1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// A forwarded HTLC.
117 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
125 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126 /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127 /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
129 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138 /// settled by this node.
139 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
143 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
145 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
170 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
171 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
172 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
173 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
174 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
175 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
182 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
185 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
186 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
187 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
188 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
189 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
190 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
191 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
192 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
193 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
194 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
195 /// may overshoot this in either case)
196 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
197 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
198 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
199 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
200 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
201 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
204 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
205 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
206 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
207 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
210 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
211 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
212 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
213 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
214 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
217 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
218 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
220 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
221 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
222 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
225 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
226 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
228 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
229 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
233 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
236 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
240 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
241 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 enum BlindedFailure {
243 FromIntroductionNode,
244 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
247 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
249 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
250 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
251 short_channel_id: u64,
252 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
254 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
255 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
256 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
258 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
259 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
264 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
266 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
267 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
268 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
270 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
271 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
274 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
275 struct ClaimableHTLC {
276 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
278 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
280 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
281 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
282 sender_intended_value: u64,
283 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
285 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
286 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
287 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
288 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
290 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
291 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
294 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
295 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
296 events::ClaimedHTLC {
297 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
298 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
299 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
300 value_msat: val.value,
301 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
306 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
307 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
309 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
310 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
311 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
314 /// Number of bytes in the id.
315 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
318 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
319 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
324 impl Readable for PaymentId {
325 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
326 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
331 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
332 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
333 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
337 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
339 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
340 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
341 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
343 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
344 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
349 impl Readable for InterceptId {
350 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
351 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
356 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
357 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
358 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
359 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
360 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
363 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
365 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
366 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
367 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
369 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
370 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
375 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
376 (0, short_channel_id, required),
377 (2, htlc_id, required),
379 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
380 (0, session_priv, required),
385 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
386 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
387 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
388 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
389 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
392 session_priv: SecretKey,
393 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
394 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
395 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
396 payment_id: PaymentId,
399 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
400 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
401 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
405 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
410 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
411 payment_id.hash(hasher);
412 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
418 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
420 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
421 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
422 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
423 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
424 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
425 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
429 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
430 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
431 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
432 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
433 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
434 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
436 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
442 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
443 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
445 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
446 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
447 pub enum FailureCode {
448 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
449 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
450 TemporaryNodeFailure,
451 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
452 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
453 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
454 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
455 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
456 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
457 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
458 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
459 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
460 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
462 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
463 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
464 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
467 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
468 fn into(self) -> u16 {
470 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
471 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
472 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
473 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
478 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
479 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
480 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
481 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
482 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
484 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
485 err: msgs::LightningError,
486 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
487 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
488 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
490 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
492 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
494 err: LightningError {
496 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
510 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
513 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
514 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
515 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
516 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
517 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
518 // commitment upon reconnecting.
519 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
521 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
524 err: LightningError { err, action },
525 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
526 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
527 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
531 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
534 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
536 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
537 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
541 log_level: Level::Warn,
544 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
546 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
548 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
550 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
551 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
559 shutdown_finish: None,
560 channel_capacity: None,
564 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
565 self.chan_id.is_some()
569 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
570 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
571 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
572 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
573 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
575 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
576 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
577 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
578 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
579 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
580 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
581 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
583 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
587 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
588 struct ClaimingPayment {
590 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
591 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
592 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
593 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
596 (0, amount_msat, required),
597 (2, payment_purpose, required),
598 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
599 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
600 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
603 struct ClaimablePayment {
604 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
605 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
606 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
609 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
610 struct ClaimablePayments {
611 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
612 /// failed/claimed by the user.
614 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
615 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
617 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
618 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
619 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
621 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
622 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
623 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
624 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
627 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
628 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
629 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
630 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
632 enum BackgroundEvent {
633 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
634 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
635 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
636 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
638 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
639 /// are regenerated on startup.
640 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
641 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
642 /// channel to continue normal operation.
644 /// In general this should be used rather than
645 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
646 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
647 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
649 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
650 /// are regenerated on startup.
651 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
652 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
653 funding_txo: OutPoint,
654 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
656 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
657 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
659 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
660 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
661 channel_id: ChannelId,
666 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
667 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
668 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
669 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
670 /// event can be generated.
671 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
672 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
673 /// operation of another channel.
675 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
676 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
677 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
678 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
680 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
681 event: events::Event,
682 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
684 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
685 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
686 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
688 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
689 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
690 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
691 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
692 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
694 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
695 /// stored for later processing.
696 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
697 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
698 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
699 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
704 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
705 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
706 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
707 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
708 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
709 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
710 (4, blocking_action, required),
712 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
713 (0, event, upgradable_required),
714 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
715 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
716 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
717 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
718 // downgrades to prior versions.
719 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
723 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
724 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
725 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
726 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
727 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
730 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
731 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
732 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
733 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
737 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
738 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
739 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
740 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
741 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
742 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
744 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
745 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
752 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
753 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
754 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
755 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
756 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
762 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
766 /// State we hold per-peer.
767 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
768 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
770 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
771 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
772 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
774 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
775 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
776 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
777 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
778 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
779 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
780 latest_features: InitFeatures,
781 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
782 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
783 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
784 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
785 /// user but which have not yet completed.
787 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
788 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
789 /// for a missing channel.
790 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
791 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
792 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
794 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
795 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
796 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
797 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
799 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
800 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
801 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
802 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
803 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
804 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
805 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
806 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
807 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
808 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
809 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
810 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
811 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
812 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
813 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
817 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
818 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
819 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
820 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
821 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
822 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
825 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
826 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
827 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
830 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
831 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
832 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
835 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
836 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
837 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
838 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
842 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
843 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
844 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
845 /// The original OpenChannel message.
846 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
847 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
848 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
851 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
852 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
853 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
855 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
856 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
858 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
861 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
862 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
863 struct PendingInboundPayment {
864 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
865 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
866 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
867 /// this payment being removed.
869 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
870 user_payment_id: u64,
871 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
872 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
873 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
876 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
877 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
878 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
879 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
880 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
881 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
882 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
883 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
885 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
886 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
895 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
897 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
898 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
899 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
904 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
905 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
906 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
907 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
908 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
909 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
910 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
911 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
912 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
914 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
915 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
916 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
925 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
927 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
928 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
929 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
934 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
938 pub trait AChannelManager {
939 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
940 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
941 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
942 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
943 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
944 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
945 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
946 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
947 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
948 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
949 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
950 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
951 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
952 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
953 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
954 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
955 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
956 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
957 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
958 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
959 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
960 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
961 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
962 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
963 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
964 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
965 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
966 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
967 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
968 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
969 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
970 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
971 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
972 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
973 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
974 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
978 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
989 type Watch = M::Target;
991 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
993 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
995 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
997 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
998 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1000 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1002 type Router = R::Target;
1004 type Logger = L::Target;
1006 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1009 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1010 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1012 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1013 /// to individual Channels.
1015 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1016 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1017 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1018 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1020 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1021 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1022 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1023 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1024 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1025 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1026 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1027 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1028 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1030 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1031 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1032 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1034 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1035 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1036 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1037 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1038 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1040 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1041 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1042 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1043 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1045 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1046 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1047 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1049 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1050 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1051 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1052 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1053 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1055 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1056 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1057 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1058 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1059 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1060 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1061 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1062 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1065 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1066 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1067 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1068 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1069 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1073 // `pending_offers_messages`
1075 // `total_consistency_lock`
1077 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1079 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1081 // |__`per_peer_state`
1083 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1085 // |__`claimable_payments`
1087 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1093 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1095 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1099 // |__`pending_events`
1101 // |__`pending_background_events`
1103 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1114 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1115 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1116 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1126 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1127 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1129 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1130 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1131 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1132 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1134 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1135 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1137 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1138 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1139 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1140 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1141 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1142 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1143 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1144 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1146 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1148 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1149 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1151 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1153 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1154 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1155 /// and via the classic SCID.
1157 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1158 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1160 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1164 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1165 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1166 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1171 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1172 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1177 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1178 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1179 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1180 /// active channel list on load.
1182 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1183 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1185 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1187 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1188 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1189 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1191 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1192 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1193 /// the handling of the events.
1195 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1196 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1199 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1200 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1201 /// would break backwards compatability.
1202 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1203 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1204 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1206 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1209 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1211 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1212 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1213 /// confirmation depth.
1215 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1216 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1217 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1223 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1225 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1227 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1229 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1230 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1231 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1233 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1234 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1236 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1237 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1238 /// keeping additional state.
1239 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1241 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1242 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1243 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1244 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1246 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1247 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1249 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1250 /// are currently open with that peer.
1252 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1253 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1256 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1258 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1260 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1261 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1262 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1264 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1265 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1266 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1267 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1268 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1270 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1271 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1275 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1276 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1277 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1279 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1280 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1282 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1283 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1284 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1285 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1286 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1288 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1290 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1293 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1294 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1295 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1296 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1297 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1298 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1299 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1300 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1301 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1302 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1304 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1305 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1306 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1308 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1310 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1311 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1313 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1317 signer_provider: SP,
1322 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1324 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1325 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1326 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1328 pub struct ChainParameters {
1329 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1330 pub network: Network,
1332 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1334 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1335 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1338 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1342 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1343 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1346 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1347 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1348 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1349 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1350 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1351 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1353 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1354 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1355 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1356 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1357 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1358 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1360 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1361 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1364 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1365 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1366 /// events to handle.
1368 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1369 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1371 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1372 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1375 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1376 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1377 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1378 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1380 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1381 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1382 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1383 should_persist: move || {
1384 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1385 // processing and return that.
1386 let notify = persist_check();
1387 match (notify, force_notify) {
1388 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1389 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1390 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1391 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1392 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1395 _read_guard: read_guard,
1399 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1400 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1401 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1402 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1403 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1404 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1406 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1407 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1408 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1409 should_persist: persist_check,
1410 _read_guard: read_guard,
1415 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1416 fn drop(&mut self) {
1417 match (self.should_persist)() {
1418 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1419 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1420 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1422 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1423 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1424 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1429 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1430 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1432 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1435 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1436 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1437 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1438 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1440 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1441 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1443 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1445 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1446 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1447 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1448 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1449 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1450 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1451 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1452 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1453 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1454 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1455 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1456 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1457 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1459 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1460 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1462 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1463 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1464 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1465 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1467 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1468 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1469 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1470 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1471 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1472 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1477 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1478 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1481 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1483 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1484 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1486 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1487 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1488 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1490 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1491 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1492 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1494 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1495 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1496 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1497 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1499 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1500 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1501 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1503 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1504 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1505 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1507 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1508 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1509 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1510 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1511 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1512 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1513 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1514 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1515 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1516 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1517 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1520 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1521 /// to better separate parameters.
1522 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1523 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1524 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1525 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1526 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1527 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1528 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1529 pub features: InitFeatures,
1530 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1531 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1532 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1534 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1536 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1537 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1538 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1539 /// payments to us through this channel.
