1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
350 err: LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
355 shutdown_finish: None,
359 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
360 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
363 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
365 err: LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
375 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
379 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
385 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
389 log_level: Level::Warn,
392 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 shutdown_finish: None,
412 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
413 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
414 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
415 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
416 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
418 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
419 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
420 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
421 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
422 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
424 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
426 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
430 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
431 struct ClaimingPayment {
433 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
434 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
437 (0, amount_msat, required),
438 (2, payment_purpose, required),
439 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
442 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
443 struct ClaimablePayments {
444 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
445 /// failed/claimed by the user.
447 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
448 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
450 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
451 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
452 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
455 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
456 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
457 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
460 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
461 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
462 /// quite some time lag.
463 enum BackgroundEvent {
464 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction.
466 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
470 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
471 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
472 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
473 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
474 /// event can be generated.
475 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
476 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
477 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
480 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
481 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
482 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
485 /// State we hold per-peer.
486 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
487 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
489 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
490 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
492 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
493 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
494 latest_features: InitFeatures,
495 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
496 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
497 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
498 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
499 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
501 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
502 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
503 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
504 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
506 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
507 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
508 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
509 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
510 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
511 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
512 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
513 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
514 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
515 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
519 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
520 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
521 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
522 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
523 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
524 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
527 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
531 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
532 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
534 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
537 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
538 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
539 struct PendingInboundPayment {
540 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
541 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
542 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
543 /// this payment being removed.
545 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
546 user_payment_id: u64,
547 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
548 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
549 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
552 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
553 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
554 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
555 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
556 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
557 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
558 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
560 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
561 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
569 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
571 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
576 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
577 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
578 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
579 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
580 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
581 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
582 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
583 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
585 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
586 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
588 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
589 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
591 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
592 /// to individual Channels.
594 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
595 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
596 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
597 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
599 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
600 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
601 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
602 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
603 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
604 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
605 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
607 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
608 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
609 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
610 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
613 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
614 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
615 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
616 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
617 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
619 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
620 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
621 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
622 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
623 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
626 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
627 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
628 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
629 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
630 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
634 // `total_consistency_lock`
636 // |__`forward_htlcs`
638 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
640 // |__`per_peer_state`
642 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
644 // | |__`claimable_payments`
646 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
652 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
654 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
658 // | |__`pending_events`
660 // | |__`pending_background_events`
662 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
664 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
666 ES::Target: EntropySource,
667 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
668 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
673 default_configuration: UserConfig,
674 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
675 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
683 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
685 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
686 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
688 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
689 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
690 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
691 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
693 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
694 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
696 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
697 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
698 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
699 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
700 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
701 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
702 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
703 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
705 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
707 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
708 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
710 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
712 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
713 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
714 /// and via the classic SCID.
716 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
717 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
721 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
723 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
724 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
725 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
730 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
731 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
736 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
737 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
738 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
739 /// active channel list on load.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
744 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
746 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
747 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
748 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
750 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
751 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
752 /// the handling of the events.
754 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
755 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
758 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
759 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
760 /// would break backwards compatability.
761 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
762 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
763 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
768 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
770 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
771 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
772 /// confirmation depth.
774 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
775 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
776 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
778 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
780 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
782 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
784 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
786 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
788 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
789 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
790 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
792 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
793 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
795 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
796 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
797 /// keeping additional state.
798 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
800 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
801 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
802 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
803 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
805 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
806 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
808 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
809 /// are currently open with that peer.
811 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
812 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
815 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
817 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
818 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
819 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
821 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
824 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
826 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
827 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
828 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
829 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
830 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
831 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
832 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
833 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
835 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
844 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
846 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
847 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
848 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
849 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
850 pub struct ChainParameters {
851 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
852 pub network: Network,
854 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
856 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
857 pub best_block: BestBlock,
860 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
866 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
867 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
868 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
869 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
870 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
871 /// updates are ready for persistence).
873 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
874 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
875 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
876 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
877 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
879 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
880 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
883 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
884 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
885 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
888 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
889 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
891 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
892 persistence_notifier: notifier,
893 should_persist: persist_check,
894 _read_guard: read_guard,
899 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
901 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
902 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
907 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
908 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
910 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
912 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
913 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
914 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
915 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
916 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
918 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
919 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
921 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
923 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
924 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
925 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
926 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
927 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
928 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
929 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
930 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
931 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
932 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
933 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
934 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
935 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
937 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
938 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
940 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
941 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
942 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
943 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
945 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
946 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
947 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
948 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
949 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
950 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
953 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
955 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
956 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
959 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
961 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
962 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
964 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
965 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
966 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
967 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
969 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
972 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
973 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
974 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
975 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
976 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
977 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
978 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
979 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
982 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
983 /// to better separate parameters.
984 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
985 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
986 /// The node_id of our counterparty
987 pub node_id: PublicKey,
988 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
989 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
990 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
991 pub features: InitFeatures,
992 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
993 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
994 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
996 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
998 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
999 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1000 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1001 /// payments to us through this channel.
1002 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1003 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1004 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1005 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1006 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1007 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1008 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1011 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1012 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1013 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1014 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1015 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1016 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1017 /// lifetime of the channel.
1018 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1019 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1020 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1021 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1022 /// our counterparty already.
1024 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1025 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1026 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1027 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1029 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1030 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1031 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1032 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1034 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1035 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1037 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1038 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1040 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1041 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1042 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1043 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1044 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1045 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1046 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1047 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1048 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1051 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1053 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1054 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1055 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1056 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1057 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1058 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1059 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1061 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1062 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1066 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1067 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1068 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1069 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1070 /// this value on chain.
1072 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1074 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1076 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1077 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1078 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1079 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1081 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1082 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1083 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1084 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1086 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1087 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1088 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1089 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1091 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1092 pub balance_msat: u64,
1093 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1094 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1095 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1096 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1098 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1100 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1101 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1102 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1103 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1104 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1105 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1106 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1107 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1109 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1110 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1111 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1112 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1113 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1114 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1115 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1117 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1118 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1119 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1120 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1121 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1122 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1123 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1124 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1125 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1127 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1129 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1130 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1131 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1132 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1133 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1135 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1136 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1137 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1138 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1139 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1140 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1141 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1143 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1144 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1145 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1146 pub is_outbound: bool,
1147 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1148 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1149 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1150 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1151 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1153 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1154 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1155 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1156 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1158 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1159 pub is_usable: bool,
1160 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1161 pub is_public: bool,
1162 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1163 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1164 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1165 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1166 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1167 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1169 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1170 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1173 impl ChannelDetails {
1174 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1175 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1176 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1178 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1179 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1180 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1181 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1184 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1185 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1186 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1188 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1189 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1190 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1191 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1195 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1196 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1197 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1198 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1199 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1201 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1203 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1204 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1205 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1208 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1209 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1210 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1212 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1213 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1214 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1216 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1217 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1218 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1220 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1225 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1227 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1229 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1230 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1231 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1232 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1234 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1235 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1236 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1239 macro_rules! handle_error {
1240 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1243 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1244 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1245 // entering the macro.
