1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
242 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
243 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
248 impl Readable for PaymentId {
249 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
250 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
255 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
257 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
258 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
259 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
261 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
262 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
267 impl Readable for InterceptId {
268 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
269 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
274 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
275 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
276 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
277 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
278 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
281 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
283 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
284 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
285 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
287 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
288 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
292 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
293 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
294 (0, short_channel_id, required),
295 (2, htlc_id, required),
297 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
298 (0, session_priv, required),
303 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
304 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
305 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
306 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
307 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
310 session_priv: SecretKey,
311 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
312 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
313 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
314 payment_id: PaymentId,
317 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
318 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
319 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
321 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
323 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
325 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
328 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
329 payment_id.hash(hasher);
330 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
336 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
338 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
339 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
340 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
341 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
342 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
343 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
347 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
348 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
349 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
350 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
351 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
352 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
354 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
360 struct InboundOnionErr {
366 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
367 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
369 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
370 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
371 pub enum FailureCode {
372 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
373 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
374 TemporaryNodeFailure,
375 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
376 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
377 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
378 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
379 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
380 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
381 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
382 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
383 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
384 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
386 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
387 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
388 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
391 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
392 fn into(self) -> u16 {
394 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
395 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
396 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
397 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
402 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
403 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
404 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
405 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
406 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
408 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
409 err: msgs::LightningError,
410 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
411 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
412 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
414 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
416 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
418 err: LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
428 shutdown_finish: None,
429 channel_capacity: None,
433 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
434 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
437 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
448 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
449 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
450 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
454 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
457 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
459 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
460 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
464 log_level: Level::Warn,
467 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
469 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
471 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
473 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
474 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
482 shutdown_finish: None,
483 channel_capacity: None,
488 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
489 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
490 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
491 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
492 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
494 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
495 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
496 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
497 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
498 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
499 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
500 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
502 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
506 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
507 struct ClaimingPayment {
509 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
510 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
511 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
512 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
514 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
515 (0, amount_msat, required),
516 (2, payment_purpose, required),
517 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
518 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
519 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
522 struct ClaimablePayment {
523 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
524 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
525 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
528 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
529 struct ClaimablePayments {
530 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
531 /// failed/claimed by the user.
533 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
534 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
536 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
537 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
538 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
540 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
541 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
542 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
543 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
546 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
547 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
548 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
549 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
550 enum BackgroundEvent {
551 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
552 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
553 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
554 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
556 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
557 /// are regenerated on startup.
558 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
559 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
560 /// channel to continue normal operation.
562 /// In general this should be used rather than
563 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
564 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
565 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
570 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
571 funding_txo: OutPoint,
572 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
574 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
575 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
577 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
578 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
579 channel_id: [u8; 32],
584 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
585 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
586 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
587 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
588 /// event can be generated.
589 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
590 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
591 /// operation of another channel.
593 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
594 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
595 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
596 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
598 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
599 event: events::Event,
600 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
605 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
606 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
607 (0, event, upgradable_required),
608 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
609 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
610 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
611 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
612 // downgrades to prior versions.
613 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
618 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
619 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
620 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
621 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
624 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
625 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
626 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
627 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
631 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
632 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
633 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
634 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
635 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
636 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
638 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
639 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
646 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
648 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
649 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
651 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
656 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
657 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
661 /// State we hold per-peer.
662 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
663 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
665 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
666 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
667 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
669 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
670 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
672 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
673 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
675 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
676 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
678 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
679 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
681 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
682 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
683 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
684 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
685 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
686 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
687 latest_features: InitFeatures,
688 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
689 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
690 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
691 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
692 /// user but which have not yet completed.
694 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
695 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
696 /// for a missing channel.
697 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
698 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
699 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
701 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
702 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
703 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
704 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
706 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
707 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
708 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
709 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
710 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
711 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
712 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
713 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
714 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
715 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
716 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
717 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
718 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
719 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
720 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
725 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
726 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
727 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
728 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
729 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
732 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
733 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
736 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
737 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
738 self.channel_by_id.len() +
739 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
740 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
741 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
744 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
745 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
746 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
747 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
749 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
753 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
754 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
755 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
756 /// The original OpenChannel message.
757 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
758 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
759 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
762 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
763 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
764 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
766 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
767 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
769 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
772 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
773 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
774 struct PendingInboundPayment {
775 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
776 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
777 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
778 /// this payment being removed.
780 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
781 user_payment_id: u64,
782 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
783 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
784 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
787 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
788 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
789 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
790 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
791 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
792 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
793 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
794 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
796 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
797 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
805 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
807 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
808 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
809 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
814 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
815 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
816 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
817 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
818 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
819 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
820 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
821 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
822 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
824 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
825 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
834 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
836 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
837 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
838 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
843 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
844 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
845 $vis trait AChannelManager {
846 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
847 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
848 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
849 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
850 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
851 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
852 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
853 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
854 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
855 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
856 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
857 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
858 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
859 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
860 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
861 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
862 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
863 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
866 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
867 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
868 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
869 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
870 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
871 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
882 type Watch = M::Target;
884 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
886 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
888 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
890 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
891 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
893 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
895 type Router = R::Target;
897 type Logger = L::Target;
899 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
902 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
903 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
905 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
906 /// to individual Channels.
908 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
909 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
910 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
911 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
913 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
914 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
915 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
916 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
917 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
918 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
919 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
921 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
922 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
923 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
925 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
926 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
927 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
928 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
929 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
931 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
932 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
933 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
934 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
936 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
937 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
938 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
940 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
941 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
942 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
943 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
944 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
946 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
947 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
948 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
949 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
950 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
951 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
952 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
953 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
956 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
957 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
958 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
959 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
960 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
964 // `total_consistency_lock`
966 // |__`forward_htlcs`
968 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
970 // |__`per_peer_state`
972 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
974 // | |__`claimable_payments`
976 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
982 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
984 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
988 // | |__`pending_events`
990 // | |__`pending_background_events`
992 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
994 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
995 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
996 ES::Target: EntropySource,
997 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
998 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1003 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1004 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1005 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1011 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1013 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1015 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1016 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1018 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1019 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1020 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1021 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1023 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1026 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1027 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1028 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1029 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1030 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1031 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1032 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1033 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1035 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1037 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1038 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1040 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1042 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1043 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1044 /// and via the classic SCID.
1046 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1047 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1049 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1051 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1053 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1054 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1055 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1057 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1058 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1060 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1061 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1066 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1067 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1068 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1069 /// active channel list on load.
1071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1074 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1076 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1077 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1078 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1080 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1081 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1082 /// the handling of the events.
1084 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1085 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1088 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1089 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1090 /// would break backwards compatability.
1091 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1092 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1093 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1095 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1096 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1098 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1100 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1101 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1102 /// confirmation depth.
1104 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1105 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1106 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1108 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1112 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1114 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1116 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1118 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1119 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1120 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1122 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1123 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1125 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1126 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1127 /// keeping additional state.
1128 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1130 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1131 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1132 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1133 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1135 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1136 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1138 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1139 /// are currently open with that peer.
1141 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1142 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1145 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1147 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1148 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1149 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1150 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1151 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1153 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1154 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1155 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1156 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1157 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1159 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1160 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1163 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1164 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1165 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1166 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1168 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1169 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1171 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1172 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1173 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1174 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1175 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1177 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1179 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1181 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1182 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1183 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1184 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1185 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1186 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1187 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1188 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1189 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1191 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1193 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1197 signer_provider: SP,
1202 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1204 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1205 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1206 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1208 pub struct ChainParameters {
1209 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1210 pub network: Network,
1212 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1214 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1215 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1218 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1225 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1226 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1227 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1228 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1229 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1230 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1232 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1233 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1234 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1235 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1236 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1238 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1239 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1242 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1243 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1244 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1245 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1247 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1248 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1249 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1250 _read_guard: read_guard,
1255 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1256 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1257 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1258 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1260 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1261 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1262 should_persist: persist_check,
1263 _read_guard: read_guard,
1268 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1269 fn drop(&mut self) {
1270 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1271 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1276 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1277 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1279 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1281 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1282 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1283 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1284 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1285 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1287 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1288 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1290 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1292 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1293 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1294 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1295 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1296 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1297 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1298 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1299 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1300 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1301 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1302 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1303 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1304 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1306 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1307 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1309 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1310 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1311 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1312 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1314 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1315 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1316 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1317 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1318 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1319 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1322 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1324 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1325 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1328 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1330 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1331 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1333 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1334 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1335 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1336 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1338 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1339 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1340 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1342 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1343 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1344 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1346 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1347 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1348 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1349 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1351 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1352 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1353 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1355 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1356 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1357 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1359 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1360 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1361 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1362 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1363 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1364 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1365 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1366 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1367 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1368 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1369 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1372 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1373 /// to better separate parameters.