1540 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1541 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1542 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1543 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1544 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1546 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1549 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1550 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1551 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1552 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1553 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1554 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1555 /// lifetime of the channel.
1556 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1557 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1558 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1559 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1560 /// our counterparty already.
1562 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1563 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1564 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1565 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1567 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1568 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1569 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1570 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1572 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1573 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1575 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1576 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1578 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1579 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1580 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1581 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1582 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1583 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1584 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1585 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1586 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1589 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1591 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1592 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1593 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1594 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1595 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1596 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1597 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1599 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1600 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1602 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1603 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1605 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1606 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1607 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1608 /// this value on chain.
1610 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1612 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1614 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1615 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1616 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1617 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1618 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1619 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1620 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1622 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1623 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1624 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1625 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1626 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1627 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1629 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1630 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1631 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1632 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1633 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1635 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1636 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1637 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1638 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1640 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1641 pub balance_msat: u64,
1642 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1643 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1644 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1645 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1647 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1649 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1650 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1651 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1652 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1653 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1654 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1655 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1656 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1658 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1659 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1660 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1661 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1662 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1663 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1664 /// route which is valid.
1665 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1666 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1667 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1668 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1669 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1670 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1672 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1673 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1674 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1675 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1676 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1677 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1678 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1679 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1680 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1682 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1684 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1685 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1686 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1687 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1688 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1690 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1691 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1692 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1693 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1694 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1695 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1696 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1698 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1699 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1700 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1701 pub is_outbound: bool,
1702 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1703 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1704 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1705 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1706 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1708 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1709 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1710 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1711 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1712 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1713 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1714 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1716 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1717 pub is_usable: bool,
1718 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1719 pub is_public: bool,
1720 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1721 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1722 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1723 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1724 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1725 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1727 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1728 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1731 impl ChannelDetails {
1732 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1733 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1734 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1736 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1737 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1738 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1739 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1742 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1743 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1744 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1746 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1747 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1748 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1749 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1752 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1753 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1754 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1757 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1758 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1760 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1761 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1762 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1764 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1765 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1766 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767 features: latest_features,
1768 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1769 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1770 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1771 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1772 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1773 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1774 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1775 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1776 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1777 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1779 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1780 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1781 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1782 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1783 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1784 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1785 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1786 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1787 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1788 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1789 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1790 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1791 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1792 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1793 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1794 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1795 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1796 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1797 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1798 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1799 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1800 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1801 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1802 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1803 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1804 config: Some(context.config()),
1805 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1810 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1811 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1812 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1813 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1814 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1815 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1816 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1817 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1818 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1820 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1822 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1823 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1825 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1826 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1827 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1828 /// to drop the channel.
1832 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1833 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1834 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1835 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1836 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1838 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1839 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1840 payment_id: PaymentId,
1842 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1844 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1845 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1846 payment_id: PaymentId,
1847 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1849 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1850 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1851 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1854 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1855 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1856 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1858 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1859 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1860 payment_id: PaymentId,
1861 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1862 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1863 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1865 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1866 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1867 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1869 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1870 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1871 payment_id: PaymentId,
1872 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1873 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1877 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1879 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1881 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1882 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1883 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1884 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1886 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1887 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1888 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1891 macro_rules! handle_error {
1892 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1893 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1894 // entering the macro.
1895 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1896 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1900 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1901 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1903 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1904 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1905 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1906 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1910 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1911 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1912 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1913 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1914 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1915 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1920 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1921 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1923 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1924 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1925 action: err.action.clone()
1929 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1930 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1931 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1932 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1937 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1942 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1945 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1946 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1947 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1953 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1954 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1955 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1956 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1957 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1958 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1960 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1961 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1962 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1963 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1964 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1966 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1967 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1969 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1973 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1974 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1975 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1977 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1978 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1980 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1981 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1983 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1984 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1985 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1986 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1987 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1988 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1990 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1991 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1995 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1996 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1998 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1999 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2001 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2002 match $channel_phase {
2003 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2004 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2007 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2009 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2010 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2016 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2017 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2021 let key = *$entry.key();
2022 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2024 $entry.remove_entry();
2032 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2033 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2037 let key = *$entry.key();
2038 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2040 $entry.remove_entry();
2048 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2049 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2051 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2052 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2058 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2059 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2060 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2061 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2062 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2064 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2065 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2066 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2067 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2068 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2069 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2070 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2071 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2072 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2073 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2078 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2079 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2080 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2081 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2082 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2083 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2084 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2085 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2086 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2088 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2093 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2094 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2095 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2096 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2097 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2098 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2099 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2100 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2101 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2103 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2108 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2109 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2110 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2111 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2112 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2113 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2114 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2115 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2116 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2117 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2118 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2120 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2121 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2122 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2128 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2129 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2131 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2132 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2133 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2134 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2135 updates.announcement_sigs);
2136 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2137 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2140 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2141 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2142 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2143 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2145 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2146 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2147 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2148 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2149 let mut batch_completed = false;
2150 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2151 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2152 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2153 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2155 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2156 channel_state.2 = true;
2158 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2160 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2162 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2165 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2166 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2167 if batch_completed {
2168 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2169 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2170 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2171 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2172 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2173 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2174 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2175 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2176 chan.set_batch_ready();
2177 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2178 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2182 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2183 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2184 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2189 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2191 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2192 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2194 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2195 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2196 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2197 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2202 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2203 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2204 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2206 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2207 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2208 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2209 panic!("{}", err_str);
2211 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2212 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2213 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2216 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2222 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2223 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2224 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2226 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2227 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2228 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2229 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2230 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2231 // filter for uniqueness here.
2232 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2233 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2234 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2235 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2237 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2238 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2240 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2241 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2242 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2248 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2249 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2250 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2251 while !processed_all_events {
2252 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2259 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2260 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2261 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2263 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2264 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2265 result = $self.process_background_events();
2267 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2268 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2269 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2270 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2274 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2275 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2276 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2277 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2280 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2282 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2283 $event_to_handle = event;
2285 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2286 post_event_actions.push(action);
2291 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2292 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2293 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2294 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2295 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2296 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2299 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2300 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2301 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2302 processed_all_events = false;
2306 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2307 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2308 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2310 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2311 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2312 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2318 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2320 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2321 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2322 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2323 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2324 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2329 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2331 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2333 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2334 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2336 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2338 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2339 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2340 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2343 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2344 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2345 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2347 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2348 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2349 current_timestamp: u32,
2351 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2352 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2353 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2354 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2356 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2357 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2358 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2363 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2365 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2366 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2367 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2368 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2369 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2370 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2371 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2372 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2374 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2377 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2378 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2380 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2382 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2384 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2386 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2387 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2388 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2389 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2390 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2391 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2392 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2393 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2395 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2405 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2406 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2407 &self.default_configuration
2410 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2411 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2412 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2415 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2416 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2418 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2420 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2424 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2429 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2431 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2432 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2433 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2434 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2435 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2437 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2438 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2440 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2441 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2442 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2444 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2445 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2446 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2448 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2449 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2451 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2452 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2453 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2454 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2455 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2456 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2458 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2459 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2460 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2461 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2462 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2467 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2468 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2472 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2473 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2475 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2477 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2478 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2484 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2485 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2486 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2487 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2488 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2489 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2493 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2498 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2500 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2501 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2504 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2506 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2512 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2513 node_id: their_network_key,
2516 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2519 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2520 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2521 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2522 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2523 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2524 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2525 // the same channel.
2526 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2530 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2533 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2534 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2535 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2536 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2540 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2541 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2542 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2550 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2551 /// more information.
2552 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2553 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2554 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2555 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2556 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2557 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2558 // the same channel.
2559 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2561 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2563 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2566 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2567 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2568 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2576 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2577 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2579 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2580 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2582 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2583 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2584 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2585 // really wanted anyway.
2586 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2589 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2590 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2591 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2594 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2597 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2598 let context_to_details = |context| {
2599 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2601 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2603 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2604 .map(context_to_details)
2610 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2611 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2613 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2614 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2615 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2617 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2618 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2619 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2620 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2621 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2622 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2624 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2625 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2626 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2628 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2629 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2630 payment_id: *payment_id,
2631 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2632 total_msat: *total_msat,
2635 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2636 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2638 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2639 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2641 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2646 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2647 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2648 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2649 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2650 Some(transaction) => {
2651 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2652 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2657 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2658 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2659 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2660 reason: closure_reason,
2661 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2662 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2666 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2669 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2670 let shutdown_result;
2672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2675 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2680 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2682 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2683 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2684 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2685 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2686 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2687 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2688 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2689 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2691 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2692 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2693 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2694 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2695 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2699 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2700 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2702 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2703 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2704 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2705 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2709 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2710 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2711 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2712 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2716 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2723 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2724 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2726 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2727 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2728 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2729 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2734 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2740 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2741 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2747 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2748 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2749 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2751 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2752 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2754 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2755 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2756 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2757 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2759 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2761 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2762 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2763 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2766 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2767 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2768 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2769 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2770 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2774 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2775 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2776 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2778 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2779 /// the channel being closed or not:
2780 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2781 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2782 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2783 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2784 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2785 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2786 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2788 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2789 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2790 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2791 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2793 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2795 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2796 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2797 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2800 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2801 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2802 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2803 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2804 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2807 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2808 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2809 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2810 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2811 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2814 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2815 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2816 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2817 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2818 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2821 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2822 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2823 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2824 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2825 // ignore the result here.
2826 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2828 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2829 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2830 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2831 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2833 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2834 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2835 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2836 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2837 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2838 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2839 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2840 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2843 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2846 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2847 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2850 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2851 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2855 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2856 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2857 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2858 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2860 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2861 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2862 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2863 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2864 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2865 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2867 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2869 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2870 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2871 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2872 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2873 mem::drop(peer_state);
2874 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2876 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2877 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2878 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2880 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2881 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2882 // Unfunded channel has no update
2883 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2886 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2887 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2888 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2889 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2891 (None, *peer_node_id)
2893 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2896 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2897 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2898 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2900 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2901 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2902 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2903 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2904 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2910 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2913 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2915 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2916 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2918 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2919 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2921 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2922 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2923 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2924 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2935 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2936 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2937 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2939 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2940 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2941 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2944 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2945 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2946 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2948 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2949 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2950 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2951 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2952 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2955 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2956 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2957 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2958 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2959 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2963 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2964 /// local transaction(s).
2965 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2966 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2967 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2971 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2972 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2974 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2976 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2977 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2980 macro_rules! return_err {
2981 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2983 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2984 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2985 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2986 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2987 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2988 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2994 let NextPacketDetails {
2995 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2996 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2997 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2998 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2999 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3002 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3003 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3004 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3005 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3006 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3007 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3008 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3009 // phantom or an intercept.
3010 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3011 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3012 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3016 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3019 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3021 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3023 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3024 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3025 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3029 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3030 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3033 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3034 // have no consistency guarantees.
