1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
138 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
139 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
142 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
145 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
146 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
149 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
150 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
152 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
153 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
154 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
160 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
161 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
164 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
165 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
168 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
173 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
174 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
175 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
176 short_channel_id: u64,
178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
179 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
181 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
182 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
187 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
189 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
190 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
191 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
194 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
197 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
198 struct ClaimableHTLC {
199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
201 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
203 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
204 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
205 sender_intended_value: u64,
206 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
208 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
209 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
210 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
211 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
217 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for PaymentId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
236 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
237 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
238 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
240 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
246 impl Readable for InterceptId {
247 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
248 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
253 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
254 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
255 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
256 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
257 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
260 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
263 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
264 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
267 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
271 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
272 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
273 (0, short_channel_id, required),
274 (2, htlc_id, required),
276 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
277 (0, session_priv, required),
282 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
286 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
289 session_priv: SecretKey,
290 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
291 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
292 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
293 payment_id: PaymentId,
296 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
297 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
298 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
302 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
307 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
308 payment_id.hash(hasher);
309 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
317 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
318 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
319 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
320 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
322 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
327 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
328 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
329 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
330 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
331 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
333 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339 struct ReceiveError {
345 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
346 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
348 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
349 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
350 pub enum FailureCode {
351 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
352 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
353 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
354 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
355 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
356 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
357 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
358 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
359 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
360 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
361 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
501 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
502 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
503 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
504 enum BackgroundEvent {
505 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
506 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
507 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
508 /// need the counterparty node_id.
510 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
511 /// are regenerated on startup.
512 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
513 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
514 /// channel to continue normal operation.
516 /// In general this should be used rather than
517 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
518 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
519 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
521 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
522 /// are regenerated on startup.
523 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
524 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
525 funding_txo: OutPoint,
526 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
531 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
532 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
533 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
534 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
535 /// event can be generated.
536 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
537 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
538 /// operation of another channel.
540 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
541 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
542 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
543 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
545 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
546 event: events::Event,
547 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
552 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
553 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
554 (0, event, upgradable_required),
555 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
556 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
557 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
558 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
559 // downgrades to prior versions.
560 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
564 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
565 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
566 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
567 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
568 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
571 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
572 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
573 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
574 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
578 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
579 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
580 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
581 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
582 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
583 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
585 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
586 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
587 channel_id: [u8; 32],
588 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
593 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
595 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
596 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
597 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
598 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
603 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
604 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
608 /// State we hold per-peer.
609 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
610 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
612 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
613 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
615 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
616 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
617 latest_features: InitFeatures,
618 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
619 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
620 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
621 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
622 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
624 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
625 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
626 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
627 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
629 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
630 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
631 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
632 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
633 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
634 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
635 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
636 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
637 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
638 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
639 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
640 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
641 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
642 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
643 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
647 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
648 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
649 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
650 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
651 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
652 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
655 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
659 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
660 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
662 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
665 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
666 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
667 struct PendingInboundPayment {
668 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
669 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
670 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
671 /// this payment being removed.
673 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
674 user_payment_id: u64,
675 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
676 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
677 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
680 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
681 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
682 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
683 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
684 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
685 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
686 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
687 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
689 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
690 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
698 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
700 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
701 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
702 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
707 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
708 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
709 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
710 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
711 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
712 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
713 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
714 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
715 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
717 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
718 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
720 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
721 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
722 $vis trait AChannelManager {
723 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
724 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
725 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
726 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
727 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
728 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
729 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
730 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
731 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
732 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
733 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
734 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
735 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
736 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
737 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
738 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
739 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
740 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
743 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
744 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
745 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
746 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
748 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
750 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
751 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
752 ES::Target: EntropySource,
753 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
754 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
759 type Watch = M::Target;
761 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
763 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
765 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
767 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
768 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
770 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
772 type Router = R::Target;
774 type Logger = L::Target;
776 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
779 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
780 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
782 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
783 /// to individual Channels.
785 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
786 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
787 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
788 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
790 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
791 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
792 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
793 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
794 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
795 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
796 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
798 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
799 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
800 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
802 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
803 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
804 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
805 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
806 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
808 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
809 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
810 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
811 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
813 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
814 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
815 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
817 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
818 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
819 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
820 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
821 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
823 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
824 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
825 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
826 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
827 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
828 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
829 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
830 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
833 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
834 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
835 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
836 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
837 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
841 // `total_consistency_lock`
843 // |__`forward_htlcs`
845 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
847 // |__`per_peer_state`
849 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
851 // | |__`claimable_payments`
853 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
859 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
861 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
865 // | |__`pending_events`
867 // | |__`pending_background_events`
869 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
871 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
872 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
873 ES::Target: EntropySource,
874 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
875 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
876 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
880 default_configuration: UserConfig,
881 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
882 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
888 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
890 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
892 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
893 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
895 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
896 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
897 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
898 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
900 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
901 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
903 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
904 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
905 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
906 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
907 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
908 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
909 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
910 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
912 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
914 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
915 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
917 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
919 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
920 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
921 /// and via the classic SCID.
923 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
924 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
926 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
930 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
931 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
932 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
934 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
935 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
937 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
938 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
940 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
941 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
943 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
944 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
945 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
946 /// active channel list on load.
948 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
949 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
951 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
953 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
954 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
955 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
957 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
958 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
959 /// the handling of the events.
961 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
962 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
965 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
966 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
967 /// would break backwards compatability.
968 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
969 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
970 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
972 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
973 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
975 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
977 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
978 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
979 /// confirmation depth.
981 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
982 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
983 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
987 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
989 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
991 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
993 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
995 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
996 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
997 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
999 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1000 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1002 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1003 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1004 /// keeping additional state.
1005 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1007 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1008 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1009 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1010 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1012 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1013 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1015 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1016 /// are currently open with that peer.
1018 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1019 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1022 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1024 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1025 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1026 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1027 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1028 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1030 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1031 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1032 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1033 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1034 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1036 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1037 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1039 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1040 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1041 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1042 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1044 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1045 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1046 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1047 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1048 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1050 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1052 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1054 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1055 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1056 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1057 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1058 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1059 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1060 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1061 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1062 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1065 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1067 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1071 signer_provider: SP,
1076 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1078 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1079 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1080 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1081 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1082 pub struct ChainParameters {
1083 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1084 pub network: Network,
1086 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1088 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1089 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1092 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1099 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1100 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1101 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1102 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1103 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1104 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1106 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1107 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1108 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1109 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1110 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1112 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1113 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1116 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1117 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1118 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1119 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1121 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1122 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1123 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1124 _read_guard: read_guard,
1129 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1130 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1131 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1132 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1134 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1135 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1136 should_persist: persist_check,
1137 _read_guard: read_guard,
1142 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1143 fn drop(&mut self) {
1144 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1145 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1150 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1151 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1153 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1155 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1156 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1157 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1158 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1159 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1161 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1162 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1164 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1166 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1167 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1168 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1169 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1170 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1171 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1172 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1173 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1174 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1175 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1176 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1177 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1178 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1180 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1181 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1183 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1184 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1185 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1186 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1188 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1189 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1190 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1191 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1192 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1193 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1196 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1198 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1199 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1202 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1204 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1205 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1207 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1208 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1209 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1210 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1212 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1213 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1214 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1216 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1217 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1218 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1220 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1221 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1222 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1223 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1225 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1226 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1227 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1229 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1230 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1231 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1233 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1234 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1235 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1236 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1237 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1238 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1239 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1240 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1241 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1242 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1243 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1246 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1247 /// to better separate parameters.
1248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1249 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1250 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1251 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1252 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1253 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1254 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1255 pub features: InitFeatures,
1256 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1257 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1258 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1260 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1262 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1263 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1264 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1265 /// payments to us through this channel.
1266 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1267 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1268 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1269 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1270 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1271 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1272 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1275 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1276 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1277 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1278 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1279 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1280 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1281 /// lifetime of the channel.
1282 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1283 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1284 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1285 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1286 /// our counterparty already.
1288 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1289 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1290 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1291 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1293 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1294 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1295 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1296 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1298 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1299 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1301 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1302 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1304 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1305 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1306 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1307 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1308 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1309 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1310 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1311 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1312 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1315 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1317 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1318 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1319 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1320 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1321 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1322 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1323 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1325 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1326 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1328 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1329 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1330 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1331 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1332 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1333 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1334 /// this value on chain.