1374 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1375 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1376 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1377 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1378 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1379 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1380 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1381 pub features: InitFeatures,
1382 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1383 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1384 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1386 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1388 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1389 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1390 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1391 /// payments to us through this channel.
1392 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1393 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1394 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1395 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1396 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1397 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1398 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1401 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1403 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1404 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1407 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1408 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1409 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1410 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1411 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1412 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1413 /// lifetime of the channel.
1414 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1415 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1416 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1417 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1418 /// our counterparty already.
1420 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1421 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1422 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1423 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1425 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1426 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1427 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1428 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1430 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1431 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1433 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1434 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1436 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1437 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1438 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1439 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1440 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1441 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1442 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1443 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1444 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1447 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1449 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1450 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1451 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1452 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1453 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1454 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1455 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1457 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1458 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1460 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1461 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1462 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1463 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1464 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1465 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1466 /// this value on chain.
1468 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1470 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1472 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1473 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1474 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1475 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1476 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1477 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1478 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1480 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1481 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1482 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1483 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1484 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1485 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1487 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1488 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1489 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1490 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1491 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1492 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1494 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1495 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1496 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1497 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1498 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1499 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1500 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1501 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1503 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1504 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1505 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1506 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1507 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1508 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1509 /// route which is valid.
1510 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1511 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1512 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1513 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1514 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1515 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1517 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1518 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1519 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1520 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1521 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1522 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1523 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1524 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1525 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1527 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1529 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1530 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1531 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1532 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1533 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1535 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1536 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1537 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1538 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1539 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1540 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1541 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1543 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1544 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1545 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1546 pub is_outbound: bool,
1547 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1548 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1549 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1550 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1551 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1553 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1554 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1555 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1556 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1557 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1558 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1559 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1561 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1562 pub is_usable: bool,
1563 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1564 pub is_public: bool,
1565 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1566 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1567 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1568 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1569 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1570 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1572 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1573 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1576 impl ChannelDetails {
1577 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1578 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1579 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1581 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1582 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1583 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1584 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1587 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1588 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1589 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1591 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1592 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1593 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1594 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1597 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1598 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1599 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1601 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1603 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1604 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1605 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1607 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1608 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1609 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1610 features: latest_features,
1611 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1612 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1613 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1614 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1615 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1616 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1617 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1618 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1619 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1620 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1622 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1623 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1624 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1625 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1626 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1627 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1628 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1629 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1630 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1631 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1632 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1633 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1634 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1635 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1636 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1637 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1638 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1639 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1640 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1641 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1642 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1643 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1644 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1645 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1646 config: Some(context.config()),
1647 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1652 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1653 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1654 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1655 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1656 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1657 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1658 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1659 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1660 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1662 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1664 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1665 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1667 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1668 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1669 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1670 /// to drop the channel.
1674 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1675 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1676 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1677 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1678 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1680 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1682 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1683 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1684 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1687 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1688 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1689 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1691 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1692 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1693 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1695 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1696 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1697 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1699 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1700 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1704 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1706 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1708 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1709 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1710 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1711 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1713 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1714 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1715 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1718 macro_rules! handle_error {
1719 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1720 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1721 // entering the macro.
1722 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1723 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1727 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1728 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1730 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1731 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1732 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1733 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1737 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1738 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1739 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1740 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1741 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1742 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1747 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1748 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1750 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1751 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1752 action: err.action.clone()
1756 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1757 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1758 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1759 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1760 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1764 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1769 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1772 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1773 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1774 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1780 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1781 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1782 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1783 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1784 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1785 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1787 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1788 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1789 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1790 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1791 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1793 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1794 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1796 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1800 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1801 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1802 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1804 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1805 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1807 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1808 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1810 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1811 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1812 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1813 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1814 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1815 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1819 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1821 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1822 // In any case, just close the channel.
1823 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1824 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1825 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1826 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1827 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1828 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1834 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1835 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1839 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1841 $entry.remove_entry();
1849 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1850 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1854 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1856 $entry.remove_entry();
1864 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1865 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1869 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1871 $entry.remove_entry();
1879 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1880 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1882 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1883 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1889 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1890 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1891 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1892 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1893 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1895 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1896 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1897 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1898 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1899 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1900 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1901 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1902 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1903 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1904 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1909 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1910 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1911 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1912 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1913 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1914 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1915 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1916 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1917 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1919 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1924 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1925 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1926 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1927 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1928 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1929 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1930 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1931 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1932 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1934 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1939 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1940 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1941 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1942 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1943 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1944 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1945 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1946 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1947 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1948 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1949 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1951 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1952 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1953 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1959 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1960 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1962 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1963 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1964 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1965 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1966 updates.announcement_sigs);
1967 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1968 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1971 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1972 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1973 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1975 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1977 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1978 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1980 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1981 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1982 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1983 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1988 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1989 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1990 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1991 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1992 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1993 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1995 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1996 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1997 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2000 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2001 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2002 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2003 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2004 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2005 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2006 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2007 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2011 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2017 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2018 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2019 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2020 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2022 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2023 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2025 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2026 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2027 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2028 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2029 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2030 // filter for uniqueness here.
2031 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2032 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2033 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2034 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2036 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2037 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2038 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2040 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2041 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2042 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2046 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2047 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2051 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2052 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2053 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2054 while !processed_all_events {
2055 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2059 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2062 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2063 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2064 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2066 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2067 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2068 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2070 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2071 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2072 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2073 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2077 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2078 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2079 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2080 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2083 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2085 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2086 $event_to_handle = event;
2088 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2089 post_event_actions.push(action);
2094 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2095 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2096 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2097 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2098 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2099 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2102 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2103 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2104 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2105 processed_all_events = false;
2108 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2109 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2115 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2117 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2118 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2119 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2120 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2121 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2122 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2126 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2128 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2130 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2131 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2133 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2135 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2136 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2137 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2140 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2141 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2142 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2144 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2145 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2146 current_timestamp: u32,
2148 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2149 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2150 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2151 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2153 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2154 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2155 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2160 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2162 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2163 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2164 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2165 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2166 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2167 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2168 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2169 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2171 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2174 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2175 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2177 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2179 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2181 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2183 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2184 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2185 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2186 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2187 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2188 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2198 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2199 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2200 &self.default_configuration
2203 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2204 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2205 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2208 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2209 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2211 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2213 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2217 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2222 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2224 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2225 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2226 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2227 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2228 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2230 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2231 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2233 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2234 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2235 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2237 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2238 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2239 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2241 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2242 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2243 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2244 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2245 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2246 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2248 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2249 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2250 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2251 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2252 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2253 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2257 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2258 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2262 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2263 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2265 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2267 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2268 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2269 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2270 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2271 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2272 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2276 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2281 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2283 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2284 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2287 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2289 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2296 node_id: their_network_key,
2299 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2302 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2303 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2304 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2305 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2306 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2307 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2308 // the same channel.
2309 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2311 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2313 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2316 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2317 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2318 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2319 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2327 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2328 /// more information.
2329 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2330 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2331 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2332 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2333 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2334 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2335 // the same channel.
2336 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2338 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2340 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2343 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2344 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2345 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2348 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2349 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2350 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2353 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2354 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2355 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2363 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2364 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2366 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2367 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2369 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2370 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2371 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2372 // really wanted anyway.
2373 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2376 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2377 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2378 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2381 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2384 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2385 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2386 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2388 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2390 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2391 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2392 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2393 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2399 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2400 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2402 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2403 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2404 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2406 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2407 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2408 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2409 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2410 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2411 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2412 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2413 total_msat: *total_msat,
2416 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2417 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2419 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2420 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2422 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2427 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2428 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2429 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2430 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2431 Some(transaction) => {
2432 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2433 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2438 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2439 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2440 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2441 reason: closure_reason,
2442 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2443 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2447 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2450 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2451 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2453 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2455 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2456 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2458 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2459 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2461 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2463 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2464 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2465 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2466 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2467 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2469 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2470 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2471 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2472 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2473 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2477 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2478 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2479 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2480 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2483 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2484 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2485 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2486 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2490 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2497 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2498 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2500 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2501 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2502 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2503 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2506 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2507 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2508 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2512 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2516 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2517 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2518 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2520 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2521 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2523 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2524 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2525 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2526 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2528 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2530 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2531 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2532 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2535 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2536 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2537 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2538 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2539 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2540 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2543 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2544 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2545 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2547 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2548 /// the channel being closed or not:
2549 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2550 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2551 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2552 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2553 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2554 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2555 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2557 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2558 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2559 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2560 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2562 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2564 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2565 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2566 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2569 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2570 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2571 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2572 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2573 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2574 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2578 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2579 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2580 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2581 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2582 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2583 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2584 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2587 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2588 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2589 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2590 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2591 // ignore the result here.