3035 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3039 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3040 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3041 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3042 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3043 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3045 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3046 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3047 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3048 // we don't have the channel here.
3049 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3051 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3053 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3054 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3055 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3056 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3057 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3058 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3059 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3060 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3061 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3062 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3063 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3065 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3068 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3069 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3071 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3072 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3079 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3081 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3082 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3084 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3085 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3086 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3087 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3088 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3090 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3091 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3097 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3098 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3099 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3100 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3102 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3103 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3105 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3106 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3107 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3109 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3110 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3111 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3112 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3113 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3114 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3115 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3119 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3121 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3124 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3125 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3126 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3127 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3128 macro_rules! return_err {
3129 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3131 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3132 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3133 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3134 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3135 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3136 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3142 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3144 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3145 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3146 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3147 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3150 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3151 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3152 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3153 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3154 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3156 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3159 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3160 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3161 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3162 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3163 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3169 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3170 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3171 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3173 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3174 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3175 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3177 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3178 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3179 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3180 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3181 return Err(LightningError {
3182 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3183 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3186 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3187 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3190 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3193 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3194 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3195 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3196 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3198 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3199 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3200 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3202 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3203 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3204 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3206 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3207 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3211 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3214 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3216 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3218 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3219 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3220 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3221 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3222 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3225 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3226 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3228 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3229 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3230 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3231 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3232 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3233 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3234 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3235 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3237 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3238 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3239 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3241 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3243 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3250 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3251 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3252 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3253 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3258 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3259 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3260 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3263 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3264 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3266 log_trace!(self.logger,
3267 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3268 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3269 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3270 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3272 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3273 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3274 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3277 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3278 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3279 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3280 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3283 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3284 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3285 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3286 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3287 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3288 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3289 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3290 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3291 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3292 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3294 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3295 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3296 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3298 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3299 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3301 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3302 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3303 Some(monitor_update) => {
3304 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3306 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3307 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3308 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3309 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3310 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3311 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3312 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3320 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3323 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3324 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3325 // `channel_by_id` map.
3326 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3327 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3332 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3333 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3335 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3340 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3342 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3343 /// fields for more info.
3345 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3346 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3348 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3350 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3351 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3352 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3353 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3354 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3356 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3357 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3358 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3359 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3360 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3362 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3363 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3364 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3365 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3367 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3369 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3370 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3371 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3373 /// In general, a path may raise:
3374 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3375 /// node public key) is specified.
3376 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3377 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3378 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3379 /// relevant updates.
3381 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3382 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3383 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3385 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3386 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3387 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3388 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3389 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3390 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3391 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3392 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3394 self.pending_outbound_payments
3395 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3396 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3397 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3400 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3401 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3402 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3403 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3405 self.pending_outbound_payments
3406 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3407 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3408 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3409 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3413 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3414 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3416 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3417 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3418 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3422 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3423 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3424 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3428 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3429 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3432 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3433 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3434 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3435 self.pending_outbound_payments
3436 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3437 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3438 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3439 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3440 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3444 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3445 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3446 /// retries are exhausted.
3448 /// # Event Generation
3450 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3451 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3453 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3454 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3455 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3457 /// # Requested Invoices
3459 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3460 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3461 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3462 /// once the invoice has been received.
3464 /// # Restart Behavior
3466 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3467 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3468 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3470 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3471 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3473 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3476 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3477 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3478 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3479 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3480 /// never reach the recipient.
3482 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3483 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3485 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3486 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3488 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3489 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3492 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3493 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3494 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3497 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3498 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3500 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3503 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3504 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3505 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3507 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3508 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3509 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3510 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3513 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3514 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3515 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3516 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3517 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3519 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3520 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3521 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3524 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3527 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3528 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3531 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3532 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3534 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3535 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3536 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3537 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3538 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3539 let payment_params =
3540 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3542 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3544 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3547 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3548 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3550 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3551 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3552 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3553 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3555 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3556 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3557 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3558 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3559 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3560 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3561 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3562 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3563 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3564 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3566 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3567 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3568 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3569 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3573 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3575 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3576 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3579 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3581 let mut res = Vec::new();
3583 for mut path in route.paths {
3584 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3585 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3586 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3587 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3588 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3591 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3594 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3595 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3597 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3599 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3600 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3605 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3608 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3613 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3614 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3615 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3617 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3618 let used_liquidity =
3619 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3621 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3622 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3624 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3627 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3632 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3633 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3634 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3641 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3642 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3643 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3644 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3645 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3646 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3649 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3653 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3654 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3655 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3657 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3658 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3659 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3660 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3661 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3662 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3663 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3664 } else { unreachable!(); });
3666 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3667 Err((chan, err)) => {
3668 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3669 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3671 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3672 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3673 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3679 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3680 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3682 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3683 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3686 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3687 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3688 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3692 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3693 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3694 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3698 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3700 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3703 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3704 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3705 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3707 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3714 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3715 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3716 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3720 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3722 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3723 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3725 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3726 /// across the p2p network.
3728 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3729 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3731 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3732 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3733 /// keys per-channel).
3735 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3736 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3737 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3739 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3740 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3741 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3743 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3744 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3745 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3746 /// for more details.
3748 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3749 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3750 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3751 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3754 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3756 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3757 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3759 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3760 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3761 /// signature for each channel.
3763 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3764 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3766 let mut result = Ok(());
3768 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3769 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3770 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3771 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3772 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3777 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3778 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3779 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3783 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3784 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3785 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3786 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3787 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3788 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3789 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3790 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3792 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3793 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3798 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3799 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3800 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3801 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3805 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3806 match states.entry(txid) {
3807 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3808 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3809 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3813 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3816 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3817 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3818 temporary_channel_id,
3819 counterparty_node_id,
3820 funding_transaction.clone(),
3823 let mut output_index = None;
3824 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3825 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3826 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3827 if output_index.is_some() {
3828 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3829 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3832 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3835 if output_index.is_none() {
3836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3837 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3840 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3841 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3842 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3848 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3849 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3850 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3851 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3852 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3853 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3854 .into_iter().flatten()
3855 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3857 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3858 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3860 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3863 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3864 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3865 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3866 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3868 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3869 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3870 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3874 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3875 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3881 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3883 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3884 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3885 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3886 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3888 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3889 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3891 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3892 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3894 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3896 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3897 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3898 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3899 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3900 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3901 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3902 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3903 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3904 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3905 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3906 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3908 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3915 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3918 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3919 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3920 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3921 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3925 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3926 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3927 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3928 config.apply(config_update);
3929 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3932 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3933 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3934 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3935 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3936 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3937 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3944 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3945 debug_assert!(false);
3946 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3948 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3949 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3956 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3958 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3959 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3960 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3961 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3963 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3964 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3966 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3967 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3969 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3971 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3972 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3973 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3974 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3975 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3976 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3977 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3978 pub fn update_channel_config(
3979 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3980 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3981 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3984 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3985 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3987 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3988 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3990 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3991 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3992 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3993 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3994 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3996 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3997 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3998 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4001 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4004 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4005 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4006 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4007 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4008 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4009 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4012 let next_hop_scid = {
4013 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4014 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4015 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4018 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4019 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4020 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4021 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4022 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4025 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4027 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4028 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4029 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4032 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4033 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4034 log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4035 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4042 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4043 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4044 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4047 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4048 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4049 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4050 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4053 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4055 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4056 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4057 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4058 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4059 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4062 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4063 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4064 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4065 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4066 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4068 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4072 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4073 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4075 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4078 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4079 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4082 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4083 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4084 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4087 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4088 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4089 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4090 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4091 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4092 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4093 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4094 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4095 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4098 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4099 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4100 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4101 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4106 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4108 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4109 /// Will likely generate further events.
4110 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4113 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4114 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4115 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4117 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4118 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4120 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4121 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4122 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4124 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4125 match forward_info {
4126 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4127 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4129 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4130 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4133 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4134 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4135 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4137 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4138 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4139 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4140 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4141 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4143 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4144 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4147 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4148 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4150 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4153 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4154 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4160 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4161 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4163 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4167 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4168 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4170 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4174 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4175 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4176 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4177 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4178 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4179 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4180 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4183 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4184 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4185 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4186 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4187 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4189 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4191 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4192 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4196 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4197 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4198 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4199 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4200 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4201 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4203 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4204 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4210 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4213 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4216 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4217 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4218 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4219 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4220 // problem, not ours.
4226 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4227 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4228 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4230 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4234 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4235 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4236 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4237 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4242 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4243 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4244 match forward_info {
4245 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4246 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4247 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4248 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4249 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4250 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4251 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4255 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4256 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4257 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4258 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4259 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4260 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4261 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4262 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4263 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4265 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4266 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4267 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4270 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4273 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4275 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4276 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4277 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4278 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4283 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4284 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4286 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4288 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4289 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4291 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4294 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4296 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4297 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4298 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4305 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4309 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4310 match forward_info {
4311 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4312 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4313 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4314 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4315 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4318 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4319 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4320 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4321 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4322 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4323 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4324 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4325 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4327 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4328 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4329 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4333 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4334 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4337 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4340 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4341 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4342 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4343 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4344 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4345 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4347 phantom_shared_secret,
4350 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4351 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4352 // if routing nodes overpay
4353 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4354 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4356 total_value_received: None,
4357 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4360 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4363 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4365 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4366 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4367 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4368 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4369 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4370 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4372 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4373 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4374 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4375 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4376 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4377 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4378 phantom_shared_secret,
4379 blinded_failure: None,
4381 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4382 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4384 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4387 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4388 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4389 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4390 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4391 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4394 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4395 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4396 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4397 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4398 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4399 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4401 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4402 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4403 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4405 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4406 .entry(payment_hash)
4407 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4408 .or_insert_with(|| {
4409 committed_to_claimable = true;
4411 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4414 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4415 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4417 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4419 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4421 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4423 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4424 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4425 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4428 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4430 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4431 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4432 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4433 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4434 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4435 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4436 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4438 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4439 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4441 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4443 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4444 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4445 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4446 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4447 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4451 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4452 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4453 committed_to_claimable = true;
4455 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4456 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4457 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4458 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4459 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4460 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4461 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4462 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4463 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4464 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4468 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4469 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4470 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4471 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4472 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4474 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4476 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4477 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4479 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4480 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4481 committed_to_claimable = true;
4484 payment_claimable_generated
4488 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4489 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4490 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4491 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4492 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4493 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4494 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4495 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4497 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4498 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4499 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4500 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4501 Ok(result) => result,
4503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4504 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4507 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4508 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4509 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4511 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4512 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4515 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4516 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4517 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4519 check_total_value!(purpose);
4521 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4522 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4523 check_total_value!(purpose);
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4528 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4530 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4532 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4533 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4535 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4536 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4538 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4539 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4541 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4542 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4543 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4545 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4546 if payment_claimable_generated {
4547 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4553 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4554 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4562 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4563 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4564 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4565 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4567 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4568 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4570 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4572 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4573 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4574 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4576 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4578 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4579 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4580 events.append(&mut new_events);
4583 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4585 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4586 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4587 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4589 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4591 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4592 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4593 if background_events.is_empty() {
4594 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4597 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4599 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4600 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4601 // monitor updating completing.