1246 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1247 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1249 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1251 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1252 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1253 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1254 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1258 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1259 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1260 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1261 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1266 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1267 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1269 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1270 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1271 action: err.action.clone()
1275 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1276 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1277 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1278 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1279 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1283 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1290 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1291 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1292 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1293 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1294 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1295 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1297 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1298 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1299 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1300 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1301 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1303 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1304 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1306 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1310 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1311 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1312 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1314 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1315 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1317 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1318 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1320 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1321 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1322 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1323 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1324 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1325 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1331 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1332 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1336 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1338 $entry.remove_entry();
1346 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1347 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1351 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1353 $entry.remove_entry();
1361 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1362 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1364 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1365 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1371 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1375 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1376 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1377 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1378 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1381 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1382 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1383 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1384 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1385 match $action_type {
1386 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1387 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1389 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1390 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1392 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1393 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1394 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1395 if !$resend_commitment {
1396 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1399 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1401 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1402 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1404 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1410 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1412 $entry.remove_entry();
1416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1417 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1418 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1420 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1421 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1423 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1424 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1426 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1427 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1429 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1430 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1434 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1435 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1436 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1437 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1438 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1440 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1441 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1442 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1443 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1444 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1445 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1446 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1447 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1448 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1449 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1454 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1455 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1456 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1458 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1459 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1460 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1461 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1462 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1463 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1466 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1471 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1472 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1473 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1474 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1475 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1476 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1477 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1478 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1479 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1480 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1481 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1483 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1484 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1485 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1491 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1492 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1494 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1495 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1496 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1497 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1498 updates.announcement_sigs);
1499 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1500 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1503 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1504 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1506 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1508 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1509 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1511 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1512 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1513 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1514 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1519 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1520 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1521 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1522 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1523 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1525 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1526 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1527 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1530 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1531 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1532 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1533 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1534 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1535 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1536 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1537 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1541 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1542 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1543 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1544 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1545 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1547 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
1553 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1554 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1558 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1560 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1561 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1562 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1563 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1564 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1565 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1569 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1571 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1572 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1574 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1576 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1577 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1578 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1579 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1580 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1581 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1582 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1583 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1585 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1586 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1587 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1592 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1594 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1595 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1596 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1597 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1598 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1599 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1600 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1601 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1606 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1607 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1609 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1611 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1613 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1615 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1616 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1617 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1618 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1628 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1629 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1630 &self.default_configuration
1633 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1634 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1635 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1638 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1639 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1641 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1643 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1647 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1652 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1654 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1655 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1656 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1657 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1658 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1660 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1661 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1663 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1664 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1665 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1667 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1668 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1669 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1670 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1671 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1672 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1674 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1675 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1676 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1677 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1678 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1679 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1683 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1684 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1688 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1689 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1691 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1693 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1694 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1695 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1696 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1697 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1698 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1702 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1707 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1709 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1710 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1713 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1715 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1722 node_id: their_network_key,
1725 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1728 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1729 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1730 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1731 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1732 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1733 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1734 // the same channel.
1735 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1739 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1742 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1743 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1744 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1745 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1746 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1747 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1748 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1749 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1750 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1751 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1752 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1753 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1754 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1755 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1756 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1757 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1758 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1759 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1760 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1762 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1763 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1764 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1765 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1766 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1767 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1768 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1769 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1770 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1771 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1772 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1773 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1774 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1775 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1776 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1777 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1778 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1779 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1780 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1781 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1782 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1783 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1784 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1785 config: Some(channel.config()),
1793 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1794 /// more information.
1795 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1796 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1799 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1800 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1802 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1803 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1806 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1807 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1808 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1809 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1810 // really wanted anyway.
1811 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1814 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1815 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1817 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1818 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1819 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1821 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1822 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1823 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1824 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1825 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1826 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1827 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1828 total_msat: *total_msat,
1831 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1832 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1834 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1835 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1837 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1842 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1843 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1844 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1845 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1846 Some(transaction) => {
1847 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1851 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1852 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1853 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1854 reason: closure_reason
1858 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1861 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1862 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1865 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1866 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1872 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1873 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1875 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1876 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1877 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1878 let (result, is_permanent) =
1879 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1881 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1886 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1887 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1891 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1892 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1893 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1894 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1898 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1906 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1907 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1908 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1909 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1912 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1916 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1917 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1918 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1920 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1921 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1923 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1924 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1925 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1926 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1928 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1931 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1932 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1933 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1934 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1937 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1938 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1939 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1941 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1942 /// the channel being closed or not:
1943 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1944 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1945 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1946 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1947 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1948 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1949 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1951 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1953 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1954 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1955 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1956 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1957 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1961 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1962 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1963 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1964 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1965 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1966 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1967 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1968 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1970 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1971 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1972 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1973 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1974 // ignore the result here.
1975 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1979 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1980 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1981 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1982 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1984 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1985 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1987 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1988 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1990 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1991 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1993 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1995 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1997 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2000 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2001 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2002 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2003 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2004 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2009 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2012 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2014 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2015 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2016 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2017 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2018 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2019 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2020 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2021 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2022 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2023 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2034 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2035 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2036 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2038 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2039 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2040 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2043 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2044 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2045 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2047 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2048 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2049 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2050 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2051 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2054 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2055 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2056 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2057 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2058 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2062 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2063 /// local transaction(s).
2064 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2065 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2066 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2070 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2071 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2073 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2074 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2075 return Err(ReceiveError {
2076 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2078 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2081 // final_expiry_too_soon
2082 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2083 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2085 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2086 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2087 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2088 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2089 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2090 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2091 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2092 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2093 return Err(ReceiveError {
2094 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2095 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2098 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2099 return Err(ReceiveError {
2101 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2102 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2106 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2107 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2109 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2110 err_data: Vec::new(),
2111 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2114 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2115 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2121 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2122 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2124 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2125 phantom_shared_secret,
2127 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2128 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2129 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2130 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2131 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2132 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2133 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2134 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2135 return Err(ReceiveError {
2136 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2137 err_data: Vec::new(),
2138 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2142 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2144 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2147 return Err(ReceiveError {
2148 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2149 err_data: Vec::new(),
2150 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2155 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2158 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2159 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2160 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2161 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2165 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2166 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2167 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2169 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2170 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2171 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2172 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2173 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2174 failure_code: $err_code,
2180 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2181 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2184 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2185 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2186 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2188 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2189 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2190 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2191 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2192 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2193 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2194 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2195 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2197 macro_rules! return_err {
2198 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2200 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2201 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2202 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2203 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2204 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2205 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2211 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2213 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2214 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2216 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2217 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2221 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2222 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2224 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2226 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2227 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2228 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2229 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2230 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2232 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2235 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2236 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2237 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2239 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2240 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2241 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2244 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2246 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2247 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2251 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2252 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2253 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2256 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2257 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2258 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2259 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2260 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2265 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2266 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2267 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2268 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2269 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2270 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2271 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2272 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2273 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2274 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2275 // phantom or an intercept.
2276 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2277 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2278 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2282 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2285 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2287 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2289 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2290 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2291 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2295 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2297 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2298 // have no consistency guarantees.
2299 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2303 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2304 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2305 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2306 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2307 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2309 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2310 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2311 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2312 // we don't have the channel here.