2592 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2596 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2597 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2598 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2599 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2603 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2606 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2607 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2609 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2611 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2612 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2613 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2614 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2615 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2616 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2617 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2618 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2619 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2620 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2621 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2622 // Unfunded channel has no update
2623 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2624 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2625 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2626 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2627 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2628 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2629 // Unfunded channel has no update
2630 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2631 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2632 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2633 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2634 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2636 (None, *peer_node_id)
2638 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2641 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2642 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2648 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2651 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2653 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2654 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2655 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2656 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2657 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2658 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2659 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2660 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2661 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2662 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2673 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2674 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2675 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2677 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2678 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2679 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2682 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2683 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2684 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2686 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2687 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2688 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2689 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2690 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2693 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2694 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2695 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2696 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2697 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2701 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2702 /// local transaction(s).
2703 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2704 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2705 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2709 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2710 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2711 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2712 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2713 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2714 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2715 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2717 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2718 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2722 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2723 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2724 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2725 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2726 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2727 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2728 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2729 err_data: Vec::new(),
2733 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2734 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2735 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2738 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2739 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2740 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2741 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2742 outgoing_cltv_value,
2743 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2747 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2748 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2749 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2750 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2751 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2752 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2753 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2754 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2756 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2758 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2759 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2760 err_data: Vec::new(),
2761 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2764 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2765 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2766 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2767 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2769 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2772 // final_expiry_too_soon
2773 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2774 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2776 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2777 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2778 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2779 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2780 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2781 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2782 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2783 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2784 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2785 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2786 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2789 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2790 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2791 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2793 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2795 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2796 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2800 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2801 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2802 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2803 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2804 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2805 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2806 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2807 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2808 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2809 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2810 err_data: Vec::new(),
2811 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2814 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2815 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2816 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2817 err_data: Vec::new(),
2818 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2821 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2825 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2828 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2829 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2832 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2833 phantom_shared_secret,
2837 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2838 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2839 err_data: Vec::new(),
2840 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2843 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2846 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2847 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2848 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2849 outgoing_cltv_value,
2850 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2854 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2855 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2856 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2857 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2858 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2860 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2861 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2862 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2863 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2864 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2865 failure_code: $err_code,
2871 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2872 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2875 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2876 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2877 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2879 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2880 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2881 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2882 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2883 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2884 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2885 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2886 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2888 macro_rules! return_err {
2889 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2891 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2892 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2893 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2894 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2895 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2896 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2902 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2904 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2905 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2907 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2908 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2911 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2912 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2913 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2914 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2917 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2918 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2919 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2921 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2922 // inbound channel's state.
2923 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2924 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2925 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2929 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2930 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2931 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2932 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2933 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2934 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2935 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2936 // phantom or an intercept.
2937 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2938 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2939 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2943 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2946 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2948 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2950 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2951 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2952 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2954 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2955 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2956 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2958 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2959 // have no consistency guarantees.
2960 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2964 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2965 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2966 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2967 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2968 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2970 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2971 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2972 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2973 // we don't have the channel here.
2974 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2976 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2978 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2979 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2980 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2981 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2982 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2983 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2984 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2985 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2986 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2987 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2988 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2990 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2993 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2994 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2996 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2997 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3001 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3002 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3003 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3004 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3006 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3013 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3014 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3015 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3016 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3017 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3018 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3020 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3021 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3023 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3024 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3025 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3026 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3027 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3028 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3029 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3030 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3031 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3032 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3038 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3039 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3040 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3041 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3043 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3044 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3046 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3047 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3048 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3050 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3051 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3052 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3053 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3054 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3055 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3056 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3060 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3062 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3065 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3066 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3067 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3068 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3069 macro_rules! return_err {
3070 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3072 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3073 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3074 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3075 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3076 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3077 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3083 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3085 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3086 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3089 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3090 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3091 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3092 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3093 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3095 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3098 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3099 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3100 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3101 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3102 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3108 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3109 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3110 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3112 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3113 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3114 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3116 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3117 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3118 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3119 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3120 return Err(LightningError {
3121 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3122 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3125 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3126 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3129 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3132 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3133 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3134 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3135 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3137 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3138 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3139 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3141 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3142 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3143 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3145 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3146 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3150 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3153 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3155 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3157 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3158 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3159 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3160 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3161 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3164 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3165 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3167 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3168 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3169 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3170 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3171 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3172 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3173 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3174 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3176 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3177 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3178 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3180 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3182 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3189 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3190 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3191 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3192 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3197 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3198 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3199 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3202 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3203 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3206 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3207 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3209 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3210 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3211 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3213 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3214 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3216 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3217 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3218 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3219 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3223 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3224 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3227 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3228 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3229 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3231 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3232 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3233 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3235 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3236 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3238 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3239 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3240 Some(monitor_update) => {
3241 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3242 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3244 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3245 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3246 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3247 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3248 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3249 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3250 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3258 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3259 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3260 // `channel_by_id` map.
3261 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3262 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3267 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3268 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3270 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3275 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3277 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3278 /// fields for more info.
3280 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3281 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3283 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3285 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3286 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3287 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3288 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3289 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3291 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3292 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3293 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3294 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3295 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3297 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3298 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3299 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3300 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3302 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3304 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3305 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3306 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3308 /// In general, a path may raise:
3309 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3310 /// node public key) is specified.
3311 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3312 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3314 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3315 /// relevant updates.
3317 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3318 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3319 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3321 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3322 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3323 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3324 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3325 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3326 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3327 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3328 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3330 self.pending_outbound_payments
3331 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3332 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3333 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3336 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3337 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3338 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3339 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3341 self.pending_outbound_payments
3342 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3343 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3344 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3345 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3349 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3350 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3352 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3353 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3354 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3358 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3359 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3360 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3364 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3365 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3369 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3370 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3371 /// retries are exhausted.
3373 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3374 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3376 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3377 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3378 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3380 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3381 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3383 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3384 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3385 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3387 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3390 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3391 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3392 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3393 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3394 /// never reach the recipient.
3396 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3397 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3399 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3400 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3402 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3403 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3404 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3406 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3407 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3408 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3411 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3412 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3414 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3417 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3418 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3419 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3421 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3422 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3423 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3424 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3427 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3428 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3429 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3430 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3431 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3433 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3434 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3435 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3438 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3441 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3442 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3445 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3446 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3447 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3448 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3449 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3451 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3452 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3456 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3458 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3460 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3461 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3462 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3463 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3464 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3465 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3466 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3467 } else { unreachable!(); });
3469 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3470 Err((chan, err)) => {
3471 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3472 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3474 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3475 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3476 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3482 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3484 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3485 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3490 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3491 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3494 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3496 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3499 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3500 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3501 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3510 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3511 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3512 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3516 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3518 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3519 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3521 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3522 /// across the p2p network.
3524 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3525 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3527 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3528 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3529 /// keys per-channel).
3531 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3532 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3533 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3535 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3536 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3537 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3539 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3540 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3541 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3542 /// for more details.
3544 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3545 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3546 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3549 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3550 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3551 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3552 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3557 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3558 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3559 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3560 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3561 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3562 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3564 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3568 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3569 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3570 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3571 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3575 let mut output_index = None;
3576 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3577 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3578 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3579 if output_index.is_some() {
3580 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3581 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3584 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3587 if output_index.is_none() {
3588 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3589 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3592 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3596 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3598 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3599 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3600 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3601 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3603 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3604 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3606 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3607 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3609 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3611 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3612 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3613 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3614 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3615 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3616 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3617 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3618 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3619 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3620 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3621 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3622 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3623 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3629 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3630 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3633 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3634 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3635 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3636 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3640 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3641 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3642 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3643 config.apply(config_update);
3644 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3647 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3648 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3649 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3650 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3651 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3658 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3659 &mut channel.context
3660 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3661 &mut channel.context
3663 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3664 debug_assert!(false);
3665 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3667 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3668 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3671 let mut config = context.config();
3672 config.apply(config_update);
3673 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3674 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3675 context.update_config(&config);
3680 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3682 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3683 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3684 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3685 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3687 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3688 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3690 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3691 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3693 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3695 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3696 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3697 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3698 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3699 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3700 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3701 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3702 pub fn update_channel_config(
3703 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3704 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3705 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3708 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3709 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3711 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3712 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3714 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3715 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3716 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3717 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3718 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3720 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3721 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3722 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3725 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3728 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3729 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3730 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3731 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3732 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3733 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3736 let next_hop_scid = {
3737 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3738 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3739 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3742 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3744 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3745 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3746 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3749 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3751 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3752 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3753 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3758 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3759 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3760 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3763 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3764 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3765 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3767 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3769 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3770 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3771 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3772 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3773 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3776 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3777 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3778 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3779 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3780 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3782 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3786 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3787 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3789 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3792 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3793 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3796 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3797 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3798 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3801 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3802 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3803 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3804 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3805 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3806 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3807 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3808 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3811 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3812 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3814 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3819 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3821 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3822 /// Will likely generate further events.
