1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
242 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
243 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
248 impl Readable for PaymentId {
249 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
250 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
255 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
256 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
257 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
261 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
263 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
264 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
265 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
267 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
268 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
273 impl Readable for InterceptId {
274 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
275 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
280 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
281 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
282 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
283 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
284 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
287 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
290 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
291 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
293 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
294 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
298 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
299 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
300 (0, short_channel_id, required),
301 (2, htlc_id, required),
303 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
304 (0, session_priv, required),
309 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
310 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
311 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
313 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
316 session_priv: SecretKey,
317 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
318 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
320 payment_id: PaymentId,
323 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
324 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
325 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
327 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
329 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
331 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
334 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
335 payment_id.hash(hasher);
336 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
342 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
344 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
345 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
346 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
347 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
348 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
349 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
353 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
354 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
355 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
356 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
357 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
358 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
360 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
366 struct InboundOnionErr {
372 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
373 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
375 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
376 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
377 pub enum FailureCode {
378 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
379 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
380 TemporaryNodeFailure,
381 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
382 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
383 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
384 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
385 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
386 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
387 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
388 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
389 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
390 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
392 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
393 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
394 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
397 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
398 fn into(self) -> u16 {
400 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
401 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
402 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
403 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
408 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
409 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
410 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
411 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
412 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
414 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
415 err: msgs::LightningError,
416 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
417 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
418 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
420 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
422 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
424 err: LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
427 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434 shutdown_finish: None,
435 channel_capacity: None,
439 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
440 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
443 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
445 err: LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
448 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
454 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
455 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
456 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
460 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
463 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
465 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
466 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
470 log_level: Level::Warn,
473 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
475 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
477 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
479 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
480 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
488 shutdown_finish: None,
489 channel_capacity: None,
494 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
495 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
496 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
497 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
498 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
500 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
501 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
502 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
503 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
504 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
505 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
506 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
508 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
512 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
513 struct ClaimingPayment {
515 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
516 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
517 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
518 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
520 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
521 (0, amount_msat, required),
522 (2, payment_purpose, required),
523 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
524 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
525 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
528 struct ClaimablePayment {
529 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
530 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
531 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
534 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
535 struct ClaimablePayments {
536 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
537 /// failed/claimed by the user.
539 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
540 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
542 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
543 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
544 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
547 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
548 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
549 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
552 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
553 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
554 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
555 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
556 enum BackgroundEvent {
557 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
558 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
559 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
560 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
562 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
563 /// are regenerated on startup.
564 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
565 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
566 /// channel to continue normal operation.
568 /// In general this should be used rather than
569 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
570 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
571 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
573 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
574 /// are regenerated on startup.
575 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
576 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
577 funding_txo: OutPoint,
578 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
580 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
581 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
583 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
584 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
585 channel_id: [u8; 32],
590 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
591 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
592 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
593 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
594 /// event can be generated.
595 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
596 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
597 /// operation of another channel.
599 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
600 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
601 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
602 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
604 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
605 event: events::Event,
606 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
610 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
611 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
612 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
613 (0, event, upgradable_required),
614 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
615 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
616 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
617 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
618 // downgrades to prior versions.
619 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
623 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
624 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
625 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
626 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
627 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
630 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
631 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
632 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
633 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
637 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
638 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
639 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
640 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
641 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
642 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
644 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
645 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
646 channel_id: [u8; 32],
647 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
652 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
654 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
655 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
656 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
657 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
662 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
663 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
667 /// State we hold per-peer.
668 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
669 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
671 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
672 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
673 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
675 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
676 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
678 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
679 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
681 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
682 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
684 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
685 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
687 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
688 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
689 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
690 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
691 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
692 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
693 latest_features: InitFeatures,
694 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
695 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
696 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
697 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
698 /// user but which have not yet completed.
700 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
701 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
702 /// for a missing channel.
703 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
704 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
705 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
707 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
708 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
709 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
710 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
712 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
713 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
714 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
715 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
716 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
717 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
718 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
719 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
720 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
721 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
722 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
723 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
724 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
725 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
726 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
730 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
731 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
732 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
733 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
734 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
735 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
738 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
739 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
742 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
743 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
744 self.channel_by_id.len() +
745 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
746 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
747 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
750 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
751 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
752 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
753 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
754 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
755 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
759 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
760 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
761 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
762 /// The original OpenChannel message.
763 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
764 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
765 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
768 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
769 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
770 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
772 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
773 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
775 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
778 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
779 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
780 struct PendingInboundPayment {
781 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
782 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
783 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
784 /// this payment being removed.
786 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
787 user_payment_id: u64,
788 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
789 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
790 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
793 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
794 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
795 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
796 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
797 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
798 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
799 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
800 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
802 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
803 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
811 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
813 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
814 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
815 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
820 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
821 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
822 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
823 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
824 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
831 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
840 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
842 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
843 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
844 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
849 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
850 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
851 $vis trait AChannelManager {
852 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
853 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
854 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
855 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
856 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
857 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
858 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
859 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
860 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
861 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
862 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
863 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
864 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
865 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
866 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
867 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
868 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
869 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
872 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
873 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
874 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
875 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
876 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
877 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
879 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
880 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
881 ES::Target: EntropySource,
882 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
883 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
884 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
888 type Watch = M::Target;
890 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
892 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
894 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
896 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
897 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
899 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
901 type Router = R::Target;
903 type Logger = L::Target;
905 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
908 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
909 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
911 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
912 /// to individual Channels.
914 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
915 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
916 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
917 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
919 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
920 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
921 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
922 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
923 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
924 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
925 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
927 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
928 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
929 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
931 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
932 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
933 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
934 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
935 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
937 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
938 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
939 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
940 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
942 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
943 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
944 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
946 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
947 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
948 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
949 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
950 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
952 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
953 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
954 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
955 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
956 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
957 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
958 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
959 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
962 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
963 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
964 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
965 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
966 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
970 // `total_consistency_lock`
972 // |__`forward_htlcs`
974 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
976 // |__`per_peer_state`
978 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
980 // | |__`claimable_payments`
982 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
988 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
990 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
994 // | |__`pending_events`
996 // | |__`pending_background_events`
998 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1000 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1001 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1002 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1003 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1004 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1005 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1009 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1010 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1011 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1017 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1019 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1021 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1022 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1024 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1025 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1026 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1027 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1029 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1030 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1032 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1033 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1034 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1035 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1036 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1037 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1038 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1039 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1041 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1043 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1044 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1046 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1048 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1049 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1050 /// and via the classic SCID.
1052 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1053 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1055 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1057 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1059 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1060 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1061 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1066 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1067 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1069 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1070 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1072 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1073 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1074 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1075 /// active channel list on load.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1080 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1082 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1083 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1084 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1086 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1087 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1088 /// the handling of the events.
1090 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1091 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1094 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1095 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1096 /// would break backwards compatability.
1097 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1098 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1099 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1101 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1102 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1104 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1106 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1107 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1108 /// confirmation depth.
1110 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1111 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1112 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1114 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1116 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1118 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1120 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1122 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1124 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1125 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1126 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1128 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1129 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1131 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1132 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1133 /// keeping additional state.
1134 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1136 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1137 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1138 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1139 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1141 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1142 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1144 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1145 /// are currently open with that peer.
1147 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1148 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1151 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1153 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1154 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1155 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1156 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1157 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1159 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1160 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1161 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1162 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1163 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1165 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1166 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1170 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1172 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1174 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1175 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1177 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1178 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1179 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1180 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1181 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1183 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1185 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1187 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1188 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1189 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1190 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1191 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1192 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1193 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1194 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1195 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1197 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1199 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1203 signer_provider: SP,
1208 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1210 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1211 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1212 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1213 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1214 pub struct ChainParameters {
1215 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1216 pub network: Network,
1218 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1220 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1221 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1224 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1231 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1232 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1233 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1234 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1235 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1236 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1238 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1239 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1240 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1241 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1242 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1244 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1245 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1248 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1249 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1250 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1251 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1253 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1254 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1255 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1256 _read_guard: read_guard,
1261 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1262 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1263 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1264 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1266 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1267 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1268 should_persist: persist_check,
1269 _read_guard: read_guard,
1274 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1275 fn drop(&mut self) {
1276 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1277 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1282 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1283 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1285 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1287 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1288 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1289 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1290 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1291 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1293 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1294 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1296 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1298 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1299 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1300 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1301 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1302 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1303 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1304 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1305 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1306 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1307 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1308 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1309 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1310 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1312 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1313 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1315 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1316 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1317 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1318 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1320 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1321 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1322 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1323 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1324 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1325 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1330 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1331 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1334 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1336 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1337 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1339 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1340 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1341 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1342 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1344 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1345 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1346 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1348 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1349 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1350 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1352 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1353 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1354 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1355 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1357 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1358 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1359 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1361 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1362 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1363 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1365 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1366 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1367 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1368 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1369 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1370 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1371 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1372 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1373 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1374 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1375 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1378 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1379 /// to better separate parameters.
1380 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1381 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1382 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1383 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1384 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1385 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1386 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1387 pub features: InitFeatures,
1388 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1389 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1390 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1392 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1394 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1395 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1396 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1397 /// payments to us through this channel.
1398 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1399 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1400 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1401 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1402 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1403 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1404 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1407 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1409 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1410 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1413 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1414 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1415 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1416 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1417 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1418 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1419 /// lifetime of the channel.
1420 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1421 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1422 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1423 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1424 /// our counterparty already.