1336 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1338 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1340 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1341 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1342 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1343 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1345 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1346 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1347 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1349 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1350 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1351 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1352 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1353 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1355 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1356 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1357 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1358 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1360 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1361 pub balance_msat: u64,
1362 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1363 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1364 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1365 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1367 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1369 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1370 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1371 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1372 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1373 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1374 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1375 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1376 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1378 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1379 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1380 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1381 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1382 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1383 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1384 /// route which is valid.
1385 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1386 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1387 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1388 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1389 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1390 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1392 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1393 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1394 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1395 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1396 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1397 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1398 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1399 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1400 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1402 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1404 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1405 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1406 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1407 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1408 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1410 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1411 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1412 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1413 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1414 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1415 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1416 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1418 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1419 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1420 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1421 pub is_outbound: bool,
1422 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1423 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1424 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1425 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1426 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1428 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1429 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1430 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1431 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1433 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1434 pub is_usable: bool,
1435 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1436 pub is_public: bool,
1437 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1438 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1439 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1440 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1441 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1442 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1444 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1445 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1448 impl ChannelDetails {
1449 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1450 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1451 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1453 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1454 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1455 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1459 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1460 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1461 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1463 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1464 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1465 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1466 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1469 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1470 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1472 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1473 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1474 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1476 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1477 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1478 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1479 features: latest_features,
1480 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1481 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1482 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1483 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1484 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1485 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1486 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1487 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1488 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1489 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1491 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1492 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1493 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1494 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1495 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1496 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1497 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1498 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1499 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1500 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1501 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1502 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1503 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1504 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1505 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1506 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1507 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1508 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1509 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1510 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1511 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1512 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1513 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1514 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1515 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1516 config: Some(context.config()),
1521 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1522 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1523 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1524 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1525 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1527 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1529 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1530 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1531 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1534 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1535 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1536 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1538 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1539 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1540 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1542 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1543 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1544 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1546 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1547 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1551 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1553 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1555 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1556 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1557 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1558 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1560 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1561 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1562 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1565 macro_rules! handle_error {
1566 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1567 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1568 // entering the macro.
1569 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1570 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1574 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1575 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1577 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1578 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1579 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1580 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1584 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1585 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1586 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1587 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1592 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1593 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1595 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1596 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1597 action: err.action.clone()
1601 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1602 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1603 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1605 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1609 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1616 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1617 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1618 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1619 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1620 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1621 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1623 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1624 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1625 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1626 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1627 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1629 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1630 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1632 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1636 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1637 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1638 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1640 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1641 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1643 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1644 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1646 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1647 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1648 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1649 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1650 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1651 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1657 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1658 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1662 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1664 $entry.remove_entry();
1672 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1673 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1677 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1679 $entry.remove_entry();
1687 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1688 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1690 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1691 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1697 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1698 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1699 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1700 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1701 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1703 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1704 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1705 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1706 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1707 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1708 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1709 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1710 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1711 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1712 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1717 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1718 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1719 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1720 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1721 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1722 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1723 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1724 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1725 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1727 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1732 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1733 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1734 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1735 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1736 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1737 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1738 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1739 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1740 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1742 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1747 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1748 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1749 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1750 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1751 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1752 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1753 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1754 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1755 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1756 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1757 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1759 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1760 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1761 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1767 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1768 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1770 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1771 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1772 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1773 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1774 updates.announcement_sigs);
1775 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1776 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1779 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1780 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1781 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1783 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1785 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1786 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1788 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1789 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1790 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1791 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1796 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1797 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1798 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1799 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1800 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1801 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1802 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1805 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1806 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1807 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1810 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1811 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1812 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1813 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1814 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1815 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1816 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1817 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1821 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1822 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1823 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1824 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1830 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1831 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1835 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1836 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1837 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1838 while !processed_all_events {
1839 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1843 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1846 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1847 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1848 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1850 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1851 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1852 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1854 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1855 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1856 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1861 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1862 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1863 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1864 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1867 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1869 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1870 $event_to_handle = event;
1872 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1873 post_event_actions.push(action);
1878 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1879 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1880 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1881 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1884 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1885 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1886 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1887 processed_all_events = false;
1890 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1891 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1899 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1900 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1902 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1904 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1908 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1910 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1911 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1913 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1915 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1916 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1917 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1920 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1921 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1922 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1923 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1924 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1925 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1926 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1927 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1929 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1930 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1931 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1936 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1938 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1939 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1940 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1941 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1942 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1943 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1944 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1945 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1947 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1950 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1951 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1953 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1955 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1957 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1959 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1960 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1961 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1962 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1963 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1964 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1965 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1975 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1976 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1977 &self.default_configuration
1980 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1981 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1982 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1985 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1986 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1988 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1990 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1994 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1999 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2001 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2002 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2003 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2004 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2005 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2007 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2008 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2010 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2011 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2012 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2014 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2015 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2016 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2018 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2019 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2020 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2021 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2022 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2023 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2025 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2026 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2027 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2028 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2029 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2034 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2035 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2040 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2042 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2044 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2045 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2046 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2047 match OutboundV1Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2048 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2049 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2053 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2058 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2060 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2061 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2064 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2066 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2072 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2073 node_id: their_network_key,
2076 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2079 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2080 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2081 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2082 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2083 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2084 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2085 // the same channel.
2086 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2088 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2090 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2091 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2092 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2093 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2094 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2095 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2103 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2104 /// more information.
2105 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2106 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2109 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2110 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2112 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2113 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2115 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2116 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2117 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2118 // really wanted anyway.
2119 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2122 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2123 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2124 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2125 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2127 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2130 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2131 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2134 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2140 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2141 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2143 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2144 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2145 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2147 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2148 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2149 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2150 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2151 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2152 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2153 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2154 total_msat: *total_msat,
2157 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2158 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2160 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2161 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2163 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2168 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2169 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2170 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2171 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2172 Some(transaction) => {
2173 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2174 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2179 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2180 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2181 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2182 reason: closure_reason
2186 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2189 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2190 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2193 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2194 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2198 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2200 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2201 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2202 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2203 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2204 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2206 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2207 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2208 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2209 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2210 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2214 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2215 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2216 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2217 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2218 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2221 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2222 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2223 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2224 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2228 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2236 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2237 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2238 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2239 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2242 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2246 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2247 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2248 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2250 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2251 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2253 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2254 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2255 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2256 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2258 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2260 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2261 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2262 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2265 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2266 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2267 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2268 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2269 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2270 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2273 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2274 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2275 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2277 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2278 /// the channel being closed or not:
2279 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2280 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2281 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2282 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2283 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2284 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2285 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2287 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2288 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2289 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2290 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2292 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2294 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2295 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2296 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2299 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2300 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2301 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2302 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2303 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2304 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2308 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2309 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2311 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2312 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2313 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2314 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2315 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2317 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2318 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2319 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2320 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2321 // ignore the result here.
2322 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2326 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2327 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2328 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2329 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2331 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2332 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2337 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2338 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2340 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2342 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2344 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2347 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2348 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2349 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2350 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2351 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2356 Ok(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2359 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2361 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2362 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2364 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2365 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2367 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2368 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2381 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2382 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2383 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2385 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2386 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2387 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2390 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2391 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2392 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2394 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2395 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2396 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2397 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2398 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2401 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2402 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2403 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2404 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2405 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2409 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2410 /// local transaction(s).
2411 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2412 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2413 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2417 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2418 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2420 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2421 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2422 return Err(ReceiveError {
2423 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2425 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2428 // final_expiry_too_soon
2429 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2430 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2432 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2433 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2434 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2435 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2436 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2437 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2438 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2439 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2440 return Err(ReceiveError {
2441 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2442 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2445 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2446 return Err(ReceiveError {
2448 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2449 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2453 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2454 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2455 return Err(ReceiveError {
2456 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2457 err_data: Vec::new(),
2458 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2461 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2462 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2463 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2464 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2465 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2466 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2467 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2468 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2469 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2470 return Err(ReceiveError {
2471 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2472 err_data: Vec::new(),
2473 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2476 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2477 return Err(ReceiveError {
2478 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2479 err_data: Vec::new(),
2480 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2483 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2487 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2489 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2490 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2493 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2494 phantom_shared_secret,
2497 return Err(ReceiveError {
2498 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2499 err_data: Vec::new(),
2500 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2505 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2508 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2509 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2510 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2511 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2515 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2516 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2517 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2519 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2520 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2521 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2522 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2523 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2524 failure_code: $err_code,
2530 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2531 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2534 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2535 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2536 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2538 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2539 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2540 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2541 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2542 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2543 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2544 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2545 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2547 macro_rules! return_err {
2548 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2550 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2551 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2552 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2553 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2554 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2555 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2561 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2563 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2564 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2566 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2567 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2571 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2572 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2574 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2576 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2577 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2578 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2579 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2580 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2582 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2585 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2586 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2587 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2589 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2590 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2591 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2594 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2595 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2596 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2597 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2601 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2602 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2603 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2606 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2607 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2608 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2609 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2610 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2615 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2616 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2617 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2618 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2619 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2620 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2621 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2622 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2623 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2624 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2625 // phantom or an intercept.