3823 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3826 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3827 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3828 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3830 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3831 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3833 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3834 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3835 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3837 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3838 match forward_info {
3839 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3840 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3841 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3842 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3843 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3846 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3847 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3848 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3850 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3851 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3852 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3853 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3854 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3855 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3856 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3859 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3860 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3862 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3865 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3866 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3872 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3873 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3875 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3879 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3880 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3882 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3886 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3887 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3888 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3889 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3890 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3892 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3893 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3894 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3895 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3896 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3898 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3900 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3901 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3905 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3906 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3907 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3908 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3910 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3911 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3917 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3920 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3923 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3924 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3925 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3926 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3927 // problem, not ours.
3933 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3934 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3936 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3941 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3942 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3943 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3950 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3954 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3955 match forward_info {
3956 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3957 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3958 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3959 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3960 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3964 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3965 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3966 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3967 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3968 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3969 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3970 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3971 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3973 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3974 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3975 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3978 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
3981 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3983 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3984 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3985 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3986 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3991 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3992 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3994 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3996 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3997 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3999 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4002 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4004 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4005 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4006 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4015 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4016 match forward_info {
4017 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4018 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4019 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4020 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4021 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4024 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4025 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4026 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4027 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4028 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4029 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4030 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4032 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4033 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4034 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4038 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4039 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4042 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4045 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4046 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4047 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4048 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4049 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4050 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4051 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4052 phantom_shared_secret,
4054 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4055 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4056 // if routing nodes overpay
4057 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4058 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4060 total_value_received: None,
4061 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4064 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4067 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4069 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4070 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4071 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4072 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4073 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4074 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4076 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4077 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4078 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4079 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4080 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4081 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4082 phantom_shared_secret,
4084 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4085 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4087 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4090 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4091 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4092 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4093 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4094 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4097 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4098 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4099 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4100 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4101 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4102 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4104 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4105 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4106 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4108 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4109 .entry(payment_hash)
4110 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4111 .or_insert_with(|| {
4112 committed_to_claimable = true;
4114 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4117 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4118 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4119 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4120 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4122 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4124 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4126 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4127 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4128 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4131 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4133 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4134 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4135 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4136 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4137 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4138 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4139 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4141 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4142 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4144 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4146 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4147 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4148 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4149 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4150 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4153 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4154 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4155 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4156 committed_to_claimable = true;
4158 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4159 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4160 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4161 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4162 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4163 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4164 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4165 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4166 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4167 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4171 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4172 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4173 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4174 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4175 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4177 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4179 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4180 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4182 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4183 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4184 committed_to_claimable = true;
4187 payment_claimable_generated
4191 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4192 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4193 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4194 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4195 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4196 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4197 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4198 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4200 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4201 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4202 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4203 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4204 Ok(result) => result,
4206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4207 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4210 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4211 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4212 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4214 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4215 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4218 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4219 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4220 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4222 check_total_value!(purpose);
4224 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4225 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4226 check_total_value!(purpose);
4230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4231 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4233 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4235 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4236 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4238 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4239 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4241 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4242 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4244 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4245 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4246 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4248 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4249 if payment_claimable_generated {
4250 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4256 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4257 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4265 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4266 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4267 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4268 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4270 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4271 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4273 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4275 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4276 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4277 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4279 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4281 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4282 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4283 events.append(&mut new_events);
4286 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4288 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4289 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4290 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4292 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4294 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4295 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4296 if background_events.is_empty() {
4297 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4300 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4302 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4303 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4304 // monitor updating completing.
4305 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4307 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4308 let mut updated_chan = false;
4310 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4316 updated_chan = true;
4317 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4318 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4325 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4326 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4328 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4329 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4330 // however, ensure that.
4332 log_error!(self.logger,
4333 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4335 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4337 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4339 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4342 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4343 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4345 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4346 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4347 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4348 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4349 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4355 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4358 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4359 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4360 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4361 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4362 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4365 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4366 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4367 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4368 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4370 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4371 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4373 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4375 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4376 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4379 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4381 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4382 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4386 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4387 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4388 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4389 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4390 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4391 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4392 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4394 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4395 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4398 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4401 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4402 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4407 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4408 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4416 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4418 /// This currently includes:
4419 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4420 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4421 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4423 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4424 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4425 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4426 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4428 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4429 /// estimate fetches.
4431 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4432 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4433 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4434 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4435 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4437 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4438 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4440 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4441 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4442 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4444 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4445 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4448 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4449 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4450 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4451 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4456 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4457 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4459 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4460 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4461 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4462 if needs_close { return false; }
4465 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4466 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4467 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4468 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4469 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4470 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4471 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4472 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4474 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4475 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4476 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4481 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4483 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4486 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4488 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4489 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4490 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4491 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4495 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4497 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4503 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4505 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4506 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4507 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4508 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4509 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4510 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4511 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4512 channel_id: *chan_id,
4513 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4522 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4524 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4525 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4526 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4528 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4529 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4530 log_error!(self.logger,
4531 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4532 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4533 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4534 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4535 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4536 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4537 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4538 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4539 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4540 channel_id: *chan_id,
4541 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4550 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4551 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4552 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4553 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4555 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4556 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4557 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4558 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4559 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4560 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4561 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4562 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4568 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4570 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4571 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4576 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4577 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4578 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4579 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4580 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4581 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4582 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4583 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4584 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4585 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4586 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4588 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4589 // have no channels to the peer.
4590 let remove_entry = {
4591 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4592 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4595 entry.remove_entry();
4598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4603 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4604 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4605 // This should be unreachable
4606 debug_assert!(false);
4609 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4610 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4611 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4612 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4613 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4614 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4615 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4618 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4619 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4620 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4622 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4623 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4630 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4631 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4632 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4634 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4637 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4638 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4641 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4643 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4644 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4645 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4646 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4647 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4654 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4655 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4656 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4658 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4659 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4660 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4661 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4663 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4664 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4665 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4666 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4667 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4668 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4671 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4672 /// reason for the failure.
4674 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4675 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4678 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4679 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4680 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4681 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4682 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4683 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4684 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4689 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4690 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4691 match failure_code {
4692 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4693 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4694 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4695 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4696 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4697 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4699 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4700 let fail_data = match data {
4701 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4704 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4709 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4710 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4712 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4714 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4715 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4716 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4717 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4718 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4719 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4720 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4722 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4724 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4725 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4727 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4732 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4733 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4734 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4735 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4736 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4737 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4738 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4739 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4740 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4741 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4743 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4744 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4745 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4746 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4748 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4749 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4750 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4751 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4752 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4756 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4757 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4758 // be surfaced to the user.
4759 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4760 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4761 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4763 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4765 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4768 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4770 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4774 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4777 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4778 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4779 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4780 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4784 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4785 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4786 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4787 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4788 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4789 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4790 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4791 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4792 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4795 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4796 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4797 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4800 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4801 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4802 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4804 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4805 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4806 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4807 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4808 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4810 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4812 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4814 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4815 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4816 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4817 push_forward_ev = true;
4819 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4821 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4824 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4827 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4828 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4829 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4830 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4831 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4832 failed_next_destination: destination,
4838 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4839 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4841 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4842 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4843 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4844 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4846 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4847 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4848 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4849 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4851 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4852 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4853 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4855 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4856 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4857 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4858 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4859 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4860 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4861 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4862 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4863 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4866 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4867 /// even type numbers.