1426 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1427 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1428 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1429 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1431 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1432 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1433 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1434 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1436 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1437 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1439 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1440 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1442 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1443 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1444 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1445 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1446 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1447 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1448 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1449 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1450 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1453 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1455 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1456 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1457 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1458 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1459 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1460 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1461 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1463 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1464 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1466 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1467 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1468 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1469 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1470 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1471 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1472 /// this value on chain.
1474 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1476 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1478 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1479 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1480 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1481 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1482 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1483 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1484 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1486 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1487 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1488 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1489 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1490 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1491 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1493 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1494 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1495 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1496 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1497 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1498 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1500 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1501 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1502 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1503 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1504 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1505 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1506 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1507 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1509 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1510 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1511 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1512 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1513 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1514 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1515 /// route which is valid.
1516 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1517 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1518 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1519 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1520 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1521 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1523 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1524 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1525 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1526 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1527 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1528 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1529 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1530 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1531 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1533 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1535 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1537 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1538 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1539 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1541 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1542 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1543 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1544 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1545 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1546 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1547 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1549 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1550 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1551 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1552 pub is_outbound: bool,
1553 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1554 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1555 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1556 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1557 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1559 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1560 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1561 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1562 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1563 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1564 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1565 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1567 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1568 pub is_usable: bool,
1569 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1570 pub is_public: bool,
1571 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1572 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1573 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1574 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1575 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1576 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1578 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1579 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1582 impl ChannelDetails {
1583 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1584 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1585 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1587 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1588 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1589 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1590 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1593 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1594 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1595 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1597 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1598 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1599 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1600 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1603 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1604 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1605 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1607 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1609 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1610 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1611 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1613 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1614 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1615 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1616 features: latest_features,
1617 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1618 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1619 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1620 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1621 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1622 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1623 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1624 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1625 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1626 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1628 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1629 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1630 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1631 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1632 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1633 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1634 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1635 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1636 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1637 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1638 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1639 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1640 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1641 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1642 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1643 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1644 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1645 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1646 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1647 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1648 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1649 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1650 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1651 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1652 config: Some(context.config()),
1653 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1658 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1659 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1660 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1661 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1662 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1663 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1664 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1665 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1666 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1668 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1670 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1671 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1673 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1674 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1675 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1676 /// to drop the channel.
1680 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1681 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1682 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1683 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1684 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1686 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1688 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1689 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1690 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1693 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1694 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1695 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1697 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1698 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1699 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1701 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1702 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1703 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1705 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1706 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1710 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1712 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1714 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1715 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1716 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1717 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1719 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1720 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1721 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1724 macro_rules! handle_error {
1725 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1726 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1727 // entering the macro.
1728 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1729 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1733 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1734 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1736 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1737 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1738 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1739 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1743 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1744 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1745 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1746 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1747 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1748 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1753 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1754 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1756 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1757 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1758 action: err.action.clone()
1762 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1763 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1764 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1765 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1766 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1770 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1775 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1778 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1779 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1780 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1786 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1787 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1788 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1789 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1790 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1791 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1793 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1794 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1795 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1796 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1797 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1799 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1800 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1802 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1806 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1807 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1808 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1810 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1811 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1813 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1814 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1816 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1817 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1818 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1819 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1820 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1821 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1825 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1827 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1828 // In any case, just close the channel.
1829 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1830 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1831 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1832 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1833 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1834 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1840 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1841 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1845 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1847 $entry.remove_entry();
1855 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1856 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1860 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1862 $entry.remove_entry();
1870 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1871 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1875 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1877 $entry.remove_entry();
1885 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1886 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1888 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1889 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1895 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1896 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1897 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1898 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1899 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1901 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1902 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1903 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1904 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1905 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1906 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1907 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1908 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1909 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1910 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1915 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1916 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1917 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1918 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1919 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1920 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1921 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1922 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1923 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1925 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1930 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1931 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1932 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1933 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1934 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1935 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1936 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1937 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1938 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1940 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1945 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1946 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1947 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1948 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1949 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1950 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1951 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1952 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1953 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1954 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1955 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1957 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1958 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1959 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1965 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1966 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1968 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1969 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1970 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1971 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1972 updates.announcement_sigs);
1973 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1974 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1977 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1978 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1979 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1981 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1983 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1984 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1986 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1987 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1988 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1989 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1994 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1995 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1996 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1997 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1998 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1999 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2001 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2002 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2003 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2006 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2007 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2008 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2009 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2010 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2011 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2012 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2013 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2017 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2023 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2024 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2025 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2026 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2028 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2029 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2031 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2032 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2033 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2034 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2035 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2036 // filter for uniqueness here.
2037 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2038 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2039 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2040 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2042 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2043 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2044 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2046 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2047 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2048 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2052 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2053 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2057 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2058 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2059 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2060 while !processed_all_events {
2061 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2065 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2068 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2069 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2070 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2072 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2073 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2074 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2076 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2077 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2078 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2079 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2083 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2084 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2085 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2086 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2089 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2091 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2092 $event_to_handle = event;
2094 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2095 post_event_actions.push(action);
2100 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2101 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2102 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2103 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2104 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2105 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2108 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2109 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2110 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2111 processed_all_events = false;
2114 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2115 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2121 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2123 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2124 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2125 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2126 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2127 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2128 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2132 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2134 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2136 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2137 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2139 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2141 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2142 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2143 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2146 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2147 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2148 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2150 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2151 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2152 current_timestamp: u32,
2154 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2155 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2156 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2157 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2159 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2160 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2161 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2166 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2168 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2169 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2170 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2171 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2172 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2173 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2174 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2175 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2177 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2180 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2181 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2183 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2185 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2187 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2189 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2190 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2191 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2192 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2193 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2194 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2204 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2205 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2206 &self.default_configuration
2209 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2210 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2211 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2214 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2215 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2217 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2219 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2223 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2228 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2230 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2231 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2232 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2233 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2234 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2236 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2237 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2239 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2240 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2241 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2243 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2244 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2245 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2247 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2248 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2249 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2250 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2251 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2252 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2254 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2255 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2256 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2257 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2258 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2259 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2263 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2264 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2268 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2269 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2271 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2273 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2274 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2275 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2276 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2277 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2278 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2282 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2287 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2289 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2290 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2293 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2295 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2301 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2302 node_id: their_network_key,
2305 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2308 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2309 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2310 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2311 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2312 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2313 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2314 // the same channel.
2315 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2317 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2318 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2319 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2320 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2321 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2322 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2323 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2324 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2325 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2333 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2334 /// more information.
2335 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2336 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2337 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2338 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2339 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2340 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2341 // the same channel.
2342 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2344 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2346 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2349 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2350 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2351 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2354 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2355 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2356 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2359 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2360 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2361 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2369 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2370 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2372 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2373 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2375 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2376 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2377 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2378 // really wanted anyway.
2379 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2382 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2383 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2384 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2387 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2390 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2391 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2392 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2394 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2396 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2397 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2398 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2399 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2405 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2406 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2408 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2409 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2410 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2412 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2413 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2414 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2415 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2416 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2417 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2418 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2419 total_msat: *total_msat,
2422 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2423 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2425 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2426 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2428 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2433 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2434 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2435 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2436 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2437 Some(transaction) => {
2438 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2439 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2444 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2445 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2446 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2447 reason: closure_reason,
2448 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2449 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2453 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2456 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2457 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2461 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2462 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2467 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2469 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2470 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2471 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2472 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2473 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2475 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2476 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2477 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2479 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2483 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2484 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2485 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2486 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2489 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2490 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2491 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2492 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2496 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2503 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2504 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2506 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2507 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2508 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2509 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2512 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2513 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2514 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2515 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2518 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2522 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2523 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2524 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2526 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2527 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2529 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2530 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2531 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2532 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2534 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2536 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2537 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2538 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2541 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2542 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2543 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2544 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2545 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2546 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2549 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2550 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2551 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2553 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2554 /// the channel being closed or not:
2555 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2556 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2557 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2558 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2559 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2560 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2561 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2563 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2564 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2565 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2566 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2568 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2570 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2571 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2572 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2575 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2576 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2577 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2578 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2579 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2580 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2584 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2585 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2586 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2587 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2588 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2589 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2590 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2591 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2593 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2594 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2595 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2596 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2597 // ignore the result here.
2598 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2602 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2603 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2604 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2605 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2606 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2608 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2609 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2610 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2611 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2612 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2613 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2615 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2617 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2618 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2619 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2620 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2621 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2622 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2623 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2624 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2625 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2626 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2627 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2628 // Unfunded channel has no update
2629 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2630 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2631 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2632 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2633 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2635 // Unfunded channel has no update
2636 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2637 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2638 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2639 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2640 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2642 (None, *peer_node_id)
2644 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2647 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2648 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2654 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2657 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2659 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2660 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2662 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2663 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2665 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2666 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2667 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2668 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2679 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2680 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2681 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2683 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2684 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2685 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2688 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2689 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2690 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2692 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2693 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2694 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2695 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2696 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2699 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2700 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2701 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2702 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2703 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2707 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2708 /// local transaction(s).