2313 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2315 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2317 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2318 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2319 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2320 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2321 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2322 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2323 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2325 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2326 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2328 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2329 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2333 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2334 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2335 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2336 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2338 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2345 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2346 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2347 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2348 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2349 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2350 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2352 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2353 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2355 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2356 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2357 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2358 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2359 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2360 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2361 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2362 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2363 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2364 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2370 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2371 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2372 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2373 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2375 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2376 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2378 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2379 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2380 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2382 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2383 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2384 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2385 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2386 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2387 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2388 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2392 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2397 pending_forward_info
2400 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2401 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2402 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2404 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2405 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2406 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2407 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2408 if !chan.should_announce() {
2409 return Err(LightningError {
2410 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2411 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2414 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2415 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2418 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2421 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2422 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2423 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2424 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2426 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2427 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2428 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2429 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2431 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2432 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2436 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2438 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2440 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2442 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2443 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2445 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2446 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2447 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2448 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2449 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2450 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2451 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2452 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2454 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2455 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2456 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2458 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2460 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2466 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2467 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2469 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2470 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2472 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2473 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2474 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2475 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2476 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2478 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2482 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2483 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2484 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2485 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2489 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2490 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2493 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2494 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2495 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2498 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2499 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2501 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2502 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2504 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2505 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2506 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2509 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2510 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2511 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2513 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2514 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2516 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2517 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2518 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2519 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2520 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2521 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2522 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2523 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2524 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2525 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2527 _ => unreachable!(),
2530 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2532 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2533 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2534 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2535 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2536 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2537 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2547 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2548 // `channel_by_id` map.
2549 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2550 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2555 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2556 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2558 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2563 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2565 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2566 /// fields for more info.
2568 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2569 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2571 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2573 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2574 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2575 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2576 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2577 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2579 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2580 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2581 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2582 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2583 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2585 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2586 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2587 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2588 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2590 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2592 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2593 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2594 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2596 /// In general, a path may raise:
2597 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2598 /// node public key) is specified.
2599 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2600 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2602 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2603 /// relevant updates.
2605 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2606 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2607 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2609 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2611 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2612 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2613 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2614 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2615 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2617 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2618 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2619 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2621 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2622 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2623 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2624 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2625 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2626 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2627 self.pending_outbound_payments
2628 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2629 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2630 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2633 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2634 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2635 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2636 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2637 self.pending_outbound_payments
2638 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2639 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2640 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2641 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2642 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2646 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2648 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2649 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2650 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2654 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2656 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2660 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2661 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2662 /// retries are exhausted.
2664 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2665 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2667 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2668 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2669 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2671 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2672 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2674 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2675 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2676 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2678 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2681 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2682 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2683 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2684 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2685 /// never reach the recipient.
2687 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2688 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2690 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2691 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2693 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2695 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2696 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2697 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2698 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2699 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2701 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2702 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2705 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2706 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2708 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2711 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2712 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2713 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2714 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2715 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2716 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2718 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2719 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2722 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2723 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2724 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2725 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2726 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2727 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2728 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2729 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2732 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2735 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2736 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2739 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2740 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2741 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2742 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2743 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2746 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2754 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2756 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2757 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2758 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2759 } else { unreachable!(); })
2762 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2765 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2766 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2769 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2770 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2775 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2776 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2781 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2784 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2785 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2786 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2795 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2796 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2797 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2801 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2803 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2804 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2806 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2807 /// across the p2p network.
2809 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2810 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2812 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2813 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2814 /// keys per-channel).
2816 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2817 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2818 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2820 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2821 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2822 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2824 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2825 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2826 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2827 /// for more details.
2829 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2830 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2831 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2834 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2835 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2837 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2842 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2843 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2844 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2845 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2846 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2847 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2852 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2853 let mut output_index = None;
2854 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2855 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2856 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2857 if output_index.is_some() {
2858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2859 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2862 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2864 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2867 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2870 if output_index.is_none() {
2871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2872 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2875 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2879 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2881 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2882 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2883 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2884 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2886 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2887 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2889 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2890 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2892 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2894 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2895 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2896 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2897 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2898 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2899 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2900 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2901 pub fn update_channel_config(
2902 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2903 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2904 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2905 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2906 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2911 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2915 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2916 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2917 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2918 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2919 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2920 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2921 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2925 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2926 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2927 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2930 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2931 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2932 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2934 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2942 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2943 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2945 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2946 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2948 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2949 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2950 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2951 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2952 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2954 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2955 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2957 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2960 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2961 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2962 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2963 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2964 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2967 let next_hop_scid = {
2968 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2969 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2970 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2971 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2972 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2973 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2975 if !chan.is_usable() {
2976 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2977 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2980 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2982 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2983 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2988 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2989 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2990 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2993 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2994 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2995 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2997 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2999 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3000 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3003 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3004 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3005 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3006 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3007 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3009 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3013 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3014 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3016 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3019 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3020 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3023 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3024 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3025 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3028 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3029 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3030 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3031 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3032 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3033 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3034 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3037 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3038 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3039 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3040 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3045 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3047 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3048 /// Will likely generate further events.
3049 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3050 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3052 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3053 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3054 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3056 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3057 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3059 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3060 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3061 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3063 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3064 match forward_info {
3065 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3066 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3067 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3068 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3069 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3072 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3073 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3074 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3076 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3077 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3078 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3079 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3080 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3081 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3084 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3085 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3087 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3090 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3091 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3097 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3098 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3100 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3104 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3105 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3107 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3111 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3112 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3113 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3114 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3115 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3117 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3118 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3119 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3120 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3121 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3123 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3125 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3126 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3131 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3132 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3133 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3139 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3142 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3145 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3146 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3147 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3148 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3149 // problem, not ours.
3155 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3156 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3158 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3163 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3164 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3165 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3172 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3176 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3177 match forward_info {
3178 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3179 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3180 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3181 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3182 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3186 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3187 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3188 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3189 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3191 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3192 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3194 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3195 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3196 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3198 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3201 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3203 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3204 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3205 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3206 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3211 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3212 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3214 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3216 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3217 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3219 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3222 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3224 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3225 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3226 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3235 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3236 match forward_info {
3237 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3238 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3239 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3240 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3243 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3244 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3245 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3246 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3248 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3249 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3251 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3254 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3255 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3256 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3257 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3258 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3259 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3260 phantom_shared_secret,
3262 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3264 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3269 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3270 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3271 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3272 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3273 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3275 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3276 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3277 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3278 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3279 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3280 phantom_shared_secret,
3282 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3283 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3287 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3288 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3289 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3290 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3291 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3294 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3295 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3296 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3298 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3299 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3300 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3303 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3304 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3305 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3308 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3309 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3310 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3311 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3317 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3318 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3319 total_value += htlc.value;
3320 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3321 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3322 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3324 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3325 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3327 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3329 _ => unreachable!(),
3332 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3334 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3335 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3336 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3337 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3338 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3339 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3340 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3343 amount_msat: total_value,
3344 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3345 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3347 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3349 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3350 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3352 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3354 payment_claimable_generated
3358 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3359 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3360 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3361 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3362 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3363 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3364 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3365 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3367 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3368 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3369 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3370 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3371 Ok(result) => result,
3373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3378 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3379 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3380 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3382 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3389 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3390 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3391 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3395 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3397 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3398 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3399 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3400 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3401 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3403 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3405 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3406 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3411 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3417 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3418 if payment_data.is_none() {
3419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3420 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3423 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3424 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3426 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3427 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3429 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3430 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3432 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3433 if payment_claimable_generated {
3434 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3440 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3441 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3449 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3450 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3451 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3452 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3453 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3454 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3456 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3457 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3459 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3461 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3462 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3463 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3465 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3467 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3468 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3469 events.append(&mut new_events);
3472 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3474 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3475 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3477 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3478 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3479 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3480 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3481 if background_events.is_empty() {
3485 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3487 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3488 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3489 // monitor updating completing.