4871 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4872 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4874 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4875 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4876 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4879 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4880 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4882 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4885 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4886 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4887 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4888 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4889 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4890 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4891 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4892 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4897 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4898 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4899 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4900 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4901 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4903 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4904 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4905 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4909 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4910 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4911 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4912 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4913 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4914 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4915 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4916 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4917 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4918 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4928 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4930 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4931 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4932 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4933 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4934 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4935 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4936 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4937 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4938 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4940 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4941 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4942 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4943 debug_assert!(false);
4947 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4949 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4950 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4951 debug_assert!(false);
4955 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4956 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4958 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4959 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4960 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4961 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4964 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4965 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4966 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4967 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4971 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4972 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4973 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4974 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4976 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4977 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4978 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4979 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4980 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4985 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4986 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4987 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4988 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4989 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4990 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4991 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4993 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4996 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4997 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4998 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4999 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5003 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5004 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5005 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5006 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5008 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5009 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5010 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5011 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5015 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5016 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5017 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5021 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5022 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5023 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5026 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5029 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5030 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5031 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5033 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5034 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5036 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5037 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5040 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5041 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5042 if let Err(e) = res {
5043 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5044 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5045 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5046 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5047 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5050 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5051 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5052 // monitor update as a background event.
5053 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5054 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5055 counterparty_node_id,
5056 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5057 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5065 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5066 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5067 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5073 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5074 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5075 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5076 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5077 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5078 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5079 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5080 // again on restart.
5081 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5082 payment_preimage, update_res);
5085 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5086 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5088 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5089 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5090 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5091 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5092 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5093 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5094 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5095 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5096 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5097 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5100 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5101 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5102 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5103 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5104 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5105 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5109 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5110 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5113 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5115 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5116 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5117 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5118 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5119 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5120 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5122 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5123 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5126 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5127 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5128 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5129 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5130 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5131 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5132 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5135 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5136 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5138 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5139 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5140 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5141 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5143 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5147 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5148 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5149 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5155 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5156 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5157 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5160 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5161 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5163 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5164 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5165 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5167 payment_purpose: purpose,
5170 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5172 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5176 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5178 sender_intended_total_msat,
5182 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5183 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5185 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5186 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5187 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5194 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5195 /// update completion.
5196 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5197 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5198 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5199 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5200 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5201 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5203 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5204 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5205 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5206 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5207 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5208 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5210 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5212 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5213 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5214 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5215 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5218 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5219 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5221 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5223 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5228 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5229 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5231 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5236 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5237 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5239 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5240 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5245 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5249 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5255 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5256 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5257 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5261 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5262 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5263 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5269 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5270 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5272 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5273 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5275 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5276 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5277 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5278 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5279 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5285 let mut peer_state_lock;
5286 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5287 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5288 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5289 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5291 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5294 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5295 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5296 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5297 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5298 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5301 let remaining_in_flight =
5302 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5303 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5306 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5307 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5308 remaining_in_flight);
5309 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5312 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5315 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5317 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5318 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5321 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5322 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5323 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5325 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5326 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5327 /// used to accept such channels.
5329 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5330 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5331 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5332 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5335 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5336 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5338 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5339 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5340 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5342 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5343 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5345 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5346 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5348 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5349 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5351 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5352 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5353 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5354 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5357 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5360 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5361 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5363 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5364 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5367 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5369 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5370 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5371 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5373 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5374 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5375 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5376 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5377 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5378 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5379 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5381 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5385 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5386 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5387 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5388 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5389 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5390 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5391 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5394 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5395 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5397 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5398 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5399 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5400 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5401 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5402 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5404 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5412 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5413 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5414 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5416 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5417 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5418 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5421 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5426 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5427 /// or 0-conf channels.
5429 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5430 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5431 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5432 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5433 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5434 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5436 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5437 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5438 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5439 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5440 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5441 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5442 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5446 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5449 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5450 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5452 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5453 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5454 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5455 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5456 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5457 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5459 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5462 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5463 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5464 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5467 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5470 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5471 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5475 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5479 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5480 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5481 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5482 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5483 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5485 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5486 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5488 debug_assert!(false);
5489 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5491 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5492 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5494 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5495 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5496 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5497 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5498 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5499 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5502 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5503 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5506 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5507 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5509 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5510 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5513 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5514 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5519 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5520 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5521 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5522 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5523 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5524 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5525 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5526 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5527 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5529 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5530 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5531 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5536 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5537 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5538 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5539 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5540 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5541 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5542 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5550 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5551 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5554 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5558 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5559 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5561 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5562 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5563 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5565 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5569 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5570 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5571 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5572 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5574 debug_assert!(false);
5575 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5579 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5581 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5582 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5587 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5588 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5589 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5590 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5591 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5593 user_channel_id: user_id,
5598 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5599 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5602 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5604 debug_assert!(false);
5605 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5610 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5611 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5612 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5613 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5615 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5616 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5617 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5618 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5619 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5620 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5621 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5622 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5623 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5627 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5632 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5635 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5636 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5637 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5638 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5639 funding_msg.channel_id))
5641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5642 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5646 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5647 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5648 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5649 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5650 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5651 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5652 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5656 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5658 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5659 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5660 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5661 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5663 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5664 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5665 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5666 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5667 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5668 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5669 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5670 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5678 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5679 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5680 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5681 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5683 debug_assert!(false);
5684 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5689 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5691 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5692 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5693 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5694 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5695 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5696 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5697 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5698 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5699 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5700 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5709 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5713 debug_assert!(false);
5714 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5718 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5720 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5721 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5722 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5724 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5725 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5726 msg: announcement_sigs,
5728 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5729 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5730 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5731 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5732 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5733 // announcement_signatures.
5734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5735 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5736 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5737 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5745 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5754 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5755 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5756 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5758 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5760 debug_assert!(false);
5761 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5765 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5766 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5768 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5769 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5770 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5771 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5773 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5774 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5775 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5776 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5777 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5779 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5780 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5781 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5782 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5783 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5786 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5787 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5788 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5789 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5791 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5792 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5793 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5794 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5796 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5801 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5802 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5803 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5804 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5811 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5812 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5813 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5814 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5820 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5821 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5822 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5824 debug_assert!(false);
5825 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5827 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5828 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5829 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5830 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5832 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5833 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5834 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5835 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5840 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5841 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5842 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5843 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5844 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5845 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5846 } else { (tx, None) }
5848 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5851 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5852 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5853 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5855 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5856 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5859 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5863 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5868 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5869 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5870 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5871 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5873 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5874 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5875 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5876 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5878 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5882 debug_assert!(false);
5883 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5887 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5890 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5891 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5892 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5893 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5894 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5896 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5897 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5898 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5899 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5900 match pending_forward_info {
5901 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5902 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5903 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5904 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5906 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5907 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5908 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5909 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5910 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5913 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5915 _ => pending_forward_info
5918 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5925 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5927 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5929 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5931 debug_assert!(false);
5932 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5934 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5935 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5936 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5938 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5939 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5945 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5949 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5951 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5953 debug_assert!(false);
5954 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5958 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5960 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5967 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5969 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5971 debug_assert!(false);
5972 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5978 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5979 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5980 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5982 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5989 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5990 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5991 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5993 debug_assert!(false);
5994 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6000 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6001 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6002 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6003 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6004 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6012 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6013 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6014 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6015 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6016 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6017 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6018 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6019 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6020 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6021 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6022 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6024 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6025 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6027 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6028 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6029 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6031 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6032 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6035 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6036 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6038 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6039 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6040 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6042 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6043 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6044 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6045 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6046 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6049 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6050 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6053 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6054 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6055 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6056 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6057 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6058 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6059 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6060 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6063 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6064 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6065 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6070 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6071 // payments are being processed.
6072 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6073 push_forward_event = true;
6075 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6076 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6083 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6087 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6088 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6089 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6091 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6095 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6097 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6098 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6099 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6101 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6102 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6103 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6104 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6105 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6106 // real by taking more time.