2709 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2710 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2711 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2715 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2716 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2717 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2718 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2719 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2720 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2721 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2723 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2724 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2728 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2729 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2730 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2731 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2732 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2733 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2734 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2735 err_data: Vec::new(),
2739 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2740 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2741 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2744 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2745 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2746 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2747 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2748 outgoing_cltv_value,
2749 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2753 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2754 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2755 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2756 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2757 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2758 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2759 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2760 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2762 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2764 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2765 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2766 err_data: Vec::new(),
2767 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2770 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2771 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2772 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2773 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2775 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2778 // final_expiry_too_soon
2779 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2780 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2782 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2783 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2784 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2785 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2786 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2787 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2788 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2789 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2790 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2791 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2792 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2795 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2796 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2797 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2799 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2801 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2802 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2806 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2807 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2808 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2809 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2810 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2811 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2812 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2813 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2814 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2815 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2816 err_data: Vec::new(),
2817 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2820 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2821 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2822 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2823 err_data: Vec::new(),
2824 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2827 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2831 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2834 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2835 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2838 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2839 phantom_shared_secret,
2843 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2844 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2845 err_data: Vec::new(),
2846 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2849 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2852 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2853 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2854 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2855 outgoing_cltv_value,
2856 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2860 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2861 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2862 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2863 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2864 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2866 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2867 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2868 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2869 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2870 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2871 failure_code: $err_code,
2877 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2878 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2881 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2882 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2883 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2885 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2886 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2887 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2888 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2889 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2890 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2891 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2892 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2894 macro_rules! return_err {
2895 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2897 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2898 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2899 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2900 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2901 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2902 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2908 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2910 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2911 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2913 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2914 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2917 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2918 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2919 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2920 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2923 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2924 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2925 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2927 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2928 // inbound channel's state.
2929 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2930 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2931 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2935 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2936 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2937 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2938 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2939 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2940 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2941 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2942 // phantom or an intercept.
2943 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2944 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2945 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2949 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2952 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2954 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2955 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2956 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2957 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2958 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2964 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2965 // have no consistency guarantees.
2966 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2970 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2971 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2972 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2973 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2974 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2976 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2977 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2978 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2979 // we don't have the channel here.
2980 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2982 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2984 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2985 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2986 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2987 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2988 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2989 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2990 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2991 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2992 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2993 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2994 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2996 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2999 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3000 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3002 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3003 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3007 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3008 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3009 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3010 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3012 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3019 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3020 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3021 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3022 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3023 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3024 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3026 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3027 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3029 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3030 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3031 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3032 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3033 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3034 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3035 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3036 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3037 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3038 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3044 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3045 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3046 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3047 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3049 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3050 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3052 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3053 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3054 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3056 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3057 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3058 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3059 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3060 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3061 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3062 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3066 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3068 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3071 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3072 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3073 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3074 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3075 macro_rules! return_err {
3076 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3078 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3079 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3080 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3081 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3082 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3083 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3089 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3091 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3092 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3095 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3096 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3097 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3098 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3099 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3101 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3104 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3105 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3106 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3107 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3108 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3114 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3115 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3116 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3118 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3119 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3120 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3122 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3123 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3124 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3125 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3126 return Err(LightningError {
3127 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3128 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3131 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3132 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3134 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3135 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3138 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3139 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3140 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3141 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3143 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3144 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3145 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3147 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3148 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3149 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3150 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3151 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3152 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3156 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3159 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3161 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3163 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3164 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3165 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3166 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3167 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3170 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3171 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3173 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3174 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3175 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3176 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3177 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3178 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3179 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3180 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3182 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3183 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3184 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3186 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3188 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3195 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3196 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3197 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3198 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3203 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3204 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3205 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3208 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3209 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3212 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3213 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3215 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3216 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3217 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3219 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3220 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3222 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3223 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3224 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3225 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3229 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3230 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3233 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3234 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3235 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3237 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3238 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3239 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3241 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3242 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3244 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3245 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3246 Some(monitor_update) => {
3247 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3248 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3250 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3251 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3252 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3253 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3254 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3255 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3256 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3264 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3265 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3266 // `channel_by_id` map.
3267 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3268 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3273 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3274 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3276 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3281 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3283 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3284 /// fields for more info.
3286 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3287 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3289 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3291 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3292 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3293 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3294 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3295 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3297 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3298 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3299 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3300 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3301 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3303 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3304 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3305 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3306 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3308 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3310 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3311 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3312 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3314 /// In general, a path may raise:
3315 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3316 /// node public key) is specified.
3317 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3318 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3320 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3321 /// relevant updates.
3323 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3324 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3325 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3327 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3328 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3329 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3330 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3331 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3332 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3333 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3334 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3336 self.pending_outbound_payments
3337 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3338 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3339 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3342 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3343 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3344 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3345 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3347 self.pending_outbound_payments
3348 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3349 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3350 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3351 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3355 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3356 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3357 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3358 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3359 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3360 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3364 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3366 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3370 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3371 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3375 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3376 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3377 /// retries are exhausted.
3379 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3380 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3382 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3383 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3384 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3386 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3387 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3389 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3390 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3391 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3393 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3396 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3397 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3398 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3399 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3400 /// never reach the recipient.
3402 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3403 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3405 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3406 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3408 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3409 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3410 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3412 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3413 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3414 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3417 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3418 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3420 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3423 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3424 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3425 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3427 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3428 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3429 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3430 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3433 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3434 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3435 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3436 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3437 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3439 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3440 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3441 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3444 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3447 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3448 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3451 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3452 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3453 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3454 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3455 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3458 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3462 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3464 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3466 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3467 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3468 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3469 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3470 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3471 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3472 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3473 } else { unreachable!(); });
3475 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3476 Err((chan, err)) => {
3477 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3478 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3480 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3481 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3482 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3488 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3490 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3491 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3496 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3497 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3500 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3502 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3505 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3506 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3507 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3516 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3517 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3518 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3522 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3524 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3525 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3527 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3528 /// across the p2p network.
3530 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3531 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3533 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3534 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3535 /// keys per-channel).
3537 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3538 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3539 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3541 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3542 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3543 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3545 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3546 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3547 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3548 /// for more details.
3550 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3551 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3552 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3555 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3556 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3557 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3558 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3563 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3564 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3565 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3566 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3567 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3568 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3569 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3570 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3574 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3575 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3577 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3581 let mut output_index = None;
3582 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3583 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3584 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3585 if output_index.is_some() {
3586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3587 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3590 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3593 if output_index.is_none() {
3594 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3595 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3598 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3602 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3604 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3605 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3606 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3607 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3609 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3610 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3612 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3613 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3615 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3617 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3618 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3619 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3620 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3621 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3622 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3623 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3624 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3625 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3626 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3627 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3629 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3635 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3636 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3639 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3640 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3641 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3642 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3646 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3647 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3648 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3649 config.apply(config_update);
3650 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3653 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3654 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3655 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3656 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3657 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3664 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3665 &mut channel.context
3666 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3667 &mut channel.context
3669 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3670 debug_assert!(false);
3671 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3673 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3674 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3677 let mut config = context.config();
3678 config.apply(config_update);
3679 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3680 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3681 context.update_config(&config);
3686 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3688 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3689 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3690 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3691 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3693 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3694 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3696 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3697 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3699 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3701 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3702 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3703 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3704 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3705 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3706 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3707 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3708 pub fn update_channel_config(
3709 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3710 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3711 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3714 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3715 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3717 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3718 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3720 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3721 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3722 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3723 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3724 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3726 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3727 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3728 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3731 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3734 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3735 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3736 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3737 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3738 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3739 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3742 let next_hop_scid = {
3743 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3744 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3745 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3750 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3751 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3752 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3755 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3757 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3758 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3759 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3764 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3765 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3766 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3769 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3770 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3771 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3773 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3775 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3776 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3777 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3778 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3779 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3782 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3783 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3784 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3785 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3786 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3788 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3792 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3793 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3795 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3798 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3799 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3800 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3802 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3803 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3804 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3807 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3808 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3809 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3810 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3811 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3812 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3813 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3814 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3817 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3818 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3820 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3825 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3827 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3828 /// Will likely generate further events.
3829 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3832 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3833 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3834 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3836 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3837 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3839 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3840 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3841 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3843 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3844 match forward_info {
3845 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3846 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3847 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3848 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3849 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3852 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3853 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3854 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3856 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3857 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3858 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3859 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3860 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3861 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3862 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3865 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3866 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3868 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3871 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3872 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3878 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3879 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3881 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3885 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3886 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3888 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3892 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3893 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3894 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3895 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3896 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3898 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3899 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3900 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3901 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3902 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3904 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3906 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3907 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3911 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3912 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3913 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3914 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3916 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3917 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3923 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3926 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3929 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3930 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3931 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3932 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3933 // problem, not ours.
