]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
Merge pull request #2248 from TheBlueMatt/2023-04-gossip-check
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
115         },
116         ReceiveKeysend {
117                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125 }
126
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132         /// Amount received
133         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135         /// may overshoot this in either case)
136         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
141 }
142
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
147 }
148
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
154 }
155
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
158
159         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
162         // HTLCs.
163         //
164         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
166         prev_htlc_id: u64,
167         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
169 }
170
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
173         FailHTLC {
174                 htlc_id: u64,
175                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
176         },
177 }
178
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183         short_channel_id: u64,
184         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
185         htlc_id: u64,
186         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188
189         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
191         outpoint: OutPoint,
192 }
193
194 enum OnionPayload {
195         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196         Invoice {
197                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200         },
201         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
203 }
204
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208         cltv_expiry: u32,
209         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210         value: u64,
211         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213         sender_intended_value: u64,
214         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215         timer_ticks: u8,
216         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220         total_msat: u64,
221         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
223 }
224
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231                         value_msat: val.value,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
237 ///
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
241
242 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
243         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244                 self.0.write(w)
245         }
246 }
247
248 impl Readable for PaymentId {
249         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
250                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
252         }
253 }
254
255 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
256         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
257                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
258         }
259 }
260
261 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
262 ///
263 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
264 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
265 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
266
267 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
268         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
269                 self.0.write(w)
270         }
271 }
272
273 impl Readable for InterceptId {
274         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
275                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
276                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
277         }
278 }
279
280 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
281 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
282 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
283         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
284         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
285 }
286 impl SentHTLCId {
287         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
288                 match source {
289                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
290                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
291                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
292                         },
293                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
294                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
295                 }
296         }
297 }
298 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
299         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
300                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
301                 (2, htlc_id, required),
302         },
303         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
304                 (0, session_priv, required),
305         };
306 );
307
308
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
313         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
314         OutboundRoute {
315                 path: Path,
316                 session_priv: SecretKey,
317                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
318                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
319                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
320                 payment_id: PaymentId,
321         },
322 }
323 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
324 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
325         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
326                 match self {
327                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
328                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
329                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
330                         },
331                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
332                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
333                                 path.hash(hasher);
334                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
335                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
336                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
337                         },
338                 }
339         }
340 }
341 impl HTLCSource {
342         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
343         #[cfg(test)]
344         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
345                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
346                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
347                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
348                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
349                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
350                 }
351         }
352
353         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
354         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
355         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
356         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
357                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
358                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
359                 } else {
360                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
361                         true
362                 }
363         }
364 }
365
366 struct InboundOnionErr {
367         err_code: u16,
368         err_data: Vec<u8>,
369         msg: &'static str,
370 }
371
372 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
373 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
374 ///
375 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
376 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
377 pub enum FailureCode {
378         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
379         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
380         TemporaryNodeFailure,
381         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
382         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
383         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
384         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
385         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
386         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
387         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
388         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
389         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
390         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
391         ///
392         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
393         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
394         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
395 }
396
397 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
398     fn into(self) -> u16 {
399                 match self {
400                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
401                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
402                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
403                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
404                 }
405         }
406 }
407
408 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
409 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
410 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
411 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
412 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
413
414 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
415         err: msgs::LightningError,
416         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
417         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
418         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
419 }
420 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
421         #[inline]
422         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
423                 Self {
424                         err: LightningError {
425                                 err: err.clone(),
426                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
427                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
428                                                 channel_id,
429                                                 data: err
430                                         },
431                                 },
432                         },
433                         chan_id: None,
434                         shutdown_finish: None,
435                         channel_capacity: None,
436                 }
437         }
438         #[inline]
439         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
440                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
441         }
442         #[inline]
443         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
444                 Self {
445                         err: LightningError {
446                                 err: err.clone(),
447                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
448                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449                                                 channel_id,
450                                                 data: err
451                                         },
452                                 },
453                         },
454                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
455                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
456                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
457                 }
458         }
459         #[inline]
460         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
461                 Self {
462                         err: match err {
463                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
464                                         err: msg.clone(),
465                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
466                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
467                                                         channel_id,
468                                                         data: msg
469                                                 },
470                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
471                                         },
472                                 },
473                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
474                                         err: msg,
475                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
476                                 },
477                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
478                                         err: msg.clone(),
479                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
480                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
481                                                         channel_id,
482                                                         data: msg
483                                                 },
484                                         },
485                                 },
486                         },
487                         chan_id: None,
488                         shutdown_finish: None,
489                         channel_capacity: None,
490                 }
491         }
492 }
493
494 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
495 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
496 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
497 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
498 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
499
500 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
501 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
502 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
503 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
504 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
505 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
506         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
507         CommitmentFirst,
508         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
509         RevokeAndACKFirst,
510 }
511
512 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
513 struct ClaimingPayment {
514         amount_msat: u64,
515         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
516         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
517         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
518         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
519 }
520 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
521         (0, amount_msat, required),
522         (2, payment_purpose, required),
523         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
524         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
525         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
526 });
527
528 struct ClaimablePayment {
529         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
530         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
531         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
532 }
533
534 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
535 struct ClaimablePayments {
536         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
537         /// failed/claimed by the user.
538         ///
539         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
540         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
541         ///
542         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
543         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
544         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
545
546         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
547         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
548         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
549         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
550 }
551
552 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
553 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
554 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
556 enum BackgroundEvent {
557         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
558         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
559         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
560         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
561         ///
562         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
563         /// are regenerated on startup.
564         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
565         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
566         /// channel to continue normal operation.
567         ///
568         /// In general this should be used rather than
569         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
570         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
571         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
572         ///
573         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
574         /// are regenerated on startup.
575         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
576                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
577                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
578                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
579         },
580         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
581         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
582         /// on a channel.
583         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
584                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
585                 channel_id: [u8; 32],
586         },
587 }
588
589 #[derive(Debug)]
590 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
591         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
592         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
593         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
594         /// event can be generated.
595         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
596         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
597         /// operation of another channel.
598         ///
599         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
600         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
601         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
602         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
603         /// outbound edge.
604         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
605                 event: events::Event,
606                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
607         },
608 }
609
610 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
611         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
612         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
613                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
614                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
615                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
616                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
617                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
618                 // downgrades to prior versions.
619                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
620         },
621 );
622
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
624 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
625         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
626                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
627                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
628         },
629 }
630 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
631         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
632                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
633                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
634         };
635 );
636
637 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
638 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
639 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
640 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
641         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
642         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
643         /// durably to disk.
644         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
645                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
646                 channel_id: [u8; 32],
647                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
648                 htlc_id: u64,
649         },
650 }
651
652 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
653         #[allow(unused)]
654         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
655                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
656                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
657                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
658                 }
659         }
660 }
661
662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
663         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
664 ;);
665
666
667 /// State we hold per-peer.
668 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
669         /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
670         ///
671         /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
672         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>,
673         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
674         ///
675         /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
676         /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
677         /// `channel_by_id`.
678         pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
679         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
680         ///
681         /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
682         /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
683         /// `channel_by_id`.
684         pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
685         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
686         ///
687         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
688         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
689         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
690         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
691         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
692         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
693         latest_features: InitFeatures,
694         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
695         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
696         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
697         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
698         /// user but which have not yet completed.
699         ///
700         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
701         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
702         /// for a missing channel.
703         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
704         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
705         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
706         ///
707         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
708         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
709         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
710         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
711         ///
712         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
713         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
714         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
715         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
716         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
717         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
718         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
719         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
720         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
721         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
722         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
723         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
724         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
725         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
726         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727         is_connected: bool,
728 }
729
730 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
731         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
732         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
733         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
734         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
735                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
736                         return false
737                 }
738                 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
739                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740         }
741
742         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
743         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
744                 self.channel_by_id.len() +
745                         self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
746                         self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
747                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
748         }
749
750         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
751         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
752                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
753                         self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
754                         self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
755                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
756         }
757 }
758
759 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
760 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
761 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
762         /// The original OpenChannel message.
763         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
764         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
765         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
766 }
767
768 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
769 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
770 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
771
772 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
773 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
774 ///
775 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
776 /// here.
777 ///
778 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
779 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
780 struct PendingInboundPayment {
781         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
782         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
783         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
784         /// this payment being removed.
785         expiry_time: u64,
786         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
787         user_payment_id: u64,
788         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
789         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
790         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
791 }
792
793 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
794 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
795 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
796 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
797 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
798 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
799 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
800 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
801 ///
802 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
803 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804         Arc<M>,
805         Arc<T>,
806         Arc<KeysManager>,
807         Arc<KeysManager>,
808         Arc<KeysManager>,
809         Arc<F>,
810         Arc<DefaultRouter<
811                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
812                 Arc<L>,
813                 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
814                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
815                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
816         >>,
817         Arc<L>
818 >;
819
820 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
821 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
822 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
823 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
824 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
829 ///
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
831 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
832         ChannelManager<
833                 &'a M,
834                 &'b T,
835                 &'c KeysManager,
836                 &'c KeysManager,
837                 &'c KeysManager,
838                 &'d F,
839                 &'e DefaultRouter<
840                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
841                         &'g L,
842                         &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
843                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
844                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
845                 >,
846                 &'g L
847         >;
848
849 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
850 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
851 $vis trait AChannelManager {
852         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
853         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
854         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
855         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
856         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
857         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
858         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
859         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
861         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
862         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
863         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
864         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
865         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
866         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
867         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
868         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
869         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
870 }
871 } }
872 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
873 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
874 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
875 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
876 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
877 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
878 where
879         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
880         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
881         ES::Target: EntropySource,
882         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
883         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
884         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
885         R::Target: Router,
886         L::Target: Logger,
887 {
888         type Watch = M::Target;
889         type M = M;
890         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
891         type T = T;
892         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
893         type ES = ES;
894         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
895         type NS = NS;
896         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
897         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
898         type SP = SP;
899         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
900         type F = F;
901         type Router = R::Target;
902         type R = R;
903         type Logger = L::Target;
904         type L = L;
905         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
906 }
907
908 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
909 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
910 ///
911 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
912 /// to individual Channels.
913 ///
914 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
915 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
916 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
917 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
918 ///
919 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
920 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
921 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
922 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
923 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
924 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
925 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
926 ///
927 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
928 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
929 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
930 ///
931 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
932 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
933 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
934 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
935 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
936 ///
937 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
938 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
939 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
940 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
941 ///
942 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
943 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
944 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
945 ///
946 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
947 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
948 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
949 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
950 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
951 ///
952 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
953 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
954 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
955 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
956 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
957 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
958 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
959 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
960 //
961 // Lock order:
962 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
963 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
964 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
965 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
966 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
967 //
968 // Lock order tree:
969 //
970 // `total_consistency_lock`
971 //  |
972 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
973 //  |   |
974 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
975 //  |
976 //  |__`per_peer_state`
977 //  |   |
978 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
979 //  |       |
980 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
981 //  |       |
982 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
983 //  |           |
984 //  |           |__`peer_state`
985 //  |               |
986 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
987 //  |               |
988 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
989 //  |               |
990 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
991 //  |               |
992 //  |               |__`best_block`
993 //  |               |
994 //  |               |__`pending_events`
995 //  |                   |
996 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
997 //
998 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
999 where
1000         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1001         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1002         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1003         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1004         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1005         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1006         R::Target: Router,
1007         L::Target: Logger,
1008 {
1009         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1010         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1011         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1012         chain_monitor: M,
1013         tx_broadcaster: T,
1014         #[allow(unused)]
1015         router: R,
1016
1017         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1018         #[cfg(test)]
1019         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1020         #[cfg(not(test))]
1021         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1022         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1023
1024         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1025         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1026         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1027         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1028         ///
1029         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1030         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1031
1032         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1033         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1034         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1035         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1036         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1037         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1038         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1039         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1040         ///
1041         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1042         ///
1043         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1044         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1045
1046         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1047         ///
1048         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1049         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1050         /// and via the classic SCID.
1051         ///
1052         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1053         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1054         ///
1055         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1056         #[cfg(test)]
1057         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1058         #[cfg(not(test))]
1059         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1060         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1061         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1062         ///
1063         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1065
1066         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1067         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1068         ///
1069         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1070         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1071
1072         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1073         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1074         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1075         /// active channel list on load.
1076         ///
1077         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1079
1080         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1081         ///
1082         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1083         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1084         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1085         ///
1086         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1087         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1088         /// the handling of the events.
1089         ///
1090         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1091         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1092         ///
1093         /// TODO:
1094         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1095         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1096         /// would break backwards compatability.
1097         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1098         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1099         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1100         ///
1101         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1102         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1103
1104         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1105         ///
1106         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1107         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1108         /// confirmation depth.
1109         ///
1110         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1111         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1112         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1113         ///
1114         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1115         #[cfg(test)]
1116         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1117         #[cfg(not(test))]
1118         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1119
1120         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1121
1122         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1123
1124         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1125         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1126         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1127         ///
1128         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1129         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1130
1131         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1132         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1133         /// keeping additional state.
1134         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1135
1136         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1137         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1138         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1139         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1140
1141         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1142         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1143         ///
1144         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1145         /// are currently open with that peer.
1146         ///
1147         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1148         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1149         /// channels.
1150         ///
1151         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1152         ///
1153         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1154         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1155         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1156         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1157         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1158
1159         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1160         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1161         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1162         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1163         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1164         ///
1165         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1166         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1167         ///
1168         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1170         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1171         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1173
1174         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1175         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1176
1177         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1178         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1179         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1180         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1181         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1182         ///
1183         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1184         ///
1185         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186         ///
1187         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1188         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1189         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1190         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1191         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1192         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1193         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1194         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1195         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1196
1197         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1198
1199         persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1200
1201         entropy_source: ES,
1202         node_signer: NS,
1203         signer_provider: SP,
1204
1205         logger: L,
1206 }
1207
1208 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1209 ///
1210 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1211 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1212 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1214 pub struct ChainParameters {
1215         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1216         pub network: Network,
1217
1218         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1219         ///
1220         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1221         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1222 }
1223
1224 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1225 #[must_use]
1226 enum NotifyOption {
1227         DoPersist,
1228         SkipPersist,
1229 }
1230
1231 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1232 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1233 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1234 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1235 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1236 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1237 ///
1238 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1239 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1240 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1241 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1242         persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1243         should_persist: F,
1244         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1245         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1246 }
1247
1248 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1249         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1250                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1251                 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1252
1253                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1254                         persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1255                         should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1256                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1257                 }
1258
1259         }
1260
1261         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1262         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1263         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1264                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1265
1266                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1267                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
1268                         should_persist: persist_check,
1269                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1270                 }
1271         }
1272 }
1273
1274 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1275         fn drop(&mut self) {
1276                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1277                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1278                 }
1279         }
1280 }
1281
1282 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1283 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1284 ///
1285 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1286 ///
1287 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1288 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1289 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1290 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1291 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1292
1293 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1294 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1295 ///
1296 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1297 ///
1298 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1299 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1300 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1301 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1302 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1303 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1304 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1305 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1306 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1307 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1308 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1309 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1310 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1311
1312 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1313 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1314 /// this value.
1315 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1316 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1317 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1318 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1319
1320 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1321 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1322 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1323 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1324 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1325 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1326 #[deny(const_err)]
1327 #[allow(dead_code)]
1328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1329
1330 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1331 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1332 #[deny(const_err)]
1333 #[allow(dead_code)]
1334 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1335
1336 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1337 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1338
1339 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1340 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1341 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1342 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1343
1344 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1345 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1346 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1347
1348 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1349 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1350 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1351
1352 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1353 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1354 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1355 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1356
1357 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1358 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1359 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1360
1361 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1362 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1363 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1364
1365 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1366 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1367 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1368         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1369         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1370         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1371         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1372         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1373         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1374         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1375         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1376 }
1377
1378 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1379 /// to better separate parameters.
1380 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1381 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1382         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1383         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1384         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1385         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1386         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1387         pub features: InitFeatures,
1388         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1389         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1390         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1391         ///
1392         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1393         ///
1394         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1395         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1396         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1397         /// payments to us through this channel.
1398         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1399         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1400         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1401         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1402         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1403         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1404         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1405 }
1406
1407 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1408 ///
1409 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1410 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1411 /// transactions.
1412 ///
1413 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1414 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1415 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1416         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1417         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1418         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1419         /// lifetime of the channel.
1420         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1421         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1422         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1423         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1424         /// our counterparty already.
1425         ///
1426         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1427         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1428         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1429         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1430         ///
1431         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1432         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1433         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1434         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1435         ///
1436         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1437         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1438         ///
1439         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1440         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1441         ///
1442         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1443         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1444         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1445         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1446         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1447         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1448         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1449         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1450         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1451         /// `Some(0)`).
1452         ///
1453         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1454         ///
1455         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1456         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1457         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1458         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1459         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1460         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1461         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1462         ///
1463         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1464         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1465         ///
1466         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1467         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1468         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1469         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1470         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1471         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1472         /// this value on chain.
