744 /// This currently includes:
2745 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2746 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2747 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2750 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2751 /// estimate fetches.
2752 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2754 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2755 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2757 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2759 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2762 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2763 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2764 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2765 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2766 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2767 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2768 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2770 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2772 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2774 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2775 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2776 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2777 if needs_close { return false; }
2780 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2781 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2782 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2783 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2784 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2785 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2786 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2791 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2792 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2794 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2795 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2800 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2801 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2810 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2811 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2817 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2818 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2819 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2820 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2821 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2822 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2825 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2826 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2827 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2828 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2829 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2830 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2831 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2832 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2833 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2834 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2835 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2841 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2842 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2843 // be surfaced to the user.
2844 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2845 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2847 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2848 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2849 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2851 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2852 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2854 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2859 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2860 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2861 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2863 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2864 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2865 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2866 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2867 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2868 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2869 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2870 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2872 rejected_by_dest: false,
2873 network_update: None,
2874 all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
2881 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2893 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2894 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2895 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2896 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2897 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2898 /// still-available channels.
2899 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2900 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2901 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2902 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2905 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2906 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2907 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2909 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2910 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2911 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2912 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2913 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
2914 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2915 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2916 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2919 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2920 all_paths_failed = true;
2924 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2927 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2928 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2929 match &onion_error {
2930 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2932 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2934 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2935 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2936 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2937 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2938 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2939 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2940 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2941 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2945 error_code: onion_error_code,
2947 error_data: onion_error_data
2951 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2957 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2958 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2959 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2960 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2962 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2963 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2964 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2965 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2966 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2967 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2968 network_update: None,
2971 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2973 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2979 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2980 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2981 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2983 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2984 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2986 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2988 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2992 let mut forward_event = None;
2993 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2994 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2996 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2998 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3001 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3004 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3005 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3006 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3007 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3008 time_forwardable: time
3015 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3016 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3017 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3019 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3020 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3021 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3022 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3024 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3026 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3027 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3028 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3029 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3033 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3034 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3035 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3036 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3038 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3039 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3040 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3041 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3043 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3044 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3045 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3046 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3047 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3049 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3050 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3051 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3057 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3058 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3059 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3061 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3062 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3063 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3064 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3066 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3067 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3069 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3070 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3071 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3072 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3073 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3074 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3075 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3076 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3078 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3079 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3080 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3081 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3082 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3083 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3085 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3090 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3091 // which were generated.
3092 channel_state.take();
3094 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3095 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3096 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3103 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3104 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3105 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3106 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3107 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3109 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3113 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3114 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3115 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3116 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3117 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3118 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3119 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3120 payment_preimage, e);
3121 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3122 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3123 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3124 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3127 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3128 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3129 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3131 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3132 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3133 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3134 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3135 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3136 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3142 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3144 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3147 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3148 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3149 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3150 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3151 payment_preimage, e);
3153 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3154 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3156 chan.remove_entry();
3158 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3161 } else { unreachable!(); }
3164 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3166 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
3167 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3168 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3169 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3170 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3171 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&mpp_id) {
3172 sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3175 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3176 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3179 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3182 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3183 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3184 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3185 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3186 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3187 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3188 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3191 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3192 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3193 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3194 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3195 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3198 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3199 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3200 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3201 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3202 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3203 payment_preimage, e);
3205 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3206 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3207 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3208 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3211 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3212 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3213 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3214 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3218 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3219 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3220 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3223 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3224 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3226 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3234 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3235 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3236 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3239 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3240 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3243 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3244 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3246 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3247 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3248 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3249 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3251 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3252 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3253 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3254 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3255 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3256 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3257 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3258 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3259 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3262 let chan_restoration_res;
3263 let mut pending_failures = {
3264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3266 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3268 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3270 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3274 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3275 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3276 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3277 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3278 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3279 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3280 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3281 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3282 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3285 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3286 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3287 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3291 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3292 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3293 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3297 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3298 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3299 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3302 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3303 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3306 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3309 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3310 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3311 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3313 entry.insert(channel);
3319 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3320 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3321 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3322 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3325 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3328 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3329 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3334 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3335 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3336 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3337 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3339 user_channel_id: user_id,