2626 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2627 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2628 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2632 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2635 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2637 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2639 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2640 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2641 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2645 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2647 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2648 // have no consistency guarantees.
2649 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2653 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2654 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2655 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2656 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2657 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2659 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2660 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2661 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2662 // we don't have the channel here.
2663 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2665 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2667 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2668 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2669 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2670 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2671 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2672 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2673 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2674 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2675 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2676 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2677 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2679 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2682 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2683 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2685 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2686 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2690 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2691 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2692 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2693 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2695 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2702 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2703 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2704 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2705 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2706 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2707 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2709 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2710 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2712 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2713 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2714 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2715 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2716 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2717 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2718 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2719 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2720 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2721 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2727 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2728 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2729 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2730 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2732 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2733 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2735 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2736 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2737 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2739 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2740 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2741 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2742 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2743 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2744 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2745 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2749 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2754 pending_forward_info
2757 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2758 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2759 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2761 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2762 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2763 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2765 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2766 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2767 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2768 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2769 return Err(LightningError {
2770 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2771 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2774 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2775 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2778 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2781 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2782 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2783 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2784 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2786 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2787 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2788 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2790 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2791 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2792 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2794 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2795 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2799 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2802 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2804 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2806 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2807 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2808 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2809 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2810 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2813 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2814 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2816 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2817 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2818 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2819 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2820 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2821 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2822 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2823 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2825 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2826 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2827 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2829 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2831 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2838 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2840 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2843 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2844 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2845 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2847 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2848 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2849 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2851 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2852 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2853 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2855 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2856 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2858 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2859 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2860 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2861 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2865 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2866 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2869 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2870 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
2871 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2873 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2874 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2875 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2877 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2878 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2880 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2881 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2882 Some(monitor_update) => {
2883 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2884 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2885 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2888 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2889 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2890 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2891 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2892 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2893 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2894 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2895 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2901 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2902 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2903 // `channel_by_id` map.
2904 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2905 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2910 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2911 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2913 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2918 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2920 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2921 /// fields for more info.
2923 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2924 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2926 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2928 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2929 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2930 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2931 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2932 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2934 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2935 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2936 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2937 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2938 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2940 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2941 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2942 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2943 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2945 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2947 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2948 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2949 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2951 /// In general, a path may raise:
2952 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2953 /// node public key) is specified.
2954 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2955 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2957 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2958 /// relevant updates.
2960 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2961 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2962 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2964 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2965 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2966 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2967 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2968 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2969 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2970 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2972 self.pending_outbound_payments
2973 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2974 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2975 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2978 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
2979 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2980 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2981 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2983 self.pending_outbound_payments
2984 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2985 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2986 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2987 &self.pending_events,
2988 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2989 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2993 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2994 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2996 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2997 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2998 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3002 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3003 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3004 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3008 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3009 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3013 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3014 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3015 /// retries are exhausted.
3017 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3018 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3020 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3021 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3022 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3024 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3025 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3027 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3028 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3029 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3031 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3034 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3035 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3036 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3037 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3038 /// never reach the recipient.
3040 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3041 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3043 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3044 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3046 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3047 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3048 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3050 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3051 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3052 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3053 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3054 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3057 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3058 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3060 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3063 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3064 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3065 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3067 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3068 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3069 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3070 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3071 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3072 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3075 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3076 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3077 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3078 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3079 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3081 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3082 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3083 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3086 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3089 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3090 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3093 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3094 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3095 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3096 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3097 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3099 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3100 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3104 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3106 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3108 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3109 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3110 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_user_id(), chan.context.force_shutdown(true), None)
3111 } else { unreachable!(); });
3113 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3115 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3116 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3118 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3120 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3126 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3128 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3129 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3135 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3138 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3140 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3142 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3143 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3144 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3145 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3154 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3155 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3156 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3160 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3162 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3163 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3165 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3166 /// across the p2p network.
3168 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3169 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3171 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3172 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3173 /// keys per-channel).
3175 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3176 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3177 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3179 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3180 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3181 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3183 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3184 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3185 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3186 /// for more details.
3188 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3189 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3190 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3193 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3194 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3195 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3196 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3201 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3202 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3203 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3204 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3205 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3206 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3208 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3212 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3213 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3214 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3215 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3219 let mut output_index = None;
3220 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3221 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3222 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3223 if output_index.is_some() {
3224 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3225 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3228 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3231 if output_index.is_none() {
3232 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3233 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3236 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3240 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3242 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3243 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3244 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3245 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3247 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3248 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3250 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3251 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3253 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3255 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3256 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3257 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3258 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3259 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3260 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3261 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3262 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3263 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3264 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3265 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3266 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3267 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3273 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3274 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3276 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3277 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3278 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3279 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3280 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3284 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3285 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3286 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3287 config.apply(config_update);
3288 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3291 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3292 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3293 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3294 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3295 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3303 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3305 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3306 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3307 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3308 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3310 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3311 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3313 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3314 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3316 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3318 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3319 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3320 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3321 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3322 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3323 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3324 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3325 pub fn update_channel_config(
3326 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3327 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3328 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3331 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3332 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3334 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3335 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3337 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3338 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3339 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3340 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3341 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3343 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3344 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3346 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3349 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3350 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3351 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3352 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3353 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3356 let next_hop_scid = {
3357 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3358 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3359 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3360 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3361 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3362 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3364 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3365 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3366 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3369 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3371 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3372 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3377 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3378 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3379 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3382 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3383 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3384 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3386 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3388 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3389 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3392 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3393 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3394 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3395 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3396 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3398 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3402 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3403 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3405 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3408 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3409 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3412 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3413 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3414 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3417 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3418 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3419 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3420 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3421 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3423 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3426 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3427 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3428 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3429 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3434 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3436 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3437 /// Will likely generate further events.
3438 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3441 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3442 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3443 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3445 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3446 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3448 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3449 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3450 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3452 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3453 match forward_info {
3454 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3455 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3456 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3457 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3458 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3461 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3462 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3463 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3465 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3466 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3467 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3468 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3470 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3473 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3474 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3476 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3479 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3480 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3486 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3487 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3489 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3493 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3494 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3496 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3500 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3501 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3502 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3503 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3504 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3506 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3507 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3508 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3509 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3510 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3512 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3514 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3515 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3519 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3520 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3521 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3522 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3528 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3531 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3534 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3535 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3536 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3537 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3538 // problem, not ours.
3544 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3545 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3547 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3552 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3553 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3554 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3559 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3561 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3565 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3566 match forward_info {
3567 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3568 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3569 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3570 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3571 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3574 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3575 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3576 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3577 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3578 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3579 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3580 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3581 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3583 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3584 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3585 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3587 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3590 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3592 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3593 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3594 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3595 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3600 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3601 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3603 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3605 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3606 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3608 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3611 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3613 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3614 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3615 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3624 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3625 match forward_info {
3626 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3627 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3628 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3629 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3632 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3633 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3634 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3636 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3637 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3638 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3640 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3641 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3642 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3645 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3646 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3649 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3652 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3653 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3654 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3655 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3656 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3657 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3658 phantom_shared_secret,
3660 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3661 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3662 // if routing nodes overpay
3663 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3664 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3666 total_value_received: None,
3667 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3672 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3674 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3675 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3676 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3677 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3678 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3679 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3681 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3682 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3683 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3684 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3685 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3686 phantom_shared_secret,
3688 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3689 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3691 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3694 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3695 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3696 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3697 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3698 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3701 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3702 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3703 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3704 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3705 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3706 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3708 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3709 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3710 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3712 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3713 .entry(payment_hash)
3714 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3715 .or_insert_with(|| {
3716 committed_to_claimable = true;
3718 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3721 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3722 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3724 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3726 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3728 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3730 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3731 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3732 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3735 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3737 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3738 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3739 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3740 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3741 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3742 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3743 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3744 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3745 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3746 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3748 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3750 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3751 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3752 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3753 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3754 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3755 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3756 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3757 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3758 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3759 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3760 committed_to_claimable = true;
3762 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3763 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3764 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3765 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3766 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3767 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3771 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3772 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3773 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3774 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3776 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3778 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3779 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3781 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3782 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3783 committed_to_claimable = true;
3786 payment_claimable_generated
3790 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3791 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3792 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3793 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3794 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3795 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3796 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3797 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3799 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3800 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3801 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3802 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3803 Ok(result) => result,
3805 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3806 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3809 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3810 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3811 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3812 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3813 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3814 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3817 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3818 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3819 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3821 check_total_value!(purpose);
3823 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3824 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3825 check_total_value!(purpose);
3829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3830 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3832 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3834 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3835 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3836 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3837 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3838 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3840 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3841 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3843 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3844 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
3845 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3847 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
3848 if payment_claimable_generated {
3849 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3855 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3856 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3864 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3865 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3866 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3867 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3868 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3869 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3871 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3872 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3874 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3876 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3877 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3878 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3880 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3882 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3883 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3884 events.append(&mut new_events);
3887 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3889 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3890 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3891 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3893 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3894 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3896 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3897 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3898 if background_events.is_empty() {
3899 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3902 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3904 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3905 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3906 // monitor updating completing.