3490 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3497 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3498 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3499 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3500 self.process_background_events();
3503 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3504 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3505 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3506 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3508 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3509 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3511 if !chan.is_live() {
3512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3513 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3514 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3517 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3519 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3520 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3524 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3525 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3526 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3527 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3528 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3529 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3530 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3532 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3535 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3536 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3537 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3538 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3539 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3540 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3548 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3550 /// This currently includes:
3551 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3552 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3553 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3555 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3556 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3557 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3559 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3560 /// estimate fetches.
3561 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3562 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3563 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3564 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3566 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3568 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3569 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3570 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3573 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3576 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3577 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3578 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3579 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3580 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3582 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3583 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3584 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3585 if needs_close { return false; }
3588 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3590 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3591 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3592 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3593 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3594 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3595 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3599 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3600 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3602 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3604 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3608 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3609 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3614 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3618 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3619 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3624 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3625 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3626 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3627 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3628 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3629 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3630 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3631 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3632 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3633 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3634 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3636 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3637 // have no channels to the peer.
3638 let remove_entry = {
3639 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3640 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3643 entry.remove_entry();
3646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3651 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3652 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3653 // This should be unreachable
3654 debug_assert!(false);
3657 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3658 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3659 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3660 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3662 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3663 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3664 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3666 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3673 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3674 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3675 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3676 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3677 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3680 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3681 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3684 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3686 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3687 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3688 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3689 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3690 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3697 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3698 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3699 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3701 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3702 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3703 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3704 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3706 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3707 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3708 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3709 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3710 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3711 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3714 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3715 /// reason for the failure.
3717 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3718 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3721 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3722 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3723 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3724 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3725 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3726 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3727 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3732 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3733 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3734 match failure_code {
3735 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3736 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3737 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3738 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3739 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3740 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3745 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3746 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3748 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3750 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3751 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3752 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3753 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3754 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3755 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3756 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3758 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3760 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3761 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3763 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3768 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3769 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3770 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3771 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3772 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3773 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3774 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3775 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3776 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3777 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3779 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3780 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3781 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3782 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3784 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3785 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3786 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3787 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3788 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3792 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3793 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3794 // be surfaced to the user.
3795 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3796 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3797 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3799 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3801 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3804 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3805 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3806 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3810 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3813 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3814 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3815 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3820 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3821 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3822 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3823 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3824 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3825 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3826 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3827 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3828 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3831 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3832 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3833 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3836 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3837 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3838 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3840 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3841 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3845 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3847 let mut forward_event = None;
3848 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3849 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3850 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3852 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3854 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3857 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3860 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3862 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3863 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3864 time_forwardable: time
3867 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3868 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3869 failed_next_destination: destination,
3875 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3876 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3878 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3879 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3880 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3882 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3883 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3884 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3885 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3887 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3888 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3889 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3890 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3891 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3892 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3893 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3898 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3899 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3900 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3901 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3902 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3903 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3904 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3905 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3910 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3911 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3912 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3914 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3915 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3916 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3917 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3922 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3924 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3925 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3926 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3927 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3928 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3930 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3931 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3933 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3934 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3935 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3936 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3937 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3939 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3940 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3941 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3942 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3944 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3945 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3946 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3953 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3954 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3962 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3967 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3968 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3969 debug_assert!(false);
3974 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3975 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3976 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3977 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3978 if sources.len() != 1 {
3979 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3980 debug_assert!(false);
3986 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3988 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3989 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3990 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3991 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3994 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3995 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3996 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3997 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4001 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4002 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4003 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4004 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4006 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4007 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4008 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4009 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4010 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4015 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4016 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4017 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4018 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4019 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4020 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4021 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4023 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4026 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4027 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4028 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4029 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4033 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4034 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4035 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4036 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4038 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4039 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4041 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4042 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4046 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4047 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4048 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4052 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
4054 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4055 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4056 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4057 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4058 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4059 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4061 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4062 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4063 payment_preimage, e);
4064 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4065 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4066 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4067 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4068 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4071 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4072 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4073 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4074 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4075 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4076 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4077 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4078 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4079 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4080 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4086 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4087 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4088 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4094 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4095 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4096 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4098 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4099 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4100 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4101 // again on restart.
4102 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4103 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4104 payment_preimage, e);
4107 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4109 chan.remove_entry();
4111 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4112 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4113 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4114 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4118 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4119 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4120 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4124 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4125 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4126 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4127 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4128 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4129 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4130 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4131 // again on restart.
4132 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4133 payment_preimage, update_res);
4135 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4136 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4137 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4138 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4139 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4140 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4141 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4142 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4147 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4148 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4151 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4153 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4154 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4156 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4157 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4158 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4159 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4160 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4161 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4162 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4165 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4166 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4168 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4170 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4176 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4177 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4178 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4184 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4185 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4186 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4189 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4190 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4192 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4193 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4194 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4195 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4196 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4200 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4201 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4207 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4208 /// update completion.
4209 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4210 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4211 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4212 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4213 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4214 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4216 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4217 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4218 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4219 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4220 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4221 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4223 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4225 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4226 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4227 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4228 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4231 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4232 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4234 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4236 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4241 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4243 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4244 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4251 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4252 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4253 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4254 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4255 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4260 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4264 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4270 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4271 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4272 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4278 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4281 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4282 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4284 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4285 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4286 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4287 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4288 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4294 let mut peer_state_lock;
4295 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4296 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4297 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4298 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4300 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4305 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4306 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4307 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4310 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4313 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4315 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4316 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4319 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4320 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4321 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4323 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4324 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4325 /// used to accept such channels.
4327 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4329 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4330 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4333 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4334 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4336 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4337 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4338 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4340 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4341 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4343 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4344 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4346 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4347 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4349 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4350 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4351 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4352 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4355 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4359 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4360 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4362 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4363 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4365 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4366 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4369 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4370 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4371 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4372 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4378 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4379 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4382 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4383 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4384 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4388 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4394 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4395 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4399 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4403 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4404 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4405 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4407 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4409 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4411 debug_assert!(false);
4412 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4414 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4415 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4416 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4417 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4418 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4421 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4426 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4428 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4432 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4433 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4434 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4436 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4437 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4438 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4441 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4442 pending_events.push(
4443 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4444 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4445 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4446 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4447 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4448 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4453 entry.insert(channel);
4459 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4460 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4462 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4464 debug_assert!(false);
4465 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4471 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4472 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4477 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4478 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4479 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4480 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4481 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4483 user_channel_id: user_id,
4488 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4490 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4492 debug_assert!(false);
4493 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4495 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4496 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4499 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4501 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4506 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4507 // lock before watch_channel
4508 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4510 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4511 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4512 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4513 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4514 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4515 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4516 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4517 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4518 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4519 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4522 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4523 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4524 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4525 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4526 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4527 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4528 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4531 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4532 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4533 // the channel above.