3939 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3940 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3942 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3947 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3948 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3949 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3954 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3956 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3960 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3961 match forward_info {
3962 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3963 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3964 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3965 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3966 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3970 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3971 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3972 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3973 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3974 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3975 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3976 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3977 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3979 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3980 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3981 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3984 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
3987 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3989 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3990 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3991 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3992 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3997 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3998 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4000 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4002 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
4003 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4005 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4006 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4008 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4010 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4011 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4012 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4021 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4022 match forward_info {
4023 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4024 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4025 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4026 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4027 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4030 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4031 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4032 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4033 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4034 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4035 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4036 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4038 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4039 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4040 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4044 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4045 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4048 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4051 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4052 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4053 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4054 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4055 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4056 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4057 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4058 phantom_shared_secret,
4060 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4061 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4062 // if routing nodes overpay
4063 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4064 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4066 total_value_received: None,
4067 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4070 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4073 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4075 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4076 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4077 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4078 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4079 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4080 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4082 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4083 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4084 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4085 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4086 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4087 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4088 phantom_shared_secret,
4090 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4091 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4093 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4096 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4097 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4098 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4099 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4100 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4103 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4104 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4105 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4106 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4107 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4108 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4110 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4111 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4112 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4114 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4115 .entry(payment_hash)
4116 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4117 .or_insert_with(|| {
4118 committed_to_claimable = true;
4120 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4123 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4124 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4125 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4126 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4128 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4129 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4130 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4132 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4133 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4134 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4137 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4139 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4140 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4141 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4142 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4143 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4144 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4145 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4146 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4147 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4148 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4150 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4152 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4153 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4154 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4156 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4159 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4160 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4161 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4162 committed_to_claimable = true;
4164 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4165 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4166 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4167 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4168 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4169 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4170 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4171 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4172 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4173 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4177 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4178 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4179 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4180 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4181 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4183 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4185 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4186 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4188 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4189 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4190 committed_to_claimable = true;
4193 payment_claimable_generated
4197 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4198 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4199 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4200 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4201 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4202 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4203 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4204 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4206 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4207 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4208 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4209 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4210 Ok(result) => result,
4212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4213 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4216 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4217 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4218 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4220 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4224 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4225 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4226 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4228 check_total_value!(purpose);
4230 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4231 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4232 check_total_value!(purpose);
4236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4237 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4239 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4241 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4242 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4245 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4247 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4248 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4250 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4251 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4252 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4254 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4255 if payment_claimable_generated {
4256 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4262 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4263 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4271 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4272 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4273 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4274 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4276 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4279 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4281 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4282 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4283 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4285 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4287 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4288 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4289 events.append(&mut new_events);
4292 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4294 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4295 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4296 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4298 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4300 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4301 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4302 if background_events.is_empty() {
4303 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4306 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4308 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4309 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4310 // monitor updating completing.
4311 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4313 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4314 let mut updated_chan = false;
4316 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4317 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4320 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4322 updated_chan = true;
4323 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4324 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4331 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4332 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4334 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4335 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4336 // however, ensure that.
4338 log_error!(self.logger,
4339 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4341 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4343 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4344 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4345 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4348 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4349 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4351 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4352 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4353 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4354 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4355 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4361 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4364 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4365 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4366 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4367 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4368 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4371 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4372 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4373 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4374 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4375 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4376 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4377 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4379 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4381 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4382 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4384 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4385 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4387 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4388 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4392 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4393 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4394 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4395 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4396 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4397 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4398 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4400 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4401 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4404 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4405 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4406 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4407 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4408 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4413 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4414 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4422 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4424 /// This currently includes:
4425 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4426 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4427 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4429 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4430 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4431 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4432 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4434 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4435 /// estimate fetches.
4437 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4438 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4439 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4440 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4441 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4443 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4444 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4446 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4447 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4448 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4451 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4454 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4455 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4456 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4457 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4462 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4463 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4465 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4466 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4467 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4468 if needs_close { return false; }
4471 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4472 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4473 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4474 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4475 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4476 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4477 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4478 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4480 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4481 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4482 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4487 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4489 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4492 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4494 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4495 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4496 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4501 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4503 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4509 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4511 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4512 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4513 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4514 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4515 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4516 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4517 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4518 channel_id: *chan_id,
4519 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4528 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4530 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4531 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4532 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4534 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4535 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4536 log_error!(self.logger,
4537 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4538 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4539 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4540 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4541 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4542 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4543 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4544 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4545 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4546 channel_id: *chan_id,
4547 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4556 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4557 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4558 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4559 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4561 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4562 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4563 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4564 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4565 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4566 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4567 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4568 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4574 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4576 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4577 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4582 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4583 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4584 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4585 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4586 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4587 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4588 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4589 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4590 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4591 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4592 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4594 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4595 // have no channels to the peer.
4596 let remove_entry = {
4597 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4598 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4601 entry.remove_entry();
4604 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4609 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4610 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4611 // This should be unreachable
4612 debug_assert!(false);
4615 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4616 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4617 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4618 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4619 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4620 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4621 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4624 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4625 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4626 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4628 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4629 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4636 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4637 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4638 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4639 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4640 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4643 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4644 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4647 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4649 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4650 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4651 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4652 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4653 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4660 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4661 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4662 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4664 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4665 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4666 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4667 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4669 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4670 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4671 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4672 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4673 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4677 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4678 /// reason for the failure.
4680 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4681 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4684 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4685 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4686 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4687 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4688 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4689 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4690 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4695 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4696 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4697 match failure_code {
4698 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4699 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4700 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4701 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4702 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4703 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4705 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4706 let fail_data = match data {
4707 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4710 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4715 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4716 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4718 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4720 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4721 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4722 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4723 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4724 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4725 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4726 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4728 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4730 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4731 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4733 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4738 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4739 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4740 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4741 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4742 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4743 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4744 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4745 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4746 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4747 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4749 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4750 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4751 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4752 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4754 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4755 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4756 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4757 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4758 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4762 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4763 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4764 // be surfaced to the user.
4765 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4766 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4767 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4769 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4770 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4771 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4776 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4780 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4783 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4784 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4785 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4790 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4791 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4792 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4793 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4794 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4795 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4796 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4797 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4798 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4801 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4802 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4803 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4806 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4807 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4808 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4810 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4811 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4812 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4813 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4814 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4816 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4818 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4820 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4821 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4822 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4823 push_forward_ev = true;
4825 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4827 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4830 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4833 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4834 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4835 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4836 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4837 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4838 failed_next_destination: destination,
4844 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4845 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4847 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4848 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4849 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4850 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4852 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4853 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4854 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4855 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4857 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4858 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4859 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4861 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4862 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4863 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4864 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4865 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4866 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4867 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4868 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4869 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4872 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4873 /// even type numbers.
4877 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4878 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4880 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4881 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4882 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4885 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4886 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4891 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4892 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4893 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4894 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4895 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4896 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4897 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4898 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4903 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4904 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4905 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4906 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4907 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4909 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4910 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4911 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4915 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4916 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4917 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4918 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4919 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4920 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4921 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4922 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4923 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4924 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4925 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4934 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4936 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4937 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4938 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4939 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4940 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4941 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4942 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4943 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4944 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4945 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4946 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4947 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4948 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4949 debug_assert!(false);
4953 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4955 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4956 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4957 debug_assert!(false);
4961 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4962 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4964 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4965 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4966 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4967 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4970 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4971 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4972 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4973 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4977 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4978 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4979 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4980 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4982 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4983 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4984 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4985 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4986 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4991 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4992 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4993 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4994 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4995 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4996 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4999 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5002 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5003 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5004 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5005 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5009 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5010 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5011 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5012 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5014 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5015 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5016 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5017 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5021 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5022 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5023 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5027 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5028 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5029 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5032 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5036 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5037 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5039 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5040 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5042 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5043 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5046 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5047 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5048 if let Err(e) = res {
5049 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5050 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5051 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5052 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5053 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5056 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5057 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5058 // monitor update as a background event.
5059 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5060 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5061 counterparty_node_id,
5062 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5063 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5071 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5072 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5073 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5079 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5080 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5081 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5082 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5083 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5084 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5085 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5086 // again on restart.
5087 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5088 payment_preimage, update_res);
5091 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5092 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5094 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5095 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5096 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5097 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5098 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5099 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5100 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5101 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5102 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5103 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5106 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5107 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5108 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5109 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5110 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5111 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5115 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5116 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5119 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5121 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5122 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5123 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5124 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5125 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5126 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5128 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5129 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5132 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5133 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5134 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5135 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5136 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5137 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5138 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5141 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5142 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5144 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5145 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5146 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5147 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5149 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5153 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5154 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5155 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5161 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5162 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5163 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5166 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5167 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5169 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5170 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5171 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5173 payment_purpose: purpose,
5176 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5178 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5182 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5184 sender_intended_total_msat,
5188 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5189 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5191 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5192 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5193 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5200 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5201 /// update completion.
5202 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5203 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5204 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5205 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5206 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5207 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5209 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5210 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5211 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5212 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5213 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5214 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5216 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5218 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5219 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5220 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5221 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5224 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5225 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5227 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5228 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5229 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5234 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5235 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5236 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5237 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5242 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5243 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5245 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5246 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5251 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5255 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5261 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5262 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5263 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5267 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5268 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5269 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5275 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5276 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5278 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5279 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5281 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5282 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5283 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5284 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5285 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5291 let mut peer_state_lock;
5292 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5293 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5294 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5297 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5300 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5301 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5302 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5303 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5304 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5307 let remaining_in_flight =
5308 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5309 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5312 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5313 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5314 remaining_in_flight);
5315 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5318 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5321 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5323 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5324 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5327 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5329 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5331 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5332 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5333 /// used to accept such channels.
5335 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5337 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5338 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5341 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5342 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5344 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5345 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5346 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5348 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5349 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5351 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5352 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5354 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5355 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5357 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5359 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5360 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5363 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5366 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5367 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5369 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5370 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5373 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5375 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5376 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5377 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5379 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5380 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5381 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5382 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5383 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5384 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5385 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5387 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5391 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5392 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5393 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5394 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5395 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5400 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5403 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5404 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5405 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5406 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5407 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5408 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5409 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5410 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5413 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5414 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5418 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5419 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5420 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5422 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5423 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5424 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5427 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5432 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5433 /// or 0-conf channels.