1473         ///
1474         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1475         ///
1476         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1477         ///
1478         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1479         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1480         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1481         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1482         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1483         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1484         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1485         ///
1486         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1487         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1488         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1489         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1490         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1491         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1492         ///
1493         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1494         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1495         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1496         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1497         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1498         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1499         ///
1500         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1501         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1502         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1503         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1504         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1505         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1506         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1507         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1508         ///
1509         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1510         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1511         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1512         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1513         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1514         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1515         /// route which is valid.
1516         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1517         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1518         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1519         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1520         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1521         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1522         ///
1523         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1524         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1525         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1526         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1527         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1528         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1529         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1530         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1531         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1532         ///
1533         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1534         ///
1535         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1536         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1537         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1538         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1539         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1540         ///
1541         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1542         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1543         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1544         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1545         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1546         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1547         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1548         ///
1549         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1550         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1551         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1552         pub is_outbound: bool,
1553         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1554         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1555         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1556         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1557         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1558         ///
1559         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1560         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1561         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1562         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1563         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1564         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1565         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1566         ///
1567         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1568         pub is_usable: bool,
1569         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1570         pub is_public: bool,
1571         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1572         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1573         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1574         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1575         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1576         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1577         ///
1578         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1579         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1580 }
1581
1582 impl ChannelDetails {
1583         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1584         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1585         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1586         ///
1587         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1588         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1589         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1590                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1591         }
1592
1593         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1594         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1595         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1596         ///
1597         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1598         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1599         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1600                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1601         }
1602
1603         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1604                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1605                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1606         ) -> Self
1607         where
1608                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1609                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1610         {
1611                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1612                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1613                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1614                 ChannelDetails {
1615                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1616                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1617                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1618                                 features: latest_features,
1619                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1620                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1621                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1622                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1623                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1624                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1625                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1626                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1627                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1628                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1629                         },
1630                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1631                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1632                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1633                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1634                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1635                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1636                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1637                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1638                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1639                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1640                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1641                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1642                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1643                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1644                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1645                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1646                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1647                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1648                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1649                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1650                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1651                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1652                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1653                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1654                         config: Some(context.config()),
1655                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1656                 }
1657         }
1658 }
1659
1660 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1661 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1662 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1663 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1664 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1665 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1666 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1667 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1668         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1669         NotShuttingDown,
1670         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1671         ShutdownInitiated,
1672         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1673         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1674         ResolvingHTLCs,
1675         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1676         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1677         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1678         /// to drop the channel.
1679         ShutdownComplete,
1680 }
1681
1682 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1683 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1684 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1685 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1686         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1687         Pending {
1688                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1689                 /// abandoned.
1690                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1691                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1692                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1693                 total_msat: u64,
1694         },
1695         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1696         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1697         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1698         Fulfilled {
1699                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1700                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1701                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1702         },
1703         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1704         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1705         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1706         Abandoned {
1707                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1708                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1709         },
1710 }
1711
1712 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1713 ///
1714 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1715 #[derive(Clone)]
1716 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1717         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1718         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1719         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1720         /// route hints.
1721         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1722         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1723         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1724 }
1725
1726 macro_rules! handle_error {
1727         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1728                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1729                 // entering the macro.
1730                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1731                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1732
1733                 match $internal {
1734                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1735                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1736                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1737
1738                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1739                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1740                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1741                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1742                                                         msg: update
1743                                                 });
1744                                         }
1745                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1746                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1747                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1748                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1749                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1750                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1751                                                 }, None));
1752                                         }
1753                                 }
1754
1755                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1756                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1757                                 } else {
1758                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1759                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1760                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1761                                         });
1762                                 }
1763
1764                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1765                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1766                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1767                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1768                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1769                                         }
1770                                 }
1771
1772                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1773                                 Err(err)
1774                         },
1775                 }
1776         } };
1777         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1778                 match $internal {
1779                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1780                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1781                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1782                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1783                         },
1784                 }
1785         };
1786 }
1787
1788 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1789         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1790                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1791                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1792                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1793                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1794                 } else {
1795                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1796                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1797                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1798                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1799                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1800                         // stage.
1801                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1802                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1803                 }
1804                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1805         }}
1806 }
1807
1808 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1809 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1810         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1811                 match $err {
1812                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1813                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1814                         },
1815                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1816                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1817                         },
1818                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1819                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1820                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1821                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1822                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1823                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1824                         },
1825                 }
1826         };
1827         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1828                 match $err {
1829                         // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1830                         // In any case, just close the channel.
1831                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1832                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1833                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1834                                 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1835                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1836                                         shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1837                         },
1838                 }
1839         }
1840 }
1841
1842 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1843         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1844                 match $res {
1845                         Ok(res) => res,
1846                         Err(e) => {
1847                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1848                                 if drop {
1849                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1850                                 }
1851                                 break Err(res);
1852                         }
1853                 }
1854         }
1855 }
1856
1857 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1858         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1859                 match $res {
1860                         Ok(res) => res,
1861                         Err(e) => {
1862                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1863                                 if drop {
1864                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1865                                 }
1866                                 return Err(res);
1867                         }
1868                 }
1869         }
1870 }
1871
1872 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1873         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1874                 match $res {
1875                         Ok(res) => res,
1876                         Err(e) => {
1877                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1878                                 if drop {
1879                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1880                                 }
1881                                 return Err(res);
1882                         }
1883                 }
1884         }
1885 }
1886
1887 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1888         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1889                 {
1890                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1891                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1892                         channel
1893                 }
1894         }
1895 }
1896
1897 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1898         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1899                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1900                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1901                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1902                 });
1903                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1904                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1905                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1906                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1907                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1908                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1909                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1910                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1911                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1912                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1913                 }
1914         }}
1915 }
1916
1917 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1918         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1919                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1920                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1921                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1922                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1923                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1924                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1925                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1926                         }, None));
1927                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1928                 }
1929         }
1930 }
1931
1932 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1933         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1934                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1935                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1936                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1937                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1938                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1939                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1940                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1941                         }, None));
1942                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1943                 }
1944         }
1945 }
1946
1947 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1948         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1949                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1950                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1951                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1952                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1953                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1954                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1955                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1956                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1957                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1958                         // now.
1959                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1960                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1961                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1962                                         msg,
1963                                 })
1964                         } else { None }
1965                 } else { None };
1966
1967                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1968                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1969
1970                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1971                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1972                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1973                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1974                         updates.announcement_sigs);
1975                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1976                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1977                 }
1978
1979                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1980                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1981                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1982
1983                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1984
1985                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1986                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1987                 }
1988                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1989                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1990                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1991                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1992                 }
1993         } }
1994 }
1995
1996 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1997         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1998                 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1999                 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2000                 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2001                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2002                 match $update_res {
2003                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2004                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2005                                         log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2006                                 Ok(false)
2007                         },
2008                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2009                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2010                                         log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2011                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2012                                 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2013                                         "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2014                                         $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2015                                         $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2016                                 $remove;
2017                                 res
2018                         },
2019                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2020                                 $completed;
2021                                 Ok(true)
2022                         },
2023                 }
2024         } };
2025         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2026                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2027                         $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2028                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2029         };
2030         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2031                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2032         };
2033         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2034                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2035                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2036                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2037                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2038                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2039                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2040                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2041                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2042                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2043                         });
2044                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2045                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2046                         $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2047                         {
2048                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2049                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2050                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2051                                 }
2052                         })
2053         } };
2054         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2055                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2056         }
2057 }
2058
2059 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2060         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2061                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2062                 while !processed_all_events {
2063                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2064                                 return;
2065                         }
2066
2067                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2068
2069                         {
2070                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2071                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2072                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2073
2074                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2075                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2076                                 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2077
2078                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2079                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2080                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2081                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2082                                 }
2083                         }
2084
2085                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2086                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2087                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2088                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2089                         }
2090
2091                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2092
2093                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2094                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2095                                 $handle_event;
2096                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2097                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2098                                 }
2099                         }
2100
2101                         {
2102                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2103                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2104                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2105                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2106                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2107                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2108                         }
2109
2110                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2111                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2112                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2113                                 processed_all_events = false;
2114                         }
2115
2116                         if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2117                                 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2118                         }
2119                 }
2120         }
2121 }
2122
2123 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2124 where
2125         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2126         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2127         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2128         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2129         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2130         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2131         R::Target: Router,
2132         L::Target: Logger,
2133 {
2134         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2135         ///
2136         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2137         ///
2138         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2139         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2140         ///
2141         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2142         ///
2143         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2144         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2145         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2146         /// more details.
2147         ///
2148         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2149         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2150         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2151         pub fn new(
2152                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2153                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2154                 current_timestamp: u32,
2155         ) -> Self {
2156                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2157                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2158                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2159                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2160                 ChannelManager {
2161                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2162                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2163                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2164                         chain_monitor,
2165                         tx_broadcaster,
2166                         router,
2167
2168                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2169
2170                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2171                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2172                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2173                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2174                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2175                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2176                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2177                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2178
2179                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2180                         secp_ctx,
2181
2182                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2183                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2184
2185                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2186
2187                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2188
2189                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2190
2191                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2192                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2193                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2194                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2195                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2196                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2197
2198                         entropy_source,
2199                         node_signer,
2200                         signer_provider,
2201
2202                         logger,
2203                 }
2204         }
2205
2206         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2207         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2208                 &self.default_configuration
2209         }
2210
2211         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2212                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2213                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2214                 let mut i = 0;
2215                 loop {
2216                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2217                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2218                         } else {
2219                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2220                         }
2221                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2222                                 break;
2223                         }
2224                         i += 1;
2225                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2226                 }
2227                 outbound_scid_alias
2228         }
2229
2230         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2231         ///
2232         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2233         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2234         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2235         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2236         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2237         ///
2238         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2239         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2240         ///
2241         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2242         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2243         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2244         ///
2245         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2246         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2247         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2248         ///
2249         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2250         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2251         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2252         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2253         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2254         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2255         ///
2256         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2257         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2258         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2259         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2260                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2261                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2262                 }
2263
2264                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2265                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2266                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2267
2268                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2269
2270                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2271                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2272
2273                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2274                 let channel = {
2275                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2276                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2277                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2278                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2279                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2280                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2281                         {
2282                                 Ok(res) => res,
2283                                 Err(e) => {
2284                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2285                                         return Err(e);
2286                                 },
2287                         }
2288                 };
2289                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2290
2291                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2292                 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2293                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2294                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2295                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2296                                 } else {
2297                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2298                                 }
2299                         },
2300                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2301                 }
2302
2303                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2304                         node_id: their_network_key,
2305                         msg: res,
2306                 });
2307                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2308         }
2309
2310         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2311                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2312                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2313                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2314                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2315                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2316                 // the same channel.
2317                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2318                 {
2319                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2320                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2321                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2322                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2323                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2324                                 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2325                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2326                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2327                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2328                                         res.push(details);
2329                                 }
2330                         }
2331                 }
2332                 res
2333         }
2334
2335         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2336         /// more information.
2337         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2338                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2339                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2340                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2341                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2342                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2343                 // the same channel.
2344                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2345                 {
2346                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2347                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2348                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2349                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2350                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2351                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2352                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2353                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2354                                         res.push(details);
2355                                 }
2356                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2357                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2358                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2359                                         res.push(details);
2360                                 }
2361                                 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2362                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2363                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2364                                         res.push(details);
2365                                 }
2366                         }
2367                 }
2368                 res
2369         }
2370
2371         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2372         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2373         ///
2374         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2375         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2376         /// are.
2377         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2378                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2379                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2380                 // really wanted anyway.
2381                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2382         }
2383
2384         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2385         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2386                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2387                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2388
2389                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2390                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2391                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2392                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2393                         let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2394                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2395                         };
2396                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2397                                 .iter()
2398                                 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2399                                 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2400                                 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2401                                 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2402                                 .collect();
2403                 }
2404                 vec![]
2405         }
2406
2407         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2408         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2409         ///
2410         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2411         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2412         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2413         ///
2414         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2415         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2416                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2417                         .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2418                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2419                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2420                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2421                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2422                                         })
2423                                 },
2424                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2425                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2426                                 },
2427                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2428                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2429                                 },
2430                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2431                         })
2432                         .collect()
2433         }
2434
2435         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2436         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2437                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2439                         Some(transaction) => {
2440                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2441                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2442                                 }, None));
2443                         },
2444                         None => {},
2445                 }
2446                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2447                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2448                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2449                         reason: closure_reason,
2450                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2451                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2452                 }, None));
2453         }
2454
2455         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2456                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2457
2458                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2459                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2460                         {
2461                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2462
2463                                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2464                                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2465
2466                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2467                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2468
2469                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2470                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2471                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2472                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2473                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2474                                                         .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2475                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2476
2477                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2478                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2479                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2480                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2481                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2482                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2483                                                 });
2484
2485                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2486                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2487                                                         break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2488                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2489                                                 }
2490
2491                                                 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2492                                                         let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2493                                                         if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2494                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2495                                                                         msg: channel_update
2496                                                                 });
2497                                                         }
2498                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2499                                                 }
2500                                                 break Ok(());
2501                                         },
2502                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2503                                 }
2504                         }
2505                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2506                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2507                         //
2508                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2509                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2510                         // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2511                         // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2512                 };
2513
2514                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2515                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2516                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2517                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2518                 }
2519
2520                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2521                 Ok(())
2522         }
2523
2524         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2525         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2526         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2527         ///
2528         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2529         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2530         ///    estimate.
2531         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2532         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2533         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2534         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2535         ///
2536         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2537         ///
2538         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2539         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2540         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2541         /// channel.
2542         ///
2543         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2544         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2545         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2546         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2547         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2548                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2549         }
2550
2551         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2552         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2553         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2554         ///
2555         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2556         /// the channel being closed or not:
2557         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2558         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2559         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2560         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2561         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2562         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2563         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2564         ///
2565         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2566         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2567         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2568         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2569         ///
2570         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2571         ///
2572         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2573         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2574         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2575         /// channel.
2576         ///
2577         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2578         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2579         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2580         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2581         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2582                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2583         }
2584
2585         #[inline]
2586         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2587                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2588                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2589                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2590                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2591                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2592                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2593                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2594                 }
2595                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2596                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2597                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2598                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2599                         // ignore the result here.
2600                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2601                 }
2602         }
2603
2604         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2605         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2606         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2607         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2608                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2609                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2610                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2611                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2612                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2613                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2614                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2615                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2616                         } else {
2617                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2618                         };
2619                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2620                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2621                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2622                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2623                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2624                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2625                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2626                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2627                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2628                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2629                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2630                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2631                                 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2632                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2633                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2634                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2635                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2636                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2637                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2638                                 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2639                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2640                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2641                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2642                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2643                                 // events anyway.
2644                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2645                         } else {
2646                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2647                         }
2648                 };
2649                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2650                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2651                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2652                                 msg: update
2653                         });
2654                 }
2655
2656                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2657         }
2658
2659         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2660                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2661                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2662                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2663                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2664                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2665                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2666                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2667                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2668                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2669                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2670                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2671                                                         },
2672                                                 }
2673                                         );
2674                                 }
2675                                 Ok(())
2676                         },
2677                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2678                 }
2679         }
2680
2681         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2682         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2683         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2684         /// channel.
2685         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2686         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2687                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2688         }
2689
2690         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2691         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2692         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2693         ///
2694         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2695         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2696         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2697         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2698                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2699         }
2700
2701         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2702         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2703         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2704                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2705                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2706                 }
2707         }
2708
2709         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2710         /// local transaction(s).
2711         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2712                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2713                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2714                 }
2715         }
2716
2717         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2718                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2719                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2720                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2721         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2722                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2723                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2724                         version: 0,
2725                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2726                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2727                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2728                 };
2729
2730                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2731                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2732                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2733                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2734                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2735                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2736                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2737                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2738                                 }),
2739                 };
2740
2741                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2742                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2743                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2744                                 short_channel_id,
2745                         },
2746                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2747                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2748                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2749                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2750                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2751                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2752                 })
2753         }
2754
2755         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2756                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2757                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2758                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2759         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2760                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2761                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2762                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2763                         } =>
2764                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2765                         _ =>
2766                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2767                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2768                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2769                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2770                                 }),
2771                 };
2772                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2773                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2774                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2775                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2776                                 err_code: 18,
2777                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2778                         })
2779                 }
2780                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2781                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2782                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2783                 //
2784                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2785                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2786                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2787                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2788                 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2789                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2790                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2791                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2792                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2793                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2794                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2795                         });
2796                 }
2797                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2798                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2799                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2800                 {
2801                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2802                                 err_code: 19,
2803                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2804                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2805                         });
2806                 }
2807
2808                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2809                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2810                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2811                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2812                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2813                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2814                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2815                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2816                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2817                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2818                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2819                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2820                                 });
2821                         }
2822                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2823                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2824                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2825                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2826                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2827                                 });
2828                         }
2829                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2830                                 payment_data,
2831                                 payment_preimage,
2832                                 payment_metadata,
2833                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2834                                 custom_tlvs,
2835                         }
2836                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2837                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2838                                 payment_data: data,
2839                                 payment_metadata,
2840                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2841                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2842                                 custom_tlvs,
2843                         }
2844                 } else {
2845                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2846                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2847                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
2848                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2849                         });
2850                 };
2851                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2852                         routing,
2853                         payment_hash,
2854                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2855                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2856                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2857                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2858                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2859                 })
2860         }
2861
2862         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2863                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2864         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2865                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2866                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2867                                 {
2868                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2869                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2870                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2871                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2872                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2873                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
2874                                         }));
2875                                 }
2876                         }
2877                 }
2878
2879                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2880                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2881                 }
2882
2883                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2884                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2885                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2886
2887                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2888                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2889                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2890                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2891                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2892                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2893                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2894                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2895                 }
2896                 macro_rules! return_err {
2897                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2898                                 {
2899                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2900                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2901                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2902                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2903                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2904                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2905                                         }));
2906                                 }
2907                         }
2908                 }
2909
2910                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2911                         Ok(res) => res,
2912                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2913                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2914                         },
2915                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2916                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2917                         },
2918                 };
2919                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2920                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2921                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2922                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2923                                 }, ..