3344 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3345 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3346 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3347 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3349 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3351 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3354 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3359 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3360 // lock before watch_channel
3361 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3363 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3364 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3365 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3366 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3367 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3368 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3369 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3370 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3371 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3372 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3375 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3376 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3377 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3378 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3379 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3380 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3386 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3390 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3391 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3392 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3401 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3403 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3404 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3405 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3406 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3408 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3411 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3412 Ok(update) => update,
3413 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3415 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3416 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3423 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3424 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3428 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3429 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3430 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3431 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3432 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3433 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3436 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3437 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3439 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3440 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3441 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3442 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3443 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3444 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3445 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3446 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3447 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3449 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3450 msg: announcement_sigs,
3452 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3455 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3464 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3465 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3466 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3470 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3472 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3476 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3477 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3478 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3479 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3482 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3483 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3485 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3486 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3487 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3488 let (result, is_permanent) =
3489 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3491 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3497 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3499 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3509 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3510 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3513 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3517 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3518 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3519 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3520 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3521 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3522 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3523 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3526 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3527 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3529 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3534 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3535 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3536 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3537 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3538 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3539 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3540 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3542 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3543 } else { (tx, None) }
3545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3548 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3549 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3550 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3552 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3553 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3554 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3555 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3559 //TODO: split between CounterpartyInitiated/LocallyInitiated
3560 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::CooperativeClosure });
3565 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3566 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3567 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3568 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3570 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3571 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3572 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3573 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3575 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3576 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3578 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3580 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3581 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3584 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3585 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3586 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3587 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3588 match pending_forward_info {
3589 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3590 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3591 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3592 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3593 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3594 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3595 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3596 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3600 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3601 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3602 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3603 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3604 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3605 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3606 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3607 // no problem just calling this
3608 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3609 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3612 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3614 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3615 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3616 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3619 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3621 _ => pending_forward_info
3624 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3626 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3631 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3632 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3633 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3635 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3637 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3640 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3645 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3649 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3650 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3651 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3652 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3654 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3655 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3657 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3664 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3665 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3666 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3667 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3669 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3670 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3672 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3673 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3674 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3676 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3683 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3684 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3685 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3686 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3688 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3691 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3692 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3693 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3694 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3695 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3696 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3697 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3702 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3703 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3705 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3706 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3707 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3709 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3711 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3712 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3713 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3714 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3715 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3716 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3718 commitment_signed: msg,
3724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3729 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3730 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3731 let mut forward_event = None;
3732 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3733 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3734 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3735 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3737 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3738 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3739 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3740 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3741 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3744 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3745 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3748 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3749 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3754 match forward_event {
3756 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3757 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3758 time_forwardable: time
3766 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3767 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3769 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3770 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3771 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3773 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3774 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3776 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3777 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3778 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3779 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3780 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3781 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3782 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3783 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3785 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3787 } else { unreachable!(); }
3790 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3791 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3792 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3796 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3801 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3803 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3804 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3805 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3807 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3814 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3815 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3817 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3819 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3820 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3822 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3829 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3833 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3835 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3838 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3839 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3843 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3844 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3845 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3846 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3854 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3855 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3856 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3857 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3858 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3859 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3861 // It's not a local channel
3862 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3865 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3867 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3868 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3869 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3870 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3871 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3872 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3876 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3877 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3878 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3879 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3881 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3886 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3889 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3890 let chan_restoration_res;
3891 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3892 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3893 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3895 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3897 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3900 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3901 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3902 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3903 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3904 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3905 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3906 let mut channel_update = None;
3907 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3908 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3909 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3912 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3913 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3914 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3915 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3916 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3917 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3918 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3921 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3922 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3923 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3924 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3926 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3931 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3932 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3934 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3935 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3940 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3941 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3942 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3943 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3944 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3945 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3946 match monitor_event {
3947 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3948 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3950 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3953 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3956 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3957 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3958 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3959 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3960 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3961 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3962 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3963 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3964 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3966 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3967 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3972 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::CommitmentTxBroadcasted });
3973 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3974 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3976 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3984 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3985 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3988 has_pending_monitor_events
3991 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3992 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3993 /// update was applied.