5435 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5436 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5437 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5438 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5439 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5440 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5442 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5443 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5444 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5445 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5446 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5447 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5448 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5452 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5455 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5456 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5458 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5459 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5460 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5461 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5462 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5463 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5465 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5468 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5469 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5470 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5473 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5476 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5477 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5481 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5485 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5486 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5487 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5488 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5489 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5491 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5492 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5494 debug_assert!(false);
5495 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5500 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5501 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5502 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5503 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5504 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5505 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5508 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5509 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5513 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5515 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5519 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5520 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5525 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5526 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5527 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5528 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5529 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5530 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5531 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5532 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5533 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5535 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5536 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5537 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5542 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5543 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5544 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5545 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5546 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5547 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5548 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5551 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5556 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5557 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5560 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5564 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5565 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5568 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5569 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5571 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5575 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5576 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5580 debug_assert!(false);
5581 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5585 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5587 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5588 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5593 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5594 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5595 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5596 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5597 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5599 user_channel_id: user_id,
5604 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5605 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5608 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5610 debug_assert!(false);
5611 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5614 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5616 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5617 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5618 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5619 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5621 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5622 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5623 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5624 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5625 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5626 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5627 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5629 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5633 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5636 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5638 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5641 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5643 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5644 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5645 funding_msg.channel_id))
5647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5648 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5652 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5653 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5654 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5655 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5656 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5657 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5658 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5662 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5664 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5665 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5666 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5667 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5669 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5670 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5671 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5672 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5673 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5674 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5675 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5676 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5684 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5685 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5687 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5689 debug_assert!(false);
5690 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5695 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5697 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5698 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5699 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5700 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5701 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5702 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5703 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5704 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5705 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5706 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5715 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5719 debug_assert!(false);
5720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5726 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5727 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5728 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5730 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5731 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5732 msg: announcement_sigs,
5734 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5735 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5736 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5737 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5738 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5739 // announcement_signatures.
5740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5741 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5743 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5751 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5760 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5761 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5762 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5764 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5766 debug_assert!(false);
5767 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5771 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5772 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5773 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5774 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5775 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5776 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5777 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5779 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5780 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5781 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5782 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5783 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5785 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5786 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5787 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5788 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5789 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5792 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5793 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5794 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5795 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5797 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5798 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5799 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5800 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5801 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5802 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5807 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5808 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5809 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5810 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5814 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5817 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5818 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5819 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5820 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5826 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5828 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5830 debug_assert!(false);
5831 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5833 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5836 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5838 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5839 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5840 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5841 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5846 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5847 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5848 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5849 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5850 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5851 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5852 } else { (tx, None) }
5854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5857 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5858 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5859 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5861 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5862 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5865 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5869 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5874 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5875 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5876 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5877 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5879 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5880 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5881 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5882 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5884 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5888 debug_assert!(false);
5889 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5893 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5896 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5897 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5898 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5899 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5900 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5902 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5903 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5904 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5905 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5906 match pending_forward_info {
5907 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5908 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5909 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5910 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5912 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5913 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5914 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5915 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5916 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5919 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5921 _ => pending_forward_info
5924 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5931 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5933 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5937 debug_assert!(false);
5938 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5944 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5945 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5951 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5955 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5959 debug_assert!(false);
5960 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5962 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5964 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5966 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5973 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5977 debug_assert!(false);
5978 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5984 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5985 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5986 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5988 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5995 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5999 debug_assert!(false);
6000 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6002 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6006 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6007 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6008 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6009 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6010 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6018 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6019 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6020 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6021 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6022 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6023 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6024 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6025 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6026 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6027 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6028 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6030 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6031 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6033 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6034 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6035 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6037 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6038 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6041 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6042 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6044 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6045 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6046 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6048 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6049 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6050 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6051 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6052 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6055 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6056 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6059 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6060 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6061 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6062 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6063 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6064 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6065 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6066 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6069 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6070 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6071 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6076 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6077 // payments are being processed.
6078 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6079 push_forward_event = true;
6081 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6082 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6089 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6093 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6094 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6095 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6097 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6101 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6102 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6103 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6104 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6105 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6107 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6108 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6109 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6110 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6111 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6112 // real by taking more time.
6113 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6114 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6115 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6120 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6121 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6122 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6123 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6124 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6125 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6126 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6128 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6129 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6130 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6131 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6132 channel_funding_outpoint,
6133 counterparty_node_id,
6138 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6139 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6141 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6143 debug_assert!(false);
6144 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6145 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6147 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6148 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6149 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6150 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6151 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6152 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6153 *counterparty_node_id)
6155 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6156 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6157 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6158 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6159 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6160 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6161 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6163 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6165 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6168 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6176 debug_assert!(false);
6177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6181 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6183 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6190 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6194 debug_assert!(false);
6195 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6199 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6201 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6202 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6205 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6206 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6207 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6208 msg, &self.default_configuration
6210 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6211 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6212 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6220 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6221 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6222 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6223 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6225 // It's not a local channel
6226 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6229 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6230 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6231 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6232 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6236 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6238 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6239 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6240 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6241 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6242 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6243 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6245 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6247 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6248 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6249 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6250 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6252 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6253 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6258 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6261 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6263 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6266 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6268 debug_assert!(false);
6269 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6273 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6275 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6276 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6277 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6278 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6279 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6280 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6281 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6282 let mut channel_update = None;
6283 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6284 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6285 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6288 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6289 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6290 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6291 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6292 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6293 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6294 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6299 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6300 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6301 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6302 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6303 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6304 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6312 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6313 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6316 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6317 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6322 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6323 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6324 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6326 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6327 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6328 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6329 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6330 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6331 match monitor_event {
6332 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6333 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6334 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6335 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6338 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6339 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6340 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6343 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6344 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6345 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6346 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6348 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6349 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6350 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6351 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6354 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6356 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6359 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6360 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6361 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6362 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6363 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6364 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6368 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6369 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6371 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6373 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6374 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6375 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6376 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6377 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6384 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6385 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6391 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6392 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6395 has_pending_monitor_events
6398 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6399 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6400 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6402 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6404 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6407 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6408 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6409 /// update was applied.
6410 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6411 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6412 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6413 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6415 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6416 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6417 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6418 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6421 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6423 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6424 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6425 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6426 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6427 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6428 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6429 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6430 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6431 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6433 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6434 has_monitor_update = true;
6436 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6437 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6438 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6439 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6441 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6443 continue 'peer_loop;
6452 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6453 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6454 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6457 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6458 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6464 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6465 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6466 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6467 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6468 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6469 let mut has_update = false;
6471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6473 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6477 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6478 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6479 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6480 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6482 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6483 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6486 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6487 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6488 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6489 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6495 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6497 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6498 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6499 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6505 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6506 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6514 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6515 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6521 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6522 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6524 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6525 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6526 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6527 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6528 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6529 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6530 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6531 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6532 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6533 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6534 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6535 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6536 assert!(should_broadcast);
6537 } else { unreachable!(); }
6538 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6539 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6540 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6543 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6547 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6550 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6551 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6553 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6554 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6555 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6556 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6558 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6560 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6561 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6565 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6566 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6568 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6570 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6571 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6573 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6574 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6575 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6576 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6577 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6578 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6579 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6580 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6581 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6582 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6583 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6586 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6587 /// stored external to LDK.
6589 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6590 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6591 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6593 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6594 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6597 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6598 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6599 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6600 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6602 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6603 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6604 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6605 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6606 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6608 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6609 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6610 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6611 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6612 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6614 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6615 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6617 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6618 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6622 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6623 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6625 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6627 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6628 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6630 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6631 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6632 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6633 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6634 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6635 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6636 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6639 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6640 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6642 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6643 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6644 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6647 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6648 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6650 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6651 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6652 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6653 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6655 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6656 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6657 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6658 Some(_) => continue,
6659 None => return scid_candidate
6664 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6666 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6667 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6669 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6670 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6671 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6675 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6676 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6677 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6679 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6680 /// times to get a unique scid.
6681 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6682 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6683 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6685 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6686 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6687 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6688 return scid_candidate
6692 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6693 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6694 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6695 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6698 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6699 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6700 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6701 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6702 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6703 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6704 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6713 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6714 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6715 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6716 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6717 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6721 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6722 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6723 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6724 events.push_back((event, None));
6728 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6729 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6730 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6734 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6735 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6739 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6740 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6743 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6744 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6745 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6746 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6747 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6748 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6751 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6752 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6753 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6755 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6756 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6757 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6758 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6760 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6764 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6765 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6766 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6767 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6768 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6770 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6774 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6775 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6776 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6777 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6778 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6779 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6780 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6782 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6784 if further_update_exists {
6785 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6791 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6795 log_debug!(self.logger,
6796 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6797 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6801 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6802 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6803 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6807 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6808 for action in actions {
6810 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6811 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6813 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6819 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6820 /// using the given event handler.
6822 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6823 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6827 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6831 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6833 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6834 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6835 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6836 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6837 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6842 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6843 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6844 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6845 /// is always placed next to each other.
6847 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6848 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6849 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6850 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6852 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6853 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6854 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6855 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6856 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6857 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6858 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6860 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6861 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6862 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6863 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6866 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6867 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6869 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6870 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6873 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6875 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6878 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6879 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6883 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6884 events.replace(pending_events);
6893 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6904 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6906 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6907 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6908 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6910 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6914 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6916 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6918 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6919 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6920 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6925 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6927 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6928 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6929 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6930 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6931 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6934 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6935 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6938 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6940 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6941 let new_height = height - 1;
6943 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6944 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6945 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6946 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6947 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6948 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6951 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6955 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6957 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6958 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6959 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6960 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6961 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6966 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6967 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6968 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6969 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6971 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6972 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6975 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6976 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6977 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6979 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6980 if height < last_best_block_height {
6981 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6982 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6986 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6987 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6988 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6989 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6991 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6992 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6995 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6996 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6998 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7000 macro_rules! max_time {
7001 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7003 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7004 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7005 // having an explicit local time source.