2924                         } => {
2925                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2926                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2927                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2928                         },
2929                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2930                         // inbound channel's state.
2931                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2932                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2933                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2934                         }
2935                 };
2936
2937                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2938                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2939                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2940                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2941                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2942                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2943                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2944                                         // phantom or an intercept.
2945                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2946                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2947                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2948                                         {
2949                                                 None
2950                                         } else {
2951                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2952                                         }
2953                                 },
2954                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2955                         };
2956                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2957                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2959                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2960                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2961                                 }
2962                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2963                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2964                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2965                                         None => {
2966                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2967                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
2968                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2969                                         },
2970                                         Some(chan) => chan
2971                                 };
2972                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2973                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2974                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2975                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2976                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2977                                 }
2978                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2979                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2980                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2981                                         // we don't have the channel here.
2982                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2983                                 }
2984                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2985
2986                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2987                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2988                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2989                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2990                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2991                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2992                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2993                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2994                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2995                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2996                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2997                                         } else {
2998                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2999                                         }
3000                                 }
3001                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3002                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3003                                 }
3004                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3005                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3006                                 }
3007                                 chan_update_opt
3008                         } else {
3009                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3010                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3011                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3012                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3013                                         break Some((
3014                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3015                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3016                                         ));
3017                                 }
3018                                 None
3019                         };
3020
3021                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3022                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3023                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3024                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3025                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3026                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3027                         }
3028                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3029                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3030                         }
3031                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3032                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3033                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3034                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3035                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3036                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3037                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3038                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3039                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3040                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3041                         }
3042
3043                         break None;
3044                 }
3045                 {
3046                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3047                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3048                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3049                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3050                                 }
3051                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3052                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3053                                 }
3054                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3055                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3056                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3057                                 }
3058                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3059                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3060                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3061                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3062                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3063                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3064                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3065                                 // instead.
3066                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3067                         }
3068                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3069                 }
3070                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3071         }
3072
3073         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3074                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3075                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3076         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3077                 macro_rules! return_err {
3078                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3079                                 {
3080                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3081                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3082                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3083                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3084                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3085                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3086                                         }));
3087                                 }
3088                         }
3089                 }
3090                 match decoded_hop {
3091                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3092                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3093                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3094                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3095                                 {
3096                                         Ok(info) => {
3097                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3098                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3099                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3100                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3101                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3102                                         },
3103                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3104                                 }
3105                         },
3106                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3107                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3108                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3109                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3110                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3111                                 }
3112                         }
3113                 }
3114         }
3115
3116         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3117         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3118         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3119         ///
3120         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3121         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3122         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3123         ///
3124         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3125         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3126         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3127                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3128                         return Err(LightningError {
3129                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3130                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3131                         });
3132                 }
3133                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3134                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3135                 }
3136                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3137                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3138         }
3139
3140         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3141         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3142         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3143         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3144         ///
3145         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3146         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3147         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3148         ///
3149         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3150         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3151         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3152                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3153                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3154                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3155                         Some(id) => id,
3156                 };
3157
3158                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3159         }
3160
3161         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3162                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3163                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3164
3165                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3166                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3167                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3168                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3169                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3170                 };
3171
3172                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3173                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3174                         short_channel_id,
3175                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3176                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3177                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3178                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3179                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3180                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3181                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3182                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3183                 };
3184                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3185                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3186                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3187                 // channel.
3188                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3189
3190                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3191                         signature: sig,
3192                         contents: unsigned
3193                 })
3194         }
3195
3196         #[cfg(test)]
3197         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3198                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3199                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3200                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3201                         session_priv_bytes
3202                 })
3203         }
3204
3205         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3206                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3207                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3208                         session_priv_bytes
3209                 } = args;
3210                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3211                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3212
3213                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3214                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3215                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3216                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3217                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3218
3219                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3220                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3221                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3222
3223                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3224                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3225
3226                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3227                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3228                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3229                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3230                         };
3231
3232                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3233                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3234                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3235                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3236                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3237                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3238                                 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3239                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3240                                 }
3241                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3242                                 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3243                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3244                                                 path: path.clone(),
3245                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3246                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3247                                                 payment_id,
3248                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3249                                 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3250                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3251                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3252                                                         Err(e) => break Err(e),
3253                                                         Ok(false) => {
3254                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3255                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3256                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3257                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3258                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3259                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3260                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3261                                                         },
3262                                                         Ok(true) => {},
3263                                                 }
3264                                         },
3265                                         None => { },
3266                                 }
3267                         } else {
3268                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3269                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3270                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3271                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3272                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3273                         }
3274                         return Ok(());
3275                 };
3276
3277                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3278                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3279                         Err(e) => {
3280                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3281                         },
3282                 }
3283         }
3284
3285         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3286         ///
3287         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3288         /// fields for more info.
3289         ///
3290         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3291         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3292         ///
3293         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3294         ///
3295         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3296         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3297         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3298         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3299         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3300         ///
3301         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3302         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3303         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3304         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3305         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3306         ///
3307         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3308         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3309         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3310         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3311         ///
3312         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3313         ///
3314         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3315         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3316         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3317         ///
3318         /// In general, a path may raise:
3319         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3320         ///    node public key) is specified.
3321         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3322         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3323         ///    failure).
3324         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3325         ///    relevant updates.
3326         ///
3327         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3328         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3329         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3330         ///
3331         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3332         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3333         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3334         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3335         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3336         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3337         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3338                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3339                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3340                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3341                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3342                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3343                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3344         }
3345
3346         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3347         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3348         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3349                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3350                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3351                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3352                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3353                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3354                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3355                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3356         }
3357
3358         #[cfg(test)]
3359         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3360                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3361                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3362                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3363                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3364                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3365         }
3366
3367         #[cfg(test)]
3368         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3369                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3370                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3371         }
3372
3373         #[cfg(test)]
3374         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3375                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3376         }
3377
3378
3379         /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3380         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3381         /// retries are exhausted.
3382         ///
3383         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3384         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3385         ///
3386         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3387         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3388         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3389         ///
3390         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3391         /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3392         ///
3393         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3394         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3395         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3396                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3397                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3398         }
3399
3400         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3401         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3402         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3403         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3404         /// never reach the recipient.
3405         ///
3406         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3407         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3408         ///
3409         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3410         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3411         ///
3412         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3413         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3414                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3415                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3416                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3417                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3418                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3419         }
3420
3421         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3422         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3423         ///
3424         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3425         /// payments.
3426         ///
3427         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3428         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3429                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3430                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3431                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3432                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3433                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3434                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3435         }
3436
3437         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3438         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3439         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3440         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3441                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3442                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3443                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3444                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3445                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3446         }
3447
3448         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3449         /// payment probe.
3450         #[cfg(test)]
3451         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3452                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3453         }
3454
3455         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3456         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3457         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3458                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3459         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3460                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3461                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3462                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3463
3464                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3465                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3466                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3467                         Some(chan) => {
3468                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3469
3470                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3471                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3472                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3473                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3474                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3475                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3476                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3477                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3478                                 match funding_res {
3479                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3480                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3481                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3482                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3483
3484                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3485                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3486                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3487                                                 });
3488                                         },
3489                                 }
3490                         },
3491                         None => {
3492                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3493                                         err: format!(
3494                                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3495                                                 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3496                                 })
3497                         },
3498                 };
3499
3500                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3501                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3502                         msg,
3503                 });
3504                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3505                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3506                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3507                         },
3508                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3509                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3510                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3511                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3512                                 }
3513                                 e.insert(chan);
3514                         }
3515                 }
3516                 Ok(())
3517         }
3518
3519         #[cfg(test)]
3520         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3521                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3522                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3523                 })
3524         }
3525
3526         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3527         ///
3528         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3529         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3530         ///
3531         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3532         /// across the p2p network.
3533         ///
3534         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3535         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3536         ///
3537         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3538         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3539         /// keys per-channel).
3540         ///
3541         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3542         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3543         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3544         ///
3545         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3546         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3547         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3548         ///
3549         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3550         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3551         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3552         /// for more details.
3553         ///
3554         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3555         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3556         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3557                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3558
3559                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3560                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3561                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3562                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3563                                 });
3564                         }
3565                 }
3566                 {
3567                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3568                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3569                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3570                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3571                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3572                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3573                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3574                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3575                                 });
3576                         }
3577                 }
3578                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3579                         if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3580                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3581                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3582                                 });
3583                         }
3584
3585                         let mut output_index = None;
3586                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3587                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3588                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3589                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3590                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3591                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3592                                                 });
3593                                         }
3594                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3595                                 }
3596                         }
3597                         if output_index.is_none() {
3598                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3599                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3600                                 });
3601                         }
3602                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3603                 })
3604         }
3605
3606         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3607         ///
3608         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3609         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3610         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3611         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3612         ///
3613         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3614         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3615         ///
3616         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3617         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3618         ///
3619         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3620         ///
3621         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3622         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3623         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3624         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3625         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3626         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3627         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3628         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3629                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3630         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3631                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3632                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3633                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3634                         });
3635                 }
3636
3637                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3638                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3639                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3640                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3641                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3642                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3643                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3644                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3645                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3646                                         err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3647                                 });
3648                         };
3649                 }
3650                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3651                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3652                                 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3653                                 config.apply(config_update);
3654                                 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3655                                         continue;
3656                                 }
3657                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3658                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3659                                 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3660                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3661                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3662                                                 msg,
3663                                         });
3664                                 }
3665                                 continue;
3666                         }
3667
3668                         let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3669                                 &mut channel.context
3670                         } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3671                                 &mut channel.context
3672                         } else {
3673                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3674                                 debug_assert!(false);
3675                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3676                                         err: format!(
3677                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3678                                                 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3679                                 });
3680                         };
3681                         let mut config = context.config();
3682                         config.apply(config_update);
3683                         // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3684                         // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3685                         context.update_config(&config);
3686                 }
3687                 Ok(())
3688         }
3689
3690         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3691         ///
3692         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3693         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3694         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3695         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3696         ///
3697         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3698         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3699         ///
3700         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3701         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3702         ///
3703         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3704         ///
3705         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3706         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3707         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3708         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3709         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3710         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3711         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3712         pub fn update_channel_config(
3713                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3714         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3715                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3716         }
3717
3718         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3719         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3720         ///
3721         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3722         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3723         ///
3724         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3725         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3726         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3727         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3728         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3729         ///
3730         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3731         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3732         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3733         /// than expected.
3734         ///
3735         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3736         /// backwards.
3737         ///
3738         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3739         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3740         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3741         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3742         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3743         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3744                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3745
3746                 let next_hop_scid = {
3747                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3748                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3749                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3750                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3751                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3752                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3753                                 Some(chan) => {
3754                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3755                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3756                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3757                                                 })
3758                                         }
3759                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3760                                 },
3761                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762                                         err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3763                                                 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3764                                 })
3765                         }
3766                 };
3767
3768                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3769                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3770                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3771                         })?;
3772
3773                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3774                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3775                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3776                         },
3777                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3778                 };
3779                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3780                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3781                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3782                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3783                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3784                 };
3785
3786                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3787                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3788                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3789                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3790                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3791                 )];
3792                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3793                 Ok(())
3794         }
3795
3796         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3797         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3798         ///
3799         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3800         /// backwards.
3801         ///
3802         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3803         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3804                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3805
3806                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3807                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3808                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3809                         })?;
3810
3811                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3812                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3813                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3814                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3815                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3816                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3817                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3818                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3819                         });
3820
3821                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3822                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3823                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3824                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3825
3826                 Ok(())
3827         }
3828
3829         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3830         ///
3831         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3832         /// Will likely generate further events.
3833         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3834                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3835
3836                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3837                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3838                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3839                 {
3840                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3841                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3842
3843                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3844                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3845                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3846                                                 () => {
3847                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3848                                                                 match forward_info {
3849                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3850                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3851                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3852                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3853                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3854                                                                                 }
3855                                                                         }) => {
3856                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3857                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3858                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3859
3860                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3861                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3862                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3863                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3864                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3865                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3866                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3867                                                                                                 });
3868
3869                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3870                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3871                                                                                                 } else {
3872                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3873                                                                                                 };
3874
3875                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3876                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3877                                                                                                         reason
3878                                                                                                 ));
3879                                                                                                 continue;
3880                                                                                         }
3881                                                                                 }
3882                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3883                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3884                                                                                                 {
3885                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3886                                                                                                 }
3887                                                                                         }
3888                                                                                 }
3889                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3890                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3891                                                                                                 {
3892                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3893                                                                                                 }
3894                                                                                         }
3895                                                                                 }
3896                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3897                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3898                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3899                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3900                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3901                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
3902                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3903                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3904                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3905                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3906                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3907                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
3908                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3909                                                                                                         },
3910                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3911                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3912                                                                                                         },
3913                                                                                                 };
3914                                                                                                 match next_hop {
3915                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3916                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3917                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3918                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3919                                                                                                                 {
3920                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3921                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3922                                                                                                                 }
3923                                                                                                         },
3924                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
3925                                                                                                 }
3926                                                                                         } else {
3927                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3928                                                                                         }
3929                                                                                 } else {
3930                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3931                                                                                 }
3932                                                                         },
3933                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3934                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3935                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3936                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3937                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
3938                                                                         }
3939                                                                 }
3940                                                         }
3941                                                 }
3942                                         }
3943                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3944                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3945                                                 None => {
3946                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3947                                                         continue;
3948                                                 }
3949                                         };
3950                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3951                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3952                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3953                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3954                                                 continue;
3955                                         }
3956                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3957                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3958                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3959                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3960                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3961                                                         continue;
3962                                                 },
3963                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3964                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3965                                                                 match forward_info {
3966                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3967                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3968                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3969                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3970                                                                                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3971                                                                                 },
3972                                                                         }) => {
3973                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3974                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3975                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3976                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3977                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3978                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3979                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3980                                                                                         // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3981                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
3982                                                                                 });
3983                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3984                                                                                         payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3985                                                                                         onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3986                                                                                         &self.logger)
3987                                                                                 {
3988                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3989                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
3990                                                                                         } else {
3991                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3992                                                                                         }
3993                                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3994                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3995                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3996                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3997                                                                                         ));
3998                                                                                         continue;
3999                                                                                 }
4000                                                                         },
4001                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4002                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4003                                                                         },
4004                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4005                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4006                                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
4007                                                                                         htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4008                                                                                 ) {
4009                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4010                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4011                                                                                         } else {
4012                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4013                                                                                         }
4014                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4015                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4016                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4017                                                                                         continue;
4018                                                                                 }
4019                                                                         },
4020                                                                 }
4021                                                         }
4022                                                 }
4023                                         }
4024                                 } else {
4025                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4026                                                 match forward_info {
4027                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4028                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4029                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4030                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4031                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4032                                                                 }
4033                                                         }) => {
4034                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4035                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4036                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4037                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4038                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4039                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4040                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4041                                                                         },
4042                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4043                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4044                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4045                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4046                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4047                                                                                 };
4048                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4049                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4050                                                                         },
4051                                                                         _ => {
4052                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4053                                                                         }
4054                                                                 };
4055                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4056                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4057                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4058                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4059                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4060                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4061                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4062                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4063                                                                         },
4064                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4065                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4066                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4067                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4068                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4069                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4070                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4071                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4072                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4073                                                                         onion_payload,
4074                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4075                                                                 };
4076
4077                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4078
4079                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4080                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4081                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4082                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4083                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4084                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4085                                                                                 );
4086                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4087                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4088                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4089                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4090                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4091                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4092                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4093                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4094                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4095                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4096                                                                                 ));
4097                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4098                                                                         }
4099                                                                 }
4100                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4101                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4102                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4103                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4104                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4105                                                                 }
4106
4107                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4108                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4109                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4110                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4111                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4112                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4113                                                                                 };
4114                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4115                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4116                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4117                                                                                 }
4118                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4119                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4120                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4121                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4122                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4123                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4124                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4125                                                                                                 }
4126                                                                                         });
4127                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4128                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4129                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4130                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4131                                                                                 }
4132                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4133                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4134                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4135                                                                                 }
4136                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4137                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4138                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4139                                                                                         }
4140                                                                                 } else {
4141                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4142                                                                                 }
4143                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4144                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4145                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4146                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4147                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4148                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4149                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4150                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4151                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4152                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4153                                                                                         }
4154                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4155                                                                                 }
4156                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4157                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4158                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4159                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4160                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4161                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4162                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4163                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4164                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4165                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4166                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4167                                                                                         }
4168                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4169                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4170                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4171                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4172                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4173                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4174                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4175                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4176                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4177                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4178                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4179                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4180                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4181                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4182                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4183                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4184                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4185                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4186                                                                                         }, None));
4187                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4188                                                                                 } else {
4189                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4190                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4191                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4192                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4193                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4194                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4195                                                                                         }
4196                                                                                 }
4197                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4198                                                                         }}
4199                                                                 }
4200
4201                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4202                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4203                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4204                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4205                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4206                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4207                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4208                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4209                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4210                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4211                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4212                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4213                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4214                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4215                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4216                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4217                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4218                                                                                                         }
4219                                                                                                 };
4220                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4221                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4222                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4223                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4224                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4225                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4226                                                                                                         }
4227                                                                                                 }
4228                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4229                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4230                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4231                                                                                                 };
4232                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4233                                                                                         },
4234                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4235                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4236                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4237                                                                                         }
4238                                                                                 }
4239                                                                         },
4240                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4241                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4242                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4243                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4244                                                                                 }
4245                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4246                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4247                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4248                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4249                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4250                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4251                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4252                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4253                                                                                 } else {
4254                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4255                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4256                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4257                                                                                         };
4258                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4259                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4260                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4261                                                                                         }
4262                                                                                 }
4263                                                                         },
4264                                                                 };
4265                                                         },
4266                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4267                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4268                                                         }
4269                                                 }
4270                                         }
4271                                 }
4272                         }
4273                 }
4274
4275                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4276                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4277                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4278                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4279
4280                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4281                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4282                 }
4283                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4284
4285                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4286                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4287                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4288                 // network stack.