3907 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3909 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3910 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3914 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3917 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3919 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3925 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3926 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3927 // however, ensure that.
3929 log_error!(self.logger,
3930 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3932 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3936 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3939 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3940 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3941 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3942 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3943 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3946 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3947 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3948 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3949 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3951 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3952 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3954 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3956 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3957 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3960 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3962 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3963 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3967 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3968 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3969 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3970 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3971 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3972 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3973 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3975 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3978 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3981 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3982 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3983 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3991 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3993 /// This currently includes:
3994 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3995 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3996 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3998 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3999 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4000 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4002 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4003 /// estimate fetches.
4005 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4006 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4007 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4008 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4009 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4011 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4013 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4014 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4015 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4018 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4019 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4020 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4021 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4022 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4023 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4024 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4025 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4027 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4028 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4029 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4030 if needs_close { return false; }
4033 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4034 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4035 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4036 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4037 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4038 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4039 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4040 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4042 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4043 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4044 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4045 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4049 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4051 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4054 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4056 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4057 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4058 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4063 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4065 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4071 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4073 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4074 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4075 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4076 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4077 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4078 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4079 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4080 channel_id: *chan_id,
4081 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4089 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4090 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4095 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4096 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4097 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4098 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4099 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4100 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4101 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4102 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4103 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4104 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4105 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4107 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4108 // have no channels to the peer.
4109 let remove_entry = {
4110 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4111 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4114 entry.remove_entry();
4117 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4122 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4123 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4124 // This should be unreachable
4125 debug_assert!(false);
4128 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4129 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4130 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4131 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4132 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4133 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4134 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4137 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4138 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4139 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4141 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4142 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4149 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4150 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4151 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4152 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4153 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4156 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4157 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4160 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4162 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4163 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4164 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4165 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4166 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4173 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4174 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4175 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4177 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4178 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4179 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4180 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4182 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4183 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4184 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4185 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4186 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4187 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4190 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4191 /// reason for the failure.
4193 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4194 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4197 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4198 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4199 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4200 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4201 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4202 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4203 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4208 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4209 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4210 match failure_code {
4211 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4212 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4213 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4214 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4215 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4216 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4221 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4222 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4224 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4226 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4227 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4228 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4229 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4230 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4231 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4232 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4234 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4236 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4237 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4239 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4244 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4245 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4246 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4247 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4248 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4249 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4250 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4251 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4252 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4253 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4255 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4256 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4257 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4258 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4260 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4261 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4262 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4263 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4264 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4268 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4269 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4270 // be surfaced to the user.
4271 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4272 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4273 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4275 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4277 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4280 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4282 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4286 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4289 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4290 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4291 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4296 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4297 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4298 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4299 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4300 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4301 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4302 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4303 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4304 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4307 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4308 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4309 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4312 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4313 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4314 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4317 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4318 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4319 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4320 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4322 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4324 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4326 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4327 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4328 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4329 push_forward_ev = true;
4331 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4333 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4336 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4339 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4340 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4341 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4342 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4343 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4344 failed_next_destination: destination,
4350 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4351 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4353 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4354 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4355 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4356 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4358 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4359 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4360 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4361 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4363 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4364 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4365 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4366 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4367 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4368 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4369 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4370 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4375 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4376 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4377 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4378 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4379 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4380 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4381 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4382 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4387 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4388 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4389 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4391 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4392 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4393 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4394 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4399 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4401 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4402 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4403 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4404 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4405 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4406 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4407 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4408 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4409 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4411 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4412 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4413 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4414 debug_assert!(false);
4418 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4420 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4421 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4422 debug_assert!(false);
4426 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4427 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4429 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4430 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4431 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4432 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4435 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4436 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4437 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4438 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4442 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4443 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4444 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4445 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4447 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4448 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4449 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4450 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4451 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4456 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4457 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4458 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4459 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4460 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4461 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4462 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4464 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4467 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4468 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4469 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4470 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4474 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4475 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4476 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4477 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4480 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4481 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4482 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4483 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4487 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4488 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4489 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4492 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4495 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4496 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4497 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4499 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4500 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4502 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4503 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4505 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4506 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4507 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4508 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4509 if let Err(e) = res {
4510 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4511 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4512 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4513 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4514 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4521 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4522 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4523 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4527 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4528 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4529 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4530 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4531 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4532 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4533 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4534 // again on restart.
4535 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4536 payment_preimage, update_res);
4538 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4539 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4540 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4541 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4542 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4543 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4547 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4548 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4551 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4553 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4554 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4556 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4557 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4558 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4559 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4560 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4561 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4562 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4565 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4566 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4568 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4569 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4570 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4571 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4573 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4577 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4578 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4579 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4585 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4586 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4587 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4590 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4591 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4593 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4594 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4595 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4596 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4597 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4601 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4602 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4604 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4605 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4606 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4613 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4614 /// update completion.
4615 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4616 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4617 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4618 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4619 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4620 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4622 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4623 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4624 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4625 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4626 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4627 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4629 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4631 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4632 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4633 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4634 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4637 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4638 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4640 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4641 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4642 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4647 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4648 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4650 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4655 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4656 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4658 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4659 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4664 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4668 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4674 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4675 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4676 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4680 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4681 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4682 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4688 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4689 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4691 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4692 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4694 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4695 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4696 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4697 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4698 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4704 let mut peer_state_lock;
4705 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4706 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4707 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4708 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4710 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4715 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4716 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4717 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4720 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4723 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4725 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4726 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4729 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4730 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4731 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4733 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4734 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4735 /// used to accept such channels.
4737 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4738 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4739 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4740 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4743 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4744 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4746 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4747 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4748 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4750 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4751 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4753 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4754 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4756 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4757 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4759 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4760 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4761 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4762 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4765 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4768 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4770 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4771 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4774 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4777 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4781 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4782 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4783 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4784 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4785 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4786 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4789 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4790 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4793 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4794 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4795 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4796 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4797 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4798 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4799 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4800 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4803 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4804 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4809 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4810 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4811 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4815 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4821 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4822 /// or 0-conf channels.
4824 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4825 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4826 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4827 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4828 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4829 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4831 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4832 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4833 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4834 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4835 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4836 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4837 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4841 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4844 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4845 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4847 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4848 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4849 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4850 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4852 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4855 num_unfunded_channels
4858 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4859 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4863 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4864 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4867 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4868 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4869 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4870 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4872 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4873 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4874 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4875 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4880 debug_assert!(false);
4881 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4886 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4887 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4888 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4889 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4890 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4891 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4894 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4895 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4898 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4899 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4900 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4901 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4902 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4905 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4906 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4907 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4910 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.context.channel_id()) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4917 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4921 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4922 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4925 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4926 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4927 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4930 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4931 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4932 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4933 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4934 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4935 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4936 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
4940 entry.insert(channel);
4946 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4947 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4948 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4949 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4951 debug_assert!(false);
4952 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4956 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4958 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4959 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
4961 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4964 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4965 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4966 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4967 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4968 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4970 user_channel_id: user_id,
4975 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4976 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4981 debug_assert!(false);
4982 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4987 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4988 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4990 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4995 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4997 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5000 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5001 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5002 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5003 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5004 funding_msg.channel_id))
5006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5007 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5011 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5012 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5013 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5014 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5015 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5021 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5023 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5024 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5025 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5027 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5028 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5029 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5030 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5031 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5032 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5033 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5034 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5042 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5043 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5044 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5045 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5047 debug_assert!(false);
5048 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5053 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5055 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5056 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5057 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5058 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5059 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5060 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5061 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5062 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5063 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5064 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5073 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5075 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5077 debug_assert!(false);
5078 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5082 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5084 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5085 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5086 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5089 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5090 msg: announcement_sigs,
5092 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5093 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5094 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5095 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5096 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5097 // announcement_signatures.