7006 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7007 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7008 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7009 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7010 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7016 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7017 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7018 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7019 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7023 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7024 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7025 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7028 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7029 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7030 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7037 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7039 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7040 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7041 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7042 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7043 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7044 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7045 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7050 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7052 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7053 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7054 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7055 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7056 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7057 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7061 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7062 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7064 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7065 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7066 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7067 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7068 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7070 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7071 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7074 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7077 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7078 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7079 let res = f(channel);
7080 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7081 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7082 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7083 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7084 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7086 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7087 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7088 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7090 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7091 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7092 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7097 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7102 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7103 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7106 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7108 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7109 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7110 msg: announcement_sigs,
7112 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7113 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7116 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7117 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7118 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7123 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7124 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7125 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7126 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7127 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7128 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7129 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7130 // is always consistent.
7131 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7132 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7133 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7134 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7135 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7138 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7139 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7140 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7141 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7142 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7143 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7148 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7149 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7150 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7151 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7152 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7153 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7154 data: reason_message,
7164 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7165 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7166 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7167 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7168 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7169 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7170 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7171 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7172 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7173 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7175 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7176 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7177 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7181 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7184 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7185 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7186 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7187 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7188 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7189 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7190 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7191 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7192 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7193 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7196 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7197 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7198 _ => unreachable!(),
7200 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7201 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7202 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7209 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7211 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7212 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7216 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7218 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7219 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7221 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7222 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7225 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7226 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7227 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7230 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7231 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7232 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7233 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7236 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7237 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7238 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7239 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7242 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7243 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7245 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7246 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7247 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7248 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7249 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7252 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7253 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7254 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7255 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7258 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7259 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7260 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7261 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7264 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7265 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7266 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7267 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7271 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7272 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7274 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7275 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7276 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7277 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7278 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7283 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7288 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7289 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7290 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7291 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7294 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7299 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7300 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7301 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7302 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7305 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7310 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7315 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7320 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7325 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7330 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7335 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7337 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7340 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7345 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7347 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7350 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7352 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7355 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7357 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7360 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7365 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7367 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7370 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7371 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7372 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7373 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7374 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7376 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7381 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7382 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7383 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7386 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7388 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7389 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7391 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7392 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7393 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7394 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7395 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7396 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7397 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7398 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7399 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7400 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7401 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7406 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7407 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7408 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7411 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7412 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7413 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7416 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7417 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7418 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7419 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7421 // V1 Channel Establishment
7422 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7424 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7425 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7426 // V2 Channel Establishment
7427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7429 // Common Channel Establishment
7430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7431 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7432 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7436 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7439 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7440 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7441 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7442 // Channel Operations
7443 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7445 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7446 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7447 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7448 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7450 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7451 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7452 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7453 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7454 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7455 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7456 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7457 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7458 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7461 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7462 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7463 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7464 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7467 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7469 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7471 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7472 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7476 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7477 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7478 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7484 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7485 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7486 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7487 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7488 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7489 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7492 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7493 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7495 if inbound_peer_limited {
7498 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7499 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7500 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7501 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7502 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7503 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7504 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7505 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7506 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7507 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7512 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7513 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7516 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7517 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7518 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7523 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7524 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7529 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7532 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7535 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7537 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7538 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7539 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7540 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7541 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7543 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7544 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7548 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7552 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7555 match &msg.data as &str {
7556 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7557 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7559 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7560 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7561 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7562 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7563 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7564 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7565 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7566 if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
7567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7568 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7569 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7570 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7571 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7572 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7573 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7574 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7578 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7579 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7580 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7581 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7582 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7583 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7585 log_level: Level::Trace,
7595 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7596 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7598 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7599 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7600 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7601 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7602 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7603 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7604 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7605 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7606 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7607 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7609 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7610 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7611 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7615 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7617 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7618 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7621 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7622 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7624 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7632 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7633 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7637 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7638 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7641 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7642 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7645 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7646 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7649 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7650 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7651 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7652 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7655 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7656 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7657 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7658 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7661 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7662 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7663 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7664 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7667 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7668 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7669 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7670 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7673 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7674 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7675 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7676 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7679 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7680 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7681 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7682 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7685 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7686 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7687 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7688 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7691 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7692 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7693 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7694 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7697 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7698 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7699 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7700 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7704 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7705 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7706 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7707 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7708 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7712 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7713 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7715 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7716 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7717 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7718 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7719 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7722 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7723 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7724 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7725 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7728 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7729 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7730 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7731 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7734 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7735 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7736 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7737 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7738 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7739 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7740 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7741 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7742 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7743 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7744 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7745 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7746 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7747 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7748 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7749 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7750 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7751 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7752 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7753 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7758 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7759 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7761 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7762 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7763 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7764 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7767 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7768 (2, node_id, required),
7769 (4, features, required),
7770 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7771 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7772 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7773 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7776 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7777 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7778 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7779 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7780 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7781 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7782 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7783 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7784 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7785 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7786 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7787 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7788 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7789 (7, self.config, option),
7790 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7791 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7792 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7793 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7794 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7795 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7796 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7797 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7798 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7799 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7800 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7801 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7802 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7803 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7804 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7805 (32, self.is_public, required),
7806 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7807 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7808 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7809 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7810 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7816 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7817 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7818 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7819 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7820 (2, channel_id, required),
7821 (3, channel_type, option),
7822 (4, counterparty, required),
7823 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7824 (6, funding_txo, option),
7825 (7, config, option),
7826 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7827 (9, confirmations, option),
7828 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7829 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7830 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7831 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7832 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7833 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7834 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7835 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7836 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7837 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7838 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7839 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7840 (26, is_outbound, required),
7841 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7842 (30, is_usable, required),
7843 (32, is_public, required),
7844 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7845 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7846 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7847 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7848 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7851 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7852 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7853 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7854 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7855 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7857 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7861 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7863 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7864 outbound_scid_alias,
7868 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7869 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7871 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7872 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7873 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7874 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7875 confirmations_required,
7877 force_close_spend_delay,
7878 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7879 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7880 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7881 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7882 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7883 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7884 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7885 channel_shutdown_state,
7890 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7891 (2, channels, required_vec),
7892 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7893 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7896 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7898 (0, onion_packet, required),
7899 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7902 (0, payment_data, required),
7903 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7904 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7905 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7906 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7908 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7909 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7910 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7911 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7912 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7913 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7917 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7918 (0, routing, required),
7919 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7920 (4, payment_hash, required),
7921 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7922 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7923 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7924 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7928 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7929 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7931 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7933 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7934 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7935 reason.write(writer)?;
7937 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7938 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7941 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7942 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7943 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7944 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7951 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7952 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7953 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7956 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7957 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7958 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7959 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7963 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7964 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7965 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7966 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7967 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7970 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7971 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7972 // messages contained in the variants.
7973 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7974 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7975 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7977 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7978 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7979 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7980 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7981 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7984 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7986 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7987 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7988 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7990 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7995 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8000 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8001 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8002 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8003 (2, outpoint, required),
8004 (4, htlc_id, required),
8005 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8006 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8009 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8010 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8011 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8012 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8013 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8015 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8016 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8017 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8018 (2, self.value, required),
8019 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8020 (4, payment_data, option),
8021 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8022 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8023 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8024 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8030 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8031 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8032 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8033 (0, prev_hop, required),
8034 (1, total_msat, option),
8035 (2, value_ser, required),
8036 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8037 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8038 (5, total_value_received, option),
8039 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8040 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8041 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8043 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8044 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8045 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8047 if payment_data.is_some() {
8048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8050 if total_msat.is_none() {
8051 total_msat = Some(value);
8053 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8056 if total_msat.is_none() {
8057 if payment_data.is_none() {
8058 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8060 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8062 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8066 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8069 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8070 total_value_received,
8071 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8073 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8074 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8079 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8080 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8081 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8084 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8085 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8086 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8087 let mut payment_id = None;
8088 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8089 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8090 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8091 (0, session_priv, required),
8092 (1, payment_id, option),
8093 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8094 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8095 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8096 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8098 if payment_id.is_none() {
8099 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8101 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8103 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8104 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8105 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8107 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8108 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8109 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8110 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8114 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8115 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8116 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8118 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8121 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8122 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8127 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8130 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8132 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8133 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8134 (0, session_priv, required),
8135 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8136 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8137 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8138 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8139 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8140 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8143 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8145 field.write(writer)?;
8152 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8153 (0, forward_info, required),
8154 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8155 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8156 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8157 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8160 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8162 (0, htlc_id, required),
8163 (2, err_packet, required),
8168 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8169 (0, payment_secret, required),
8170 (2, expiry_time, required),
8171 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8172 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8173 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8176 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8178 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8179 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8180 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8181 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8182 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8183 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8187 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8188 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8190 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8192 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8194 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8195 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8196 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8199 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8201 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8202 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8203 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8204 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8207 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8208 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8210 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8211 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8212 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8213 unfunded_channels += 1;
8218 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8220 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8223 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8224 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8225 channel.write(writer)?;
8232 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8233 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8234 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8235 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8236 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8237 for forward in pending_forwards {
8238 forward.write(writer)?;
8243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8245 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8246 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8247 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8249 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8250 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8251 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8252 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8253 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8254 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8255 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8256 htlc.write(writer)?;
8258 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8259 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8262 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8263 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8264 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8265 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8266 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8267 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8268 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8271 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8272 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8273 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8274 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8275 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8277 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8278 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8279 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8280 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8281 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8282 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8283 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8288 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8289 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8290 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8291 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8292 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8293 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8294 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8295 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8296 0u64.write(writer)?;
8298 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8299 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8300 event.write(writer)?;
8304 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8305 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8306 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8307 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8308 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8309 0u64.write(writer)?;
8311 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8312 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8313 // likely to be identical.