6107 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6108 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6109 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6114 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6115 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6116 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6117 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6118 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6119 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6120 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6122 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6123 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6124 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6125 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6126 channel_funding_outpoint,
6127 counterparty_node_id,
6132 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6133 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6135 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6137 debug_assert!(false);
6138 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6139 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6141 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6143 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6144 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6145 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6146 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6147 *counterparty_node_id)
6149 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6150 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6151 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6152 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6153 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6154 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6155 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6157 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6162 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6166 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6168 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6170 debug_assert!(false);
6171 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6173 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6174 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6175 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6184 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6186 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6188 debug_assert!(false);
6189 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6193 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6195 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6196 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6199 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6200 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6201 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6202 msg, &self.default_configuration
6204 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6205 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6206 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6214 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6215 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6216 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6217 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6219 // It's not a local channel
6220 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6224 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6225 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6226 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6232 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6233 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6234 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6235 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6236 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6237 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6241 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6242 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6243 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6244 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6246 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6247 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6252 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6255 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6257 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6260 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6262 debug_assert!(false);
6263 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6267 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6269 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6270 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6271 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6272 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6273 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6274 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6275 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6276 let mut channel_update = None;
6277 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6278 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6279 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6282 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6283 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6284 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6285 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6286 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6287 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6288 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6293 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6294 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6295 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6296 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6297 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6298 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6306 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6307 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6310 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6311 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6316 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6317 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6318 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6320 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6321 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6322 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6323 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6324 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6325 match monitor_event {
6326 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6327 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6329 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6332 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6333 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6334 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6337 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6338 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6339 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6340 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6342 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6343 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6344 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6345 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6348 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6351 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6353 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6354 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6355 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6356 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6357 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6358 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6362 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6363 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6365 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6367 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6368 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6369 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6370 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6371 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6378 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6379 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6385 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6386 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6389 has_pending_monitor_events
6392 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6393 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6394 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6396 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6397 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6398 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6401 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6402 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6403 /// update was applied.
6404 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6405 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6406 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6407 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6409 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6410 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6411 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6412 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6420 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6421 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6422 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6423 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6424 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6425 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6427 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6428 has_monitor_update = true;
6430 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6431 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6432 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6433 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6435 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6437 continue 'peer_loop;
6446 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6447 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6448 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6451 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6452 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6458 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6459 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6460 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6461 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6462 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6463 let mut has_update = false;
6465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6467 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6471 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6472 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6473 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6474 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6477 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6480 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6481 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6482 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6483 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6489 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6491 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6492 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6493 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6499 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6500 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6508 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6509 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6515 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6516 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6518 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6519 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6520 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6521 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6522 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6523 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6524 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6525 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6526 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6527 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6528 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6529 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6530 assert!(should_broadcast);
6531 } else { unreachable!(); }
6532 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6533 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6534 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6537 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6541 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6544 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6545 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6547 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6548 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6549 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6550 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6552 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6554 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6555 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6559 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6560 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6562 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6564 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6565 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6567 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6568 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6569 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6570 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6571 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6572 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6573 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6574 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6575 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6576 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6577 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6580 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6581 /// stored external to LDK.
6583 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6584 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6585 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6587 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6588 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6591 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6592 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6593 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6594 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6596 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6597 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6598 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6599 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6600 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6602 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6603 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6604 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6605 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6606 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6608 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6609 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6611 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6612 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6616 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6617 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6619 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6621 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6622 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6624 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6625 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6626 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6627 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6628 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6629 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6630 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6633 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6634 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6636 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6637 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6638 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6641 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6642 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6644 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6645 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6647 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6649 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6650 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6651 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6652 Some(_) => continue,
6653 None => return scid_candidate
6658 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6660 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6661 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6663 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6664 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6665 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6669 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6670 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6671 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6673 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6674 /// times to get a unique scid.
6675 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6676 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6677 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6679 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6680 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6681 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6682 return scid_candidate
6686 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6687 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6688 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6689 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6695 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6696 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6697 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6698 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6708 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6709 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6710 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6711 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6715 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6716 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6717 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6718 events.push_back((event, None));
6722 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6723 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6724 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6728 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6729 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6733 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6734 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6737 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6738 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6739 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6740 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6741 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6742 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6745 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6746 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6749 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6750 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6751 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6752 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6754 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6758 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6759 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6760 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6761 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6762 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6764 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6768 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6769 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6770 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6771 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6772 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6773 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6774 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6776 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6778 if further_update_exists {
6779 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6784 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6785 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6789 log_debug!(self.logger,
6790 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6791 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6795 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6796 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6797 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6801 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6802 for action in actions {
6804 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6805 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6807 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6813 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6814 /// using the given event handler.
6816 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6817 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6821 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6825 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6827 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6828 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6829 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6830 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6831 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6832 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6836 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6837 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6838 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6839 /// is always placed next to each other.
6841 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6842 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6843 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6844 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6846 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6847 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6848 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6849 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6850 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6852 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6854 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6855 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6856 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6860 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6861 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6863 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6864 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6867 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6868 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6869 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6872 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6873 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6877 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6878 events.replace(pending_events);
6887 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6898 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6900 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6901 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6902 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6904 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6908 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6910 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6911 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6912 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6913 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6914 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6915 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6919 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6921 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6922 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6923 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6924 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6925 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6928 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6929 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6932 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6934 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6935 let new_height = height - 1;
6937 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6938 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6939 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6940 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6941 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6942 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6945 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6949 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6951 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6953 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6954 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6955 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6956 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6960 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6961 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6962 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6963 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6965 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6966 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6969 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6970 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6971 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6973 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6974 if height < last_best_block_height {
6975 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6976 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6980 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6981 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6982 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6983 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6985 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6986 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6989 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6990 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6992 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6994 macro_rules! max_time {
6995 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6997 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6998 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6999 // having an explicit local time source.
7000 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7001 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7002 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7003 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7004 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7010 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7011 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7012 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7013 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7017 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7018 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7019 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7022 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7023 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7024 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7031 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7033 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7034 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7035 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7036 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7037 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7038 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7039 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7044 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7046 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7047 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7048 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7050 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7051 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7055 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7056 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7058 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7059 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7060 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7061 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7062 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7064 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7065 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7067 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7068 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7069 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7071 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7072 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7073 let res = f(channel);
7074 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7075 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7076 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7077 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7078 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7080 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7081 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7082 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7084 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7085 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7086 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7097 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7100 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7101 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7102 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7103 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7104 msg: announcement_sigs,
7106 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7107 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7108 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7110 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7111 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7112 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7117 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7118 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7119 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7120 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7121 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7122 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7123 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7124 // is always consistent.
7125 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7126 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7127 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7128 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7129 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7132 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7133 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7134 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7135 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7136 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7137 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7138 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7142 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7143 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7144 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7145 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7146 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7147 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7148 data: reason_message,
7158 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7159 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7160 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7161 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7162 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7163 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7164 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7165 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7166 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7167 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7169 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7170 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7171 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7175 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7178 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7179 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7180 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7181 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7182 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7183 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7184 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7186 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7187 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7190 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7191 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7192 _ => unreachable!(),
7194 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7195 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7196 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7203 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7205 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7206 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7210 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7212 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7213 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7215 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7216 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7219 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7220 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7221 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7224 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7225 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7226 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7227 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7230 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7231 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7232 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7233 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7236 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7237 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7239 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7240 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7241 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7242 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7243 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7246 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7247 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7248 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7249 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7252 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7253 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7254 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7255 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7258 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7259 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7260 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7261 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7265 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7266 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7268 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7269 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7270 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7271 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7272 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7277 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7279 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7282 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7283 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7284 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7285 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7288 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7293 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7294 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7295 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7296 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7299 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7304 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7309 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7314 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7319 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7324 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7329 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7331 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7334 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7339 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7344 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7349 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7354 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7359 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7364 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7365 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7366 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7367 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7368 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7370 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7375 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7380 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7382 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7383 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7385 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7386 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7387 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7388 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7389 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7390 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7391 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7392 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7393 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7394 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7395 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7400 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7401 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7402 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7405 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7406 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7407 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7410 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7411 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7412 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7413 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7415 // V1 Channel Establishment
7416 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7417 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7418 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7419 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7420 // V2 Channel Establishment
7421 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7422 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7423 // Common Channel Establishment
7424 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7425 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7426 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7431 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7432 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7436 // Channel Operations
7437 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7439 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7440 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7441 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7442 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7445 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7446 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7447 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7448 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7449 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7450 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7455 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7456 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7457 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7458 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7461 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7463 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7465 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7466 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7470 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7471 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7472 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7478 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7479 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7480 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7481 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7482 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7483 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7486 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7487 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7489 if inbound_peer_limited {