4602 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4604 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4605 let mut updated_chan = false;
4607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4608 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4613 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4614 updated_chan = true;
4615 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4616 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4618 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4626 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4627 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4630 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4632 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4635 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4636 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4638 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4639 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4640 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4641 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4642 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4648 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4652 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4653 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4654 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4655 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4658 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4659 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4660 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4661 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4662 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4664 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4666 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4668 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4670 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4671 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4674 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4676 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4677 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4681 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4682 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4683 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4684 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4685 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4686 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4687 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4689 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4690 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4693 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4696 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4697 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4699 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4704 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4705 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4713 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4715 /// This currently includes:
4716 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4717 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4718 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4720 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4721 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4722 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4723 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4724 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4725 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4726 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4727 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4729 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4730 /// estimate fetches.
4732 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4733 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4734 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4735 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4736 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4738 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4739 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4741 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4742 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4743 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4744 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4746 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4747 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4748 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4749 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4750 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4751 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4753 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4754 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4755 log_error!(self.logger,
4756 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4757 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4758 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4759 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4760 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4761 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4762 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4763 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4764 channel_id: *chan_id,
4765 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4781 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4782 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4784 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4785 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4790 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4791 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4793 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4794 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4795 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4796 if needs_close { return false; }
4799 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4800 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4801 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4802 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4803 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4804 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4805 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4806 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4808 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4809 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4810 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4815 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4817 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4820 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4822 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4823 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4824 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4825 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4829 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4831 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4837 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4839 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4840 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4841 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4842 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4843 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4844 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4845 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4846 channel_id: *chan_id,
4847 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4855 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4856 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4857 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4859 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4860 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4861 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4866 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4867 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4868 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4869 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4870 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4871 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4872 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4873 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4879 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4881 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4882 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4887 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4888 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4889 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4890 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4891 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4892 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4893 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4894 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4895 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4896 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4897 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4899 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4900 // have no channels to the peer.
4901 let remove_entry = {
4902 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4903 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4906 entry.remove_entry();
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4914 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4915 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4916 // This should be unreachable
4917 debug_assert!(false);
4920 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4921 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4922 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4923 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4924 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4925 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4926 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4929 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4930 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4931 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4933 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4934 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4941 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4942 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4943 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4944 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4948 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4949 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4952 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4953 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4956 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4957 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4958 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4959 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4960 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4961 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4962 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4965 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4966 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4969 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4970 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4971 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4972 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4973 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4980 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4981 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4982 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4984 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4985 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4986 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4987 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4989 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4990 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4991 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4992 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4993 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4994 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4997 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4998 /// reason for the failure.
5000 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5001 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5004 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5005 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5006 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5007 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5008 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5009 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5010 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5015 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5016 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5017 match failure_code {
5018 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5019 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5020 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5021 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5022 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5023 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5025 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5026 let fail_data = match data {
5027 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5030 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5035 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5036 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5038 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5040 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5041 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5042 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5043 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5044 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5045 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5046 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5048 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5050 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5051 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5053 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5058 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5059 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5060 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5061 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5062 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5063 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5064 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5065 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5066 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5067 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5069 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5070 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5071 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5072 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5074 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5075 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5076 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5077 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5078 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5082 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5083 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5084 // be surfaced to the user.
5085 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5086 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5087 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5089 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5091 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5094 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5096 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5097 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5099 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5106 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5109 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5110 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5111 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5112 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5116 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5117 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5118 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5119 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5120 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5121 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5122 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5123 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5124 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5125 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5128 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5129 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5130 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5133 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5134 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5135 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5137 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5138 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5139 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5140 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5141 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5143 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5145 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5147 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5148 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5149 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5150 push_forward_ev = true;
5152 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5154 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5157 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5160 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5161 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5162 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5163 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5164 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5165 failed_next_destination: destination,
5171 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5172 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5174 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5175 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5176 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5177 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5179 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5180 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5181 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5182 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5184 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5185 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5186 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5188 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5189 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5190 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5191 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5192 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5193 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5194 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5195 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5196 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5199 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5200 /// even type numbers.
5204 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5205 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5207 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5208 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5209 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5212 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5213 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5218 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5219 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5220 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5221 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5222 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5223 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5224 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5225 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5230 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5231 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5232 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5233 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5234 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5236 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5237 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5238 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5242 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5243 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5244 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5245 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5246 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5247 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5248 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5249 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5250 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5251 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5261 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5263 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5264 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5265 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5266 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5267 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5268 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5269 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5270 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5271 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5273 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5274 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5275 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5276 debug_assert!(false);
5280 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5282 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5283 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5284 debug_assert!(false);
5288 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5289 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5291 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5292 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5293 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5294 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5297 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5298 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5299 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5300 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5304 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5305 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5306 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5307 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5308 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5309 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5312 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5313 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5314 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5315 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5316 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5321 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5322 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5323 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5324 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5325 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5326 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5329 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5332 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5333 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5334 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5335 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5339 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5340 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5341 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5342 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5344 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5345 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5346 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5347 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5349 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5350 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5351 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5352 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5356 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5357 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5358 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5362 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5363 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5364 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5367 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5368 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5369 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5370 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5371 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5372 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5373 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5376 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5377 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5380 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5383 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5384 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5386 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5387 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5388 // monitor update as a background event.
5389 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5390 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5391 counterparty_node_id,
5392 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5393 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5397 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5398 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5403 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5407 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5408 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5409 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5410 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5411 blocking_action: blocker,
5413 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5415 debug_assert!(false,
5416 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5419 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5420 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5421 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5422 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5423 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5425 let mut found_blocker = false;
5426 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5427 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5428 // which case we need to only remove the one
5429 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5430 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5431 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5432 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5434 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5437 debug_assert!(false);
5446 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5447 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5448 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5454 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5455 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5456 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5457 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5458 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5459 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5460 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5461 // again on restart.
5462 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5463 payment_preimage, update_res);
5466 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5467 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5469 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5470 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5471 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5472 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5473 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5474 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5475 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5476 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5477 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5478 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5481 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5482 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5483 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5484 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5485 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5486 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5490 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5491 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5494 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5495 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5496 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5499 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5500 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5501 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5502 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5503 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5505 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5506 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5507 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5509 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5510 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5513 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5514 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5515 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5517 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5518 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5519 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5520 let chan_to_release =
5521 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5522 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5524 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5525 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5526 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5527 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5532 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5533 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5534 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5535 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5536 // in the background.
5537 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5538 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5539 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5540 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5542 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5543 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5544 funding_txo, update, ..
5546 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5547 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5548 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5549 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5551 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5557 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5558 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5559 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5561 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5562 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5564 monitor_update.updates[0],
5565 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5570 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5571 // immediately once we get going.
5572 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5575 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5577 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5580 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5581 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5582 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5583 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5584 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5585 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5589 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5590 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5591 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5594 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5595 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5597 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5598 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5599 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5600 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5602 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5606 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5607 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5608 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5614 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5615 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5616 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5619 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5620 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5621 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5622 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5624 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5626 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5627 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5628 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5630 payment_purpose: purpose,
5633 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5635 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5639 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5641 sender_intended_total_msat,
5645 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5646 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5648 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5649 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5650 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5653 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5654 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5656 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5657 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5658 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5659 Some(blocking_action),
5666 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5667 /// update completion.
5668 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5669 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5670 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5671 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5672 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5673 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5674 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5675 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5676 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5677 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5678 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5679 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5680 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5682 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5684 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5685 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5686 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5687 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5690 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5691 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5693 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5694 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5695 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5700 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5701 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5703 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5708 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5709 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5710 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5711 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5712 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5717 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5721 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5727 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5728 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5729 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5733 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5734 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5735 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5741 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5742 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5744 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5745 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5747 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5748 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5749 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5750 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5751 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5757 let mut peer_state_lock;
5758 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5759 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5760 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5763 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5766 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5767 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5768 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5769 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5770 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5773 let remaining_in_flight =
5774 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5775 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5778 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5779 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5780 remaining_in_flight);
5781 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5784 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5787 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5789 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5790 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5793 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5794 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5795 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5797 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5798 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5799 /// used to accept such channels.
5801 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5802 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5803 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5804 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5807 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5808 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5810 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5811 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5812 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5814 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5815 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5817 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5818 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5820 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5821 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5823 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5824 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5825 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5826 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5829 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5832 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5833 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5836 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5837 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5838 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5839 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5841 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5842 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5843 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5845 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5846 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5847 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5848 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5849 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5850 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5851 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5853 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5857 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5858 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5859 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5860 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5861 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5862 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5863 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5866 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5869 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5870 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5871 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5872 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5873 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5874 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5875 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5876 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5879 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5884 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5885 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5886 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5888 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5889 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5890 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5893 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5898 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5899 /// or 0-conf channels.
5901 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5902 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5903 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5904 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5905 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5906 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5908 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5909 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5910 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5911 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5912 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5913 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5914 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5918 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5921 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5922 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5924 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5925 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5927 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5928 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5929 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5930 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5931 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5933 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5936 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5937 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5938 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5941 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5942 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5947 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5950 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5951 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5952 // likely to be lost on restart!
5953 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5954 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5957 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5961 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5962 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5963 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5964 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5965 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5968 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5970 debug_assert!(false);
5971 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5976 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5977 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5978 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5979 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5980 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5981 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5984 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5985 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5988 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5989 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5990 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5991 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5992 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5995 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5996 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6001 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6002 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6003 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6004 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6005 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6006 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6007 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6008 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6009 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6011 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6012 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6013 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6018 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6019 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6020 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6021 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6022 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6023 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6024 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6032 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6033 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6034 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6036 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6040 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6041 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6043 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6044 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6045 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6047 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6051 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6052 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6053 // likely to be lost on restart!
6054 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6055 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6056 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6058 debug_assert!(false);
6059 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6063 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6065 match phase.get_mut() {
6066 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6067 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6068 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6071 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6078 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6079 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6080 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6081 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6082 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6084 user_channel_id: user_id,
6089 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6090 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6095 debug_assert!(false);
6096 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6101 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6102 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6103 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6104 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6106 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6107 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6108 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6109 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6110 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6111 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6112 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6113 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6114 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6118 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6121 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6124 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6126 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6127 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6128 chan.context.channel_id()
6131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6132 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6133 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6136 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6137 chan.context.channel_id()))
6139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6140 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6141 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6142 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6143 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6145 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6146 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6147 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6148 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6149 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6150 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6151 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6157 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6158 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6160 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6164 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6165 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6166 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6167 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6170 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6179 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6180 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6181 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6182 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6184 debug_assert!(false);
6185 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6190 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6192 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6193 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6194 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6195 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6196 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6197 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6200 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6212 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6213 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6214 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6218 debug_assert!(false);
6219 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6225 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6226 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6227 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6228 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6231 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6232 msg: announcement_sigs,
6234 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6235 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6236 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6237 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6238 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6239 // announcement_signatures.