8314 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8315 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8317 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8318 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8319 hash.write(writer)?;
8320 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8323 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8324 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8325 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8326 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8327 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8330 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8331 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8333 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8334 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8335 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8336 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8339 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8340 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8344 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8345 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8346 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8348 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8349 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8350 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8356 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8357 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8358 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8359 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8362 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8363 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8364 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8365 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8366 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8369 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8370 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8371 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8372 if !updates.is_empty() {
8373 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8374 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8379 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8380 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8381 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8382 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8383 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8384 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8385 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8386 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8387 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8388 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8389 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8390 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8391 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8398 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8399 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8400 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8401 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8404 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8405 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8406 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8407 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8408 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8409 // check that the event is sane here.
8410 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8411 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8412 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8413 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8419 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8420 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8421 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8422 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8423 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8424 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8427 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8428 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8429 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8430 events.push_back((ev, action));
8431 } else if action.is_some() {
8432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8439 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8440 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8441 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8442 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8443 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8444 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8447 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8449 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8451 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8452 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8453 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8454 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8455 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8456 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8457 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8458 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8459 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8460 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8461 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8462 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8463 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8465 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8466 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8468 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8469 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8471 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8472 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8473 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8474 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8475 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8476 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8478 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8479 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8481 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8482 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8483 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8484 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8485 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8490 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8491 pub entropy_source: ES,
8493 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8494 pub node_signer: NS,
8496 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8497 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8499 pub signer_provider: SP,
8501 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8503 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8504 pub fee_estimator: F,
8505 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8507 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8508 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8509 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8510 pub chain_monitor: M,
8512 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8513 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8514 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8515 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8516 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8517 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8519 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8521 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8522 /// deserialization.
8524 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8525 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8526 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8528 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8529 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8531 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8532 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8533 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8534 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8536 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8539 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8540 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8543 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8544 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8546 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8548 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8549 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8550 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8551 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8555 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8556 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8557 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8558 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8559 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8561 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8562 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8567 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8568 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8569 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8570 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8572 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8573 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8574 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8575 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8576 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8581 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8582 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8583 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8587 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8588 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8590 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8591 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8592 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8593 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8594 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8595 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8599 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8600 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8602 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8603 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8604 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8606 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8608 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8609 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8610 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8611 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8612 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8613 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8614 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8615 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8616 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8617 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8619 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8620 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8621 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8622 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8623 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8624 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8625 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8626 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8627 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8628 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8629 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8630 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8631 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8632 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8633 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8634 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8637 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8638 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8639 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8640 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8641 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8642 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8643 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8645 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8646 let mut found_htlc = false;
8647 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8648 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8651 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8652 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8653 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8654 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8655 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8656 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8657 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8658 log_info!(args.logger,
8659 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8660 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), &payment_hash);
8661 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8665 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8666 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8667 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8668 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8669 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8671 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8672 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8674 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8676 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8677 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8680 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8681 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8682 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8686 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8687 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8688 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8689 // safely discard the channel.
8690 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8691 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8692 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8693 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8694 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8695 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8696 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8699 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8700 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8701 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8702 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8703 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8704 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8708 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8709 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8710 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8711 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8712 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8713 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8714 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8716 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8720 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8721 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8722 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8723 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8724 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8725 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8726 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8727 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8728 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8730 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8733 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8734 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8735 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8736 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8737 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8738 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8739 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8740 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8742 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8745 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8748 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8749 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8750 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8751 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8752 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8753 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8754 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8756 is_connected: false,
8760 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8761 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8762 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8763 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8765 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8766 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8767 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8770 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8772 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8773 for _ in 0..event_count {
8774 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8775 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8780 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8781 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8782 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8784 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8785 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8786 // on-startup monitor updates.
8787 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8788 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8794 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8795 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8798 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8799 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8800 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8801 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8805 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8806 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8807 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8808 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8809 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8810 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8811 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8813 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8814 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8818 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8819 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8820 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8821 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8822 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8823 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8824 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8825 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8826 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8827 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8828 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8829 let mut events_override = None;
8830 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8831 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8832 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8833 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8834 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8835 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8836 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8837 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8838 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8839 (8, events_override, option),
8840 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8841 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8842 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8843 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8845 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8846 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8849 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8850 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8853 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8854 pending_events_read = events;
8857 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8858 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8861 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8862 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8863 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8864 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8865 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8866 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8868 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8870 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8871 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8872 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8875 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8876 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8877 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8878 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8879 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8881 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8882 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8883 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8885 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8886 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8887 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8888 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8889 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8891 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8892 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8893 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8894 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8895 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8896 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8897 pending_background_events.push(
8898 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8899 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8900 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8901 update: update.clone(),
8904 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8905 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8906 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8907 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8908 pending_background_events.push(
8909 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8910 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8911 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8914 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8915 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8918 max_in_flight_update_id
8922 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8923 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8924 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8925 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8926 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8928 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8929 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8930 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8931 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8932 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8933 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8934 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8935 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8936 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8939 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8940 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8941 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8942 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8943 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8944 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8945 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8946 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8947 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8948 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8949 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8954 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8955 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8956 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8957 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8958 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8959 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8961 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8963 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8964 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8965 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8967 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8968 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8969 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8970 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8971 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8972 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8973 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8974 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8979 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8980 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8982 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8983 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8984 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8985 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8988 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8989 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8990 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8991 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8992 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8993 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8994 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8996 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8997 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8998 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8999 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9000 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9001 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9002 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9006 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9007 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9008 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9009 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9011 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9012 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9013 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9016 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9017 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9018 retry_strategy: None,
9019 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9020 payment_params: None,
9021 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9022 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9023 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9024 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9025 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9026 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9027 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9028 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9029 total_msat: path_amt,
9030 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9032 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9033 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9038 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9040 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9041 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9042 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9043 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9045 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9046 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9047 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9048 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9049 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9050 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9051 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9052 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9053 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9054 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9055 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9060 !forwards.is_empty()
9062 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9063 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9064 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9065 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9066 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9067 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9068 intercepted_id != ev_id
9075 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9076 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9077 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9078 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9079 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9080 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9081 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9082 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9083 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9084 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9085 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9087 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9088 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9089 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9091 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9092 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9093 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9100 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9101 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9103 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9105 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9106 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9107 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9108 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9109 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9110 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9111 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9112 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9113 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9116 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9117 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9118 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9119 // channel still live case here.
9123 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9124 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9129 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9130 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9131 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9132 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9133 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9134 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9135 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9136 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9140 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9141 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9143 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9144 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9145 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9146 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9148 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9149 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9150 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9152 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9153 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9155 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9156 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9158 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9161 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9162 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9163 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9165 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9169 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9170 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9171 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9172 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9173 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9175 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9176 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9177 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9178 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9179 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9180 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9181 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9182 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9184 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9185 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9189 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9191 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9193 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9194 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9196 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9197 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9202 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9203 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9205 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9207 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9209 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9210 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9211 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9212 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9216 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9217 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9220 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9221 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9222 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9224 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9225 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9226 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9228 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9229 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9230 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9231 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9232 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9233 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9235 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9236 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9237 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9238 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9239 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9240 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9246 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9248 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9249 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9250 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9251 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9252 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9253 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9254 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9255 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9256 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9257 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9258 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9260 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9261 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9263 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9264 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9265 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9266 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9268 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9269 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9270 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9271 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9273 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9274 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9275 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9276 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9278 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9279 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9280 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9283 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9284 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9287 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9288 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9291 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9294 purpose: payment.purpose,
9295 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9296 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9297 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9303 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9304 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9305 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9306 for action in actions.iter() {
9307 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9308 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9309 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9311 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9312 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9313 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9314 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9316 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9317 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9318 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9319 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9325 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9327 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9332 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9334 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9335 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9336 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9337 router: args.router,
9339 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9341 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9342 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9343 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9344 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9346 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9347 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9348 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9349 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9350 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9351 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9353 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9358 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9360 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9362 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9363 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9364 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9365 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9366 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9367 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9369 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9370 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9371 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9373 logger: args.logger,
9374 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9377 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9378 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9379 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9380 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9381 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9384 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9385 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9386 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9387 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9388 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9389 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9392 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9393 //connection or two.
9395 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9401 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9402 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9403 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9404 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9405 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9406 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9407 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9408 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9409 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9410 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9411 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9412 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9413 use crate::util::test_utils;
9414 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9415 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9418 fn test_notify_limits() {
9419 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9420 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9424 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9426 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9427 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9428 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9429 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9430 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9432 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9434 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9435 // to connect messages with new values
9436 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9437 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9438 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9439 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9440 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9441 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9443 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9444 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9445 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9446 // ... but the last node should not.
9447 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9448 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9449 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9450 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9452 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9453 // about the channel.