5098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5099 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5100 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5101 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5108 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5109 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5118 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5119 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5120 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5124 debug_assert!(false);
5125 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5129 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5132 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5133 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5134 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5135 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5138 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5139 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5140 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5141 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5143 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5144 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5145 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5146 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5147 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5148 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5153 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5154 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5155 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5156 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5157 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5164 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5165 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5166 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5167 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5173 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5175 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5177 debug_assert!(false);
5178 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5180 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5183 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5185 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5186 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5187 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5188 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5193 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5194 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5195 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5196 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5197 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5198 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5199 } else { (tx, None) }
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5204 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5205 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5206 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5208 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5209 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5212 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5216 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5221 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5222 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5223 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5224 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5226 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5227 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5228 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5229 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5231 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5233 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5235 debug_assert!(false);
5236 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5240 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5243 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5244 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5245 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5246 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5247 match pending_forward_info {
5248 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5249 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5250 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5251 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5253 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5254 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5255 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5256 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5257 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5260 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5262 _ => pending_forward_info
5265 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5272 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5273 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5275 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5277 debug_assert!(false);
5278 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5282 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5283 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5284 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5289 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5293 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5294 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5295 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5297 debug_assert!(false);
5298 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5304 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5311 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5313 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5315 debug_assert!(false);
5316 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5320 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5322 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5323 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5324 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5333 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5334 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5335 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5337 debug_assert!(false);
5338 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5342 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5343 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5344 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5345 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5346 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5347 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5348 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5349 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5350 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5358 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5359 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5360 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5361 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5362 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5363 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5364 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5365 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5366 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5367 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5368 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5370 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5371 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5373 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5374 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5375 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5377 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5378 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5381 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5382 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5384 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5385 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5386 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5388 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5389 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5390 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5391 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5392 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5395 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5396 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5399 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5400 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5401 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5402 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5403 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5404 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5405 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5408 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5409 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5410 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5415 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5416 // payments are being processed.
5417 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5418 push_forward_event = true;
5420 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5421 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5428 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5429 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5432 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5433 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5434 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5436 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5440 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5441 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5442 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5443 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5444 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5446 if !forward_ev_exists {
5447 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5449 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5454 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5455 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5456 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5457 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5458 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5459 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5460 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5462 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5463 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5464 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5465 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5466 channel_funding_outpoint,
5467 counterparty_node_id,
5472 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5473 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5475 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5477 debug_assert!(false);
5478 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5479 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5481 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5483 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5484 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5485 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5486 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5487 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5488 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5489 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5491 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5496 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5500 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5501 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5502 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5504 debug_assert!(false);
5505 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5509 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5511 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5518 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5522 debug_assert!(false);
5523 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5525 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5526 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5529 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5533 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5534 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5535 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5536 msg, &self.default_configuration
5538 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5539 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5540 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5548 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5549 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5550 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5551 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5553 // It's not a local channel
5554 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5558 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5559 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5560 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5564 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5566 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5567 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5568 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5569 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5570 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5571 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5575 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5576 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5577 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5578 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5580 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5581 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5586 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5589 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5591 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5594 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5596 debug_assert!(false);
5597 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5603 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5604 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5605 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5606 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5607 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5608 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5609 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5610 let mut channel_update = None;
5611 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5612 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5616 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5617 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5618 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5619 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5620 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5621 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5622 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5627 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5628 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5629 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5630 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5631 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5632 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5640 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5641 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5644 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5645 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5650 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5651 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5652 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5654 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5655 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5656 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5657 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5658 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5659 match monitor_event {
5660 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5661 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5663 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5666 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5667 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5671 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5672 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5673 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5674 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5676 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5677 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5678 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5679 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5682 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5683 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5684 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5685 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5687 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5688 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5689 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5690 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5691 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5692 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5696 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5697 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5699 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5701 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5703 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5704 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5705 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5712 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5713 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5719 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5720 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5723 has_pending_monitor_events
5726 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5727 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5728 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5730 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5732 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5735 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5736 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5737 /// update was applied.
5738 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5739 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5740 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5741 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5743 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5744 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5745 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5746 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5749 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5752 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5753 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5754 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5755 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5756 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5757 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5758 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5759 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5761 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5762 has_monitor_update = true;
5764 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5765 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5766 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5767 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5768 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5769 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5770 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5772 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5774 continue 'peer_loop;
5783 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5784 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5785 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5788 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5789 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5795 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5796 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5797 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5798 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5799 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5800 let mut has_update = false;
5802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5804 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5807 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5808 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5809 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5810 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5811 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5813 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5814 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5817 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5818 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5819 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5820 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5826 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5828 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5829 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5830 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
5836 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5837 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5845 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5846 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5852 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5853 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5855 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5856 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5857 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5858 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5859 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5860 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5861 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5862 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5863 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5864 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5865 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5866 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5867 assert!(should_broadcast);
5868 } else { unreachable!(); }
5869 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5870 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5871 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5874 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5878 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5879 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5881 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5882 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5885 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5888 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5889 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5891 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5892 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5893 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5894 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5895 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5896 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5897 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5898 // never fail a payment too early.
5899 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5901 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5909 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5912 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5913 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5915 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5916 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5917 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5918 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5920 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5922 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5923 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5927 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5928 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5930 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5932 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5933 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5935 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5936 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5937 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5938 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5939 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5940 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5941 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5942 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5943 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5944 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5945 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5948 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5949 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5951 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5954 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5956 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5958 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5959 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5960 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5961 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5962 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5965 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5966 /// stored external to LDK.
5968 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5969 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5970 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5972 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5973 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5976 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5977 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5978 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5979 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5981 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5982 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5983 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5984 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5985 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5987 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5988 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5989 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5990 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5991 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5993 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5994 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5996 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5997 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6001 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6002 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6004 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6006 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6007 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6009 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6010 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6011 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6012 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6013 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6014 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6015 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6018 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6019 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6021 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6024 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6026 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6028 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6029 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6032 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6033 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6035 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6036 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6037 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6040 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6041 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6043 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6044 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6045 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6046 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6048 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6049 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6050 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6051 Some(_) => continue,
6052 None => return scid_candidate
6057 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6059 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6060 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6062 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6063 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6064 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6068 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6069 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6070 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6072 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6073 /// times to get a unique scid.
6074 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6075 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6076 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6078 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6079 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6080 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6081 return scid_candidate
6085 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6086 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6087 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6088 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6090 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6091 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6094 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6095 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6096 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6097 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6106 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6107 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6108 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6109 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6110 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6114 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6115 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6116 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6117 events.push_back((event, None));
6121 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6122 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6123 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6127 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6128 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6132 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6133 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6136 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6137 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6138 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6139 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6140 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6141 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6144 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6145 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6148 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6149 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6150 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6151 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6153 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6157 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6158 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6159 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6160 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6161 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6163 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6167 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6168 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6169 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6170 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6171 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6172 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6173 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6174 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6175 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6177 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6179 if further_update_exists {
6180 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6186 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6190 log_debug!(self.logger,
6191 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6192 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6196 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6197 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6203 for action in actions {
6205 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6206 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6208 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6214 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6215 /// using the given event handler.
6217 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6218 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6222 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6226 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6228 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6230 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6231 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6232 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6233 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6237 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6238 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6239 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6240 /// is always placed next to each other.
6242 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6243 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6244 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6245 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6247 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6248 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6249 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6250 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6251 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6252 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6253 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6255 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6256 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6257 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6258 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6261 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6262 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6264 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6265 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6268 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6270 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6273 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6274 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6278 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6279 events.replace(pending_events);
6288 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6290 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6292 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6294 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6299 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6301 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6302 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6303 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6305 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6309 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6311 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6312 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6313 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6314 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6315 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6316 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6320 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6322 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6323 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6324 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6325 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6326 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6329 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6330 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6333 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6335 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6336 let new_height = height - 1;
6338 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6339 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6340 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6341 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6342 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6343 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6346 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6350 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6352 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6353 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6354 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6355 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6356 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6357 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6361 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6362 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6363 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6364 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6366 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6367 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6369 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6370 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6371 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6372 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6374 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6375 if height < last_best_block_height {
6376 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6377 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6381 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6382 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6383 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6384 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6386 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6387 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6390 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6391 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6393 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6395 macro_rules! max_time {
6396 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6398 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6399 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6400 // having an explicit local time source.