4534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4536 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4541 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4542 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4545 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4546 funding_msg.channel_id))
4548 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4549 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4552 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4553 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4557 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4565 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4571 debug_assert!(false);
4572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4579 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4580 Ok(update) => update,
4581 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4583 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4584 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4586 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4587 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4588 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4589 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4590 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4591 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4592 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4598 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4599 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4606 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4607 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4611 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4612 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4613 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4615 debug_assert!(false);
4616 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4618 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4620 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4622 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4623 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4624 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4627 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4628 msg: announcement_sigs,
4630 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4631 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4632 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4633 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4634 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4635 // announcement_signatures.
4636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4637 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4638 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4639 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4645 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4653 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4654 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4655 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4657 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4659 debug_assert!(false);
4660 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4664 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4667 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4668 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4669 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4670 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4673 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4674 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4676 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4677 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4678 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4679 let (result, is_permanent) =
4680 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4682 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4687 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4688 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4689 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4696 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4699 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4700 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4701 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4705 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4709 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4713 debug_assert!(false);
4714 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4716 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4717 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4718 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4719 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4721 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4722 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4729 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4730 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4731 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4732 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4733 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4734 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4735 } else { (tx, None) }
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4740 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4741 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4742 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4744 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4752 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4757 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4758 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4759 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4760 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4762 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4763 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4764 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4765 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4767 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4771 debug_assert!(false);
4772 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4779 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4780 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4781 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4782 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4783 match pending_forward_info {
4784 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4785 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4786 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4787 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4789 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4790 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4791 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4792 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4793 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4796 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4798 _ => pending_forward_info
4801 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4803 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4808 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4809 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4810 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4811 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4813 debug_assert!(false);
4814 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4816 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4817 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4818 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4825 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4829 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4831 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4833 debug_assert!(false);
4834 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4838 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4840 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4847 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4849 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4851 debug_assert!(false);
4852 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4856 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4858 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4859 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4860 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4862 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4869 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4871 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4873 debug_assert!(false);
4874 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4878 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4880 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4881 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4882 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4883 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4884 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4885 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4886 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4891 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4892 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4896 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4897 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4898 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4900 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4901 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4902 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4903 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4904 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4905 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4906 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4907 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4909 commitment_signed: msg,
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4920 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4921 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4922 let mut forward_event = None;
4923 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4924 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4925 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4926 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4927 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4928 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4929 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4930 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4932 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4933 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4935 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4936 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4937 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4939 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4940 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4943 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4944 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4946 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4947 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4948 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4950 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4951 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4952 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4953 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4954 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4957 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4958 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4961 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4962 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4963 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4964 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4965 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4966 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4967 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4970 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4971 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4972 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4977 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4978 // payments are being processed.
4979 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4980 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4982 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4983 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4990 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4991 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4994 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4995 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4996 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4999 match forward_event {
5001 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5002 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5003 time_forwardable: time
5011 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5012 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5017 debug_assert!(false);
5018 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5024 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5025 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5026 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5027 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5028 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
5029 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5030 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5031 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5032 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5033 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5034 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5035 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5037 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5038 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5039 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5040 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5041 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5042 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5044 } else { unreachable!(); }
5046 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5047 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5048 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5052 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5053 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5054 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5055 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5056 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5057 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5062 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5064 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5065 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5067 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5068 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5069 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5071 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5072 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5079 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5081 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5083 debug_assert!(false);
5084 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5086 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5087 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5088 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5090 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5097 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5099 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5101 debug_assert!(false);
5102 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5108 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5112 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5113 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5114 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5115 msg, &self.default_configuration
5117 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5118 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5119 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5127 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5128 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5129 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5130 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5132 // It's not a local channel
5133 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5137 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5138 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5139 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5143 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5145 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5146 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5147 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5148 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5149 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5150 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5154 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5155 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5156 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5157 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5159 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5160 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5165 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5168 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5170 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5173 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5175 debug_assert!(false);
5176 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5180 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5182 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5183 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5184 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5185 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5186 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5187 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5188 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5189 let mut channel_update = None;
5190 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5191 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5192 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5195 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5196 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5197 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5198 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5199 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5200 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5201 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5206 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5207 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5208 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5209 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5210 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5219 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5220 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5223 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5224 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5229 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5230 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5231 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5232 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5233 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5234 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5235 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5236 match monitor_event {
5237 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5238 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5240 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5243 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5244 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5245 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5248 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5249 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5250 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5251 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5253 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5254 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5255 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5256 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5259 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5261 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5264 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5265 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5266 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5267 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5268 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5273 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5274 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5276 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5278 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5279 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5280 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5282 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5289 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5290 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5296 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5297 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5300 has_pending_monitor_events
5303 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5304 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5305 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5307 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5308 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5311 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5312 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5313 /// update was applied.
5314 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5315 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5316 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5317 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5321 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5324 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5325 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5326 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5327 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5328 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5330 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5332 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5335 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5336 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5337 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5339 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5340 updates: commitment_update,
5344 has_monitor_update = true;
5345 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5346 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5347 if close_channel { return false; }
5354 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5355 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5356 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5364 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5365 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5366 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5369 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5370 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5376 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5377 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5378 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5379 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5380 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5381 let mut has_update = false;
5383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5385 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5388 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5389 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5390 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5391 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5392 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5394 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5395 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5398 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5399 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5400 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5401 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5407 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5409 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5410 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5411 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5417 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5418 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5426 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5427 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5433 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5434 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5436 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5437 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5438 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5439 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5440 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5441 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5442 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5443 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5444 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5445 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5446 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5447 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5448 assert!(should_broadcast);
5449 } else { unreachable!(); }
5450 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5452 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5456 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5457 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5459 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5463 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5466 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5467 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5469 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5470 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5471 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5472 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5473 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5474 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5475 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5476 // never fail a payment too early.
5477 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5479 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5487 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5490 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5491 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5493 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5494 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5495 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5496 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5498 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5500 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5501 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5505 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5506 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5508 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5510 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5511 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5513 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5514 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5515 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5516 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5517 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5518 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5519 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5520 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5521 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5522 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5523 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5526 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5527 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5529 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5532 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5534 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5536 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5537 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5538 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5539 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5540 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5543 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5544 /// stored external to LDK.
5546 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5547 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5548 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5550 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5551 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5554 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5555 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5556 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5557 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5559 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5560 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5561 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5562 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5563 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5565 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5566 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5567 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5568 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5569 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5571 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5572 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5574 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5575 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5579 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5580 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5582 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5584 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5585 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5587 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5588 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5589 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5590 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5591 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5592 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5593 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5596 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5597 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5599 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5602 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5604 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5606 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5607 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5610 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5611 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5613 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5614 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5615 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5618 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5619 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5621 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5622 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5623 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5624 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5626 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5627 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5628 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5629 Some(_) => continue,
5630 None => return scid_candidate
5635 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5637 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5638 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5640 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5641 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5642 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5646 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5647 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5648 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5650 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5651 /// times to get a unique scid.