4289                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4290
4291                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4292                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4293                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4294         }
4295
4296         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4297         ///
4298         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4299         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4300                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4301
4302                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4303
4304                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4305                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4306                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4307                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4308                 }
4309
4310                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4311                         match event {
4312                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4313                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4314                                         // monitor updating completing.
4315                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4316                                 },
4317                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4318                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4319                                         let res = {
4320                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4321                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4322                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4323                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4324                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4325                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4326                                                                         updated_chan = true;
4327                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4328                                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4329                                                                 },
4330                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4331                                                         }
4332                                                 } else { Ok(()) }
4333                                         };
4334                                         if !updated_chan {
4335                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4336                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4337                                         }
4338                                         // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4339                                         // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4340                                         // however, ensure that.
4341                                         if res.is_err() {
4342                                                 log_error!(self.logger,
4343                                                         "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4344                                         }
4345                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4346                                 },
4347                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4348                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4349                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4350                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4351                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4352                                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4353                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4354                                                 } else {
4355                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4356                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4357                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4358                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4359                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4360                                                 }
4361                                         }
4362                                 },
4363                         }
4364                 }
4365                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4366         }
4367
4368         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4369         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4370         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4371                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4372                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4373         }
4374
4375         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4376                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4377                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4378                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4379                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4380                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4381                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4382                 }
4383                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4384                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4385                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4386                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4387                 }
4388                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4389                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4390
4391                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4392                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4393         }
4394
4395         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4396         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4397         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4398         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4399         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4400         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4401                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4402                         let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4403
4404                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4405                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4406
4407                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4408                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4409                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4410                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4411                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4412                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4413                                                 min_mempool_feerate
4414                                         } else {
4415                                                 normal_feerate
4416                                         };
4417                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4418                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4419                                 }
4420                         }
4421
4422                         should_persist
4423                 });
4424         }
4425
4426         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4427         ///
4428         /// This currently includes:
4429         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4430         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4431         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4432         ///    the channel.
4433         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4434         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4435         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4436         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4437         ///
4438         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4439         /// estimate fetches.
4440         ///
4441         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4442         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4443         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4444                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4445                         let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4446
4447                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4448                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4449
4450                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4451                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4452                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4453                         {
4454                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4455                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4456                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4457                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4458                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4459                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4460                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4461                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4462                                                         min_mempool_feerate
4463                                                 } else {
4464                                                         normal_feerate
4465                                                 };
4466                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4467                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4468
4469                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4470                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4471                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4472                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4473                                                 }
4474
4475                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4476                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4477                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4478                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4479                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4480                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4481                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4482                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4483                                                                 n += 1;
4484                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4485                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4486                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4487                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4488                                                                                         msg: update
4489                                                                                 });
4490                                                                         }
4491                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4492                                                                 } else {
4493                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4494                                                                 }
4495                                                         },
4496                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4497                                                                 n += 1;
4498                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4499                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4500                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4501                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4502                                                                                         msg: update
4503                                                                                 });
4504                                                                         }
4505                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4506                                                                 } else {
4507                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4508                                                                 }
4509                                                         },
4510                                                         _ => {},
4511                                                 }
4512
4513                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4514
4515                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4516                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4517                                                                         counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4518                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4519                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4520                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4521                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4522                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4523                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4524                                                                         },
4525                                                                 },
4526                                                         });
4527                                                 }
4528
4529                                                 true
4530                                         });
4531
4532                                         let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4533                                                 chan_id: &[u8; 32],
4534                                                 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4535                                                 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4536                                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4537                                         | {
4538                                                 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4539                                                 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4540                                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4541                                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4542                                                                 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4543                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4544                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4545                                                         self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4546                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4547                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4548                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4549                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4550                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4551                                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4552                                                                         },
4553                                                                 },
4554                                                         });
4555                                                         false
4556                                                 } else {
4557                                                         true
4558                                                 }
4559                                         };
4560                                         peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4561                                                 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4562                                         peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4563                                                 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4564
4565                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4566                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4567                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4568                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4569                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4570                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4571                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4572                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4573                                                                         },
4574                                                                 }
4575                                                         );
4576                                                 }
4577                                         }
4578                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4579
4580                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4581                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4582                                         }
4583                                 }
4584                         }
4585
4586                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4587                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4588                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4589                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4590                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4591                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4592                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4593                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4594                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4595                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4596                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4597                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4598                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4599                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4600                                                         let remove_entry = {
4601                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4602                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4603                                                         };
4604                                                         if remove_entry {
4605                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4606                                                         }
4607                                                 },
4608                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4609                                         }
4610                                 }
4611                         }
4612
4613                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4614                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4615                                         // This should be unreachable
4616                                         debug_assert!(false);
4617                                         return false;
4618                                 }
4619                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4620                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4621                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4622                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4623                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4624                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4625                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4626                                         {
4627                                                 return true;
4628                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4629                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4630                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4631                                         }) {
4632                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4633                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4634                                                 return false;
4635                                         }
4636                                 }
4637                                 true
4638                         });
4639
4640                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4641                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4642                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4643                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4644                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4645                         }
4646
4647                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4648                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4649                         }
4650
4651                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4652
4653                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4654                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4655                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4656                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4657                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4658                         }
4659
4660                         should_persist
4661                 });
4662         }
4663
4664         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4665         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4666         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4667         ///
4668         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4669         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4670         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4671         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4672         ///
4673         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4674         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4675         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4676         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4677         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4678                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4679         }
4680
4681         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4682         /// reason for the failure.
4683         ///
4684         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4685         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4686                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4687
4688                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4689                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4690                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4691                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4692                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4693                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4694                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4695                         }
4696                 }
4697         }
4698
4699         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4700         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4701                 match failure_code {
4702                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4703                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4704                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4705                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4706                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4707                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4708                         },
4709                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4710                                 let fail_data = match data {
4711                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4712                                         None => Vec::new(),
4713                                 };
4714                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4715                         }
4716                 }
4717         }
4718
4719         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4720         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4721         ///
4722         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4723         /// forwarding
4724         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4725                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4726                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4727                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4728                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4729                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4730                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4731                 } else {
4732                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4733                 };
4734                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4735                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4736                 } else {
4737                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4738                 }
4739         }
4740
4741
4742         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4743         /// that we want to return and a channel.
4744         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4745                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4746                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4747                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4748                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4749                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4750                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4751                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4752                         }
4753                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4754                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4755                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4756                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4757                 } else {
4758                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4759                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4760                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4761                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4762                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4763                 }
4764         }
4765
4766         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4767         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4768         // be surfaced to the user.
4769         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4770                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4771                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4772         ) {
4773                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4774                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4775                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4776                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4777                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4778                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4779                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4780                                                 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4781                                         },
4782                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4783                                 }
4784                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4785                 };
4786
4787                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4788                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4789                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4790                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4791                 }
4792         }
4793
4794         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4795         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4796         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4797                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4798                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4799                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4800                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4801                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4802                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4803                 }
4804
4805                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4806                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4807                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4808                 //timer handling.
4809
4810                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4811                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4812                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4813                 match source {
4814                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4815                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4816                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4817                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4818                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4819                         },
4820                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4821                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4822                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4823
4824                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4825                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4826                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4827                                         push_forward_ev = true;
4828                                 }
4829                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4830                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4831                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4832                                         },
4833                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4834                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4835                                         }
4836                                 }
4837                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4838                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4839                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4840                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4841                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4842                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
4843                                 }, None));
4844                         },
4845                 }
4846         }
4847
4848         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4849         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4850         ///
4851         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4852         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4853         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4854         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4855         ///
4856         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4857         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4858         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4859         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4860         ///
4861         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4862         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4863         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4864         ///
4865         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4866         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4867         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4868         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4869         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4870         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4871         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4872         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4873                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4874         }
4875
4876         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4877         /// even type numbers.
4878         ///
4879         /// # Note
4880         ///
4881         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4882         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4883         ///
4884         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4885         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4886                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4887         }
4888
4889         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4890                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4891
4892                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4893
4894                 let mut sources = {
4895                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4896                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4897                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4898                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4899                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4900                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4901                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4902                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4903                                                 break;
4904                                         }
4905                                 }
4906
4907                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4908                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4909                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4910                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4911                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4912                                 });
4913                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4914                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4915                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4916                                                 &payment_hash);
4917                                 }
4918
4919                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4920                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4921                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4922                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4923                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4924                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4925                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4926                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4927                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4928                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4929                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4930                                                 }
4931                                                 return;
4932                                         }
4933                                 }
4934
4935                                 payment.htlcs
4936                         } else { return; }
4937                 };
4938                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4939
4940                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4941                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4942                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4943                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4944                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4945                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4946                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4947                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4948                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4949                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4950                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4951                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4952                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4953                                 debug_assert!(false);
4954                                 valid_mpp = false;
4955                                 break;
4956                         }
4957                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4958
4959                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4960                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4961                                 debug_assert!(false);
4962                                 valid_mpp = false;
4963                                 break;
4964                         }
4965                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4966                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4967                 }
4968                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4969                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4970                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4971                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4972                         return;
4973                 }
4974                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4975                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4976                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4977                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4978                         return;
4979                 }
4980                 if valid_mpp {
4981                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4982                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4983                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4984                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4985                                 {
4986                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4987                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4988                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4989                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4990                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4991                                 }
4992                         }
4993                 }
4994                 if !valid_mpp {
4995                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4996                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4997                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4998                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4999                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5000                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5001                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5002                         }
5003                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5004                 }
5005
5006                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5007                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5008                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5009                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5010                 }
5011         }
5012
5013         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5014                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5015         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5016                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5017
5018                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5019                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5020                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5021                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5022
5023                 {
5024                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5025                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5026                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5027                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5028                                 None => None
5029                         };
5030
5031                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5032                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5033                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5034                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5035
5036                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5037                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5038                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5039                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5040                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5041                                         let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5042
5043                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5044                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5045                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5046                                                                 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5047                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5048                                                 }
5049                                                 if !during_init {
5050                                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5051                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5052                                                         if let Err(e) = res {
5053                                                                 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5054                                                                 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5055                                                                 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5056                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5057                                                                 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5058                                                         }
5059                                                 } else {
5060                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5061                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5062                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5063                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5064                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5065                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5066                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5067                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5068                                                                 });
5069                                                 }
5070                                         }
5071                                         return Ok(());
5072                                 }
5073                         }
5074                 }
5075                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5076                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5077                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5078                                 payment_preimage,
5079                         }],
5080                 };
5081
5082                 if !during_init {
5083                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5084                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5085                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5086                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5087                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5088                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5089                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5090                                 // again on restart.
5091                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5092                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5093                         }
5094                 } else {
5095                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5096                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5097                         // event.
5098                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5099                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5100                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5101                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5102                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5103                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5104                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5105                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5106                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5107                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5108                                 )));
5109                 }
5110                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5111                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5112                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5113                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5114                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5115                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5116                 Ok(())
5117         }
5118
5119         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5120                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5121         }
5122
5123         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5124                 match source {
5125                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5126                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5127                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5128                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5129                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5130                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5131                                 };
5132                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5133                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5134                                         &self.logger);
5135                         },
5136                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5137                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5138                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5139                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5140                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5141                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5142                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5143                                                         } else { None };
5144
5145                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5146                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5147                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5148                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5149                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5150                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5151                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5152                                                                 },
5153                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5154                                                         })
5155                                                 } else { None }
5156                                         });
5157                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5158                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5159                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5160                                 }
5161                         },
5162                 }
5163         }
5164
5165         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5166         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5167                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5168         }
5169
5170         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5171                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5172                         match action {
5173                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5174                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5175                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5176                                                 amount_msat,
5177                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5178                                                 receiver_node_id,
5179                                                 htlcs,
5180                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5181                                         }) = payment {
5182                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5183                                                         payment_hash,
5184                                                         purpose,
5185                                                         amount_msat,
5186                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5187                                                         htlcs,
5188                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5189                                                 }, None));
5190                                         }
5191                                 },
5192                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5193                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5194                                 } => {
5195                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5196                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5197                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5198                                         }
5199                                 },
5200                         }
5201                 }
5202         }
5203
5204         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5205         /// update completion.
5206         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5207                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5208                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5209                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5210                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5211         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5212                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5213                         log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5214                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5215                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5216                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5217                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5218                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5219
5220                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5221
5222                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5223                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5224                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5225                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5226                 }
5227
5228                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5229                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5230                 }
5231                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5232                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5233                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5234                                 msg,
5235                         });
5236                 }
5237
5238                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5239                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5240                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5241                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5242                                         updates: update,
5243                                 });
5244                         }
5245                 } }
5246                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5247                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5248                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5249                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5250                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5251                                 });
5252                         }
5253                 } }
5254                 match order {
5255                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5256                                 handle_cs!();
5257                                 handle_raa!();
5258                         },
5259                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5260                                 handle_raa!();
5261                                 handle_cs!();
5262                         },
5263                 }
5264
5265                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5266                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5267                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5268                 }
5269
5270                 {
5271                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5272                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5273                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5274                 }
5275
5276                 htlc_forwards
5277         }
5278
5279         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5280                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5281
5282                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5283                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5284                         None => {
5285                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5286                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5287                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5288                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5289                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5290                                         None => return,
5291                                 }
5292                         }
5293                 };
5294                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5295                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5296                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5297                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5298                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5299                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5300                 let channel =
5301                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5302                                 chan
5303                         } else {
5304                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5305                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5306                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5307                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5308                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5309                                 return;
5310                         };
5311                 let remaining_in_flight =
5312                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5313                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5314                                 pending.len()
5315                         } else { 0 };
5316                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5317                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5318                         remaining_in_flight);
5319                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5320                         return;
5321                 }
5322                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5323         }
5324
5325         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5326         ///
5327         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5328         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5329         /// the channel.
5330         ///
5331         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5332         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5333         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5334         ///
5335         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5336         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5337         /// used to accept such channels.
5338         ///
5339         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5340         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5341         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5342                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5343         }
5344
5345         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5346         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5347         ///
5348         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5349         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5350         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5351         ///
5352         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5353         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5354         ///
5355         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5356         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5357         ///
5358         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5359         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5360         ///
5361         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5362         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5363         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5364                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5365         }
5366
5367         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5368                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5369
5370                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5371                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5372                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5373                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5374                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5375                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5376                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5377                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5378
5379                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5380                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5381                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5382                 // succeed.
5383                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5384                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5385                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5386                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5387                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5388                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5389                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5390                         }
5391                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5392                 }?;
5393
5394                 if accept_0conf {
5395                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5396                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5397                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5398                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5399                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5400                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5401                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5402                                 }
5403                         };
5404                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5405                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5406                 } else {
5407                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5408                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5409                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5410                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5411                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5412                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5413                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5414                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5415                                         }
5416                                 };
5417                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5418                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5419                         }
5420                 }
5421
5422                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5423                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5424                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5425
5426                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5427                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5428                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5429                 });
5430
5431                 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5432
5433                 Ok(())
5434         }
5435
5436         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5437         /// or 0-conf channels.