6401 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6402 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6403 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6404 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6405 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6411 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6412 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6413 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6414 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6418 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6419 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6420 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6421 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6422 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6423 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6424 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6425 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6432 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6434 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6435 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6436 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6437 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6438 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6439 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6440 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6447 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6448 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6449 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6450 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6451 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6456 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6457 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6459 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6460 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6461 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6462 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6463 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6465 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6466 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6472 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6473 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6474 let res = f(channel);
6475 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6476 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6477 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6478 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6479 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6481 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6482 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6483 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6485 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6487 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6497 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6498 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6501 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6503 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6504 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6505 msg: announcement_sigs,
6507 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6508 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6509 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6511 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6512 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6513 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6518 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6519 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6520 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6521 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6522 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6523 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6524 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6525 // is always consistent.
6526 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6527 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6528 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6529 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6530 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6533 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6534 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6535 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6536 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6537 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6538 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6539 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6543 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6544 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6545 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6546 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6547 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6548 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6549 data: reason_message,
6559 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6560 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6561 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6562 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6563 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6564 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6565 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6566 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6567 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6568 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6570 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6571 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6572 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6576 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6579 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6580 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6581 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6582 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6583 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6584 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6585 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6586 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6587 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6590 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6591 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6592 _ => unreachable!(),
6594 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6595 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6596 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6597 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6603 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6605 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6606 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6610 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6612 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6613 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6615 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6616 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6619 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6620 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6621 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6624 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6625 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6626 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6627 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6630 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6631 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6632 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6633 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6636 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6637 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6639 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6640 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6641 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6642 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6643 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6646 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6647 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6648 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6649 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6652 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6653 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6654 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6655 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6658 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6659 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6660 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6661 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6665 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6666 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6668 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6670 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6671 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6672 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6673 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6677 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6682 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6683 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6684 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6685 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6688 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6690 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6693 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6694 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6695 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6696 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6699 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6701 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6704 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6706 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6709 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6711 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6714 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6716 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6719 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6721 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6724 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6726 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6729 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6731 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6734 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6736 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6739 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6741 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6744 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6746 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6749 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6750 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6751 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6754 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6756 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6759 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6761 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6764 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6765 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6766 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6767 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6768 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6770 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6775 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6777 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6780 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6782 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6783 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6786 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6787 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6790 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6791 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6792 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6793 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6794 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6795 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6800 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6802 // V1 Channel Establishment
6803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6807 // V2 Channel Establishment
6808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6809 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6810 // Common Channel Establishment
6811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6813 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6818 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6823 // Channel Operations
6824 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6827 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6829 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6832 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6833 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6834 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6836 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6842 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6843 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6844 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6845 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6848 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6850 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6852 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6853 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6857 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6858 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6859 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6865 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6866 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6867 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6868 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6869 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6870 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6873 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6874 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6876 if inbound_peer_limited {
6879 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6880 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6881 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6882 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6883 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6884 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6889 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6890 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6892 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6893 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6894 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6895 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6900 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6901 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6906 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6908 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6909 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6912 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6913 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6914 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6915 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
6916 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6917 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6918 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6922 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6923 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6924 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6929 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6930 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6931 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6932 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6933 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6942 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6946 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6949 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6950 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6952 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6953 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6956 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6958 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6959 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6960 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6964 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6966 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6967 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6970 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6971 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6973 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6981 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6982 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6986 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6987 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6990 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6991 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6994 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
6995 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
6998 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6999 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7000 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7001 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7004 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7005 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7006 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7007 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7010 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7011 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7012 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7013 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7016 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7017 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7018 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7019 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7022 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7023 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7024 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7025 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7028 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7029 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7030 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7031 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7034 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7035 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7036 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7037 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7040 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7041 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7042 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7043 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7046 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7047 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7048 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7049 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7053 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7054 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7055 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7056 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7059 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7060 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7062 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7063 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7064 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7065 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7066 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7069 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7070 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7071 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7072 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7075 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7076 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7077 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7078 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7081 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7082 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7083 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7084 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7085 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7086 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7087 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7088 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7089 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7090 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7091 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7092 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7093 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7094 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7095 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7096 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7097 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7098 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7100 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7101 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7102 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7108 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7109 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7111 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7112 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7113 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7114 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7117 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7118 (2, node_id, required),
7119 (4, features, required),
7120 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7121 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7122 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7123 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7126 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7127 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7128 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7129 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7130 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7131 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7132 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7133 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7134 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7135 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7136 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7137 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7138 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7139 (7, self.config, option),
7140 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7141 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7142 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7143 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7144 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7145 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7146 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7147 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7148 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7149 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7150 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7151 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7152 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7153 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7154 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7155 (32, self.is_public, required),
7156 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7157 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7158 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7159 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7165 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7166 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7167 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7168 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7169 (2, channel_id, required),
7170 (3, channel_type, option),
7171 (4, counterparty, required),
7172 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7173 (6, funding_txo, option),
7174 (7, config, option),
7175 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7176 (9, confirmations, option),
7177 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7178 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7179 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7180 (16, balance_msat, required),
7181 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7182 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7183 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7184 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7185 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7186 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7187 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7188 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7189 (26, is_outbound, required),
7190 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7191 (30, is_usable, required),
7192 (32, is_public, required),
7193 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7194 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7195 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7196 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7199 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7200 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7201 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7202 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7203 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7207 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7209 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7210 outbound_scid_alias,
7214 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7215 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7217 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7218 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7219 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7220 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7221 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7222 confirmations_required,
7224 force_close_spend_delay,
7225 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7226 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7227 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7228 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7229 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7230 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7231 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7236 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7237 (2, channels, vec_type),
7238 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7239 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7242 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7244 (0, onion_packet, required),
7245 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7248 (0, payment_data, required),
7249 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7250 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7251 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7253 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7254 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7255 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7256 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7257 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7261 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7262 (0, routing, required),
7263 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7264 (4, payment_hash, required),
7265 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7266 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7267 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7271 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7272 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7274 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7276 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7277 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7278 reason.write(writer)?;
7280 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7281 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7284 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7285 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7286 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7287 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7294 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7295 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7296 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7300 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7301 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7302 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7306 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7307 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7308 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7309 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7310 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7313 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7314 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7315 // messages contained in the variants.
7316 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7317 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7318 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7320 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7322 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7323 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7324 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7327 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7329 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7330 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7331 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7333 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7338 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7343 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7344 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7345 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7346 (2, outpoint, required),
7347 (4, htlc_id, required),
7348 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7351 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7352 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7353 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7354 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7355 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7357 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7358 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7359 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7360 (2, self.value, required),
7361 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7362 (4, payment_data, option),
7363 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7364 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7365 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7371 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7372 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7373 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7375 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7376 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7377 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7378 let mut total_value_received = None;
7379 let mut total_msat = None;
7380 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7381 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7382 (0, prev_hop, required),
7383 (1, total_msat, option),
7384 (2, value, required),
7385 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7386 (4, payment_data, option),
7387 (5, total_value_received, option),
7388 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7389 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7391 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7393 if payment_data.is_some() {
7394 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7396 if total_msat.is_none() {
7397 total_msat = Some(value);
7399 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7402 if total_msat.is_none() {
7403 if payment_data.is_none() {
7404 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7406 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7408 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7412 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7415 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7416 total_value_received,
7417 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7424 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7425 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7426 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7430 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7431 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7432 let mut payment_id = None;
7433 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7434 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7435 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7436 (0, session_priv, required),
7437 (1, payment_id, option),
7438 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7439 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7440 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7441 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7443 if payment_id.is_none() {
7444 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7446 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7448 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7449 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7450 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7452 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7453 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7454 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7455 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7459 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7460 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7461 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7463 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7466 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7467 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7472 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7473 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7475 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7477 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7478 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7479 (0, session_priv, required),
7480 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7481 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7482 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7483 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7484 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7485 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7488 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7490 field.write(writer)?;
7497 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7498 (0, forward_info, required),
7499 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7500 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7501 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7502 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7505 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7507 (0, htlc_id, required),
7508 (2, err_packet, required),
7513 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7514 (0, payment_secret, required),
7515 (2, expiry_time, required),
7516 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7517 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7518 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7521 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7523 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7525 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7526 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7527 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7528 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7533 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7535 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7537 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7539 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7540 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7541 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7544 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7546 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7547 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7548 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7549 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7550 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7552 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7553 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7555 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7556 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7557 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7558 unfunded_channels += 1;
7563 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7565 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7566 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7567 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7568 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7569 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7570 channel.write(writer)?;
7577 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7578 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7579 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7580 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7581 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7582 for forward in pending_forwards {
7583 forward.write(writer)?;
7588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7590 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7591 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7592 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7594 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7595 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7596 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7597 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7598 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7599 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7600 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7601 htlc.write(writer)?;
7603 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7604 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7607 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7608 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7609 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7610 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7611 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7612 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7613 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7616 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7617 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7618 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7619 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7620 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7622 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7623 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7624 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7625 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7626 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7627 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7628 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7633 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7634 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7635 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7636 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7637 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7638 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7639 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7640 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7641 0u64.write(writer)?;
7643 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7644 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7645 event.write(writer)?;
7649 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7650 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7651 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7652 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7653 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7654 0u64.write(writer)?;
7656 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7657 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7658 // likely to be identical.