5652 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5653 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5654 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5656 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5657 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5658 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5659 return scid_candidate
5663 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5664 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5665 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5666 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5668 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5669 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5672 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5673 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5674 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5675 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5684 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5685 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5686 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5687 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5688 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5692 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5693 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5694 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5699 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5700 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5701 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5705 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5706 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5710 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5711 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5714 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5715 /// using the given event handler.
5717 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5718 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5721 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5722 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5723 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5725 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5727 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5728 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5729 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5730 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5733 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5734 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5735 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5738 for event in pending_events {
5739 handler(event).await;
5742 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5743 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5748 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5750 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5751 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5752 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5753 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5754 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5759 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5760 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5761 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5762 /// is always placed next to each other.
5764 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5765 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5766 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5767 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5769 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5770 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5771 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5772 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5773 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5774 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5775 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5777 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5778 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5779 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5780 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5783 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5784 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5786 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5787 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5790 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5792 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5795 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5796 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5800 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5801 events.replace(pending_events);
5810 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5812 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5813 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5814 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5815 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5816 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5817 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5821 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5823 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5824 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5825 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5827 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5829 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5830 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5831 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5832 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5835 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5836 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5837 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5840 for event in pending_events {
5841 handler.handle_event(event);
5849 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5851 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5855 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5860 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5862 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5863 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5864 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5865 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5866 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5869 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5870 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5873 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5875 let new_height = height - 1;
5877 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5878 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5879 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5880 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5881 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5882 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5885 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5891 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5893 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5894 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5895 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5900 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5901 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5902 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5903 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5905 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5906 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5909 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5910 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5912 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5913 if height < last_best_block_height {
5914 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5915 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5919 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5920 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5921 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5922 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5924 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5925 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5929 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5931 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5933 macro_rules! max_time {
5934 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5936 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5937 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5938 // having an explicit local time source.
5939 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5940 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5941 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5942 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5943 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5949 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5950 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5951 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5952 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5956 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5957 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5958 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5961 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5962 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5963 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5970 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5972 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5973 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5974 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5975 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5976 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5977 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5993 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5994 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5996 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5997 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5998 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5999 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6000 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6002 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6003 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6005 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6006 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6009 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6010 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6011 let res = f(channel);
6012 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6013 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6014 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6015 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6016 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6018 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6019 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6020 if channel.is_usable() {
6021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6024 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6029 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6033 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6035 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6036 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6037 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6038 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6039 msg: announcement_sigs,
6041 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6042 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6043 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6045 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6046 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6047 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6052 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6053 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6054 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6055 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6056 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6057 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6058 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6059 // is always consistent.
6060 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6061 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6062 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6063 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6064 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6067 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6068 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6069 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6070 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6071 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6072 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6073 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6077 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6078 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6080 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6081 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6082 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6083 data: reason_message,
6093 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6094 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6095 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6096 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6097 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6098 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6099 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6100 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6101 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6102 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6104 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6105 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6106 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6110 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6113 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6114 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6115 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6116 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6117 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6118 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6120 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6121 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6124 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6125 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6126 _ => unreachable!(),
6128 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6129 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6130 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6131 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6137 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6139 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6140 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6144 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6145 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6146 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6147 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6149 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6151 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6152 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6153 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6154 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6155 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6156 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6159 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6160 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6161 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6163 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6164 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6165 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6166 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6169 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6170 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6171 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6172 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6173 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6177 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6178 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6181 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6182 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6183 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6184 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6187 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6188 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6189 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6190 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6193 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6194 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6196 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6197 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6198 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6199 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6200 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6203 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6204 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6205 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6206 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6209 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6210 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6211 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6212 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6215 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6216 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6217 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6218 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6223 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6225 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6227 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6228 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6229 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6234 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6304 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6310 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6311 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6314 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6319 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6324 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6327 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6329 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6330 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6331 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6334 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6335 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6336 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6337 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6338 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6339 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6344 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6349 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6369 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6370 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6371 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6375 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6377 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6379 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6380 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6384 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6385 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6386 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6390 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6392 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6395 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6396 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6398 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6399 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6400 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6401 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6402 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6407 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6408 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6409 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6410 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6417 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6418 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6419 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6420 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6421 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6422 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6423 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6424 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6425 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6426 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6431 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6432 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6437 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6438 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6439 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6440 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6441 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6450 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6454 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6458 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6460 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6461 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6462 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6463 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6464 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6466 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6467 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6468 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6472 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6474 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6475 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6478 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6479 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6480 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6481 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6489 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6490 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6494 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6495 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6498 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6499 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6503 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6504 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6505 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6506 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6509 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6510 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6512 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6513 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6514 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6515 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6516 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6519 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6520 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6521 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6522 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6525 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6526 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6527 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6528 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6531 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6532 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6533 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6534 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6535 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6536 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6537 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6538 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6539 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6540 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6541 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6542 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6543 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6544 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6545 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6546 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6547 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6548 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6550 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6551 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6552 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6558 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6559 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6561 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6562 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6563 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6564 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6567 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6568 (2, node_id, required),
6569 (4, features, required),
6570 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6571 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6572 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6573 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6576 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6577 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6578 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6579 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6580 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6581 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6582 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6583 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6584 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6585 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6586 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6587 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6588 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6589 (7, self.config, option),
6590 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6591 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6592 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6593 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6594 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6595 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6596 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6597 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6598 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6599 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6600 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6601 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6602 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6603 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6604 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6605 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6606 (32, self.is_public, required),
6607 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6608 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6609 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6615 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6616 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6617 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6618 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6619 (2, channel_id, required),
6620 (3, channel_type, option),
6621 (4, counterparty, required),
6622 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6623 (6, funding_txo, option),
6624 (7, config, option),
6625 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6626 (9, confirmations, option),
6627 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6628 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6629 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6630 (16, balance_msat, required),
6631 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6632 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6633 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6634 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6635 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6636 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6637 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6638 (26, is_outbound, required),
6639 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6640 (30, is_usable, required),
6641 (32, is_public, required),
6642 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6643 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6644 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6647 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6648 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6649 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6650 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6651 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6655 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6657 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6658 outbound_scid_alias,
6662 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6663 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6665 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6666 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6667 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6668 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6669 confirmations_required,
6671 force_close_spend_delay,
6672 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6673 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6674 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6675 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6676 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6677 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6682 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6683 (2, channels, vec_type),
6684 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6685 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6688 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6690 (0, onion_packet, required),
6691 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6694 (0, payment_data, required),
6695 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6696 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6698 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6699 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6700 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6704 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6705 (0, routing, required),
6706 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6707 (4, payment_hash, required),
6708 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6709 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6710 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6714 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6715 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6717 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6719 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6720 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6721 reason.write(writer)?;
6723 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6724 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6727 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6728 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6729 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6730 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6737 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6738 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6739 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6743 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6744 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6749 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6750 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6751 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6752 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6753 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6756 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6757 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6758 // messages contained in the variants.