7492 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7493 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7494 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7495 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7496 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7497 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7498 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7499 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7500 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7501 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7506 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7507 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7509 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7510 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7511 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7512 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7517 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7518 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7523 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7526 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7529 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7531 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7532 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7533 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7534 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7535 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7536 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7537 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7538 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7542 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7546 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7547 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7549 match &msg.data as &str {
7550 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7551 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7553 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7554 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7555 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7556 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7557 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7558 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7559 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7560 if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
7561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7562 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7563 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7564 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7565 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7566 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7567 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7568 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7572 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7573 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7574 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7575 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7576 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7577 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7579 log_level: Level::Trace,
7589 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7590 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7592 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7593 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7594 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7595 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7596 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7597 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7598 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7599 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7600 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7601 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7603 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7604 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7605 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7609 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7611 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7612 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7613 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7614 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7615 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7616 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7617 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7618 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7626 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7627 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7631 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7632 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7635 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7636 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7639 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7640 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7643 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7644 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7645 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7646 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7649 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7650 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7651 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7652 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7655 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7656 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7657 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7658 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7661 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7662 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7663 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7664 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7667 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7668 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7669 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7670 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7673 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7674 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7675 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7676 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7679 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7680 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7681 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7682 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7685 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7686 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7687 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7688 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7691 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7692 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7693 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7694 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7698 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7699 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7700 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7701 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7702 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7706 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7707 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7709 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7710 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7711 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7712 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7713 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7716 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7717 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7718 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7719 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7722 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7723 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7724 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7725 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7728 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7729 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7730 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7731 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7732 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7733 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7734 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7735 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7736 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7737 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7738 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7739 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7740 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7741 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7742 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7743 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7744 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7745 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7746 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7747 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7752 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7753 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7755 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7756 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7757 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7758 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7761 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7762 (2, node_id, required),
7763 (4, features, required),
7764 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7765 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7766 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7767 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7770 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7771 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7772 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7773 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7774 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7775 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7776 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7777 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7778 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7779 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7780 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7781 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7782 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7783 (7, self.config, option),
7784 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7785 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7786 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7787 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7788 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7789 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7790 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7791 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7792 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7793 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7794 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7795 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7796 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7797 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7798 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7799 (32, self.is_public, required),
7800 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7801 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7802 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7803 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7804 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7810 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7811 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7812 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7813 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7814 (2, channel_id, required),
7815 (3, channel_type, option),
7816 (4, counterparty, required),
7817 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7818 (6, funding_txo, option),
7819 (7, config, option),
7820 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7821 (9, confirmations, option),
7822 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7823 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7824 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7825 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7826 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7827 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7828 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7829 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7830 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7831 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7832 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7833 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7834 (26, is_outbound, required),
7835 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7836 (30, is_usable, required),
7837 (32, is_public, required),
7838 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7839 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7840 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7841 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7842 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7845 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7846 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7847 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7848 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7849 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7851 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7855 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7857 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7858 outbound_scid_alias,
7862 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7863 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7865 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7866 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7867 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7868 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7869 confirmations_required,
7871 force_close_spend_delay,
7872 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7873 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7874 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7875 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7876 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7877 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7878 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7879 channel_shutdown_state,
7884 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7885 (2, channels, required_vec),
7886 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7887 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7890 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7892 (0, onion_packet, required),
7893 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7896 (0, payment_data, required),
7897 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7898 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7899 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7900 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7902 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7903 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7904 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7905 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7906 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7907 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7911 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7912 (0, routing, required),
7913 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7914 (4, payment_hash, required),
7915 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7916 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7917 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7918 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7922 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7923 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7925 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7927 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7928 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7929 reason.write(writer)?;
7931 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7932 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7935 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7936 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7937 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7938 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7945 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7946 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7947 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7951 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7952 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7953 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7957 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7958 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7959 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7960 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7961 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7964 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7965 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7966 // messages contained in the variants.
7967 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7968 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7969 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7971 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7972 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7973 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7974 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7975 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7978 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7979 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7980 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7981 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7982 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7984 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7989 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7995 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7996 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7997 (2, outpoint, required),
7998 (4, htlc_id, required),
7999 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8000 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8003 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8004 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8005 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8006 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8007 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8009 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8010 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8011 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8012 (2, self.value, required),
8013 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8014 (4, payment_data, option),
8015 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8016 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8017 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8018 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8024 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8025 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8026 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8027 (0, prev_hop, required),
8028 (1, total_msat, option),
8029 (2, value_ser, required),
8030 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8031 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8032 (5, total_value_received, option),
8033 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8034 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8035 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8037 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8038 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8039 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8041 if payment_data.is_some() {
8042 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8044 if total_msat.is_none() {
8045 total_msat = Some(value);
8047 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8050 if total_msat.is_none() {
8051 if payment_data.is_none() {
8052 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8054 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8056 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8060 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8063 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8064 total_value_received,
8065 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8067 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8068 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8073 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8074 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8075 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8078 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8079 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8080 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8081 let mut payment_id = None;
8082 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8083 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8084 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8085 (0, session_priv, required),
8086 (1, payment_id, option),
8087 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8088 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8089 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8090 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8092 if payment_id.is_none() {
8093 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8095 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8097 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8098 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8101 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8102 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8103 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8104 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8108 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8109 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8110 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8112 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8115 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8116 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8121 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8122 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8124 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8126 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8127 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8128 (0, session_priv, required),
8129 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8130 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8131 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8132 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8133 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8134 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8139 field.write(writer)?;
8146 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8147 (0, forward_info, required),
8148 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8149 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8150 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8151 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8154 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8156 (0, htlc_id, required),
8157 (2, err_packet, required),
8162 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8163 (0, payment_secret, required),
8164 (2, expiry_time, required),
8165 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8166 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8167 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8170 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8172 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8174 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8175 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8176 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8177 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8181 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8182 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8184 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8186 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8188 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8189 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8190 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8193 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8195 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8196 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8197 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8198 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8199 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8200 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8201 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8202 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8204 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8205 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8206 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8207 unfunded_channels += 1;
8212 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8214 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8215 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8216 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8217 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8218 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8219 channel.write(writer)?;
8226 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8227 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8228 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8229 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8230 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8231 for forward in pending_forwards {
8232 forward.write(writer)?;
8237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8239 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8240 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8241 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8243 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8244 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8245 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8246 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8247 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8248 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8249 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8250 htlc.write(writer)?;
8252 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8253 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8256 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8257 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8258 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8259 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8260 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8261 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8262 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8265 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8266 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8267 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8268 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8269 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8271 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8272 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8273 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8274 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8275 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8276 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8277 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8282 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8283 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8284 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8285 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8286 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8287 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8288 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8289 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8290 0u64.write(writer)?;
8292 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8293 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8294 event.write(writer)?;
8298 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8299 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8300 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8301 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8302 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8303 0u64.write(writer)?;
8305 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8306 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8307 // likely to be identical.
8308 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8309 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8311 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8312 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8313 hash.write(writer)?;
8314 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8317 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8318 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8319 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8320 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8321 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8324 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8325 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8327 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8328 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8329 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8330 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8333 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8334 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8338 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8339 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8340 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8342 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8343 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8344 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8350 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8351 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8352 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8353 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8356 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8357 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8358 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8359 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8360 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8363 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8364 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8365 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8366 if !updates.is_empty() {
8367 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8368 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8373 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8374 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8375 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8376 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8377 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8378 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8379 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8380 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8381 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8382 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8383 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8384 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8385 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8392 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8393 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8394 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8395 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8398 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8399 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8400 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8401 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8402 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8403 // check that the event is sane here.
8404 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8405 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8406 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8407 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8413 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8414 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8415 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8416 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8417 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8418 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8421 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8422 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8423 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8424 events.push_back((ev, action));
8425 } else if action.is_some() {
8426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8433 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8434 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8435 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8436 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8437 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8438 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8441 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8443 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8445 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8446 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8447 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8448 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8449 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8450 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8451 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8452 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8453 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8454 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8455 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8456 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8457 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8459 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8460 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8462 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8463 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8465 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8466 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8467 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8468 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8469 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8470 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8472 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8473 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8475 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8477 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8478 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8479 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8480 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8484 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8485 pub entropy_source: ES,
8487 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8488 pub node_signer: NS,
8490 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8491 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8493 pub signer_provider: SP,
8495 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8497 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8498 pub fee_estimator: F,
8499 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8501 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8502 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8503 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8504 pub chain_monitor: M,
8506 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8507 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8508 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8509 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8510 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8511 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8513 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8515 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8516 /// deserialization.
8518 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8519 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8520 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8522 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8523 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8525 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8526 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8527 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8528 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8530 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8533 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8534 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8537 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8538 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8540 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8541 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8542 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8543 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8544 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8545 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8549 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8550 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8551 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8552 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8553 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8555 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8556 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8561 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8562 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8563 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8564 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8566 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8567 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8568 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8569 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8570 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8571 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8575 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8576 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8577 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8581 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8582 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8584 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8585 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8586 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8587 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8588 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8593 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8594 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8596 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8597 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8598 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8600 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8602 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8603 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8604 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8605 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8606 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8607 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8608 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8609 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8610 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8611 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8613 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8614 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8615 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8616 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8617 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8618 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8619 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8620 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8621 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8622 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8623 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8624 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8625 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8626 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8627 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8628 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8631 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8632 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8633 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8634 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8635 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8636 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8637 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8639 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8640 let mut found_htlc = false;
8641 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8642 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8645 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8646 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8647 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8648 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8649 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8650 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8651 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8652 log_info!(args.logger,
8653 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8654 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), &payment_hash);
8655 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8659 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8660 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8661 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8662 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8663 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8665 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8666 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8668 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8670 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8671 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8674 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8675 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8676 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8680 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8681 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8682 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8683 // safely discard the channel.