5438         ///
5439         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5440         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5441         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5442         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5443                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5444                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5445                 {
5446                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5447                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5448                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5449                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5450                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5451                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5452                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5453                                 }
5454                         }
5455                 }
5456                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5457         }
5458
5459         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5460                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5461         ) -> usize {
5462                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5463                 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5464                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5465                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5466                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5467                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5468                         {
5469                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5470                         }
5471                 }
5472                 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5473                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5474                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5475                         }
5476                 }
5477                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5478         }
5479
5480         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5481                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5482                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5483                 }
5484
5485                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5486                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5487                 }
5488
5489                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5490                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5491                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5492                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5493                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5494
5495                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5496                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5497                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5498                                 debug_assert!(false);
5499                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5500                         })?;
5501                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5502                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5503
5504                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5505                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5506                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5507                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5508                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5509                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5510                 {
5511                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5512                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5513                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5514                 }
5515
5516                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5517                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5518                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5519                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5520                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5521                 }
5522
5523                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5524                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5525                 if channel_exists {
5526                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5527                 }
5528
5529                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5530                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5531                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5532                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5533                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5534                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5535                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5536                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5537                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5538                         }, None));
5539                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5540                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5541                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5542                         });
5543                         return Ok(());
5544                 }
5545
5546                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5547                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5548                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5549                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5550                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5551                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5552                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5553                 {
5554                         Err(e) => {
5555                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5556                         },
5557                         Ok(res) => res
5558                 };
5559
5560                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5561                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5562                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5563                 }
5564                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5565                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5566                 }
5567
5568                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5569                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5570
5571                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5572                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5573                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5574                 });
5575                 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5576                 Ok(())
5577         }
5578
5579         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5580                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5581                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5582                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5583                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5584                                         debug_assert!(false);
5585                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5586                                 })?;
5587                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5588                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5589                         match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5590                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5591                                         try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5592                                         (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5593                                 },
5594                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5595                         }
5596                 };
5597                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5598                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5599                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5600                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5601                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
5602                         output_script,
5603                         user_channel_id: user_id,
5604                 }, None));
5605                 Ok(())
5606         }
5607
5608         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5609                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5610
5611                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5612                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5613                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5614                                 debug_assert!(false);
5615                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5616                         })?;
5617
5618                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5619                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5620                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5621                         match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5622                                 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5623                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5624                                                 Ok(res) => res,
5625                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5626                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5627                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5628                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5629                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5630                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5631                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5632                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5633                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5634                                                 },
5635                                         }
5636                                 },
5637                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5638                         };
5639
5640                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5641                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5642                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5643                         },
5644                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5645                                 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5646                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5647                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5648                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5649                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
5650                                         },
5651                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5652                                                 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5653                                         }
5654                                 }
5655
5656                                 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5657                                 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5658                                 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5659                                 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5660                                 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5661                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5662                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5663                                         msg: funding_msg,
5664                                 });
5665
5666                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5667
5668                                 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5669                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5670                                         per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5671                                         { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5672
5673                                 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5674                                 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5675                                 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5676                                 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5677                                 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5678                                 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5679                                 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5680                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5681                                         res.0 = None;
5682                                 }
5683                                 res.map(|_| ())
5684                         }
5685                 }
5686         }
5687
5688         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5689                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5690                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5691                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5692                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5693                                 debug_assert!(false);
5694                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5695                         })?;
5696
5697                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5698                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5699                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5700                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5701                                 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5702                                         chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5703                                 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5704                                 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5705                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5706                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5707                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5708                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5709                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5710                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5711                                         }
5712                                 }
5713                                 res.map(|_| ())
5714                         },
5715                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5716                 }
5717         }
5718
5719         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5720                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5721                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5722                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5723                                 debug_assert!(false);
5724                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5725                         })?;
5726                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5727                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5728                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5729                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5730                                 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5731                                         self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5732                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5733                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5734                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5735                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5736                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
5737                                         });
5738                                 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5739                                         // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5740                                         // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5741                                         // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5742                                         // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5743                                         // announcement_signatures.
5744                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5745                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5746                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5747                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5748                                                         msg,
5749                                                 });
5750                                         }
5751                                 }
5752
5753                                 {
5754                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5755                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5756                                 }
5757
5758                                 Ok(())
5759                         },
5760                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5761                 }
5762         }
5763
5764         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5765                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5766                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5767                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5768                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5769                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5770                                         debug_assert!(false);
5771                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5772                                 })?;
5773                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5774                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5775                         // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5776                         // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5777                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5778                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5779                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5780                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5781                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5782                                 return Ok(());
5783                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5784                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5785                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5786                                 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5787                                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5788                                 return Ok(());
5789                         } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5790                                 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5791                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5792                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5793                                                 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5794                                 }
5795
5796                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5797                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5798                                         chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5799                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5800
5801                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5802                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5803                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5804                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5805                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5806                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5807                                                 msg,
5808                                         });
5809                                 }
5810
5811                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5812                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5813                                         break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5814                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5815                                 }
5816                                 break Ok(());
5817                         } else {
5818                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5819                         }
5820                 };
5821                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5822                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5823                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5824                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5825                 }
5826
5827                 result
5828         }
5829
5830         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5831                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5832                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5833                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5834                                 debug_assert!(false);
5835                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5836                         })?;
5837                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5838                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5839                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5840                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5841                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5842                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5843                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5844                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5845                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5846                                                         msg,
5847                                                 });
5848                                         }
5849                                         if tx.is_some() {
5850                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5851                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5852                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5853                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5854                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5855                                                 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5856                                         } else { (tx, None) }
5857                                 },
5858                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5859                         }
5860                 };
5861                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5862                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5863                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5864                 }
5865                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5866                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5867                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5868                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5869                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5870                                         msg: update
5871                                 });
5872                         }
5873                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5874                 }
5875                 Ok(())
5876         }
5877
5878         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5879                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5880                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5881                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5882                 //
5883                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5884                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5885                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5886                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5887
5888                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5889                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5890                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5891                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5892                                 debug_assert!(false);
5893                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5894                         })?;
5895                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5896                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5897                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5898                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5899
5900                                 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5901                                         Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5902                                                 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5903                                                         chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5904                                         Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5905                                 };
5906                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5907                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5908                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5909                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5910                                         match pending_forward_info {
5911                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5912                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5913                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5914                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5915                                                         } else {
5916                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5917                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5918                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5919                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5920                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5921                                                                 reason
5922                                                         };
5923                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5924                                                 },
5925                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
5926                                         }
5927                                 };
5928                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5929                         },
5930                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5931                 }
5932                 Ok(())
5933         }
5934
5935         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5936                 let funding_txo;
5937                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5938                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5939                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5940                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5941                                         debug_assert!(false);
5942                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5943                                 })?;
5944                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5945                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5946                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5947                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5948                                         let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5949                                         funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5950                                         res
5951                                 },
5952                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5953                         }
5954                 };
5955                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5956                 Ok(())
5957         }
5958
5959         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5960                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5961                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5962                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5963                                 debug_assert!(false);
5964                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5965                         })?;
5966                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5967                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5968                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5969                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5970                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5971                         },
5972                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5973                 }
5974                 Ok(())
5975         }
5976
5977         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5978                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5979                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5980                         .ok_or_else(|| {
5981                                 debug_assert!(false);
5982                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5983                         })?;
5984                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5985                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5986                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5987                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5988                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5989                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5990                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5991                                 }
5992                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5993                                 Ok(())
5994                         },
5995                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5996                 }
5997         }
5998
5999         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6000                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6001                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6002                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6003                                 debug_assert!(false);
6004                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6005                         })?;
6006                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6007                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6008                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6009                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6010                                 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6011                                 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6012                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6013                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6014                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6015                                 } else { Ok(()) }
6016                         },
6017                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6018                 }
6019         }
6020
6021         #[inline]
6022         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6023                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6024                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6025                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6026                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6027                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6028                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6029                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6030                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6031                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6032                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6033                                         };
6034                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6035                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6036
6037                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6038                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6039                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6040                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6041                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6042                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6043                                                 },
6044                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6045                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6046                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6047                                                         {
6048                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6049                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6050                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6051                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6052                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6053                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6054                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6055                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6056                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6057                                                                                         intercept_id
6058                                                                                 }, None));
6059                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6060                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6061                                                                         },
6062                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6063                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6064                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6065                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6066                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6067                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6068                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6069                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6070                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6071                                                                                 });
6072
6073                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6074                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6075                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6076                                                                                 ));
6077                                                                         }
6078                                                                 }
6079                                                         } else {
6080                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6081                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6082                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6083                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6084                                                                 }
6085                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6086                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6087                                                         }
6088                                                 }
6089                                         }
6090                                 }
6091                         }
6092
6093                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6094                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6095                         }
6096
6097                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6098                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6099                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6100                         }
6101                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6102                 }
6103         }
6104
6105         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6106                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6107                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6108                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6109                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6110                 ).count();
6111                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6112                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6113                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6114                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6115                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6116                 // real by taking more time.
6117                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6118                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6119                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6120                         }, None));
6121                 }
6122         }
6123
6124         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6125         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6126         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6127         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6128         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6129                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6130                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6131         ) -> bool {
6132                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6133                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6134                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6135                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6136                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6137                                 counterparty_node_id,
6138                         })
6139                 })
6140         }
6141
6142         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6143                 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6144                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6145                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6146                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6147                                         debug_assert!(false);
6148                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6149                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6150                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6151                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6152                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6153                                         let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6154                                         let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6155                                                 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6156                                                         &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6157                                                         *counterparty_node_id)
6158                                         } else { false };
6159                                         let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6160                                                 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6161                                         let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6162                                                 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6163                                                         .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6164                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6165                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6166                                         } else { Ok(()) };
6167                                         (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6168                                 },
6169                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6170                         }
6171                 };
6172                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6173                 res
6174         }
6175
6176         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6177                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6178                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6179                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6180                                 debug_assert!(false);
6181                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6182                         })?;
6183                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6184                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6185                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6186                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6187                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6188                         },
6189                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6190                 }
6191                 Ok(())
6192         }
6193
6194         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6195                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6196                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6197                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6198                                 debug_assert!(false);
6199                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6200                         })?;
6201                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6202                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6203                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6204                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6205                                 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6206                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6207                                 }
6208
6209                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6210                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6211                                                 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6212                                                 msg, &self.default_configuration
6213                                         ), chan),
6214                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6215                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6216                                         update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6217                                 });
6218                         },
6219                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6220                 }
6221                 Ok(())
6222         }
6223
6224         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6225         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6226                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6227                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6228                         None => {
6229                                 // It's not a local channel
6230                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6231                         }
6232                 };
6233                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6234                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6235                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6236                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6237                 }
6238                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6239                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6240                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6241                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6242                                 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6243                                         if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6244                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6245                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6246                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6247                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6248                                         }
6249                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6250                                 }
6251                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6252                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6253                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6254                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6255                                 } else {
6256                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6257                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6258                                 }
6259                         },
6260                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6261                 }
6262                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6263         }
6264
6265         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6266                 let htlc_forwards;
6267                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6268                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6269
6270                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6271                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6272                                         debug_assert!(false);
6273                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6274                                 })?;
6275                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6276                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6277                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6278                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6279                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6280                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6281                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6282                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6283                                         let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6284                                                 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6285                                                 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6286                                         let mut channel_update = None;
6287                                         if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6288                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6289                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6290                                                         msg,
6291                                                 });
6292                                         } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6293                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6294                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6295                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6296                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6297                                                         channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6298                                                                 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6299                                                                 msg,
6300                                                         });
6301                                                 }
6302                                         }
6303                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6304                                         htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6305                                                 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6306                                                 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6307                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6308                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6309                                         }
6310                                         need_lnd_workaround
6311                                 },
6312                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6313                         }
6314                 };
6315
6316                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6317                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6318                 }
6319
6320                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6321                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6322                 }
6323                 Ok(())
6324         }
6325
6326         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6327         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6328                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6329
6330                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6331                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6332                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6333                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6334                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6335                                 match monitor_event {
6336                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6337                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6338                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6339                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6340                                                 } else {
6341                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6342                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6343                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6344                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6345                                                 }
6346                                         },
6347                                         MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6348                                         MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6349                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6350                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6351                                                         None => {
6352                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6353                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6354                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6355                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6356                                                         }
6357                                                 };
6358                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6359                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6360                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6361                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6362                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6363                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6364                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6365                                                                         let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6366                                                                         failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6367                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6368                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6369                                                                                         msg: update
6370                                                                                 });
6371                                                                         }
6372                                                                         let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6373                                                                                 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6374                                                                         } else {
6375                                                                                 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6376                                                                         };
6377                                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6378                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6379                                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6380                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6381                                                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6382                                                                                 },
6383                                                                         });
6384                                                                 }
6385                                                         }
6386                                                 }
6387                                         },
6388                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6389                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6390                                         },
6391                                 }
6392                         }
6393                 }
6394
6395                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6396                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6397                 }
6398
6399                 has_pending_monitor_events
6400         }
6401
6402         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6403         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6404         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6405         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
6406         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6407                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6408                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6409         }
6410
6411         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6412         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6413         /// update was applied.
6414         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6415                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6416                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6417                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6418
6419                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6420                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6421                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6422                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6423                 'peer_loop: loop {
6424                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6425                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6426                                 'chan_loop: loop {
6427                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6428                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6429                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6430                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6431                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6432                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6433                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6434                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6435                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6436                                                 }
6437                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6438                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6439
6440                                                         let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6441                                                         let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6442                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6443                                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6444                                                         if res.is_err() {
6445                                                                 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6446                                                         }
6447                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6448                                                 }
6449                                         }
6450                                         break 'chan_loop;
6451                                 }
6452                         }
6453                         break 'peer_loop;
6454                 }
6455
6456                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6457                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6458                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6459                 }
6460
6461                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6462                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6463                 }
6464
6465                 has_update
6466         }
6467
6468         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6469         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6470         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6471         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6472                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6473                 let mut has_update = false;
6474                 {
6475                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6476
6477                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6478                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6479                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6480                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6481                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6482                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6483                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6484                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6485                                                                 has_update = true;
6486                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6487                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6488                                                                 });
6489                                                         }
6490                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6491                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6492                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6493                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6494                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6495                                                                                 msg: update
6496                                                                         });
6497                                                                 }
6498
6499                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6500
6501                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6502                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6503                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6504                                                                 false
6505                                                         } else { true }
6506                                                 },
6507                                                 Err(e) => {
6508                                                         has_update = true;
6509                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6510                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6511                                                         !close_channel
6512                                                 }
6513                                         }
6514                                 });
6515                         }
6516                 }
6517
6518                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6519                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6520                 }
6521
6522                 has_update
6523         }
6524
6525         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6526         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6527         /// Channel object.
6528         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6529                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6530                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6531                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6532                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
6533                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6534                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6535                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6536                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6537                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6538                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6539                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6540                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
6541                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6542                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6543                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6544                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6545                                         });
6546                         }
6547                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6548                 }
6549         }
6550
6551         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6552         /// to pay us.
6553         ///
6554         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6555         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6556         ///
6557         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6558         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6559         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6560         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6561         ///
6562         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6563         ///
6564         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6565         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6566         ///
6567         /// # Note
6568         ///
6569         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6570         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6571         ///
6572         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6573         ///
6574         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6575         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6576         ///
6577         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6578         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6579         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6580         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6581         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6582         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6583         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6584                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6585                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6586                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6587                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6588         }
6589
6590         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6591         /// stored external to LDK.
6592         ///
6593         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6594         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6595         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6596         ///
6597         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6598         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6599         /// payments.
6600         ///
6601         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6602         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6603         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6604         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6605         ///
6606         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6607         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6608         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6609         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6610         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6611         ///
6612         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6613         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6614         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6615         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6616         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6617         ///
6618         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6619         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6620         ///
6621         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6622         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6623         ///
6624         /// # Note
6625         ///
6626         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6627         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6628         ///
6629         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6630         ///
6631         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6632         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6633         ///
6634         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6635         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6636         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6637                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6638                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6639                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6640                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
6641         }
6642
6643         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6644         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6645         ///
6646         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6647         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6648                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6649         }
6650
6651         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6652         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6653         ///
6654         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6655         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6656                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6657                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6658                 loop {
6659                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6660                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6661                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6662                                 Some(_) => continue,
6663                                 None => return scid_candidate
6664                         }
6665                 }
6666         }
6667
6668         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6669         ///
6670         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6671         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6672                 PhantomRouteHints {
6673                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6674                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6675                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6676                 }
6677         }
6678
6679         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6680         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6681         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6682         ///
6683         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6684         /// times to get a unique scid.