6240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6241 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6242 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6243 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6251 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6256 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6257 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6261 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6266 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6267 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6268 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6273 debug_assert!(false);
6274 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6278 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6279 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6281 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6282 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6283 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6285 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6288 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6289 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6290 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6291 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6293 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6294 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6295 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6296 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6297 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6298 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6302 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6303 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6304 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6305 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6308 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6309 let context = phase.context_mut();
6310 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6311 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6312 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6313 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6320 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6321 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6322 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6323 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6325 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6326 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6332 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6333 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6334 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6336 debug_assert!(false);
6337 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6339 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6342 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6344 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6345 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6346 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6347 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6348 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6349 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6354 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6355 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6356 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6357 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6358 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6359 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6360 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6362 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6363 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6369 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6370 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6371 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6373 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6374 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6381 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6383 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6384 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6385 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6390 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6391 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6392 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6393 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6395 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6396 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6397 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6398 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6400 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6401 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6403 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6405 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6407 debug_assert!(false);
6408 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6412 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6414 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6415 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6416 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6417 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6418 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6419 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6421 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6422 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6423 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6424 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6425 match pending_forward_info {
6426 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6427 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6428 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6429 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6431 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6432 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6433 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6434 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6435 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6438 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6440 _ => pending_forward_info
6443 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6445 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6446 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6454 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6456 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6460 debug_assert!(false);
6461 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6463 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6465 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6467 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6468 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6469 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6470 log_trace!(self.logger,
6471 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6473 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6474 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6475 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6477 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6478 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6479 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6480 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6481 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6482 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6483 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6486 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6487 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6493 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6497 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6498 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6499 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6503 debug_assert!(false);
6504 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6510 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6511 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6513 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6514 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6522 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6523 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6524 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6526 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6528 debug_assert!(false);
6529 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6533 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6535 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6536 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6537 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6539 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6540 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6542 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6543 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6551 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6555 debug_assert!(false);
6556 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6560 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6562 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6563 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6564 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6565 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6566 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6567 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6571 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6572 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6580 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6581 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6582 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6583 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6584 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6585 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6586 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6587 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6588 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6589 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6590 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6592 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6593 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6595 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6596 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6597 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6599 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6600 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6603 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6604 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6606 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6607 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6608 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6610 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6611 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6612 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6613 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6614 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6617 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6618 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6621 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6622 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6623 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6624 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6625 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6626 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6627 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6628 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6629 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6632 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6633 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6634 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6639 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6640 // payments are being processed.
6641 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6642 push_forward_event = true;
6644 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6645 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6652 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6653 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6656 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6657 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6658 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6660 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6664 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6665 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6666 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6667 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6668 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6670 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6671 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6672 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6673 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6674 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6675 // real by taking more time.
6676 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6677 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6678 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6683 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6684 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6685 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6686 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6687 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6688 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6689 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6691 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6692 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6693 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6694 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6695 channel_funding_outpoint,
6696 counterparty_node_id,
6701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6702 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6703 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6706 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6707 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6710 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6711 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6712 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6718 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6719 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6721 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6723 debug_assert!(false);
6724 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6725 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6729 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6730 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6731 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6732 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6733 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6734 *counterparty_node_id)
6736 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6737 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6738 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6739 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6740 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6741 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6742 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6746 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6747 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6753 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6757 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6761 debug_assert!(false);
6762 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6768 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6769 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6771 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6772 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6780 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6784 debug_assert!(false);
6785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6789 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6790 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6791 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6792 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6797 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6798 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6799 msg, &self.default_configuration
6800 ), chan_phase_entry),
6801 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6802 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6803 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6806 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6807 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6815 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6816 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6817 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6818 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6820 // It's not a local channel
6821 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6825 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6826 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6827 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6833 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6834 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6835 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6836 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6837 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6838 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6839 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6843 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6844 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6845 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6846 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6848 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6849 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6850 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6853 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6857 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6858 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6863 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6866 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6868 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6871 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6873 debug_assert!(false);
6874 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6875 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6881 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6883 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6884 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6885 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6886 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6887 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6888 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6889 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6890 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6891 let mut channel_update = None;
6892 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6893 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6894 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6897 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6898 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6899 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6900 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6901 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6902 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6903 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6908 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6909 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6910 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6911 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6912 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6913 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6917 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6918 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6922 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6923 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6924 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6925 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6926 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6927 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6928 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6929 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6931 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6932 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6933 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6934 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6935 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6936 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6937 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6938 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6939 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6940 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6941 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6942 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6943 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6944 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6945 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6946 next_funding_txid: None,
6949 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6950 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6951 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6957 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6958 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6959 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6960 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6963 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6964 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6969 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6970 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6971 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6973 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6974 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6975 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6976 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6977 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6978 match monitor_event {
6979 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6980 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6982 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6985 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6986 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6987 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6990 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6991 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6992 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6994 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6995 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6996 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6997 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7000 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7002 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7005 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7007 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7008 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7014 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7016 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7017 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7018 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7026 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7027 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7033 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7034 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7037 has_pending_monitor_events
7040 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7041 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7042 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7044 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7046 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7049 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7050 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7051 /// update was applied.
7052 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7053 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7054 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7056 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7057 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7058 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7059 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7062 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7065 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7066 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7067 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7069 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7070 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7071 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7072 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7073 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7074 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7076 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7077 has_monitor_update = true;
7079 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7080 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7081 continue 'peer_loop;
7090 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7091 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7092 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7098 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7099 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7101 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7102 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7104 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7105 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7106 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7107 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7110 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7111 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7112 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7113 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7114 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7115 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7120 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7126 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7127 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7132 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7133 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7138 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7139 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7140 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7143 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7144 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7148 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7149 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7150 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7151 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7152 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7158 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7159 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7160 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7161 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7162 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7163 let mut has_update = false;
7164 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7166 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7168 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7171 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7172 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7174 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7175 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7176 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7177 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7179 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7180 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7183 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7184 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7185 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7187 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7188 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7189 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7196 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7198 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7199 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7200 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7206 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7207 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7212 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7218 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7219 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7222 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7223 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7229 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7230 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7232 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7233 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7234 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7235 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7236 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7237 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7238 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7239 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7240 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7241 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7242 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7243 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7244 assert!(should_broadcast);
7245 } else { unreachable!(); }
7246 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7247 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7248 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7251 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7255 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7256 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7257 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7261 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7262 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7263 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7264 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7268 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7271 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7273 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7274 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7275 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7276 &self, description: String
7277 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7278 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7279 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7280 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7281 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7282 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7284 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7285 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7289 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7290 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7294 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7295 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7297 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7298 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7299 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7302 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7303 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7304 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7306 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7307 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7311 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7312 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7313 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7314 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7318 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7319 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7323 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7324 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7326 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7328 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7329 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7330 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7331 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7332 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7333 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7334 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7335 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7336 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7337 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7338 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7339 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7341 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7342 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7344 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7345 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7348 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7349 self.pending_outbound_payments
7350 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7351 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7353 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7358 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7359 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7360 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7362 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7363 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7364 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7365 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7366 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7367 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7368 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7370 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7371 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7375 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7376 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7379 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7380 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7381 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7385 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7386 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7387 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7388 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7392 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7393 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7394 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7398 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7399 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7401 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7402 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7403 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7404 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7405 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7406 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7407 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7408 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7409 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7410 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7411 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7412 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7413 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7414 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7415 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7418 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7419 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7420 let builder = match quantity {
7422 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7424 let builder = match amount_msats {
7426 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7428 let builder = match payer_note {
7430 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7433 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7434 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7436 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7437 self.pending_outbound_payments
7438 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7439 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7441 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7443 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7444 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7445 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7446 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7447 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7450 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7452 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7453 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7454 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7455 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7456 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7457 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7458 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7459 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7460 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7462 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7469 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7472 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7473 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7474 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7478 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7479 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7480 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7481 /// received and no retries will be made.
7483 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7484 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7485 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7486 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7487 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7489 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7490 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7492 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7493 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7494 let payment_paths = vec![
7495 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7497 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7498 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7499 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7501 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7502 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7503 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7505 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7506 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7507 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7509 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7510 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7512 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7513 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7514 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7515 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7516 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7519 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7521 for path in refund.paths() {
7522 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7523 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7524 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7525 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7527 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7533 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7537 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7540 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7541 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7543 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7544 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7545 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7546 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7548 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7550 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7551 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7555 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7556 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7558 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7560 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7561 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7563 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7564 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7565 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7566 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7567 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7568 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7569 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7570 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7571 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7572 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7573 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7576 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7577 /// stored external to LDK.
7579 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7580 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7581 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7583 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7584 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7587 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7588 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7589 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7590 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7592 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7593 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7594 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7595 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7596 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7598 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7599 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7600 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7601 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7602 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7604 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7605 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7607 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7608 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7612 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7613 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7615 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7617 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7618 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7620 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7621 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7622 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7623 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7624 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7625 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7626 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7629 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7630 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7632 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7633 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7634 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7637 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7639 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7640 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7641 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7642 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7645 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7647 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7648 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7649 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7650 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7651 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7653 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7654 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7655 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7657 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7659 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7662 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7663 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7664 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7668 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7669 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7671 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7672 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7674 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7676 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7677 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7678 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7679 Some(_) => continue,
7680 None => return scid_candidate
7685 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7687 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7688 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7690 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7691 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7692 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7696 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7697 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7698 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7700 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7701 /// times to get a unique scid.
7702 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7703 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7704 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7706 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7707 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7708 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7709 return scid_candidate
7713 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7714 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7715 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7716 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7719 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7720 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7721 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7722 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7723 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7725 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7726 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7727 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7737 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7738 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7739 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7740 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7744 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7745 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7746 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7747 events.push_back((event, None));
7751 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7752 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7753 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7757 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7758 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7762 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7763 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7766 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7767 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7768 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7769 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7770 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7773 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7774 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7777 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7778 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7779 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7780 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7782 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7786 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7787 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7788 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7789 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7790 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7791 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7792 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7796 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7797 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7798 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7799 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7800 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7801 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7802 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7803 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7804 if further_update_exists {
7805 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7811 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7816 log_debug!(self.logger,
7817 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7818 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7824 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7825 for action in actions {
7827 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7828 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7830 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7836 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7837 /// using the given event handler.
7839 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7840 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7844 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7848 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7850 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7851 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7852 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7853 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7854 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7855 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7859 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7860 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7861 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7862 /// is always placed next to each other.