3995 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3996 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3997 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3998 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3999 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4000 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4001 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4002 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4006 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4007 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4008 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4010 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4011 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4012 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4013 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4014 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4016 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4017 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4018 has_monitor_update = true;
4019 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4020 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4021 if close_channel { return false; }
4023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4024 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4025 updates: commitment_update,
4032 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4033 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4034 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4041 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4042 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4043 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4046 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4047 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4053 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4054 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4055 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4056 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4057 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4058 let mut has_update = false;
4060 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4061 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4062 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4063 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4064 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4066 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4067 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4068 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4069 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4072 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4075 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4076 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4077 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4078 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4079 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4082 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4083 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4088 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4089 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4095 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4096 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4103 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4104 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4110 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4111 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4113 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4114 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4115 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4116 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4117 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4118 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4119 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4120 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4121 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4122 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4123 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4124 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4125 assert!(should_broadcast);
4126 } else { unreachable!(); }
4127 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4129 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4133 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4134 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4136 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4139 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4140 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4142 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4143 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4144 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4145 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4146 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4147 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4148 // never fail a payment too early.
4149 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4151 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4159 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4162 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4163 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4165 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4166 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4167 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4169 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4171 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4172 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4173 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4174 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4175 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4176 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4177 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4180 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4181 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4184 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4185 /// stored external to LDK.
4187 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4188 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4189 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4191 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4192 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4194 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4195 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4196 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4197 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4198 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4200 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4201 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4202 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4203 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4205 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4206 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4207 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4208 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4209 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4211 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4212 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4213 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4214 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4215 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4217 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4218 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4219 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4221 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4223 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4224 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4226 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4227 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4228 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4229 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4230 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4233 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4234 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4235 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4236 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4237 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4242 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4243 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4244 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4245 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4249 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4250 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4251 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4252 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4254 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4255 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4256 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4257 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4260 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4261 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4263 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4264 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4267 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4268 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4269 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4271 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4272 events.replace(pending_events);
4281 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4283 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4285 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4289 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4291 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4292 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4294 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4295 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4296 /// restarting from an old state.
4297 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4298 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4299 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4301 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4302 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4303 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4304 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4307 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4308 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4309 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4312 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4313 handler.handle_event(&event);
4321 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4323 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4324 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4325 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4326 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4329 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4331 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4332 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4333 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4334 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4335 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4338 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4339 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4340 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4343 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4344 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4345 let new_height = height - 1;
4347 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4348 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4349 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4350 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4351 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4352 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4355 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4359 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4361 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4362 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4363 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4364 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4367 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4368 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4369 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4370 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4372 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4373 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4376 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4379 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4380 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4381 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4382 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4384 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4385 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4389 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4391 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4393 macro_rules! max_time {
4394 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4396 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4397 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4398 // having an explicit local time source.