6685         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6686                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6687                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6688                 loop {
6689                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6690                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6691                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6692                         return scid_candidate
6693                 }
6694         }
6695
6696         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6697         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6698         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6699                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6700
6701                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6702                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6703                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6704                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6705                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6706                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6707                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6708                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6709                                         }
6710                                 }
6711                         }
6712                 }
6713
6714                 inflight_htlcs
6715         }
6716
6717         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6718         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6719                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6720                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6721                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6722                 events.into_inner()
6723         }
6724
6725         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6726         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6727                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6728                 events.push_back((event, None));
6729         }
6730
6731         #[cfg(test)]
6732         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6733                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6734                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6735         }
6736
6737         #[cfg(test)]
6738         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6739                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6740         }
6741
6742         #[cfg(test)]
6743         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6744                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6745         }
6746
6747         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6748         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6749         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6750         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6751         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6752                 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6753                 loop {
6754                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6755                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6756                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6757                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6758
6759                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6760                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6761                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6762                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6763                                         {
6764                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6765                                         }
6766                                 }
6767
6768                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6769                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6770                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6771                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6772                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6773                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6774                                                 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6775                                         break;
6776                                 }
6777
6778                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6779                                         debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6780                                         if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6781                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6782                                                         log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6783                                                 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6784                                                         peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6785                                                 {
6786                                                         errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6787                                                 }
6788                                                 if further_update_exists {
6789                                                         // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6790                                                         // top of the loop.
6791                                                         continue;
6792                                                 }
6793                                         } else {
6794                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6795                                                         log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6796                                         }
6797                                 }
6798                         } else {
6799                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
6800                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6801                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6802                         }
6803                         break;
6804                 }
6805                 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6806                         let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6807                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6808                 }
6809         }
6810
6811         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6812                 for action in actions {
6813                         match action {
6814                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6815                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6816                                 } => {
6817                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6818                                 }
6819                         }
6820                 }
6821         }
6822
6823         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6824         /// using the given event handler.
6825         ///
6826         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6827         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6828                 &self, handler: H
6829         ) {
6830                 let mut ev;
6831                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6832         }
6833 }
6834
6835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6836 where
6837         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6838         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6839         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6840         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6841         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6842         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6843         R::Target: Router,
6844         L::Target: Logger,
6845 {
6846         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6847         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6848         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6849         /// is always placed next to each other.
6850         ///
6851         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6852         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6853         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6854         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6855         ///
6856         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6857         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6858         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6859         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6860                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6861                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6862                         let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6863
6864                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6865                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6866                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6867                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6868                         }
6869
6870                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6871                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6872                         }
6873                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6874                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6875                         }
6876
6877                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6878                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6879                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6880                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6881                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6882                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6883                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6884                                 }
6885                         }
6886
6887                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6888                                 events.replace(pending_events);
6889                         }
6890
6891                         result
6892                 });
6893                 events.into_inner()
6894         }
6895 }
6896
6897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6898 where
6899         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6900         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6901         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6902         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6903         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6904         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6905         R::Target: Router,
6906         L::Target: Logger,
6907 {
6908         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6909         ///
6910         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6911         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6912         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6913                 let mut ev;
6914                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6915         }
6916 }
6917
6918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6919 where
6920         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6921         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6922         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6923         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6924         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6925         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6926         R::Target: Router,
6927         L::Target: Logger,
6928 {
6929         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6930                 {
6931                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6932                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6933                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6934                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6935                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6936                 }
6937
6938                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6939                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6940         }
6941
6942         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6943                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6944                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6945                 let new_height = height - 1;
6946                 {
6947                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6948                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6949                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6950                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6951                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6952                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6953                 }
6954
6955                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6956         }
6957 }
6958
6959 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6960 where
6961         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6962         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6963         ES::Target: EntropySource,
6964         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6965         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6966         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6967         R::Target: Router,
6968         L::Target: Logger,
6969 {
6970         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6971                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6972                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6973                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6974
6975                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6976                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6977
6978                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6979                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6980                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6981                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6982
6983                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6984                 if height < last_best_block_height {
6985                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6986                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6987                 }
6988         }
6989
6990         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6991                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6992                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6993                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6994
6995                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6996                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6997
6998                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6999                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7000                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7001
7002                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7003
7004                 macro_rules! max_time {
7005                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
7006                                 loop {
7007                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7008                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7009                                         // having an explicit local time source.
7010                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7011                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7012                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7013                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7014                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7015                                                 break;
7016                                         }
7017                                 }
7018                         }
7019                 }
7020                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7021                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7022                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7023                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7024                 });
7025         }
7026
7027         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7028                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7029                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7030                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7031                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7032                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7033                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7034                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7035                                 }
7036                         }
7037                 }
7038                 res
7039         }
7040
7041         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7042                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7043                         &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7044                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7045                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7046                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7047                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7048                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7049                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7050                 });
7051         }
7052 }
7053
7054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7055 where
7056         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7057         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7058         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7059         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7060         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7061         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7062         R::Target: Router,
7063         L::Target: Logger,
7064 {
7065         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7066         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7067         /// the function.
7068         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7069                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7070                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7071                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7072                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7073
7074                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7075                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7076                 {
7077                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7078                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7079                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7080                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7081                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7082                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7083                                         let res = f(channel);
7084                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7085                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7086                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7087                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7088                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7089                                                 }
7090                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7091                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7092                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
7093                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7094                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7095                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7096                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7097                                                                                 msg,
7098                                                                         });
7099                                                                 }
7100                                                         } else {
7101                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7102                                                         }
7103                                                 }
7104
7105                                                 {
7106                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7107                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7108                                                 }
7109
7110                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7111                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7112                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7113                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7114                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
7115                                                         });
7116                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7117                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7118                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7119                                                                                 msg: announcement,
7120                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7121                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7122                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7123                                                                         });
7124                                                                 }
7125                                                         }
7126                                                 }
7127                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7128                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7129                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7130                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7131                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7132                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7133                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7134                                                                 // is always consistent.
7135                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7136                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7137                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7138                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7139                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7140                                                         }
7141                                                 }
7142                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7143                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7144                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7145                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7146                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7147                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7148                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7149                                                                 msg: update
7150                                                         });
7151                                                 }
7152                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7153                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7154                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7155                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7156                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7157                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7158                                                                 data: reason_message,
7159                                                         } },
7160                                                 });
7161                                                 return false;
7162                                         }
7163                                         true
7164                                 });
7165                         }
7166                 }
7167
7168                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7169                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7170                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7171                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7172                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7173                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7174                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7175                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7176                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7177                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7178
7179                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7180                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7181                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7182                                                 false
7183                                         } else { true }
7184                                 });
7185                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7186                         });
7187
7188                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7189                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7190                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7191                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7192                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7193                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7194                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7195                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7196                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7197                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7198                                         });
7199
7200                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7201                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7202                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
7203                                         };
7204                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7205                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7206                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7207                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7208                                         false
7209                                 } else { true }
7210                         });
7211                 }
7212
7213                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7214
7215                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7216                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7217                 }
7218         }
7219
7220         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7221         ///
7222         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7223         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7224         ///
7225         pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7226                 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7227         }
7228
7229         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7230         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7231                 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7232         }
7233
7234         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7235         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7236         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7237                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7238         }
7239
7240         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7241         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7242         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7243                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7244         }
7245
7246         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7247         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7248         ///
7249         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7250         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7251         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7252         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7253                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7254         }
7255
7256         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7257         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7258         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7259                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7260         }
7261
7262         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7263         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7264         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7265                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7266         }
7267
7268         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7269         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7270         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7271                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7272         }
7273 }
7274
7275 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7276         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7277 where
7278         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7279         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7280         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7281         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7282         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7283         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7284         R::Target: Router,
7285         L::Target: Logger,
7286 {
7287         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7288                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7289                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7290         }
7291
7292         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7293                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7294                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7295                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7296         }
7297
7298         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7299                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7300                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7301         }
7302
7303         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7304                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7305                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7306                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7307         }
7308
7309         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7310                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7311                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7312         }
7313
7314         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7315                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7316                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7317         }
7318
7319         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7320                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7321                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7322         }
7323
7324         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7325                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7326                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7327         }
7328
7329         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7330                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7331                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7332         }
7333
7334         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7335                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7336                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7337         }
7338
7339         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7340                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7341                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7342         }
7343
7344         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7345                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7346                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7347         }
7348
7349         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7350                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7351                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7352         }
7353
7354         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7355                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7356                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7357         }
7358
7359         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7360                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7361                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7362         }
7363
7364         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7365                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7366                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7367         }
7368
7369         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7370                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7371                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7372         }
7373
7374         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7375                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7376                         let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7377                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7378                                 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7379                         } else {
7380                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7381                         }
7382                 });
7383         }
7384
7385         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7386                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7387                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7388         }
7389
7390         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7391                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7392                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7393                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7394                 let remove_peer = {
7395                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7396                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7397                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7398                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7399                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7400                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7401                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7402                                         chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7403                                         if chan.is_shutdown() {
7404                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7405                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7406                                                 return false;
7407                                         }
7408                                         true
7409                                 });
7410                                 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7411                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7412                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7413                                         false
7414                                 });
7415                                 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7416                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7417                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7418                                         false
7419                                 });
7420                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7421                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7422                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7423                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7424                                         match msg {
7425                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
7426                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7427                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7428                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7429                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7430                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
7431                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7432                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7433                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
7434                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7435                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7436                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7437                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7438                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7439                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7440                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7441                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7442                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7443                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7444                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7445                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7446                                                 // Channel Operations
7447                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7448                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7449                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7450                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7451                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7452                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7453                                                 // Gossip
7454                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7455                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7456                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7457                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7458                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7459                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7460                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7461                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7462                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7463                                         }
7464                                 });
7465                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7466                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7467                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7468                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7469                 };
7470                 if remove_peer {
7471                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7472                 }
7473                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7474
7475                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7476                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7477                 }
7478         }
7479
7480         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7481                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7482                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7483                         return Err(());
7484                 }
7485
7486                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7487
7488                 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7489                 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7490                 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7491                 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7492                 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7493                 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7494
7495                 {
7496                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7497                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7498                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7499                                         if inbound_peer_limited {
7500                                                 return Err(());
7501                                         }
7502                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7503                                                 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7504                                                 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7505                                                 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7506                                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7507                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7508                                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7509                                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7510                                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7511                                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7512                                                 is_connected: true,
7513                                         }));
7514                                 },
7515                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7516                                         let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7517                                         peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7518
7519                                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7520                                         if inbound_peer_limited &&
7521                                                 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7522                                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7523                                         {
7524                                                 return Err(());
7525                                         }
7526
7527                                         debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7528                                         peer_state.is_connected = true;
7529                                 },
7530                         }
7531                 }
7532
7533                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7534
7535                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7536                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7537                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7538                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7539                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7540
7541                         // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7542                         // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7543                         // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7544                         // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7545                         peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7546                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7547                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7548                                         msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7549                                 });
7550                         });
7551                 }
7552                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7553                 Ok(())
7554         }
7555
7556         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7557                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7558
7559                 match &msg.data as &str {
7560                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7561                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
7562                         {
7563                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7564                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7565                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7566                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7567                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7568                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7569                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7570                                 if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
7571                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7572                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7573                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7574                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7575                                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7576                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7577                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7578                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7579                                                                 msg,
7580                                                         });
7581                                                 }
7582                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7583                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7584                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7585                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7586                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7587                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7588                                                                 },
7589                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
7590                                                         }
7591                                                 });
7592                                         }
7593                                 }
7594                                 return;
7595                         }
7596                         _ => {}
7597                 }
7598
7599                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7600                         let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7601                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7602                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7603                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7604                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7605                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7606                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7607                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7608                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7609                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7610                                         .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7611                                         .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7612                         };
7613                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
7614                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7615                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7616                         }
7617                 } else {
7618                         {
7619                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7620                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7621                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7622                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7623                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7624                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7625                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7626                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7627                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7628                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7629                                                         msg,
7630                                                 });
7631                                                 return;
7632                                         }
7633                                 }
7634                         }
7635
7636                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7637                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7638                 }
7639         }
7640
7641         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7642                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7643         }
7644
7645         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7646                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7647         }
7648
7649         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7650                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7651         }
7652
7653         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7654                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7655                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7656                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7657         }
7658
7659         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7660                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7661                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7662                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7663         }
7664
7665         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7666                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7667                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7668                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7669         }
7670
7671         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7672                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7673                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7674                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7675         }
7676
7677         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7678                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7679                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7680                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7681         }
7682
7683         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7684                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7685                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7686                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7687         }
7688
7689         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7690                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7691                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7692                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7693         }
7694
7695         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7696                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7697                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7698                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7699         }
7700
7701         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7702                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7703                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7704                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7705         }
7706 }
7707
7708 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7709 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7710 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7711         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7712         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7713         node_features
7714 }
7715
7716 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7717 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7718 ///
7719 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7720 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7721 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7722 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7723         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7724 }
7725
7726 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7727 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7728 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7729         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7730 }
7731
7732 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7733 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7734 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7735         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7736 }
7737
7738 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7739 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7740 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7741         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7742         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7743         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7744         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7745         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7746         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7747         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7748         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7749         features.set_payment_secret_required();
7750         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7751         features.set_wumbo_optional();
7752         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7753         features.set_channel_type_optional();
7754         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7755         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7756         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7757                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7758         }
7759         features
7760 }
7761
7762 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7763 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7764
7765 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7766         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7767         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7768         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7769 });
7770
7771 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7772         (2, node_id, required),
7773         (4, features, required),
7774         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7775         (8, forwarding_info, option),
7776         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7777         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7778 });
7779
7780 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7781         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7782                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7783                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7784                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7785                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7786                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7787                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7788                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
7789                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
7790                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
7791                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7792                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7793                         (7, self.config, option),
7794                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7795                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
7796                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7797                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7798                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7799                         (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),  // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7800                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7801                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7802                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7803                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7804                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7805                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7806                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7807                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7808                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
7809                         (32, self.is_public, required),
7810                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7811                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7812                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7813                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7814                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7815                 });
7816                 Ok(())
7817         }
7818 }
7819
7820 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7821         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7822                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7823                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7824                         (2, channel_id, required),
7825                         (3, channel_type, option),
7826                         (4, counterparty, required),
7827                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7828                         (6, funding_txo, option),
7829                         (7, config, option),
7830                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
7831                         (9, confirmations, option),
7832                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7833                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7834                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7835                         (16, _balance_msat, option),  // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7836                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7837                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7838                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7839                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7840                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7841                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7842                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
7843                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7844                         (26, is_outbound, required),
7845                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7846                         (30, is_usable, required),
7847                         (32, is_public, required),
7848                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7849                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7850                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7851                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7852                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7853                 });
7854
7855                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7856                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7857                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7858                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7859                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7860
7861                 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7862
7863                 Ok(Self {
7864                         inbound_scid_alias,
7865                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7866                         channel_type,
7867                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7868                         outbound_scid_alias,
7869                         funding_txo,
7870                         config,
7871                         short_channel_id,
7872                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7873                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7874                         user_channel_id,
7875                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7876                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7877                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7878                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7879                         confirmations_required,
7880                         confirmations,
7881                         force_close_spend_delay,
7882                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7883                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7884                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7885                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7886                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7887                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7888                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7889                         channel_shutdown_state,
7890                 })
7891         }
7892 }
7893
7894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7895         (2, channels, required_vec),
7896         (4, phantom_scid, required),
7897         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7898 });
7899
7900 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7901         (0, Forward) => {
7902                 (0, onion_packet, required),
7903                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7904         },
7905         (1, Receive) => {
7906                 (0, payment_data, required),
7907                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7908                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7909                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7910                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7911         },
7912         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7913                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7914                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7915                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7916                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7917                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7918         },
7919 ;);
7920
7921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7922         (0, routing, required),
7923         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7924         (4, payment_hash, required),
7925         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7926         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7927         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7928         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7929 });
7930
7931
7932 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7933         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7934                 match self {
7935                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7936                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
7937                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7938                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7939                                 reason.write(writer)?;
7940                         },
7941                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7942                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7943                         }) => {
7944                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
7945                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7946                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7947                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7948                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7949                         },
7950                 }
7951                 Ok(())
7952         }
7953 }
7954
7955 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7956         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7957                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958                 match id {
7959                         0 => {
7960                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7961                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7962                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7963                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7964                                 }))
7965                         },
7966                         1 => {
7967                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7968                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7969                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7970                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7971                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7972                                 }))
7973                         },
7974                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7975                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7976                         // messages contained in the variants.