7864 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7865 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7866 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7867 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7869 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7870 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7871 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7872 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7873 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7874 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7875 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7877 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7878 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7879 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7880 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7883 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7884 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7886 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7887 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7890 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7891 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7892 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7893 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7894 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7895 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7896 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7900 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7901 events.replace(pending_events);
7910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7912 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7913 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7914 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7915 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7916 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7917 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7921 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7923 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7924 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7925 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7927 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7931 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7933 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7934 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7935 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7936 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7937 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7938 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7942 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7944 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7945 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7946 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7947 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7948 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7951 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7952 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7955 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7956 let _persistence_guard =
7957 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7958 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7959 let new_height = height - 1;
7961 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7962 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7963 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7964 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7965 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7966 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7969 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7973 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7975 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7976 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7977 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7978 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7979 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7980 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7984 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7985 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7986 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7987 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7989 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7990 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7992 let _persistence_guard =
7993 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7994 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7995 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7996 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7998 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7999 if height < last_best_block_height {
8000 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8001 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8005 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8006 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8007 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8008 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8010 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8011 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8013 let _persistence_guard =
8014 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8015 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8016 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8018 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8020 macro_rules! max_time {
8021 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8023 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8024 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8025 // having an explicit local time source.
8026 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8027 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8028 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8029 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8030 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8036 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8037 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8038 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8039 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8043 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8044 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8045 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8048 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8049 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8050 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8051 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8052 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8053 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8060 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8061 let _persistence_guard =
8062 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8063 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8064 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8065 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8066 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8067 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8068 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8069 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8074 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8076 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8077 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8078 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8079 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8080 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8081 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8085 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8086 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8088 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8089 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8090 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8091 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8092 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8094 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8095 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8098 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8101 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8102 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8104 // Retain unfunded channels.
8105 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8106 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8107 let res = f(channel);
8108 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8109 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8110 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8111 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8112 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8114 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8115 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8116 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8118 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8119 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8120 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8130 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8131 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8134 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8136 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8137 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8138 msg: announcement_sigs,
8140 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8141 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8142 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8144 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8145 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8146 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8151 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8152 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8153 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8154 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8155 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8156 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8157 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8158 // is always consistent.
8159 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8160 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8161 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8162 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8163 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8166 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8167 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8168 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8169 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8170 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8171 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8172 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8176 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8177 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8178 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8179 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8180 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8181 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8182 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8183 data: reason_message,
8196 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8197 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8198 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8199 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8200 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8201 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8202 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8203 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8204 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8205 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8207 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8208 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8209 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8213 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8216 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8217 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8218 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8219 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8220 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8221 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8222 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8223 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8224 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8225 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8226 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8229 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8230 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8231 _ => unreachable!(),
8233 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8234 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8235 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8242 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8244 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8245 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8249 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8250 /// may have events that need processing.
8252 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8253 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8255 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8256 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8257 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8258 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8261 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8262 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8263 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8266 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8267 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8268 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8271 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8272 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8273 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8274 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8277 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8278 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8279 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8280 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8283 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8284 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8286 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8287 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8288 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8289 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8290 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8293 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8294 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8295 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8296 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8299 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8300 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8301 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8302 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8305 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8306 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8307 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8308 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8311 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8312 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8313 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8314 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8318 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8319 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8321 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8322 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8323 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8324 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8325 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8326 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8330 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8331 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8332 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8333 // change to the contents.
8334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8335 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8336 let persist = match &res {
8337 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8338 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8339 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8341 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8343 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8348 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8349 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8350 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8351 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8354 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8355 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8356 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8357 // change to the contents.
8358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8359 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8360 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8364 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8365 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8366 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8367 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8370 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8372 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8375 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8380 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8381 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8382 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8383 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8384 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8386 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8387 let persist = match &res {
8388 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8389 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8391 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8396 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8397 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8398 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8399 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8402 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8403 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8404 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8405 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8408 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8409 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8410 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8411 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8414 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8415 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8416 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8417 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8420 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8422 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8425 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8430 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8431 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8432 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8433 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8434 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8435 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8436 let persist = match &res {
8437 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8438 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8439 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8441 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8446 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8448 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8451 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8452 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8453 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8454 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8456 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8457 let persist = match &res {
8458 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8459 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8460 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8462 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8467 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8468 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8469 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8470 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8472 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8473 let persist = match &res {
8474 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8475 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8476 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8478 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8483 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8485 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8488 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8490 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8493 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8494 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8495 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8496 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8498 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8499 let persist = match &res {
8500 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8501 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8502 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8504 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8509 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8514 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8515 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8516 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8519 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8524 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8526 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8527 let persist = match &res {
8528 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8529 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8530 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8532 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8537 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8539 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8540 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8541 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8543 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8544 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8545 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8548 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8549 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8550 let context = match phase {
8551 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8552 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8553 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8558 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8559 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8562 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8566 // Clean up for removal.
8567 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8568 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8569 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8572 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8573 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8574 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8575 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8577 // V1 Channel Establishment
8578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8582 // V2 Channel Establishment
8583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8584 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8585 // Common Channel Establishment
8586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8591 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8592 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8593 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8594 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8595 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8599 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8600 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8603 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8604 // Channel Operations
8605 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8606 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8608 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8610 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8613 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8614 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8615 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8623 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8624 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8625 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8626 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8629 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8631 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8633 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8634 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8638 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8639 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8640 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8644 let mut res = Ok(());
8646 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8647 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8648 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8649 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8650 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8651 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8652 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8655 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8656 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8658 if inbound_peer_limited {
8660 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8662 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8663 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8664 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8665 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8666 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8667 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8668 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8669 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8674 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8675 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8677 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8678 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8679 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8680 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8683 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8686 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8687 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8692 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8694 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8695 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8696 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8697 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8698 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8700 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8701 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8702 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8703 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8704 // worry about closing and removing them.
8705 debug_assert!(false);
8709 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8710 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8711 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8716 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8717 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8722 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8725 match &msg.data as &str {
8726 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8727 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8729 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8730 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8731 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8732 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8733 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8734 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8735 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8736 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8740 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8741 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8742 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8743 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8744 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8749 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8750 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8751 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8752 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8753 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8755 log_level: Level::Trace,
8765 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8766 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8768 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8769 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8772 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8773 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8774 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8775 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8777 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8778 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8779 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8783 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8785 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8786 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8789 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8790 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8791 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8792 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8800 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8801 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8805 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8806 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8809 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8810 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8813 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8814 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8817 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8818 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8819 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8820 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8823 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8824 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8825 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8826 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8829 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8830 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8831 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8832 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8835 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8837 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8838 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8841 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8843 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8844 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8847 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8848 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8849 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8850 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8853 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8854 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8855 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8856 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8859 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8860 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8861 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8862 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8865 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8866 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8867 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8868 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8872 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8873 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8877 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8878 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8884 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8885 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8886 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8889 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8890 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8893 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8894 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8896 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8897 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8899 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8900 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8903 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8905 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8906 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8907 let payment_paths = vec![
8908 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8910 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8911 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8912 payment_paths, payment_hash
8914 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8915 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8916 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8918 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8919 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8920 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8922 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8923 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8924 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8927 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8928 let payment_paths = vec![
8929 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8931 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8932 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8933 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8934 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8935 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8937 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8938 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8939 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8941 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8942 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8944 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8945 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8946 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8947 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8949 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8950 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8954 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8955 Err(error) => Some(error),
8959 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8963 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8964 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8966 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
8968 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8969 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8972 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8974 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
8981 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8982 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
8988 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
8989 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
8993 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8994 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8995 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8996 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8997 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9001 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9002 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9004 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9005 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9006 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9007 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9008 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9011 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9012 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9013 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9014 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9017 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9018 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9019 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9020 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9023 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9024 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9025 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9026 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9029 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9030 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9031 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9032 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9033 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9034 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9035 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9036 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9037 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9038 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9039 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9040 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9041 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9042 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9043 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9044 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9045 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9046 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9047 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9048 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9053 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9054 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9056 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9057 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9058 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9059 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9062 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9063 (2, node_id, required),
9064 (4, features, required),
9065 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9066 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9067 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9068 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9071 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9073 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9074 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9075 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9076 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9077 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9078 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9079 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9080 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9081 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9082 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9083 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9084 (7, self.config, option),
9085 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9086 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9087 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9088 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9089 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9090 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9091 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9092 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9093 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9094 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9095 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9096 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9097 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9098 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9099 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9100 (32, self.is_public, required),
9101 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9102 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9103 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9104 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9105 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9111 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9112 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9113 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9114 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9115 (2, channel_id, required),
9116 (3, channel_type, option),
9117 (4, counterparty, required),
9118 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9119 (6, funding_txo, option),
9120 (7, config, option),
9121 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9122 (9, confirmations, option),
9123 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9124 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9125 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9126 (16, balance_msat, required),
9127 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9128 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9129 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9130 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9131 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9132 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9133 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9134 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9135 (26, is_outbound, required),
9136 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9137 (30, is_usable, required),
9138 (32, is_public, required),
9139 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9140 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9141 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9142 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9143 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9146 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9147 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9148 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9149 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9150 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9154 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9156 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9157 outbound_scid_alias,
9161 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9162 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9164 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9165 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9166 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9167 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9168 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9169 confirmations_required,
9171 force_close_spend_delay,
9172 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9173 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9174 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9175 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9176 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9177 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9178 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9179 channel_shutdown_state,
9184 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9185 (2, channels, required_vec),
9186 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9187 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9190 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9191 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9194 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9196 (0, onion_packet, required),
9197 (1, blinded, option),
9198 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9201 (0, payment_data, required),
9202 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9203 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9204 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9205 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9207 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9208 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9209 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9210 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9211 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9212 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9216 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9217 (0, routing, required),
9218 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9219 (4, payment_hash, required),
9220 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9221 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9222 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9223 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9227 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9228 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9230 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9232 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9233 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9234 reason.write(writer)?;
9236 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9237 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9240 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9241 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9242 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9243 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9250 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9251 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9252 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9255 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9256 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9257 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9258 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9262 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9263 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9264 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9265 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9266 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9269 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9270 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9271 // messages contained in the variants.