4399 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4400 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4401 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4402 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4403 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4409 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4410 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4411 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4412 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4413 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4417 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4418 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4419 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4420 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4421 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4422 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4428 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4430 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4431 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4432 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4433 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4434 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4435 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4440 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4442 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4443 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4444 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4445 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4448 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4449 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4451 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4452 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4453 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4454 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4455 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4457 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4458 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4462 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4463 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4464 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4465 let res = f(channel);
4466 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4467 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4468 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4469 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4470 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4474 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4475 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4476 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4477 msg: funding_locked,
4479 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4482 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4483 msg: announcement_sigs,
4485 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4488 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4489 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4494 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4496 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4497 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4498 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4500 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4501 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4502 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4503 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4508 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::CommitmentTxBroadcasted });
4509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4510 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4511 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4518 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4519 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4520 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4521 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4522 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4523 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4524 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4525 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4526 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4527 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4528 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4529 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4530 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4535 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4540 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4542 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4543 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4547 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4548 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4549 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4551 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4552 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4553 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4554 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4557 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4558 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4560 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4561 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4564 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4565 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4566 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4567 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4568 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4572 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4573 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4574 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4575 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4579 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4580 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4581 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4582 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4583 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4587 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4589 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4592 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4597 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4602 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4607 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4612 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4617 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4622 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4627 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4632 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4637 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4642 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4647 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4652 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4657 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4662 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4663 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4664 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4667 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4672 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4677 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4679 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4680 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4684 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4685 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4686 if no_connection_possible {
4687 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4688 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4689 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4690 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4691 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4693 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4694 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4695 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4699 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::DisconnectedPeer });
4706 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4707 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4708 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4709 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4710 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4711 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4712 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4714 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::DisconnectedPeer });
4717 no_channels_remain = false;
4723 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4725 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4727 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4731 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4734 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4735 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4736 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4737 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4738 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4740 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4747 if no_channels_remain {
4748 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4751 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4752 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4756 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4757 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4762 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4763 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4765 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4766 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4770 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4777 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4778 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4779 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4780 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4781 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4782 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4783 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4788 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4789 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4795 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4798 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4801 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4802 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4803 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4804 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4805 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4809 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4810 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), None);
4815 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4816 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4817 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4818 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4819 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4820 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4823 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4826 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4832 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4833 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4838 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4839 let result = *guard;
4847 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4848 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4849 let current_time = Instant::now();
4851 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4852 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4857 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4858 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4859 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4860 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4861 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4863 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4864 let result = *guard;
4865 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4869 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4870 None => return result,
4876 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4878 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4879 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4880 *persistence_lock = true;
4881 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4886 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4887 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4889 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4891 (0, onion_packet, required),
4892 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4895 (0, payment_data, required),
4896 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4898 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4899 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4900 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4904 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4905 (0, routing, required),
4906 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4907 (4, payment_hash, required),
4908 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4909 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4912 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4916 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4922 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4923 (2, outpoint, required),
4924 (4, htlc_id, required),
4925 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4928 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4929 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4930 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4931 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4934 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4935 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4936 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4941 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4942 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4943 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4949 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4950 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4951 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4953 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4954 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4955 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4959 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4960 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4961 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4963 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4965 if payment_data.is_some() {
4966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4968 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4971 if payment_data.is_none() {
4972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4974 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4978 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4986 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4987 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4988 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4991 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4992 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
4993 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
4994 let mut mpp_id = None;
4995 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4996 (0, session_priv, required),
4997 (1, mpp_id, option),
4998 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4999 (4, path, vec_type),
5001 if mpp_id.is_none() {
5002 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5004 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5006 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5007 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5008 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5009 path: path.unwrap(),
5010 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
5013 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5014 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5019 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5022 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
5024 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
5025 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5026 (0, session_priv, required),
5027 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
5028 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5029 (4, path, vec_type),
5032 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5034 field.write(writer)?;
5041 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5042 (0, LightningError) => {
5046 (0, failure_code, required),
5047 (2, data, vec_type),
5051 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5053 (0, forward_info, required),
5054 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5055 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5056 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5059 (0, htlc_id, required),
5060 (2, err_packet, required),
5064 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5065 (0, payment_secret, required),
5066 (2, expiry_time, required),
5067 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5068 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5069 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5072 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5073 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5074 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5075 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5079 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5080 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5082 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5084 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5086 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5087 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5088 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5091 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5092 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5093 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5094 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5095 unfunded_channels += 1;