7977                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7978                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7979                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7980                         2 => {
7981                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7982                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7983                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7984                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7985                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7986                         },
7987                         3 => {
7988                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7990                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7991                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7992                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7993                         },
7994                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7995                 }
7996         }
7997 }
7998
7999 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8000         (0, Forward),
8001         (1, Fail),
8002 );
8003
8004 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8005         (0, short_channel_id, required),
8006         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8007         (2, outpoint, required),
8008         (4, htlc_id, required),
8009         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8010         (7, user_channel_id, option),
8011 });
8012
8013 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8014         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8015                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8016                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8017                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8018                 };
8019                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8020                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8021                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
8022                         (2, self.value, required),
8023                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8024                         (4, payment_data, option),
8025                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8026                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8027                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8028                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8029                 });
8030                 Ok(())
8031         }
8032 }
8033
8034 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8035         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8036                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8037                         (0, prev_hop, required),
8038                         (1, total_msat, option),
8039                         (2, value_ser, required),
8040                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8041                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8042                         (5, total_value_received, option),
8043                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8044                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8045                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8046                 });
8047                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8048                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8049                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8050                         Some(p) => {
8051                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
8052                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8053                                 }
8054                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8055                                         total_msat = Some(value);
8056                                 }
8057                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8058                         },
8059                         None => {
8060                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8061                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
8062                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8063                                         }
8064                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8065                                 }
8066                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8067                         },
8068                 };
8069                 Ok(Self {
8070                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8071                         timer_ticks: 0,
8072                         value,
8073                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8074                         total_value_received,
8075                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8076                         onion_payload,
8077                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8078                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8079                 })
8080         }
8081 }
8082
8083 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8084         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8085                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8086                 match id {
8087                         0 => {
8088                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8089                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8090                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8091                                 let mut payment_id = None;
8092                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8093                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8094                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8095                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8096                                         (1, payment_id, option),
8097                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8098                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8099                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8100                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
8101                                 });
8102                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
8103                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8104                                         // instead.
8105                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8106                                 }
8107                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8108                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8109                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8110                                 }
8111                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8112                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8113                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8114                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8115                                                 }
8116                                         }
8117                                 }
8118                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8119                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8120                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
8121                                         path,
8122                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8123                                 })
8124                         }
8125                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8126                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8127                 }
8128         }
8129 }
8130
8131 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8132         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8133                 match self {
8134                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8135                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8136                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8137                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8138                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8139                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8140                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8141                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8142                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8143                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8144                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8145                                  });
8146                         }
8147                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8148                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8149                                 field.write(writer)?;
8150                         }
8151                 }
8152                 Ok(())
8153         }
8154 }
8155
8156 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8157         (0, forward_info, required),
8158         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8159         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8160         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8161         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8162 });
8163
8164 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8165         (1, FailHTLC) => {
8166                 (0, htlc_id, required),
8167                 (2, err_packet, required),
8168         };
8169         (0, AddHTLC)
8170 );
8171
8172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8173         (0, payment_secret, required),
8174         (2, expiry_time, required),
8175         (4, user_payment_id, required),
8176         (6, payment_preimage, required),
8177         (8, min_value_msat, required),
8178 });
8179
8180 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8181 where
8182         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8183         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8184         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8185         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8186         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8187         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8188         R::Target: Router,
8189         L::Target: Logger,
8190 {
8191         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8192                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8193
8194                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8195
8196                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8197                 {
8198                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8199                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8200                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8201                 }
8202
8203                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8204                 {
8205                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8206                         let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8207                         let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8208                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8209                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8210                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8211                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8212                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
8213                                 }
8214                                 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8215                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8216                                         if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8217                                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
8218                                         }
8219                                 }
8220                         }
8221
8222                         ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8223
8224                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8225                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8226                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8227                                 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8228                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8229                                                 channel.write(writer)?;
8230                                         }
8231                                 }
8232                         }
8233                 }
8234
8235                 {
8236                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8237                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8238                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8239                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8240                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8241                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
8242                                         forward.write(writer)?;
8243                                 }
8244                         }
8245                 }
8246
8247                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8248
8249                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8250                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8251                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8252
8253                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8254                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8255                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8256                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8257                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8258                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8259                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8260                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
8261                         }
8262                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8263                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8264                 }
8265
8266                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8267                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8268                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8269                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8270                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8271                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
8272                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8273                 }
8274
8275                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8276                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8277                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8278                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8279                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8280                         // no channels.
8281                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8282                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8283                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8284                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8285                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8286                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8287                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8288                                 }
8289                         }
8290                 }
8291
8292                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8293                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8294                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8295                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8296                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8297                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8298                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8299                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
8300                         0u64.write(writer)?;
8301                 } else {
8302                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8303                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8304                                 event.write(writer)?;
8305                         }
8306                 }
8307
8308                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8309                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8310                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8311                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8312                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8313                 0u64.write(writer)?;
8314
8315                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8316                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8317                 // likely to be identical.
8318                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8319                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8320
8321                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8322                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8323                         hash.write(writer)?;
8324                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8325                 }
8326
8327                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8328                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8329                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8330                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8331                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8332                         }
8333                 }
8334                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8335                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8336                         match outbound {
8337                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8338                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8339                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8340                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8341                                         }
8342                                 }
8343                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8344                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8345                         }
8346                 }
8347
8348                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8349                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8350                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8351                         match outbound {
8352                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8353                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8354                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8355                                 },
8356                                 _ => {},
8357                         }
8358                 }
8359
8360                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8361                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8362                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8363                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8364                 }
8365
8366                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8367                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8368                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8369                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8370                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
8371                 }
8372
8373                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8374                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8375                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8376                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
8377                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8378                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8379                                 }
8380                         }
8381                 }
8382
8383                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8384                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8385                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8386                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8387                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8388                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8389                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8390                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8391                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8392                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8393                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8394                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8395                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8396                 });
8397
8398                 Ok(())
8399         }
8400 }
8401
8402 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8403         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8404                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8405                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8406                         event.write(w)?;
8407                         action.write(w)?;
8408                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8409                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8410                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8411                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8412                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8413                                 // check that the event is sane here.
8414                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8415                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8416                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8417                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8418                         }
8419                 }
8420                 Ok(())
8421         }
8422 }
8423 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8424         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8425                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8426                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8427                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8428                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8429                         len) as usize);
8430                 for _ in 0..len {
8431                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8432                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8433                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8434                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
8435                         } else if action.is_some() {
8436                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8437                         }
8438                 }
8439                 Ok(events)
8440         }
8441 }
8442
8443 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8444         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8445         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8446         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8447         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8448         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8449 );
8450
8451 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8452 ///
8453 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8454 /// is:
8455 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8456 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8457 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8458 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8459 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8460 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8461 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8462 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8463 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8464 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8465 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8466 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8467 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8468 ///    the next step.
8469 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8470 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8471 ///
8472 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8473 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8474 ///
8475 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8476 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8477 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8478 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8479 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8480 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8481 ///
8482 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8483 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8484 where
8485         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8486         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8487         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8488         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8489         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8490         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8491         R::Target: Router,
8492         L::Target: Logger,
8493 {
8494         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8495         pub entropy_source: ES,
8496
8497         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8498         pub node_signer: NS,
8499
8500         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8501         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8502         /// signing data.
8503         pub signer_provider: SP,
8504
8505         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8506         ///
8507         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8508         pub fee_estimator: F,
8509         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8510         ///
8511         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8512         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8513         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8514         pub chain_monitor: M,
8515
8516         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8517         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8518         /// force-closed during deserialization.
8519         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8520         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8521         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8522         ///
8523         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8524         pub router: R,
8525         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8526         /// deserialization.
8527         pub logger: L,
8528         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8529         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8530         pub default_config: UserConfig,
8531
8532         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8533         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8534         ///
8535         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8536         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8537         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8538         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8539         ///
8540         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8541         /// this struct.
8542         ///
8543         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8544         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8545 }
8546
8547 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8548                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8549 where
8550         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8551         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8552         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8553         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8554         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8555         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8556         R::Target: Router,
8557         L::Target: Logger,
8558 {
8559         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8560         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8561         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8562         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8563                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8564                 Self {
8565                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8566                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8567                 }
8568         }
8569 }
8570
8571 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8572 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8573 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8574         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8575 where
8576         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8577         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8578         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8579         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8580         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8581         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8582         R::Target: Router,
8583         L::Target: Logger,
8584 {
8585         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8586                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8587                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8588         }
8589 }
8590
8591 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8592         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8593 where
8594         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8595         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8596         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8597         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8598         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8599         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8600         R::Target: Router,
8601         L::Target: Logger,
8602 {
8603         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8604                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8605
8606                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8607                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8608                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8609
8610                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8611
8612                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8613                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8614                 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8615                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8616                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8617                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8618                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8619                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8620                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8621                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8622                         ))?;
8623                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8624                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8625                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8626                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8627                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8628                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8629                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8630                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8631                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8632                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8633                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8634                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8635                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8636                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8637                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8638                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8639                                                 });
8640                                         }
8641                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8642                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8643                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8644                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8645                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8646                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8647                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8648                                         }, None));
8649                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8650                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
8651                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8652                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8653                                                 }
8654                                                 if !found_htlc {
8655                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8656                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8657                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8658                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8659                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8660                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8661                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8662                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
8663                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8664                                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), &payment_hash);
8665                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8666                                                 }
8667                                         }
8668                                 } else {
8669                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8670                                                 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8671                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8672                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8673                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8674                                         }
8675                                         if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8676                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8677                                         }
8678                                         match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8679                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8680                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8681                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8682                                                 },
8683                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8684                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8685                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8686                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
8687                                                 }
8688                                         }
8689                                 }
8690                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8691                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8692                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8693                                 // safely discard the channel.
8694                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8695                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8696                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8697                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8698                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8699                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8700                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8701                                 }, None));
8702                         } else {
8703                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8704                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8705                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8706                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8707                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8708                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8709                         }
8710                 }
8711
8712                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8713                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8714                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8715                                         log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8716                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8717                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8718                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8719                                 };
8720                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8721                         }
8722                 }
8723
8724                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8725                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8726                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8727                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8728                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8729                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8730                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8731                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8732                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8733                         }
8734                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8735                 }
8736
8737                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8738                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8739                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8740                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8741                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8742                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8743                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8744                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8745                         }
8746                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8747                 }
8748
8749                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8750                         PeerState {
8751                                 channel_by_id,
8752                                 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8753                                 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8754                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8755                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8756                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8757                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8758                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8759                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8760                                 is_connected: false,
8761                         }
8762                 };
8763
8764                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8766                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8767                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8768                         let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8769                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8770                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8772                 }
8773
8774                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8775                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8776                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8777                 for _ in 0..event_count {
8778                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8779                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8780                                 None => continue,
8781                         }
8782                 }
8783
8784                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8785                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8786                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8787                                 0 => {
8788                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8789                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8790                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
8791                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8792                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8793                                 }
8794                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8795                         }
8796                 }
8797
8798                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8799                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8800
8801                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8802                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8803                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8804                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8805                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8806                         }
8807                 }
8808
8809                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8810                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8811                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8812                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8813                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8814                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8815                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8816                         };
8817                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8818                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8819                         };
8820                 }
8821
8822                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8823                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8824                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8825                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8826                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8827                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8828                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8829                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8830                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8831                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8832                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8833                 let mut events_override = None;
8834                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8835                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8836                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8837                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8838                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8839                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8840                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8841                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8842                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8843                         (8, events_override, option),
8844                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8845                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8846                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8847                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8848                 });
8849                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8850                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8851                 }
8852
8853                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8854                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8855                 }
8856
8857                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8858                         pending_events_read = events;
8859                 }
8860
8861                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8862                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8863                 }
8864
8865                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8866                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8867                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8868                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8869                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8870                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8871                         }
8872                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8873                 }
8874                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8875                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8876                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8877                 };
8878
8879                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8880                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8881                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8882                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8883                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8884                 //
8885                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8886                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8887                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8888                 //
8889                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8890                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8891                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8892                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8893                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8894                         ) => { {
8895                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8896                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8897                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8898                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8899                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8900                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8901                                         pending_background_events.push(
8902                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8903                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8904                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8905                                                         update: update.clone(),
8906                                                 });
8907                                 }
8908                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8909                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8910                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8911                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8912                                         pending_background_events.push(
8913                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8914                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8915                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8916                                                 });
8917                                 }
8918                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8919                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8920                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8921                                 }
8922                                 max_in_flight_update_id
8923                         } }
8924                 }
8925
8926                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8927                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8928                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8929                         for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8930                                 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8931                                 // discarded.
8932                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8933                                 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8934                                         .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8935                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8936                                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8937                                         if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8938                                                 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8939                                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8940                                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8941                                         }
8942                                 }
8943                                 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8944                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8945                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8946                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8947                                                 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8948                                         log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8949                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8950                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8951                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8952                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8953                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8954                                 }
8955                         }
8956                 }
8957
8958                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8959                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8960                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8961                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8962                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8963                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8964                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8965                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8966                                         });
8967                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8968                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8969                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8970                                 } else {
8971                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8972                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8973                                                 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8974                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8975                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8976                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8977                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8978                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8979                                 }
8980                         }
8981                 }
8982
8983                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8984                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8985
8986                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8987                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8988                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8989                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8990
8991                 {
8992                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8993                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8994                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8995                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8996                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8997                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8998                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8999                         // 0.0.102+
9000                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9001                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9002                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9003                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9004                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9005                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
9006                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9007                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9008                                                         }
9009
9010                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9011                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9012                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9013                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9014                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9015                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9016                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9017                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9018                                                                 },
9019                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9020                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9021                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9022                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
9023                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9024                                                                                 payment_params: None,
9025                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9026                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9027                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9028                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9029                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9030                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9031                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9032                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9033                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
9034                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9035                                                                         });
9036                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9037                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9038                                                                 }
9039                                                         }
9040                                                 }
9041                                         }
9042                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9043                                                 match htlc_source {
9044                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9045                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9046                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9047                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9048                                                                 };
9049                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9050                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9051                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9052                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9053                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9054                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9055                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
9056                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9057                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9058                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9059                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9060                                                                                                 false
9061                                                                                         } else { true }
9062                                                                                 } else { true }
9063                                                                         });
9064                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
9065                                                                 });
9066                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9067                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9068                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9069                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9070                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9071                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9072                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
9073                                                                                         } else { true }
9074                                                                                 });
9075                                                                                 false
9076                                                                         } else { true }
9077                                                                 });
9078                                                         },
9079                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9080                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9081                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9082                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9083                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9084                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9085                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9086                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9087                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9088                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9089                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9090                                                                         let compl_action =
9091                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9092                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9093                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9094                                                                                 };
9095                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9096                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9097                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9098                                                                 }
9099                                                         },
9100                                                 }
9101                                         }
9102                                 }
9103
9104                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9105                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9106                                 // payments.
9107                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9108                                         .into_iter()
9109                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9110                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9111                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9112                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9113                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9114                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9115                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9116                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9117                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9118                                                         } else { None }
9119                                                 } else {
9120                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9121                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9122                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9123                                                         // channel still live case here.
9124                                                         None
9125                                                 }
9126                                         });
9127                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9128                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9129                                 }
9130                         }
9131                 }
9132
9133                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9134                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9135                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9136                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9137                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9138                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9139                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9140                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9141                         }, None));
9142                 }
9143
9144                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9145                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9146
9147                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9148                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9149                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9150                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9151                         }
9152                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9153                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9154                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9155                                 }
9156                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9157                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9158                                 {
9159                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9160                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9161                                         });
9162                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9163                                 }
9164                         } else {
9165                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9166                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9167                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9168                                         });
9169                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9170                                 }
9171                         }
9172                 } else {
9173                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9174                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9175                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9176                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9177                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9178                                 }
9179                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9180                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9181                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9182                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9183                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9184                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9185                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9186                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9187                                                                                 Err(()) => {
9188                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9189                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9190                                                                                 }
9191                                                                         }
9192                                                                 },
9193                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9194                                                         }
9195                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9196                                         },
9197                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9198                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9199                                 };
9200                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9201                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9202                                 });
9203                         }
9204                 }
9205
9206                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9207                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9208
9209                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9210                         Ok(key) => key,
9211                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9212                 };
9213                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9214                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9215                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9216                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9217                         }
9218                 }
9219
9220                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9221                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9222                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9223                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9224                         for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9225                                 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9226                                         let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9227                                         loop {
9228                                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9229                                                         .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9230                                                 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9231                                         }
9232                                         chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9233                                 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9234                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9235                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9236                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9237                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9238                                 }
9239                                 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9240                                         if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9241                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9242                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9243                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9244                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9245                                         }
9246                                 }
9247                         }
9248                 }
9249
9250                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9251
9252                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9253                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9254                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9255                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9256                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9257                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9258                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9259                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9260                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9261                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9262                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9263                                         }
9264                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9265                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9266
9267                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9268                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9269                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9270                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9271                                                 //
9272                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9273                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9274                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9275                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9276                                                 // reason to.
9277                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9278                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9279                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9280                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9281                                                 // restart.
9282                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9283                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9284                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9285                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9286                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9287                                                         if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9288                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9289                                                         }
9290                                                 }
9291                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9292                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9293                                                 }
9294                                         }
9295                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9296                                                 receiver_node_id,
9297                                                 payment_hash,
9298                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
9299                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9300                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9301                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9302                                         }, None));
9303                                 }
9304                         }
9305                 }
9306
9307                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9308                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9309                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9310                                         for action in actions.iter() {
9311                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9312                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9313                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9314                                                 } = action {
9315                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9316                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9317                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9318                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9319                                                         } else {
9320                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9321                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9322                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9323                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9324                                                                 // anymore.