7659 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7660 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7662 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7663 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7664 hash.write(writer)?;
7665 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7668 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7669 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7670 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7671 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7672 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7675 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7676 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7678 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7679 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7680 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7681 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7684 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7685 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7689 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7690 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7691 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7693 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7694 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7695 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7701 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7702 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7703 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7704 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7707 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7708 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7709 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7710 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7711 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7714 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7715 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7716 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7717 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7718 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7719 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7720 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7721 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7722 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7723 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7724 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7725 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7732 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7733 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7734 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7735 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7738 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7739 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7740 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7741 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7742 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7743 // check that the event is sane here.
7744 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7745 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7746 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7747 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7753 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7754 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7755 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7756 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7757 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7758 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7761 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7762 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7763 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7764 events.push_back((ev, action));
7765 } else if action.is_some() {
7766 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7773 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7775 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7777 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7778 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7779 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7780 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7781 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7782 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7783 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7784 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7785 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7786 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7787 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7788 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7789 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7791 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7792 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7794 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7795 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7797 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7798 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7799 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7800 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7801 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7802 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7804 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7805 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7807 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7808 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7809 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7810 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7811 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7816 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7817 pub entropy_source: ES,
7819 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7820 pub node_signer: NS,
7822 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7823 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7825 pub signer_provider: SP,
7827 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7829 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7830 pub fee_estimator: F,
7831 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7833 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7834 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7835 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7836 pub chain_monitor: M,
7838 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7839 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7840 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7841 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7842 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7843 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7845 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7847 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7848 /// deserialization.
7850 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7851 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7852 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7854 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7855 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7857 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7858 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7859 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7860 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7862 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7865 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7866 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7869 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7870 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7872 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7873 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7874 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7875 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7881 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7882 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7883 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7884 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7885 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7887 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7888 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7893 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7894 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7895 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7896 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7898 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7899 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7900 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7901 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7903 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7907 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7908 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7909 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7913 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7914 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7916 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7918 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7919 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7920 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7925 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7926 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7928 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7930 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7932 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7934 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7935 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7936 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7937 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7938 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7939 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7940 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7941 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7942 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7943 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7945 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7946 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7947 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7948 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7949 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7950 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7951 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7952 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7953 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7954 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7955 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7956 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7957 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7958 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7959 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7960 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7961 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7962 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7963 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7964 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7965 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7966 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7967 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
7968 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7969 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7970 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7973 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7974 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7975 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7976 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
7977 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7979 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7980 let mut found_htlc = false;
7981 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7982 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7985 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7986 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7987 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7988 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7989 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7990 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7991 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7992 log_info!(args.logger,
7993 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7994 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7995 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7999 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8000 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8001 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8002 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8003 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8004 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8006 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8007 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8009 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8011 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8012 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8015 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8016 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8017 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8021 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8022 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8023 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8024 // safely discard the channel.
8025 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8026 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8027 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8028 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8029 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8032 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8033 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8034 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8035 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8036 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8041 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8042 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8043 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8044 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8045 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8046 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8047 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8049 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8053 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8054 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8055 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8056 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8057 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8058 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8059 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8060 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8061 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8063 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8066 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8067 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8068 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8069 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8070 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8071 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8072 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8073 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8075 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8078 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8079 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8080 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8081 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8082 let peer_state = PeerState {
8083 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8084 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8085 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8086 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8087 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8088 is_connected: false,
8090 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8093 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8094 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8095 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8096 for _ in 0..event_count {
8097 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8098 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8103 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8104 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8105 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8107 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8108 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8109 // on-startup monitor updates.
8110 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8111 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8113 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8117 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8118 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8119 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8120 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8121 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8122 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8123 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8124 pending_background_events.push(
8125 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8126 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8129 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8135 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8136 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8138 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8139 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8140 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8141 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8142 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8146 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8147 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8148 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8149 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8150 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8151 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8152 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8154 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8155 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8159 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8160 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8161 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8162 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8163 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8164 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8165 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8166 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8167 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8168 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8169 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8170 let mut events_override = None;
8171 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8172 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8173 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8174 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8175 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8176 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8177 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8178 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8179 (8, events_override, option),
8180 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8181 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8182 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8184 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8185 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8188 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8189 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8192 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8193 pending_events_read = events;
8196 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8197 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8200 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8201 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8202 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8203 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8204 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8205 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8207 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8209 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8210 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8211 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8215 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8216 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8217 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8218 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8219 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8220 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8221 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8223 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8224 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8225 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8226 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8227 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8228 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8229 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8232 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8233 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8234 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8235 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8237 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8238 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8239 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8242 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8243 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8244 retry_strategy: None,
8245 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8246 payment_params: None,
8247 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8248 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8249 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8250 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8251 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8252 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8253 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8254 total_msat: path_amt,
8255 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8257 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8258 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8263 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8265 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8266 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8267 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8268 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8270 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8271 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8272 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8273 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8274 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8275 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8276 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8277 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8278 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8279 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8280 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8285 !forwards.is_empty()
8287 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8288 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8289 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8290 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8291 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8292 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8293 intercepted_id != ev_id
8300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8301 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8302 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8303 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8304 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8305 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8306 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8307 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8308 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8309 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8310 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8311 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8312 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8321 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8322 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8323 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8324 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8325 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8326 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8327 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8328 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8332 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8333 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8335 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8336 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8337 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8340 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8341 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8344 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8345 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8347 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8348 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8350 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8353 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8354 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8355 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8357 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8361 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8362 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8363 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8364 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8365 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8367 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8368 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8369 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8370 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8371 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8372 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8373 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8374 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8376 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8377 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8381 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8383 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8385 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8386 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8388 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8389 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8394 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8395 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8397 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8399 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8401 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8402 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8403 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8404 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8408 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8409 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8412 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8413 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8414 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8416 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8417 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8418 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8420 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8421 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8422 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8423 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8424 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8427 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8428 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8429 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8430 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8431 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8438 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8440 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8441 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8442 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8443 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8444 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8445 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8446 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8447 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8448 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8449 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8450 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8452 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8453 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8455 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8456 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8457 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8458 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8460 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8461 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8462 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8463 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8465 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8466 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8467 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8468 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8470 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8471 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8472 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8475 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8476 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8479 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8480 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8483 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8486 purpose: payment.purpose,
8487 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8493 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8494 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8495 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8496 for action in actions.iter() {
8497 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8498 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8499 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8501 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8502 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8503 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8504 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8509 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8511 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8512 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8516 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8518 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8519 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8520 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8521 router: args.router,
8523 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8525 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8526 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8527 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8528 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8530 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8531 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8532 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8533 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8534 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8535 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8537 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8542 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8544 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8546 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8547 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8548 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8549 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8550 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8551 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8552 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8554 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8555 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8556 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8558 logger: args.logger,
8559 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8562 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8563 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8564 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8565 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8566 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8569 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8570 //connection or two.
8572 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8578 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8579 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8580 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8581 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8582 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8583 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8584 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8585 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8586 use crate::ln::msgs;
8587 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8588 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8589 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8590 use crate::util::test_utils;
8591 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8592 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8595 fn test_notify_limits() {
8596 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8597 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8598 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8599 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8600 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8601 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8603 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8604 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8605 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8606 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8607 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8609 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8611 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8612 // to connect messages with new values
8613 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8614 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8615 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8616 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8617 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8618 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8620 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8621 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8622 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8623 // ... but the last node should not.
8624 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8625 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8626 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8627 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8629 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8630 // about the channel.