6759 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6760 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6761 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6763 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6765 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6766 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6767 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6770 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6771 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6772 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6773 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6774 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6776 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6786 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6787 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6788 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6789 (2, outpoint, required),
6790 (4, htlc_id, required),
6791 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6794 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6795 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6796 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6797 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6798 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6800 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6801 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6802 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6803 (2, self.value, required),
6804 (4, payment_data, option),
6805 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6806 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6812 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6813 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6814 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6816 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6817 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6818 let mut total_msat = None;
6819 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6820 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6821 (0, prev_hop, required),
6822 (1, total_msat, option),
6823 (2, value, required),
6824 (4, payment_data, option),
6825 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6826 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6828 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6830 if payment_data.is_some() {
6831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6833 if total_msat.is_none() {
6834 total_msat = Some(value);
6836 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6839 if total_msat.is_none() {
6840 if payment_data.is_none() {
6841 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6843 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6845 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6849 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6852 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6859 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6860 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6861 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6865 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6866 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6867 let mut payment_id = None;
6868 let mut payment_secret = None;
6869 let mut payment_params = None;
6870 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6871 (0, session_priv, required),
6872 (1, payment_id, option),
6873 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6874 (3, payment_secret, option),
6875 (4, path, vec_type),
6876 (5, payment_params, option),
6878 if payment_id.is_none() {
6879 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6881 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6883 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6884 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6885 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6886 path: path.unwrap(),
6887 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6892 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6893 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6898 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6901 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6903 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6904 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6905 (0, session_priv, required),
6906 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6907 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6908 (3, payment_secret, option),
6909 (4, *path, vec_type),
6910 (5, payment_params, option),
6913 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6915 field.write(writer)?;
6922 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6923 (0, forward_info, required),
6924 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6925 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6926 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6927 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6930 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6932 (0, htlc_id, required),
6933 (2, err_packet, required),
6938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6939 (0, payment_secret, required),
6940 (2, expiry_time, required),
6941 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6942 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6943 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6946 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6948 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6949 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6950 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6951 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6952 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6953 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6958 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6960 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6962 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6964 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6965 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6966 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6969 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6973 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6974 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6977 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6978 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6980 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6981 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6982 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6983 unfunded_channels += 1;
6988 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6990 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6993 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6994 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6995 channel.write(writer)?;
7002 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7003 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7004 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7005 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7006 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7007 for forward in pending_forwards {
7008 forward.write(writer)?;
7013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7015 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7016 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7017 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7019 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7020 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7021 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7022 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7023 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7024 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7025 htlc.write(writer)?;
7027 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7030 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7031 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7032 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7033 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
7036 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7037 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7038 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7039 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7040 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7042 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7043 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7044 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7045 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7046 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7047 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7048 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7053 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7054 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7055 for event in events.iter() {
7056 event.write(writer)?;
7059 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7060 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7061 for event in background_events.iter() {
7063 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7065 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7066 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7071 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7072 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7073 // likely to be identical.
7074 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7075 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7077 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7078 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7079 hash.write(writer)?;
7080 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7083 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7084 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7085 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7086 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7087 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7090 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7091 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7093 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7094 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7095 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7096 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7099 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7100 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7104 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7105 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7106 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7108 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7109 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7110 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7116 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7117 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7118 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7119 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7122 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7123 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7124 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7125 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7126 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7128 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7131 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7132 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7133 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7134 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7135 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7136 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7137 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7138 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7139 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7140 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7147 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7149 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7151 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7152 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7153 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7154 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7155 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7156 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7157 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7158 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7159 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7160 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7161 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7162 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7163 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7165 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7166 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7168 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7169 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7171 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7172 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7173 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7174 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7175 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7176 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7178 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7179 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7181 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7182 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7183 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7185 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7186 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7190 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7191 pub entropy_source: ES,
7193 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7194 pub node_signer: NS,
7196 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7197 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7199 pub signer_provider: SP,
7201 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7203 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7204 pub fee_estimator: F,
7205 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7207 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7208 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7209 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7210 pub chain_monitor: M,
7212 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7213 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7214 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7215 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7216 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7217 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7219 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7221 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7222 /// deserialization.
7224 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7225 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7226 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7228 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7229 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7231 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7232 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7233 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7234 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7236 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7239 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7240 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7243 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7244 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7255 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7256 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7257 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7258 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7259 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7261 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7262 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7267 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7268 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7269 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7270 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7272 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7276 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7281 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7282 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7283 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7287 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7288 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7290 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7292 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7294 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7299 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7300 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7302 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7308 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7310 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7311 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7312 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7313 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7314 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7315 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7316 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7318 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7319 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7320 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7321 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7322 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7323 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7324 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7325 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7326 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7327 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7328 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7329 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7330 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7331 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7332 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7333 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7334 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7335 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7336 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7337 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7338 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7339 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7340 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7341 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7342 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7343 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7344 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7345 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7346 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7347 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7348 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7349 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7351 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7352 let mut found_htlc = false;
7353 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7354 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7357 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7358 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7359 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7360 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7361 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7362 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7363 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7364 log_info!(args.logger,
7365 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7366 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7367 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7371 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7372 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7373 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7375 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7376 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7378 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7380 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7381 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7384 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7385 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7386 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7390 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7391 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7392 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7393 // safely discard the channel.
7394 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7395 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7396 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7397 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7398 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7401 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7402 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7403 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7404 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7410 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7411 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7412 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7413 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7417 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7418 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7420 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7421 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7422 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7423 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7424 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7425 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7427 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7430 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7432 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7433 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7436 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7437 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7439 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7442 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7444 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7445 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let peer_state = PeerState {
7447 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7448 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7449 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7450 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7451 is_connected: false,
7453 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7456 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7458 for _ in 0..event_count {
7459 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7460 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7465 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7467 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7468 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7469 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7470 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7474 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7475 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7479 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7480 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7485 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7487 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7488 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7489 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7491 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7493 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7498 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7499 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7500 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7501 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7502 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7503 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7504 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7505 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7506 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7507 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7508 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7509 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7510 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7511 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7512 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7513 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7514 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7515 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7516 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7517 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7519 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7520 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7523 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7524 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7527 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7528 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7529 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7530 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7531 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7532 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7534 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7536 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7537 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7538 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7539 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7540 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7541 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7542 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7544 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7545 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7546 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7547 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7548 if path.is_empty() {
7549 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7552 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7553 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7554 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7555 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7557 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7558 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7559 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7562 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7563 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7564 retry_strategy: None,
7565 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7566 payment_params: None,
7567 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7568 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7570 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7571 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7572 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7573 total_msat: path_amt,
7574 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7576 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7577 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7582 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7583 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7584 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7585 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7586 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7588 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7589 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7590 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7591 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7592 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7593 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7594 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7595 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7596 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7597 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7598 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7603 !forwards.is_empty()
7605 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7606 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7607 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7608 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7609 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7610 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7611 intercepted_id != ev_id
7623 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7624 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7625 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7626 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7627 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7628 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7629 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7630 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7634 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7635 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7637 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7638 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7639 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7640 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7642 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7643 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7646 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7647 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7648 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7649 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7650 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7652 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7653 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7654 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7655 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7656 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7657 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7658 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7659 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7661 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7666 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7668 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7670 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7671 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7673 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7677 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7678 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7680 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7681 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7684 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7686 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7688 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7689 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7690 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7695 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7696 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7699 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7700 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7701 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7703 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7704 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7705 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7707 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7708 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7709 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7710 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7711 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7712 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7714 if chan.is_usable() {
7715 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7716 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7717 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7718 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7719 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7725 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7727 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7728 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7729 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7730 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7731 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7732 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7733 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7734 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7735 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7736 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7737 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7739 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7740 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7742 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7743 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7744 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7745 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7747 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7748 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7749 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7750 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7752 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7753 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7754 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7755 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7757 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7758 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7762 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7763 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7766 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7767 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7770 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7773 purpose: payment_purpose,
7774 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7780 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7781 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7782 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7784 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7785 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7789 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7791 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7792 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7793 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7794 router: args.router,
7796 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7798 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7799 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7800 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7801 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7803 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7804 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7805 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7806 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7807 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7808 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7810 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7815 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7817 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7819 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7820 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7821 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7822 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7824 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7825 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7826 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7828 logger: args.logger,
7829 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7832 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7833 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7834 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7835 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7836 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7839 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7840 //connection or two.