5098 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5099 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5100 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5101 channel.write(writer)?;
5105 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5106 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5107 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5108 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5109 for forward in pending_forwards {
5110 forward.write(writer)?;
5114 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5115 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5116 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5117 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5118 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5119 htlc.write(writer)?;
5123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5124 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5125 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5126 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5127 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5128 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5131 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5132 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5133 for event in events.iter() {
5134 event.write(writer)?;
5137 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5138 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5139 for event in background_events.iter() {
5141 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5143 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5144 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5149 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5150 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5152 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5153 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5154 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5155 hash.write(writer)?;
5156 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5159 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5160 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5161 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5162 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5163 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5165 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5166 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5167 for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5168 outbound.write(writer)?;
5172 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5173 (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5180 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5182 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5184 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5185 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5186 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5187 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5188 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5189 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5190 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5191 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5192 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5193 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5194 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5196 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5197 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5199 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5200 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5201 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5202 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5203 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5204 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5205 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5206 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5207 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5208 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5209 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5212 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5213 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5215 pub keys_manager: K,
5217 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5219 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5220 pub fee_estimator: F,
5221 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5223 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5224 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5225 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5226 pub chain_monitor: M,
5228 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5229 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5230 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5231 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5232 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5233 /// deserialization.
5235 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5236 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5237 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5239 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5240 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5242 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5243 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5244 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5245 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5247 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5250 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5251 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5254 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5255 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5256 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5257 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5258 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5259 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5262 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5263 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5264 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5265 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5266 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5268 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5269 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5274 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5275 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5276 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5277 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5278 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5279 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5280 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5281 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5284 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5285 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5286 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5290 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5291 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5292 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5293 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5294 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5298 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5299 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5301 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5302 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5303 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5305 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5307 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5308 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5309 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5310 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5311 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5312 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5313 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5314 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5315 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5316 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5317 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5318 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5319 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5320 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5321 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5322 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5323 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5324 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5325 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5326 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5327 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5329 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5330 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5331 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5332 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5333 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5334 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5335 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5336 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5337 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5338 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5339 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5340 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5342 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5343 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5345 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5348 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5349 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5350 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5351 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5352 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5353 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5357 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5358 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5359 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5363 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5364 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5365 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5366 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5367 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5368 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5369 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5370 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5371 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5373 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5376 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5377 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5378 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5379 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5380 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5381 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5382 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5383 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5385 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5388 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5389 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5390 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5391 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5392 let peer_state = PeerState {
5393 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5395 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5398 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5399 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5400 for _ in 0..event_count {
5401 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5402 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5407 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5408 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5409 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5410 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5411 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5416 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5417 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5419 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5420 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5421 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5422 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5427 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5428 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5429 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5430 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5431 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5432 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5437 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5438 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5439 (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5441 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5442 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5445 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5446 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5448 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5450 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5451 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5452 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5454 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5456 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5461 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5463 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5464 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5466 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5467 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5470 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5471 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5473 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5475 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5476 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5477 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5478 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5480 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5481 logger: args.logger,
5482 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5485 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5486 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5489 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5490 //connection or two.
5492 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5498 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5499 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5500 use core::time::Duration;
5501 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5502 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5503 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5504 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5506 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5507 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5508 use util::errors::APIError;
5509 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5510 use util::test_utils;
5512 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5514 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5515 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5517 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5520 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5521 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5523 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5524 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5525 thread::spawn(move || {
5527 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5528 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5529 *persistence_lock = true;
5532 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5538 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5539 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5541 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5544 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5549 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5551 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5554 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5561 fn test_notify_limits() {
5562 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5563 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5564 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5567 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5569 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5570 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5571 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5572 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5573 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5575 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5577 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5578 // to connect messages with new values
5579 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5580 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5581 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5582 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5584 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5585 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5586 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5587 // ... but the last node should not.