8631 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8632 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8633 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8635 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8637 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8638 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8639 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8640 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8641 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8642 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8644 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8645 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8646 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8648 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8649 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8650 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8651 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8652 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8653 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8655 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8656 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8657 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8658 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8659 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8660 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8661 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8662 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8664 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8665 // the channel info has updated.
8666 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8667 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8668 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8669 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8670 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8671 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8675 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8676 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8678 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8679 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8680 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8682 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8684 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8685 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8686 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8687 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8689 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8690 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8691 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8692 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8693 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8694 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8695 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8696 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8700 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8702 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8703 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8704 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8708 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8709 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8713 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8714 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8716 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8718 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8719 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8720 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8721 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8722 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8723 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8724 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8726 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8727 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8728 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8730 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8732 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8734 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8735 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8736 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8737 // lightning messages manually.
8738 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8739 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8742 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8744 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8746 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8747 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8749 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8751 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8752 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8753 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8754 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8756 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8757 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8758 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8760 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8762 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8764 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8765 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8768 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8769 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8770 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8773 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8774 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8775 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8776 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8778 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8781 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8782 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8783 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8784 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8789 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8790 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8791 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8792 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8794 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8799 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8800 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8801 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
8804 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
8805 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8806 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8807 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8808 // fails as expected.
8809 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
8810 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
8811 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
8812 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
8813 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
8814 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
8815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8817 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8818 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
8819 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8820 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8821 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8822 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8823 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8825 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8826 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8827 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8829 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8830 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8831 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8832 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8834 let route = find_route(
8835 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8836 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8838 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8839 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8841 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8842 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8843 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8844 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8845 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8847 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8848 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8849 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8853 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8854 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8855 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8856 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8857 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8858 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8859 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8860 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8861 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8863 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8864 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8866 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8867 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8868 let route = find_route(
8869 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8870 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8872 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8873 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8875 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8877 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8878 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8879 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8881 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8882 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8883 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8884 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8886 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8888 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8889 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8892 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8893 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8896 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8897 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8898 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8899 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8900 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8901 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8902 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8904 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8906 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8907 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8909 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8910 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
8911 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8912 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
8913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8914 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8916 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8917 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8918 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8920 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8921 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8922 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8923 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8925 let route = find_route(
8926 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8927 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8929 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
8930 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8931 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
8932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8933 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8935 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8936 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8937 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8941 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8943 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8944 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8945 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8946 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8948 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8951 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8953 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8954 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8958 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8959 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8960 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8961 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8962 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8963 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8966 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8967 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8969 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8970 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8971 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
8972 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8974 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8975 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8976 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8977 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8978 let route = find_route(
8979 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8980 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8983 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8984 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8985 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8986 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8987 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8988 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8991 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8992 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8993 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8994 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8995 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8996 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8997 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8999 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9003 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9004 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9005 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9006 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9007 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9011 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9013 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9014 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9016 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9017 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9018 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9019 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9021 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9022 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9023 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9024 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9025 let route = find_route(
9026 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9027 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9030 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9031 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9032 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9033 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9034 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9035 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9036 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9037 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9040 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9041 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9042 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9043 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9044 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9045 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9046 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9048 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9052 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9056 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9058 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9059 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9060 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9061 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9063 // Marshall an MPP route.
9064 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9065 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9066 route.paths.push(path);
9067 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9068 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9069 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9070 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9071 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9072 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9074 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9075 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9077 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9078 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9080 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9085 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9089 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9091 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9093 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9094 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9096 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9097 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9099 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9102 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9103 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9104 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9105 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9106 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9107 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9110 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9113 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9114 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9119 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9120 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9124 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9126 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9127 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9129 total_msat: 100_000,
9132 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9133 // payment verification fails as expected.
9134 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9135 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9136 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9137 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9139 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9143 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9144 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9148 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9149 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9150 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9151 // the channel is successfully closed.
9152 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9153 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9154 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9155 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9157 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9158 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9160 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9161 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9163 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9164 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9166 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9167 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9168 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9172 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9174 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9175 // as it has the funding transaction.
9176 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9177 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9178 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9181 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9183 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9185 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9187 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9188 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9189 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9191 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9194 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9195 // as it has the funding transaction.
9196 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9197 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9198 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9201 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9202 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9204 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9205 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9206 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9207 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9209 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9210 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9211 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9212 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9214 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9215 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9217 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9218 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9219 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9220 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9221 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9222 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9223 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9227 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9228 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9229 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9230 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9231 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9232 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9233 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9236 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9238 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9239 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9240 // closing transaction).
9241 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9242 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9243 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9245 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9246 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9247 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9248 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9249 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9252 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9254 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9256 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9257 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9258 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9260 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9262 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9263 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9266 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9267 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9268 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9271 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9272 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9273 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9276 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9278 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9279 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9281 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9282 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9284 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9285 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9290 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9291 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9292 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9293 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9294 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9295 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9296 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9297 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9300 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9301 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9302 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9304 // Test the API functions.
9305 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9307 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9309 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9311 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9313 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9315 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9317 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9321 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9322 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9328 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9330 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9331 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9333 let mut funding_tx = None;
9334 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9336 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9339 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9340 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9341 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9342 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9343 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9345 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9347 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9349 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9351 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9353 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9355 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9358 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9359 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9360 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9361 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9362 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9364 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9365 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9367 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9368 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9369 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9370 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9371 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9372 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9373 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9376 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9377 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9379 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9380 }, true).unwrap_err();
9382 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9383 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9384 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9385 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9386 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9387 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9388 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9390 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9391 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9393 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9394 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9395 }, true).unwrap_err();
9397 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9398 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9399 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9401 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9403 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9404 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9406 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9407 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9408 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9409 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9410 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9412 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9413 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9414 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9416 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9417 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9418 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9420 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9421 // "protected" and can connect again.
9422 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9423 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9424 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9426 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9428 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9430 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9431 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9435 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9436 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9437 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9438 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9439 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9440 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9442 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9444 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9445 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9447 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9448 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9449 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9450 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9453 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9456 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9457 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9459 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9460 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9461 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9463 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9464 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9465 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9466 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9470 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9471 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9472 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9475 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9476 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9480 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9482 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9483 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9485 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9486 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9487 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9488 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9489 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9490 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9493 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9494 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9496 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9497 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9501 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9502 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9505 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9506 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9507 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9508 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9509 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9512 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9514 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9515 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9516 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9517 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9523 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9524 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9526 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9527 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9528 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9530 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9531 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9535 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9540 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9541 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9542 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9543 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9546 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9547 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9548 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9549 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9552 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9553 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9554 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9556 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9557 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9559 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9560 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9565 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9566 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9568 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9569 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9571 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9575 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9576 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9577 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9578 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9579 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9581 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9582 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9584 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9585 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9586 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9588 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9589 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9590 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9591 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9594 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9595 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9598 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9599 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9600 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9602 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9603 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9604 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9605 ..Default::default()
9607 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9608 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9611 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9612 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9615 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9616 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9617 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9618 ..Default::default()
9620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9622 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9625 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9626 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9633 use crate::chain::Listen;
9634 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9635 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9636 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9637 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9638 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9639 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9640 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9641 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9642 use crate::util::test_utils;
9643 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9645 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9646 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9647 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9649 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9651 use criterion::Criterion;
9653 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9654 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9655 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9656 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9657 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9658 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9659 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9661 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9662 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9664 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9665 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9667 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9669 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9672 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9673 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9676 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9677 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9678 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9680 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9682 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9683 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9684 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9685 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9686 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9688 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9689 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9691 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9692 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9693 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9694 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9696 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9698 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9700 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9701 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9702 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9703 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9704 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9706 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9708 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9710 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9711 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9713 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9714 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9716 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9717 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9718 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9721 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9722 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9723 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9725 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9726 } else { panic!(); }
9728 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9729 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9730 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9732 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9733 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9738 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9739 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9740 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9742 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9743 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9748 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9750 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9751 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9752 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9754 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9755 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9756 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9757 match msg_events[0] {
9758 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9759 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9760 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9764 match msg_events[1] {
9765 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9769 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9770 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9772 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9773 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9778 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9779 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9781 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9782 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9787 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9788 macro_rules! send_payment {
9789 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9790 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9791 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9792 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9793 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9795 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9796 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9798 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9799 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9800 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9801 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9802 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9803 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9804 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9805 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9806 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9807 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9808 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9810 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9811 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9812 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9813 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9815 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9816 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9817 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9818 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9819 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9821 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9824 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9825 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9826 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9827 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9829 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9833 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9834 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9835 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);