7842 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7848 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7849 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7850 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7851 use core::time::Duration;
7852 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7853 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7854 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7855 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7856 use crate::ln::msgs;
7857 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7858 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7859 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7860 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7861 use crate::util::test_utils;
7862 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7863 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7866 fn test_notify_limits() {
7867 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7868 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7872 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7874 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7875 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7876 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7877 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7878 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7880 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7882 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7883 // to connect messages with new values
7884 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7885 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7886 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7887 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7889 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7890 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7891 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7892 // ... but the last node should not.
7893 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7894 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7895 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7896 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7898 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7899 // about the channel.
7900 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7901 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7902 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7907 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7908 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7909 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7910 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7911 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7917 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7918 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7919 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7920 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7921 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7922 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7924 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7925 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7926 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7928 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7930 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7931 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7933 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7934 // the channel info has updated.
7935 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7937 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7939 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7940 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7944 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7945 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7951 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7953 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7954 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7955 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7956 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7958 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7959 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7960 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7961 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7962 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7963 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7965 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7966 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7967 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7969 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7970 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7972 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7974 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7975 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7976 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7978 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7979 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7982 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7983 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7984 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7985 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7986 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7987 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7988 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7989 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7990 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7992 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7993 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7997 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7999 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8000 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8001 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8002 // lightning messages manually.
8003 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8004 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8007 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8012 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8014 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8017 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8019 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8021 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8022 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8023 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8027 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8029 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8033 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8034 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8038 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8039 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8040 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8041 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8046 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8047 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8048 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8049 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8051 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8054 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8055 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8056 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8057 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8064 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8065 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8066 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8067 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8068 // fails as expected.
8069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8074 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8075 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8077 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8078 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8079 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8081 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8082 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8083 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8084 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8085 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8087 let route = find_route(
8088 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8089 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8091 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8093 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8094 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8095 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8096 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8097 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8100 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8101 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8105 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8106 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8107 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8108 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8109 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8111 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8113 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8115 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8116 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8118 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8119 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8120 let route = find_route(
8121 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8122 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8124 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8126 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8128 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8129 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8130 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8132 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8133 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8134 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8136 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8138 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8139 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8144 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8146 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8147 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8148 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8149 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8150 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8151 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8152 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8153 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8154 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8156 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8157 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8161 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8162 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8163 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8167 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8169 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8170 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8172 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8173 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8174 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8175 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8176 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8178 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8179 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8180 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8181 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8182 let route = find_route(
8183 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8184 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8187 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8188 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8189 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8190 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8193 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8194 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8195 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8197 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8199 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8201 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8205 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8206 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8210 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8212 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8213 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8215 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8216 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8217 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8218 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8219 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8221 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8222 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8223 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8224 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8225 let route = find_route(
8226 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8227 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8230 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8231 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8232 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8233 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8234 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8237 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8238 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8239 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8240 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8241 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8242 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8243 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8245 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8249 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8253 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8255 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8256 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8257 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8258 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8260 // Marshall an MPP route.
8261 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8262 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8263 route.paths.push(path);
8264 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8265 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8266 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8267 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8268 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8269 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8271 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8272 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8273 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8274 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8279 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8285 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8287 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8288 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8290 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8291 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8293 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8296 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8297 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8298 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8299 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8300 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8301 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8304 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8307 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8308 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8313 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8314 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8318 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8320 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8321 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8323 total_msat: 100_000,
8326 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8327 // payment verification fails as expected.
8328 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8329 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8330 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8331 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8333 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8337 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8338 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8342 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8343 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8344 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8345 // the channel is successfully closed.
8346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8349 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8351 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8352 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8353 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8354 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8355 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8357 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8358 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8360 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8361 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8363 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8366 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8368 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8369 // as it has the funding transaction.
8370 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8371 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8372 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8374 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8377 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8381 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8382 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8383 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8385 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8386 // as it has the funding transaction.
8387 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8388 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8389 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8392 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8393 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8395 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8396 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8397 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8399 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8400 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8401 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8404 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8405 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8407 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8408 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8409 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8410 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8411 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8412 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8413 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8415 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8416 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8417 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8418 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8419 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8420 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8421 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8424 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8426 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8427 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8428 // closing transaction).
8429 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8430 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8433 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8434 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8435 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8436 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8437 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8440 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8444 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8445 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8446 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8448 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8454 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8455 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8456 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8459 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8460 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8461 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8464 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8466 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8467 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8469 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8470 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8472 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8473 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8478 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8479 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8480 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8481 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8482 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8483 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8484 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8488 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8489 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8490 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8492 // Test the API functions.
8493 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8495 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8497 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8499 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8501 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8503 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8505 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8510 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8511 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8512 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8513 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8514 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8515 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8516 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8517 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8518 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8519 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8520 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8522 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8523 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8524 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8526 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8527 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8529 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8530 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8532 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8535 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8536 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8538 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8539 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8545 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8547 use crate::chain::Listen;
8548 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8549 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8550 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8551 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8552 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8553 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8554 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8555 use crate::util::test_utils;
8556 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8557 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8559 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8560 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8561 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8563 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8567 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8568 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8569 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8570 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8571 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8572 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8573 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8574 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8579 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8580 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8583 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8584 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8585 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8587 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8588 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8590 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8591 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8592 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8593 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8594 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8596 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8597 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8599 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8600 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8601 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8602 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8604 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8606 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8608 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8609 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8610 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8611 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8612 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8614 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8616 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8618 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8619 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8620 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8621 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8622 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8625 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8626 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8627 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8629 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8630 } else { panic!(); }
8632 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8633 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8635 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8638 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8641 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8642 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8644 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8645 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8646 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8647 match msg_events[0] {
8648 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8649 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8650 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8654 match msg_events[1] {
8655 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8659 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8660 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8662 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8663 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8668 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8669 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8671 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8672 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8677 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8679 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8680 macro_rules! send_payment {
8681 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8682 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8683 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8684 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8685 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8686 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8687 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8688 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8689 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8690 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8692 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8693 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8695 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8696 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8698 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8699 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8700 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8701 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8702 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8703 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8704 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8705 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8707 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8708 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8709 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8710 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8712 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8713 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8714 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8715 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8716 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8718 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8721 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8722 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8723 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8724 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8726 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8731 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8732 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);