9325                                                         }
9326                                                 }
9327                                         }
9328                                 }
9329                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9330                         } else {
9331                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9332                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9333                         }
9334                 }
9335
9336                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9337                         genesis_hash,
9338                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9339                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9340                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9341                         router: args.router,
9342
9343                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9344
9345                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9346                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9347                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9348                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9349
9350                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9351                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9352                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9353                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9354                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9355                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9356
9357                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9358
9359                         our_network_pubkey,
9360                         secp_ctx,
9361
9362                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9363
9364                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9365
9366                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9367                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9368                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9369                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9370                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9371                         persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9372
9373                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9374                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
9375                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9376
9377                         logger: args.logger,
9378                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
9379                 };
9380
9381                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9382                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9383                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9384                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9385                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9386                 }
9387
9388                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9389                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9390                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9391                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9392                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9393                                 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9394                 }
9395
9396                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9397                 //connection or two.
9398
9399                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9400         }
9401 }
9402
9403 #[cfg(test)]
9404 mod tests {
9405         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9406         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9407         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9408         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9409         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9410         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9411         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9412         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9413         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9414         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9415         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9416         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9417         use crate::util::test_utils;
9418         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9419         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9420
9421         #[test]
9422         fn test_notify_limits() {
9423                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9424                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9425                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9426                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9427                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9428                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9429
9430                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9431                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9432                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9433                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9434                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9435
9436                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9437
9438                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9439                 // to connect messages with new values
9440                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9441                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9442                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9443                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9444                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9445                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9446
9447                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9448                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9449                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9450                 // ... but the last node should not.
9451                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9452                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9453                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9454                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9455
9456                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9457                 // about the channel.
9458                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9459                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9460                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9461
9462                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9463                 // parties.
9464                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9465                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9466                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9467                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9468                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9469                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9470
9471                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9472                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9473                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9474
9475                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9476                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9477                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9478                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9479                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9480                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9481
9482                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9483                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9484                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9485                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9486                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9487                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9488                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9489                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9490
9491                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9492                 // the channel info has updated.
9493                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9494                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9495                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9496                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9497                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9498                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9499         }
9500
9501         #[test]
9502         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9503                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9504                 // expected.
9505                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9506                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9507                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9508                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9509                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9510
9511                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9512                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9513                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9514                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9515
9516                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9517                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9518                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9519                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9520                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9521                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9522                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9523                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9525                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9526                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9527                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9528
9529                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9530                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9531                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9533                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9534                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9535                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9536                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9537                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9539                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9540                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9541                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9542                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9543                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9544                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9545                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9546                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9547                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9548                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9549                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9550                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9551                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9552
9553                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9554                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9555                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9556                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9557                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9558                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9559                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9560
9561                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9562                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9563                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9564                 // lightning messages manually.
9565                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9566                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9568
9569                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9570                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9571                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9572                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9573                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9575                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9576                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9577                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9578                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9579                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9580                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9581                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9582                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9584                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9585                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9586                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9587                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9588                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9589                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9590                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9591                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9592                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9593                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9594                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9595
9596                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9597                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9598                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9599                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9600                 match events[0] {
9601                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9602                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9603                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9604                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9605                         },
9606                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9607                 }
9608                 match events[1] {
9609                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9610                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9611                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9612                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9613                         },
9614                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9615                 }
9616         }
9617
9618         #[test]
9619         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9620                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9621                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9622         }
9623
9624         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9625                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9626                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9627                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9628                 //      fails as expected.
9629                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9630                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9631                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9632                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9633                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9634                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9635                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9636                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9637                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9638                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9639                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9640                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9641                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9642                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9643                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9644
9645                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9646                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9647                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9648
9649                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9650                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9651                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9652                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
9653                 };
9654                 let route = find_route(
9655                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9656                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9657                 ).unwrap();
9658                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9659                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9660                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9661                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9662                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9663                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9664                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9665                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9666                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9667                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9668                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9669                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9670                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9671                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9672                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9673                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9674                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9675                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9676                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9677                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9678                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9679                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9680                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9681                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9682
9683                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9684                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9685
9686                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9687                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9688                 let route = find_route(
9689                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9690                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9691                 ).unwrap();
9692                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9693                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9694                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9695                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9696                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9697                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9698                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9699                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9700
9701                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9702                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9703                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9704                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9705                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9706                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9707                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9708                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9709                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9710                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9711                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9712                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9713                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9714                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9715                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9716                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9717                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9718                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9719                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9720                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9721                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9722                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9723                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9724                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9725
9726                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9727                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9728
9729                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9730                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9731                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9732                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9733                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9734                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9735                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9736                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9737                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9738                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9739
9740                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9741                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9742                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9743                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
9744                 };
9745                 let route = find_route(
9746                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9747                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9748                 ).unwrap();
9749                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9750                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9751                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9752                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9753                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9754                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9755                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9756                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9757                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9758                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9759                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9760                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9761                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9762                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9763                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9764                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9765                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9766                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9767                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9768                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9769                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9770                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9771                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9772
9773                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9774                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9775         }
9776
9777         #[test]
9778         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9779                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9780                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9781                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9782                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9783                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9784                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9785
9786                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9787                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9788
9789                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9790                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9791                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9792                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
9793                 };
9794                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9795                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9796                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9797                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9798                 let route = find_route(
9799                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9800                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9801                 ).unwrap();
9802
9803                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9804                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9805                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9806                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9807                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9808                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9809                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9810
9811                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9812                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9813                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9814                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9815                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9816                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9817                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9818
9819                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9820         }
9821
9822         #[test]
9823         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9824                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9825                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9826                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9827                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9828                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9829                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9830                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9831                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9832
9833                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9834                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9835
9836                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9837                 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9838                         payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9839                         final_value_msat: 10_000,
9840                 };
9841                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9842                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9843                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9844                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9845                 let route = find_route(
9846                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9847                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9848                 ).unwrap();
9849
9850                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9851                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9852                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9853                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9854                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9855                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9856                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9857                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9858                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9859
9860                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9861                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9862                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9863                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9864                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9865                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9866                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9867
9868                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9869         }
9870
9871         #[test]
9872         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9873                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9874                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9875                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9876                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9877
9878                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9879                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9880                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9881                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9882
9883                 // Marshall an MPP route.
9884                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9885                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9886                 route.paths.push(path);
9887                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9888                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9889                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9890                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9891                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9892                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9893
9894                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9895                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9896                 .unwrap_err() {
9897                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9898                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9899                         },
9900                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9901                 }
9902         }
9903
9904         #[test]
9905         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9906                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9907                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9908                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9909                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9910
9911                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9912
9913                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9914                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9915
9916                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9917                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9918                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9919                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9920
9921                 {
9922                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9923                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9924                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9925                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9926                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9927                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9928                 }
9929
9930                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9931
9932                 {
9933                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9934                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9935                 }
9936         }
9937
9938         #[test]
9939         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9940                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9941                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9942                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9943                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9944                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9945
9946                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9947                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9948                         payment_secret,
9949                         total_msat: 100_000,
9950                 };
9951
9952                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9953                 // payment verification fails as expected.
9954                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9955                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9956                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9957                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9958                         Err(()) => {
9959                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9960                         }
9961                 }
9962
9963                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9964                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9965         }
9966
9967         #[test]
9968         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9969                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9970                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9971                 // the channel is successfully closed.
9972                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9973                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9974                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9975                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9976
9977                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9978                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9979                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9980                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9981                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9982
9983                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9984                 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9985                 {
9986                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9987                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9988                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9989                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9990                 }
9991
9992                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9993                 {
9994                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9995                         // as it has the funding transaction.
9996                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9997                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9998                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9999                 }
10000
10001                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10002
10003                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10004
10005                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10006                 {
10007                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10008                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10009                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10010                 }
10011                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10012
10013                 {
10014                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10015                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10016                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10017                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10018                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10019                 }
10020                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10021                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10022                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10023                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10024                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10025                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10026                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10027                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10028
10029                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10030                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10031                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10032                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10033
10034                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10035                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10036                 {
10037                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10038                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10039                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10040                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10041                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10042                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10043                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10044                 }
10045
10046                 {
10047                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10048                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10049                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10050                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10051                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10052                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10053                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10054                 }
10055
10056                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10057                 {
10058                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10059                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10060                         // closing transaction).
10061                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10062                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10063                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10064
10065                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10066                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10067                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10068                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10069                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10070                 }
10071
10072                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10073
10074                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10075                 {
10076                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10077                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10078                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10079                 }
10080                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10081
10082                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10083                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10084         }
10085
10086         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10087                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10088                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10089         }
10090
10091         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10092                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10093                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10094         }
10095
10096         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10097                 match res_err {
10098                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10099                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10100                         },
10101                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10102                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10103                         },
10104                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10105                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10106                 }
10107         }
10108
10109         #[test]
10110         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10111                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10112                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10113                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10114                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10115                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10116                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10117                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10118
10119                 // Dummy values
10120                 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10121                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10122                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10123
10124                 // Test the API functions.
10125                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10126
10127                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10128
10129                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10130
10131                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10132
10133                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10134
10135                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10136
10137                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10138         }
10139
10140         #[test]
10141         fn test_connection_limiting() {
10142                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10143                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10144                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10145                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10146                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10147
10148                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10149
10150                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10151                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10152
10153                 let mut funding_tx = None;
10154                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10155                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10156                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10157
10158                         if idx == 0 {
10159                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10160                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10161                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10162                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10163                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10164
10165                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10166                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10167                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10168
10169                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10170
10171                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10172                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10173                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10174                         }
10175                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10176                 }
10177
10178                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10179                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10180                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10181                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10182                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10183
10184                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10185                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10186                 // limit.
10187                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10188                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10189                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10190                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10191                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10192                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10193                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10194                         }, true).unwrap();
10195                 }
10196                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10197                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10198                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10199                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10200                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10201
10202                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10203                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10204                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10205                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10206                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10207                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10208                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10209                 }
10210                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10211                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10212                 }, true).unwrap();
10213                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10214                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10215                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10216
10217                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10218                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10219                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10220                 }, false).unwrap();
10221                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10222
10223                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10224                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10225                 // open channels.
10226                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10227                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10228                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10229                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10230                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10231                 }
10232                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10233                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10234                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10235
10236                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10237                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10238                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10239
10240                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10241                 // "protected" and can connect again.
10242                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10243                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10244                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10245                 }, true).unwrap();
10246                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10247
10248                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10249                 // last_random_pk.
10250                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10251                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10252         }
10253
10254         #[test]
10255         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10256                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10257                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10258                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10259                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10260                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10261
10262                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10263
10264                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10265                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10266
10267                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10268                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10269                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10270                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10271                 }
10272
10273                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10274                 // rejected.
10275                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10276                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10277                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10278
10279                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10280                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10281                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10282
10283                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10284                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10285                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10286                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10287         }
10288
10289         #[test]
10290         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10291                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10292                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10293                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10294                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10295                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10296                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10297                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10298                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10299
10300                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10301
10302                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10303                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10304
10305                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10306                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10307                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10308                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10309                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10310                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10311                         }, true).unwrap();
10312
10313                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10314                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10315                         match events[0] {
10316                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10317                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10318                                 }
10319                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10320                         }
10321                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10322                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10323                 }
10324
10325                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10326                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10327                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10328                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10329                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10330                 }, true).unwrap();
10331                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10332                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10333                 match events[0] {
10334                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10335                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10336                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10337                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10338                                         _ => panic!(),
10339                                 }
10340                         }
10341                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10342                 }
10343                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10344                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10345
10346                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10347                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10348                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10349                 match events[0] {
10350                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10351                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10352                         }
10353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10354                 }
10355                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10356         }
10357
10358         #[test]
10359         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10360                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10361                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10362                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10363                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10364                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10365                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10366                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10367                         amt_msat: 100,
10368                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10369                         payment_metadata: None,
10370                         keysend_preimage: None,
10371                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10372                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10373                         }),
10374                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10375                 };
10376                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10377                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10378                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10379                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10380                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10381                 {
10382                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10383                 } else { panic!(); }
10384
10385                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10386                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10387                         amt_msat: 100,
10388                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10389                         payment_metadata: None,
10390                         keysend_preimage: None,
10391                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10392                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10393                         }),
10394                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10395                 };
10396                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10397                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10398         }
10399
10400         #[test]
10401         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10402                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10403                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10404                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10405                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10406
10407                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10408                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10409
10410                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10411                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10412                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10413                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10414                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10415
10416                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10417                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10418
10419                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10420                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10421                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10422                 match &msg_events[0] {
10423                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10424                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10425                                 match action {
10426                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10427                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10428                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10429                                 }
10430                         }
10431                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10432                 }
10433
10434                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10435                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10436                 match events[0] {
10437                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10438                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10439                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10440                 }
10441                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10442         }
10443
10444         #[test]
10445         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10446                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10447                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10448                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10449                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10450                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10451                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10452                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10453                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10454                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10455                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10456
10457                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10458                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10459                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10460
10461                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10462                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10463                 match events[0] {
10464                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10465                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10466                         }
10467                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10468                 }
10469
10470                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10471                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10472
10473                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10474                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10475
10476                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10477                 // not have generated any events.
10478                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10479         }
10480
10481         #[test]
10482         fn test_update_channel_config() {
10483                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10484                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10485                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10486                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10487                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10488                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10489                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10490
10491                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10492                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10493                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10494
10495                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10496                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10497                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10498                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10499                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10500                 match &events[0] {
10501                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10502                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10503                 }
10504
10505                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10506                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10507                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10508
10509                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10510                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10511                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10512                         ..Default::default()
10513                 }).unwrap();
10514                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10515                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10516                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10517                 match &events[0] {
10518                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10519                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10520                 }
10521
10522                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10523                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10524                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10525                         ..Default::default()
10526                 }).unwrap();
10527                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10528                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10529                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10530                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10531                 match &events[0] {
10532                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10533                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10534                 }
10535
10536                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10537                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10538                 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10539                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10540                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10541                 assert!(
10542                         matches!(
10543                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10544                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10545                                         ..Default::default()
10546                                 }),
10547                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10548                         )
10549                 );
10550                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10551                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10552                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10553                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10554         }
10555
10556         #[test]
10557         fn test_payment_display() {
10558                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10559                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10560                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10561                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10562                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10563                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10564         }
10565 }
10566
10567 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
10568 pub mod bench {
10569         use crate::chain::Listen;
10570         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10571         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10572         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10573         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10574         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10575         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10576         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10577         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10578         use crate::util::test_utils;
10579         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10580
10581         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10582         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10583         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10584
10585         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10586
10587         use criterion::Criterion;
10588
10589         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10590                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10591                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10592                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10593                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10594                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10595                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10596
10597         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10598                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10599         }
10600         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10601                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10602                 #[inline]
10603                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10604                 #[inline]
10605                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10606         }
10607
10608         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10609                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10610         }
10611
10612         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10613                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10614                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10615                 // calls per node.
10616                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10617                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10618
10619                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10620                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10621                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10622                 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10623                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10624
10625                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10626                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10627                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10628
10629                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10630                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10631                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10632                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10633                         network,
10634                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10635                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10636                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10637
10638                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10639                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10640                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10641                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10642                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10643                         network,
10644                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10645                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10646                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10647
10648                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10649                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10650                 }, true).unwrap();
10651                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10652                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10653                 }, false).unwrap();
10654                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10655                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10656                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10657
10658                 let tx;
10659                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10660                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10661                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10662                         }]};
10663                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10664                 } else { panic!(); }
10665
10666                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10667                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10668                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10669                 match events_b[0] {
10670                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10671                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10672                         },
10673                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10674                 }
10675
10676                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10677                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10678                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10679                 match events_a[0] {
10680                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10681                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10682                         },
10683                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10684                 }
10685
10686                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10687
10688                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10689                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10690                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10691
10692                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10693                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10694                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10695                 match msg_events[0] {
10696                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10697                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10698                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10699                         },
10700                         _ => panic!(),
10701                 }
10702                 match msg_events[1] {
10703                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10704                         _ => panic!(),
10705                 }
10706
10707                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10708                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10709                 match events_a[0] {
10710                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10711                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10712                         },
10713                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10714                 }
10715
10716                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10717                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10718                 match events_b[0] {
10719                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10720                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10721                         },
10722                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10723                 }
10724
10725                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10726                 macro_rules! send_payment {
10727                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10728                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10729                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10730                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10731                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10732                                 payment_count += 1;
10733                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10734                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10735
10736                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10737                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10738                                                 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10739                                         }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10740                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10741                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10742                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10743                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10744                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10745                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10746                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10747
10748                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10749                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10750                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10751                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10752
10753                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10754                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10755                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10756                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10757                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10758                                         },
10759                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10760                                 }
10761
10762                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10763                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10764                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10765                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10766
10767                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10768                         }
10769                 }
10770
10771                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10772                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10773                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
10774                 }));
10775         }
10776 }