9454 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9455 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9456 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9458 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9460 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9461 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9462 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9463 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9464 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9465 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9467 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9468 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9469 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9471 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9472 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9473 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9474 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9475 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9476 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9478 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9479 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9480 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9481 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9482 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9483 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9484 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9485 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9487 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9488 // the channel info has updated.
9489 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9490 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9491 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9492 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9493 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9494 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9498 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9499 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9505 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9507 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9508 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9509 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9510 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9512 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9513 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9514 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9515 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9516 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9517 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9518 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9519 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9521 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9523 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9525 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9526 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9527 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9529 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9530 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9531 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9532 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9535 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9536 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9539 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9540 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9541 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9542 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9543 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9544 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9545 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9546 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9547 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9549 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9550 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9551 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9553 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9555 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9557 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9558 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9559 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9560 // lightning messages manually.
9561 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9562 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9565 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9566 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9567 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9568 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9570 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9571 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9573 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9574 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9576 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9577 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9578 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9580 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9581 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9582 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9584 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9586 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9588 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9589 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9592 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9593 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9594 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9597 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9598 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9599 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9600 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9602 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9605 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9606 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9607 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9608 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9615 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9616 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9617 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9620 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9621 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9622 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9623 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9624 // fails as expected.
9625 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9626 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9627 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9628 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9629 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9630 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9633 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9634 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9636 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9638 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9639 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9641 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9642 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9643 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9645 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9646 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9647 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9648 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9650 let route = find_route(
9651 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9652 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9654 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9655 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9657 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9659 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9660 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9663 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9664 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9665 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9667 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9669 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9671 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9672 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9673 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9674 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9675 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9677 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9679 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9680 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9682 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9683 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9684 let route = find_route(
9685 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9686 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9688 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9689 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9691 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9693 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9694 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9695 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9697 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9698 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9699 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9700 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9702 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9704 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9705 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9708 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9712 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9713 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9714 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9715 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9716 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9717 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9718 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9719 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9720 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9722 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9725 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9726 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9727 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9728 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9730 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9732 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9733 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9734 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9736 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9737 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9738 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9739 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9741 let route = find_route(
9742 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9743 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9745 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9746 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9747 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9751 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9752 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9759 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9760 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9761 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9762 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9763 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9764 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9765 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9767 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9769 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9774 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9775 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9776 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9782 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9783 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9785 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9786 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9787 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9788 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9790 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9791 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9792 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9793 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9794 let route = find_route(
9795 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9796 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9799 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9800 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9801 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9802 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9803 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9804 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9807 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9808 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9809 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9810 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9811 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9812 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9813 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9815 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9819 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9820 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9821 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9822 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9823 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9826 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9827 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9829 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9830 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9832 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9833 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9834 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9835 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9837 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9838 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9839 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9840 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9841 let route = find_route(
9842 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9843 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9846 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9847 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9848 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9849 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9850 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9851 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9852 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9853 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9856 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9857 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9858 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9859 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9860 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9861 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9862 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9864 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9868 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9872 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9874 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9875 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9876 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9877 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9879 // Marshall an MPP route.
9880 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9881 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9882 route.paths.push(path);
9883 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9884 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9885 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9886 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9887 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9888 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9890 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9891 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9893 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9894 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9896 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9901 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9905 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9907 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9909 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9910 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9912 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9913 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9915 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9918 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9919 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9920 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9921 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9922 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9923 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9926 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9929 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9930 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9935 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9936 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9937 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9938 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9939 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9942 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9943 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9945 total_msat: 100_000,
9948 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9949 // payment verification fails as expected.
9950 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9951 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9952 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9953 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9955 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9959 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9960 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9964 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9965 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9966 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9967 // the channel is successfully closed.
9968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9973 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9974 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9975 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9976 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9977 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9979 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9980 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9982 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9983 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9984 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9985 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9988 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9990 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9991 // as it has the funding transaction.
9992 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9993 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9994 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9997 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9999 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10001 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10003 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10004 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10005 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10007 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10010 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10011 // as it has the funding transaction.
10012 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10013 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10014 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10017 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10018 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10020 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10021 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10022 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10023 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10025 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10026 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10027 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10028 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10030 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10031 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10033 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10034 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10035 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10036 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10037 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10038 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10039 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10043 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10044 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10045 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10046 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10047 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10048 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10049 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10052 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10054 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10055 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10056 // closing transaction).
10057 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10058 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10059 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10061 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10062 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10063 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10064 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10065 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10068 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10070 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10072 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10073 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10074 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10076 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10078 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10079 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10082 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10083 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10084 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10087 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10088 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10089 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10092 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10094 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10095 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10097 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10098 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10100 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10101 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10106 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10107 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10108 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10109 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10110 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10111 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10112 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10116 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10117 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10118 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10120 // Test the API functions.
10121 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10123 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10125 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10127 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10129 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10131 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10133 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10137 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10138 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10144 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10146 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10147 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10149 let mut funding_tx = None;
10150 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10151 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10152 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10155 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10156 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10157 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10158 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10159 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10161 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10163 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10165 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10167 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10169 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10171 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10174 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10175 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10176 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10177 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10178 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10180 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10181 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10183 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10184 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10185 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10186 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10187 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10188 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10189 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10192 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10193 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10194 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10195 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10196 }, true).unwrap_err();
10198 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10199 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10200 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10201 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10202 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10203 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10204 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10206 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10207 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10209 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10210 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10211 }, true).unwrap_err();
10213 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10214 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10215 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10216 }, false).unwrap();
10217 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10219 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10220 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10222 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10223 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10224 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10225 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10226 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10228 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10229 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10230 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10232 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10233 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10234 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10236 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10237 // "protected" and can connect again.
10238 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10239 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10240 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10242 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10244 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10246 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10247 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10251 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10252 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10258 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10260 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10261 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10263 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10264 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10265 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10266 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10269 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10271 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10272 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10273 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10275 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10276 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10277 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10279 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10280 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10281 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10282 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10286 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10287 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10288 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10291 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10292 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10294 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10296 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10298 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10299 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10301 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10302 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10303 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10304 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10305 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10306 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10309 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10310 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10312 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10313 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10317 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10318 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10321 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10322 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10323 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10324 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10325 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10327 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10328 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10330 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10331 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10332 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10333 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10337 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10339 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10340 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10342 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10343 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10344 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10346 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10347 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10351 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10355 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10356 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10357 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10358 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10359 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10360 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10361 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10362 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10364 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10365 payment_metadata: None,
10366 keysend_preimage: None,
10367 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10368 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10370 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10372 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10373 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10374 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10375 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10376 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10378 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10379 } else { panic!(); }
10381 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10382 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10384 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10385 payment_metadata: None,
10386 keysend_preimage: None,
10387 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10388 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10390 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10392 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10393 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10397 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10398 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10399 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10400 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10401 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10403 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10404 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10409 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10410 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10412 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10413 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10416 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10417 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10418 match &msg_events[0] {
10419 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10420 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10422 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10423 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10424 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10427 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10430 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10431 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10433 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10434 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10437 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10441 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10442 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10443 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10444 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10447 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10448 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10449 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10453 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10454 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10455 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10457 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10458 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10460 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10461 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10463 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10466 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10467 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10469 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10470 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10472 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10473 // not have generated any events.
10474 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10478 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10479 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10480 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10481 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10482 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10484 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10485 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10487 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10488 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10491 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10492 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10493 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10494 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10497 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10498 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10501 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10502 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10505 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10506 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10507 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10508 ..Default::default()
10510 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10511 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10512 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10514 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10515 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10518 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10519 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10520 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10521 ..Default::default()
10523 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10525 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10526 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10528 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10529 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10532 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10533 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10534 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10535 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10536 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10539 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10540 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10541 ..Default::default()
10543 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10546 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10548 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10553 fn test_payment_display() {
10554 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10555 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10556 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10557 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10558 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10559 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10565 use crate::chain::Listen;
10566 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10567 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10568 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10569 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10570 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10571 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10572 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10573 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10574 use crate::util::test_utils;
10575 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10577 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10578 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10579 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10581 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10583 use criterion::Criterion;
10585 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10586 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10587 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10588 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10589 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10590 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10591 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10593 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10594 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10596 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10597 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10599 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10601 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10604 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10605 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10608 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10609 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10610 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10612 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10613 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10615 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10616 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10617 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10618 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10619 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10621 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10622 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10623 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10625 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10626 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10627 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10628 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10630 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10631 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10632 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10634 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10635 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10636 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10637 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10638 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10640 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10641 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10642 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10644 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10645 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10647 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10648 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10649 }, false).unwrap();
10650 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10651 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10652 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10655 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10656 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10657 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10659 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10660 } else { panic!(); }
10662 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10663 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10664 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10665 match events_b[0] {
10666 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10667 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10672 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10673 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10674 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10675 match events_a[0] {
10676 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10677 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10682 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10684 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10685 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10686 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10688 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10689 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10690 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10691 match msg_events[0] {
10692 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10693 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10694 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10698 match msg_events[1] {
10699 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10703 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10704 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10705 match events_a[0] {
10706 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10707 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10709 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10712 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10713 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10714 match events_b[0] {
10715 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10716 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10721 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10722 macro_rules! send_payment {
10723 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10724 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10725 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10726 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10727 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10728 payment_count += 1;
10729 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10730 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10732 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10733 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10734 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10735 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10736 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10737 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10738 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10739 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10740 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10741 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10742 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10744 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10745 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10746 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10747 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10749 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10751 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10752 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10753 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10755 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10758 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10759 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10760 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10761 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10763 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10767 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10768 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10769 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);