9272 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9273 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9274 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9276 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9277 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9278 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9279 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9280 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9283 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9284 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9285 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9286 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9287 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9289 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9294 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9299 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9300 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9303 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9304 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9305 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9306 (2, outpoint, required),
9307 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9308 (4, htlc_id, required),
9309 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9310 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9313 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9314 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9315 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9316 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9317 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9319 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9320 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9321 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9322 (2, self.value, required),
9323 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9324 (4, payment_data, option),
9325 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9326 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9327 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9328 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9334 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9335 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9336 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9337 (0, prev_hop, required),
9338 (1, total_msat, option),
9339 (2, value_ser, required),
9340 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9341 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9342 (5, total_value_received, option),
9343 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9344 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9345 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9347 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9348 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9349 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9351 if payment_data.is_some() {
9352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9354 if total_msat.is_none() {
9355 total_msat = Some(value);
9357 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9360 if total_msat.is_none() {
9361 if payment_data.is_none() {
9362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9364 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9366 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9370 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9373 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9374 total_value_received,
9375 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9377 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9383 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9384 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9385 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9388 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9389 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9390 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9391 let mut payment_id = None;
9392 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9393 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9394 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9395 (0, session_priv, required),
9396 (1, payment_id, option),
9397 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9398 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9399 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9400 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9402 if payment_id.is_none() {
9403 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9405 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9407 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9408 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9409 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9411 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9412 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9413 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9414 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9418 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9419 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9420 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9422 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9425 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9426 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9431 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9432 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9434 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9436 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9437 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9438 (0, session_priv, required),
9439 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9440 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9441 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9442 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9443 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9444 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9447 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9449 field.write(writer)?;
9456 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9457 (0, forward_info, required),
9458 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9459 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9460 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9461 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9464 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9466 (0, htlc_id, required),
9467 (2, err_packet, required),
9472 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9473 (0, payment_secret, required),
9474 (2, expiry_time, required),
9475 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9476 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9477 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9480 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9482 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9483 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9484 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9485 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9486 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9487 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9491 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9492 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9494 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9496 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9498 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9499 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9500 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9503 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9505 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9506 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9507 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9510 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9511 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9514 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9515 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9519 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9521 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9522 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9523 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9524 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9525 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9526 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9529 channel.write(writer)?;
9535 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9536 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9537 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9538 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9539 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9540 for forward in pending_forwards {
9541 forward.write(writer)?;
9546 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9548 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9549 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9550 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9552 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9553 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9554 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9555 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9556 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9557 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9558 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9559 htlc.write(writer)?;
9561 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9562 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9565 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9566 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9567 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9568 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9569 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9570 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9571 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9574 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9575 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9576 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9577 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9578 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9580 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9581 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9582 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9583 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9584 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9585 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9586 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9591 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9592 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9593 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9594 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9595 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9596 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9597 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9598 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9599 0u64.write(writer)?;
9601 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9602 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9603 event.write(writer)?;
9607 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9608 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9609 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9610 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9611 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9612 0u64.write(writer)?;
9614 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9615 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9616 // likely to be identical.
9617 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9618 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9620 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9621 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9622 hash.write(writer)?;
9623 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9626 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9627 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9628 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9629 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9630 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9633 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9634 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9636 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9637 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9638 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9639 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9642 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9643 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9644 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9645 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9649 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9650 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9651 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9653 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9654 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9655 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9661 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9662 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9663 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9664 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9667 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9668 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9669 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9670 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9671 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9674 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9675 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9676 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9677 if !updates.is_empty() {
9678 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9679 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9684 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9685 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9686 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9687 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9688 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9689 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9690 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9691 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9692 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9693 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9694 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9695 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9696 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9703 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9704 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9705 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9706 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9709 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9710 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9711 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9712 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9713 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9714 // check that the event is sane here.
9715 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9716 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9717 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9718 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9724 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9725 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9726 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9727 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9728 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9729 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9732 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9733 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9734 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9735 events.push_back((ev, action));
9736 } else if action.is_some() {
9737 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9744 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9745 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9746 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9747 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9748 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9749 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9752 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9754 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9756 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9757 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9758 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9759 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9760 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9761 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9762 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9763 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9764 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9765 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9766 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9767 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9768 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9770 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9771 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9773 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9774 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9776 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9777 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9778 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9779 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9780 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9781 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9783 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9784 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9786 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9788 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9789 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9790 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9795 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9796 pub entropy_source: ES,
9798 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9799 pub node_signer: NS,
9801 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9802 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9804 pub signer_provider: SP,
9806 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9808 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9809 pub fee_estimator: F,
9810 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9812 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9813 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9814 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9815 pub chain_monitor: M,
9817 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9818 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9819 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9820 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9821 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9822 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9824 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9826 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9827 /// deserialization.
9829 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9830 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9831 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9833 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9834 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9836 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9837 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9838 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9839 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9841 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9844 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9845 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9848 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9849 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9851 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9855 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9860 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9861 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9862 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9863 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9864 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9866 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9867 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9872 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9873 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9874 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9875 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9877 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9879 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9880 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9881 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9886 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9887 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9888 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9892 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9893 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9904 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9905 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9907 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9908 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9909 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9911 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9913 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9914 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9915 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9916 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9917 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9918 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9919 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9920 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9921 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9922 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9924 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9925 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9926 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9927 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9928 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9929 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9930 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9931 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9932 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9933 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9934 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9935 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9936 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9938 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9939 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9940 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9942 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9943 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9944 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9946 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9947 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9948 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9950 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9951 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9952 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9954 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
9955 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9956 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9959 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
9960 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9961 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9962 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9963 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9964 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9965 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9967 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9968 let mut found_htlc = false;
9969 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9970 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9973 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9974 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9975 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9976 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9977 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9978 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9979 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9980 log_info!(args.logger,
9981 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9982 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9983 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9987 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9988 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9989 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9990 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9991 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9993 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9994 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9996 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9998 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9999 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10002 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10003 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10004 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10008 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10009 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10010 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10011 // safely discard the channel.
10012 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10013 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10014 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10015 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10016 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10017 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10018 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10021 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10022 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10023 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10024 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10025 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10026 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10030 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10031 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10032 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10033 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10034 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10035 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10036 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10038 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10042 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10043 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10044 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10045 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10046 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10047 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10048 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10049 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10050 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10052 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10055 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10056 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10057 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10058 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10059 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10060 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10061 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10062 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10064 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10067 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10070 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10071 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10072 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10073 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10074 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10075 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10076 is_connected: false,
10080 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10081 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10082 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10083 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10084 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10085 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10086 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10087 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10090 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10091 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10092 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10093 for _ in 0..event_count {
10094 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10095 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10100 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10101 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10102 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10104 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10105 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10106 // on-startup monitor updates.
10107 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10108 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10110 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10114 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10115 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10117 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10118 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10119 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10120 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10121 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10125 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10126 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10127 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10128 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10129 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10130 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10131 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10133 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10134 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10138 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10139 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10140 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10141 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10142 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10143 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10144 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10145 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10146 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10147 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10148 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10149 let mut events_override = None;
10150 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10151 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10152 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10153 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10154 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10155 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10156 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10157 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10158 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10159 (8, events_override, option),
10160 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10161 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10162 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10163 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10165 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10166 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10169 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10170 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10173 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10174 pending_events_read = events;
10177 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10178 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10181 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10182 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10183 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10184 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10185 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10186 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10188 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10190 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10191 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10192 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10195 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10196 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10197 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10198 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10199 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10201 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10202 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10203 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10205 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10206 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10207 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10208 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10209 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10211 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10212 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10213 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10214 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10215 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10216 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10217 pending_background_events.push(
10218 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10219 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10220 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10221 update: update.clone(),
10224 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10225 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10226 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10227 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10228 pending_background_events.push(
10229 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10230 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10231 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10234 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10235 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10236 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10238 max_in_flight_update_id
10242 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10245 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10246 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10247 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10249 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10250 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10251 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10252 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10253 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10254 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10255 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10256 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10257 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10260 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10261 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10262 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10263 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10264 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10265 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10266 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10267 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10268 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10269 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10270 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10273 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10274 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10275 debug_assert!(false);
10276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10281 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10282 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10283 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10284 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10285 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10286 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10287 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10288 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10290 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10291 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10292 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10294 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10295 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10296 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10297 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10298 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10299 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10300 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10301 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10306 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10307 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10309 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10310 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10311 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10312 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10315 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10316 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10317 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10318 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10319 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10320 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10321 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10323 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10324 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10325 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10326 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10328 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10329 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10330 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10333 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10334 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10335 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10336 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10338 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10339 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10340 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10343 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10344 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10345 retry_strategy: None,
10346 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10347 payment_params: None,
10348 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10349 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10350 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10351 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10352 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10353 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10354 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10355 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10356 total_msat: path_amt,
10357 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10358 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10360 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10361 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10366 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10367 match htlc_source {
10368 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10369 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10370 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10371 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10373 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10374 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10375 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10376 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10377 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10378 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10379 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10380 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10381 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10382 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10383 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10388 !forwards.is_empty()
10390 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10391 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10392 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10393 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10394 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10395 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10396 intercepted_id != ev_id
10403 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10404 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10405 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10406 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10407 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10408 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10409 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10410 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10411 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10412 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10413 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10415 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10416 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10417 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10419 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10420 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10421 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10428 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10429 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10431 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10433 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10434 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10435 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10436 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10437 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10438 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10439 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10440 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10441 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10442 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10445 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10446 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10447 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10448 // channel still live case here.
10452 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10453 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10458 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10459 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10460 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10461 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10462 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10463 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10464 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10465 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10469 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10470 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10472 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10473 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10474 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10475 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10477 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10478 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10481 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10482 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10484 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10485 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10487 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10490 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10491 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10492 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10494 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10498 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10499 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10500 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10501 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10504 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10505 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10506 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10507 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10508 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10509 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10510 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10511 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10513 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10514 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10518 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10520 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10522 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10523 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10525 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10526 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10531 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10532 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10534 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10536 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10538 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10539 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10540 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10545 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10546 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10549 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10550 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10551 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10552 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10554 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10555 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10556 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10558 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10559 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10560 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10561 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10562 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10563 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10565 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10566 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10567 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10568 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10569 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10574 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10575 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10576 debug_assert!(false);
10577 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10582 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10584 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10585 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10586 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10587 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10588 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10589 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10590 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10591 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10592 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10593 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10594 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10596 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10597 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10599 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10600 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10601 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10602 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10604 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10605 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10606 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10607 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10609 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10610 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10611 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10612 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10614 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10615 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10616 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10619 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10620 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10623 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10624 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10627 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10630 purpose: payment.purpose,
10631 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10632 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10633 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10639 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10640 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10641 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10642 for action in actions.iter() {
10643 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10644 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10645 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10647 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10648 log_trace!(args.logger,
10649 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10650 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10651 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10652 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10653 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10655 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10656 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10657 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10658 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10662 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10663 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10667 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10669 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10670 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10674 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10676 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10677 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10678 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10679 router: args.router,
10681 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10683 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10684 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10685 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10686 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10688 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10689 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10690 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10691 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10692 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10693 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10695 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10697 our_network_pubkey,
10700 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10702 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10704 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10705 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10706 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10707 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10708 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10710 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10711 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10713 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10715 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10717 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10718 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10719 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10721 logger: args.logger,
10722 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10725 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10726 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10727 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10728 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10729 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10732 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10733 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10734 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10735 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10736 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10737 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10740 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10741 //connection or two.