5588 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5589 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5590 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5591 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5593 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5594 // about the channel.
5595 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5596 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5597 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5599 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5601 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5602 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5603 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5604 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5605 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5606 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5608 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5609 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5610 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5612 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5613 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5614 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5615 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5616 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5617 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5619 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5620 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5621 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5622 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5623 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5624 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5625 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5626 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5628 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5629 // the channel info has updated.
5630 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5631 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5632 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5633 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5634 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5635 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5639 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5640 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5646 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5647 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5649 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5650 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5651 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5652 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5653 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5654 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5655 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5656 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5657 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5659 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5661 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5663 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5664 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5667 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5668 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5669 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5672 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5673 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5675 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5679 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5680 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5681 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5682 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5683 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5684 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5685 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5686 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5687 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, our_payment_hash, true);
5689 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5690 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5692 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5694 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5696 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5697 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5698 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5699 // lightning messages manually.
5700 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5702 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5703 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5704 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5706 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5707 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5710 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5712 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5713 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5714 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5716 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5717 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5718 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5720 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5722 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5724 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5725 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5728 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5729 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5730 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5732 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5733 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5740 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5741 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5742 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5743 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5744 // fails as expected.
5745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5749 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5750 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5752 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5753 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5754 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5756 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5757 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5758 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5760 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5762 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5763 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5764 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5767 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5768 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5769 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5770 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5772 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5773 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5774 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5775 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5776 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5777 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5778 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5779 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5780 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5781 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
5783 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5784 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5786 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5787 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5788 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5789 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5791 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5792 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5793 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5794 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5795 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5797 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5798 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5799 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5801 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5802 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5803 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5804 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5805 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5807 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5808 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5809 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5810 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5811 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5813 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5814 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5815 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5816 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5817 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5818 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5819 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5820 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5821 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5822 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
5824 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5825 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5829 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5830 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5831 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5837 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5838 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5839 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5840 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5842 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5843 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5844 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5845 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5846 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5847 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5849 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5850 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5851 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5854 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5855 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5856 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5857 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5858 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5859 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5860 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5862 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5866 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5867 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5873 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5874 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5875 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5876 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5878 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5879 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5880 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5881 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5882 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5883 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5885 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5886 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5887 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5888 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5891 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5893 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5894 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5895 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5896 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5899 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5903 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5907 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5909 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5910 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5911 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5912 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5913 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5915 // Marshall an MPP route.
5916 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5917 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5918 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5919 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5920 route.paths.push(path);
5921 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5922 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5923 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5924 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5925 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5926 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5928 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5929 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5930 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5931 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5936 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5939 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5940 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5941 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5942 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5943 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5944 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5945 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5946 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5947 use routing::router::get_route;
5948 use util::test_utils;
5949 use util::config::UserConfig;
5950 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5952 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5953 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5954 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5956 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5960 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5961 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5962 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5963 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5964 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5965 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5966 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5971 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5972 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5975 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5976 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5977 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5979 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5980 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5982 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5983 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5985 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5986 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5988 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5989 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5990 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5991 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5992 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5994 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5996 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5998 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5999 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6000 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6001 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6002 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6004 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6006 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6008 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6009 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6010 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6011 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6012 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6015 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6016 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6017 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6019 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6020 } else { panic!(); }
6022 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6023 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6025 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6028 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6031 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6032 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6034 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6035 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6036 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6037 match msg_events[0] {
6038 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6039 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6040 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6044 match msg_events[1] {
6045 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6049 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6051 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6052 macro_rules! send_payment {
6053 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6054 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6055 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6056 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6058 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6059 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6061 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6062 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6064 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6065 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6066 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6067 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6068 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6069 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6070 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6071 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6074 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6075 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6077 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6078 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6079 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6080 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6081 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6083 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6086 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6087 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6088 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6089 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6091 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6096 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6097 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);