10743 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10749 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10750 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10751 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10752 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10753 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10754 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10755 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10756 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10757 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10758 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10759 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10760 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10761 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10762 use crate::util::test_utils;
10763 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10764 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10767 fn test_notify_limits() {
10768 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10769 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10773 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10775 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10776 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10777 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10778 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10779 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10781 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10783 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10784 // to connect messages with new values
10785 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10786 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10787 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10788 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10789 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10790 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10792 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10793 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10794 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10795 // ... but the last node should not.
10796 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10797 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10798 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10799 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10801 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10802 // about the channel.
10803 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10804 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10805 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10807 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10809 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10810 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10811 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10812 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10813 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10814 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10816 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10818 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10820 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10821 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10822 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10823 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10824 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10825 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10827 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10828 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10829 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10830 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10831 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10832 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10833 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10834 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10836 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10837 // the channel info has updated.
10838 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10839 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10840 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10841 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10842 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10843 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10847 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10848 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10854 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10856 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10857 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10858 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10859 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10861 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10862 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10863 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10864 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10865 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10866 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10867 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10868 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10872 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10874 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10875 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10876 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10878 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10880 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10881 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10884 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10886 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10888 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10889 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10890 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10891 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10892 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10893 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10894 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10895 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10896 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10898 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10899 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10900 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10902 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10904 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10906 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10907 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10908 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10909 // lightning messages manually.
10910 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10911 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10914 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10915 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10916 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10917 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10919 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10920 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10922 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10923 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10925 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10926 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10929 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10930 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10931 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10933 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10935 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10937 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10938 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10941 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10942 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10943 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10946 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10947 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10948 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10949 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10954 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10955 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10956 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10957 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10964 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10965 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10966 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10969 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10970 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10971 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10972 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10973 // fails as expected.
10974 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10975 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10976 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10977 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10978 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10979 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10980 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10981 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10982 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10983 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10984 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10985 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10986 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10987 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10988 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10990 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10991 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10992 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10994 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10995 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10996 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10997 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10998 let route = find_route(
10999 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11000 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11002 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11003 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11005 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11007 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11008 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11009 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11012 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11013 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11017 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11018 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11019 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11020 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11021 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11022 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11024 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11025 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11027 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11028 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11030 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11031 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11032 let route = find_route(
11033 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11034 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11036 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11037 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11039 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11041 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11042 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11043 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11045 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11046 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11047 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11048 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11050 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11052 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11053 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11054 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11056 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11058 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11060 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11061 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11062 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11063 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11064 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11065 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11066 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11067 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11068 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11070 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11071 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11073 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11074 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11075 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11076 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11080 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11081 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11082 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11084 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11085 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11086 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11089 let route = find_route(
11090 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11091 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11093 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11094 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11095 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11097 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11099 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11100 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11101 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11107 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11108 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11109 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11110 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11112 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11113 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11114 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11115 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11117 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11118 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11122 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11123 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11124 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11130 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11131 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11133 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11134 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11135 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11136 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11137 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11138 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11139 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11140 let route = find_route(
11141 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11142 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11145 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11146 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11147 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11148 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11149 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11150 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11153 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11154 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11155 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11156 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11157 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11158 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11159 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11161 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11165 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11166 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11167 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11168 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11169 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11175 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11176 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11178 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11179 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11180 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11181 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11182 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11183 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11184 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11185 let route = find_route(
11186 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11187 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11190 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11191 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11192 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11193 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11194 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11195 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11196 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11197 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11200 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11201 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11202 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11203 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11204 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11205 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11206 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11208 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11212 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11216 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11218 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11219 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11220 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11221 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11223 // Marshall an MPP route.
11224 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11225 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11226 route.paths.push(path);
11227 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11228 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11229 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11230 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11231 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11232 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11234 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11235 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11237 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11238 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11240 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11245 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11251 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11253 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11254 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11256 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11259 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11262 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11263 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11264 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11265 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11266 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11267 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11270 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11273 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11274 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11279 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11280 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11284 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11286 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11287 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11289 total_msat: 100_000,
11292 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11293 // payment verification fails as expected.
11294 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11295 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11296 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11297 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11299 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11303 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11304 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11308 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11309 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11310 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11311 // the channel is successfully closed.
11312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11317 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11318 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11319 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11320 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11321 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11323 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11324 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11326 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11327 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11328 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11329 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11332 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11334 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11335 // as it has the funding transaction.
11336 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11337 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11338 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11341 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11343 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11345 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11347 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11348 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11349 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11351 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11354 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11355 // as it has the funding transaction.
11356 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11357 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11358 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11361 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11362 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11364 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11365 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11366 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11367 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11369 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11370 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11371 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11372 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11374 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11375 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11377 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11378 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11379 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11380 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11381 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11382 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11383 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11387 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11388 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11389 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11390 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11391 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11392 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11393 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11396 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11398 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11399 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11400 // closing transaction).
11401 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11402 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11403 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11405 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11406 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11407 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11408 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11409 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11412 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11414 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11416 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11417 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11420 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11422 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11423 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11426 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11427 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11428 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11431 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11432 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11433 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11436 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11437 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11438 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11441 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11442 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11443 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11446 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11448 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11449 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11451 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11452 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11454 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11455 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11460 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11461 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11462 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11463 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11464 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11465 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11466 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11467 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11470 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11471 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11472 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11474 // Test the API functions.
11475 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11477 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11479 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11481 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11483 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11485 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11487 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11491 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11492 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11493 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11494 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11495 // the given `channel_id`.
11496 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11497 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11498 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11501 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11504 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11506 // Test the API functions.
11507 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11509 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11511 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11513 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11515 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11517 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11521 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11522 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11528 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11530 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11531 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11533 let mut funding_tx = None;
11534 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11535 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11536 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11539 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11540 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11541 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11542 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11543 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11545 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11547 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11549 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11551 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11553 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11555 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11558 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11559 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11560 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11561 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11562 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11564 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11565 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11567 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11568 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11569 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11570 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11571 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11572 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11573 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11576 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11577 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11578 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11579 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11580 }, true).unwrap_err();
11582 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11583 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11585 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11586 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11587 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11588 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11593 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11594 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11595 }, true).unwrap_err();
11597 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11598 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11599 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11600 }, false).unwrap();
11601 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11603 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11604 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11606 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11607 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11608 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11609 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11610 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11612 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11613 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11614 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11616 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11617 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11618 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11620 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11621 // "protected" and can connect again.
11622 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11623 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11624 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11626 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11628 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11631 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11635 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11636 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11642 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11644 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11645 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11647 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11648 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11649 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11650 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11653 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11655 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11656 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11657 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11659 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11660 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11661 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11663 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11665 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11666 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11670 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11671 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11672 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11675 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11676 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11680 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11682 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11683 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11685 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11686 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11687 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11688 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11689 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11690 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11694 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11696 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11697 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11701 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11702 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11705 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11706 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11707 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11708 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11709 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11711 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11712 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11714 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11715 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11716 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11717 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11723 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11724 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11726 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11727 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11730 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11731 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11735 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11739 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11740 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11741 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11742 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11743 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11744 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11745 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11746 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11748 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11749 payment_metadata: None,
11750 keysend_preimage: None,
11751 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11752 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11754 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11756 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11757 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11758 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11759 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11760 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11761 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11762 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11764 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11765 } else { panic!(); }
11767 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11768 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11770 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11771 payment_metadata: None,
11772 keysend_preimage: None,
11773 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11774 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11776 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11778 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11779 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11780 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11781 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11785 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11786 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11787 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11788 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11789 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11791 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11792 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11794 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11795 payment_metadata: None,
11796 keysend_preimage: None,
11797 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11798 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11800 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11801 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11802 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11804 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11805 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11806 // is not satisfied.
11807 assert!(result.is_ok());
11811 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11812 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11813 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11814 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11815 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11817 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11818 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11823 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11824 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11826 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11827 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11829 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11830 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11831 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11832 match &msg_events[0] {
11833 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11834 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11836 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11837 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11838 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11844 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11845 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11847 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11848 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11851 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11855 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11856 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11857 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11858 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11861 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11862 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11863 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11867 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11868 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11869 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11871 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11872 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11874 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11875 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11877 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11880 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11881 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11883 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11884 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11886 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11887 // not have generated any events.
11888 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11892 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11893 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11894 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11895 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11896 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11897 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11898 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11899 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11901 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11902 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11905 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11906 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11907 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11908 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11911 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11912 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11915 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11916 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11917 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11919 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11920 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11921 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11922 ..Default::default()
11924 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11925 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11928 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11929 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11932 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11933 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11934 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11935 ..Default::default()
11937 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11938 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11939 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11942 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11943 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11946 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11947 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11948 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11949 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11950 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11953 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11954 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11955 ..Default::default()
11957 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11960 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11962 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11967 fn test_payment_display() {
11968 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11969 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11970 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11971 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11972 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11973 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11977 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11978 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11979 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11980 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11981 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11984 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11985 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11986 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11987 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11988 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11989 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11990 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11991 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11993 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11994 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11995 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11998 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11999 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12001 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12002 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12004 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12005 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12006 }, false).unwrap();
12007 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12008 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12009 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12011 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12013 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12014 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12015 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12016 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12017 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12018 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12019 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12020 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12021 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12022 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12023 } else { panic!() };
12024 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12025 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12026 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12027 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12031 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12032 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12033 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12040 use crate::chain::Listen;
12041 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12042 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12043 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12044 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12045 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12046 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12047 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12048 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12049 use crate::util::test_utils;
12050 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12052 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12053 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12054 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12055 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12057 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12059 use criterion::Criterion;
12061 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12062 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12063 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12064 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12065 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12066 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12067 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12069 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12070 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12072 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12073 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12075 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12077 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12080 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12081 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12084 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12085 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12086 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12088 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12089 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12091 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12092 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12093 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12094 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12095 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12097 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12098 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12099 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12101 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12102 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12103 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12104 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12106 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12107 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12108 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12110 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12111 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12112 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12113 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12114 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12116 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12117 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12118 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12120 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12121 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12123 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12124 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12125 }, false).unwrap();
12126 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12127 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12128 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12131 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12132 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12133 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12135 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12136 } else { panic!(); }
12138 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12139 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12140 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12141 match events_b[0] {
12142 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12143 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12145 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12148 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12149 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12150 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12151 match events_a[0] {
12152 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12153 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12158 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12160 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12161 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12162 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12164 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12165 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12166 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12167 match msg_events[0] {
12168 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12169 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12170 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12174 match msg_events[1] {
12175 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12179 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12180 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12181 match events_a[0] {
12182 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12183 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12188 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12189 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12190 match events_b[0] {
12191 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12192 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12197 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12198 macro_rules! send_payment {
12199 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12200 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12201 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12202 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12203 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12204 payment_count += 1;
12205 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12206 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12208 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12209 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12210 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12211 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12212 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12213 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12214 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12215 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12216 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12217 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12218 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12221 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12222 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12223 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12225 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12226 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12227 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12228 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12229 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12231 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12234 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12235 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12236 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12237 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12239 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12243 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12244 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12245 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);