8684 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8685 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8686 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8687 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8688 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8689 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8690 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8693 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8694 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8695 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8696 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8697 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8698 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8702 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8703 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8704 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8705 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8706 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8707 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8708 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8710 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8714 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8715 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8716 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8717 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8718 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8719 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8720 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8721 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8722 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8724 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8727 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8728 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8729 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8730 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8731 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8732 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8733 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8734 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8736 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8739 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8742 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8743 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8744 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8745 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8746 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8747 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8748 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8749 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8750 is_connected: false,
8754 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8755 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8756 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8757 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8758 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8759 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8760 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8761 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8764 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8765 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8766 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8767 for _ in 0..event_count {
8768 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8769 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8774 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8775 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8776 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8778 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8779 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8780 // on-startup monitor updates.
8781 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8782 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8784 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8788 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8789 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8791 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8792 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8793 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8794 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8799 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8800 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8801 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8802 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8803 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8804 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8805 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8807 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8812 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8813 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8814 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8815 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8816 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8817 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8818 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8819 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8820 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8821 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8822 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8823 let mut events_override = None;
8824 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8825 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8826 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8827 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8828 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8829 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8830 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8831 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8832 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8833 (8, events_override, option),
8834 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8835 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8836 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8837 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8839 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8840 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8843 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8844 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8847 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8848 pending_events_read = events;
8851 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8852 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8855 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8856 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8857 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8858 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8859 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8860 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8862 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8864 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8865 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8866 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8869 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8870 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8871 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8872 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8873 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8875 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8876 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8877 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8879 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8880 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8881 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8882 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8883 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8885 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8886 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8887 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8888 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8889 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8890 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8891 pending_background_events.push(
8892 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8893 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8894 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8895 update: update.clone(),
8898 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8899 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8900 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8901 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8902 pending_background_events.push(
8903 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8904 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8905 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8908 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8909 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8912 max_in_flight_update_id
8916 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8919 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8920 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8922 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8923 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8924 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8925 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8926 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8927 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8928 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8929 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8930 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8933 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8934 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8935 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8936 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8937 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8938 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8939 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8940 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8941 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8942 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8943 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8948 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8949 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8950 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8951 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8952 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8953 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8954 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8955 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8957 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8958 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8959 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8961 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8962 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8963 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8964 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8965 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8966 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8967 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8968 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8973 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8974 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8976 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8977 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8978 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8979 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8982 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8983 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8984 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8985 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8986 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8987 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8988 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8990 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8991 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8992 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8993 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8994 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8995 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8996 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9000 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9001 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9002 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9003 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9005 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9006 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9007 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9010 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9011 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9012 retry_strategy: None,
9013 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9014 payment_params: None,
9015 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9016 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9017 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9018 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9019 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9020 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9021 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9022 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9023 total_msat: path_amt,
9024 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9026 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9027 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9032 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9034 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9035 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9036 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9037 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9039 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9040 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9041 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9042 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9043 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9044 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9045 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9046 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9047 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9048 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9049 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9054 !forwards.is_empty()
9056 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9057 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9058 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9059 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9060 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9061 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9062 intercepted_id != ev_id
9069 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9070 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9071 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9072 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9073 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9074 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9075 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9076 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9077 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9078 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9079 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9081 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9082 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9083 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9085 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9086 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9087 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9094 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9095 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9097 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9099 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9100 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9101 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9102 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9103 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9104 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9105 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9106 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9107 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9110 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9111 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9112 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9113 // channel still live case here.
9117 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9118 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9123 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9124 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9125 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9126 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9127 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9128 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9129 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9130 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9134 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9135 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9137 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9138 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9139 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9140 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9142 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9143 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9146 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9147 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9149 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9150 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9152 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9155 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9156 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9157 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9159 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9163 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9164 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9165 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9166 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9167 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9169 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9170 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9171 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9172 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9173 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9174 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9175 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9176 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9178 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9179 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9183 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9185 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9187 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9188 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9190 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9191 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9196 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9197 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9199 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9201 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9203 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9204 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9205 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9210 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9211 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9214 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9215 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9216 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9218 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9219 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9220 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9222 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9223 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9224 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9225 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9226 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9227 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9229 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9230 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9231 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9232 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9233 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9234 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9240 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9242 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9243 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9244 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9245 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9246 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9247 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9248 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9249 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9250 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9251 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9252 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9254 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9255 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9257 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9258 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9259 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9260 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9262 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9263 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9264 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9265 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9267 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9268 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9269 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9270 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9272 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9273 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9274 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9276 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9277 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9278 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9281 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9282 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9285 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9288 purpose: payment.purpose,
9289 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9290 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9291 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9297 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9298 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9299 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9300 for action in actions.iter() {
9301 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9302 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9303 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9305 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9306 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9307 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9308 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9310 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9311 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9312 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9313 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9319 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9321 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9322 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9326 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9328 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9329 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9330 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9331 router: args.router,
9333 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9335 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9336 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9337 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9338 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9340 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9341 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9342 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9343 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9344 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9345 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9347 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9352 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9354 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9356 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9357 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9358 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9359 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9360 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9361 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9363 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9364 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9365 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9367 logger: args.logger,
9368 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9371 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9372 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9373 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9374 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9375 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9378 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9379 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9380 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9381 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9382 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9383 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9386 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9387 //connection or two.
9389 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9395 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9396 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9397 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9398 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9399 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9400 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9401 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9402 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9403 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9404 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9405 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9406 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9407 use crate::util::test_utils;
9408 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9409 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9412 fn test_notify_limits() {
9413 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9414 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9418 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9420 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9421 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9422 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9424 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9426 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9428 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9429 // to connect messages with new values
9430 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9431 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9432 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9433 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9434 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9435 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9437 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9439 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9440 // ... but the last node should not.
9441 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9442 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9443 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9444 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9446 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9447 // about the channel.
9448 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9449 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9450 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9452 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9454 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9455 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9456 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9457 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9458 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9459 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9461 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9465 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9466 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9467 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9468 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9469 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9470 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9472 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9473 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9474 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9475 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9476 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9477 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9478 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9479 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9481 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9482 // the channel info has updated.
9483 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9484 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9485 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9486 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9487 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9488 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9492 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9493 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9501 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9502 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9503 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9504 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9506 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9507 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9508 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9509 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9510 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9511 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9512 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9513 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9515 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9517 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9519 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9520 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9521 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9523 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9524 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9525 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9526 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9527 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9529 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9530 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9531 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9533 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9534 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9535 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9536 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9537 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9538 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9539 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9540 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9541 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9543 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9544 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9545 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9547 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9549 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9551 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9552 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9553 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9554 // lightning messages manually.
9555 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9556 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9559 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9560 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9561 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9562 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9564 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9565 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9567 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9568 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9570 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9571 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9572 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9574 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9575 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9576 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9578 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9580 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9582 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9583 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9586 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9587 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9588 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9591 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9592 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9593 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9594 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9599 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9600 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9601 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9602 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9604 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9609 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9610 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9611 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9614 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9615 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9616 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9617 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9618 // fails as expected.
9619 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9620 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9621 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9622 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9623 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9624 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9627 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9628 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9631 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9632 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9633 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9635 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9636 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9637 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9639 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9640 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9641 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9642 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9644 let route = find_route(
9645 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9646 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9648 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9649 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9651 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9653 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9654 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9658 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9659 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9660 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9661 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9663 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9664 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9665 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9666 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9667 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9668 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9669 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9671 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9673 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9674 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9676 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9677 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9678 let route = find_route(
9679 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9680 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9682 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9683 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9685 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9686 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9687 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9688 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9689 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9691 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9692 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9693 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9694 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9696 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9697 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9698 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9699 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9700 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9702 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9704 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9706 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9707 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9708 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9709 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9710 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9711 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9712 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9714 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9716 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9717 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9719 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9720 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9721 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9722 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9724 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9725 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9726 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9727 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9728 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9730 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9731 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9732 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9733 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9735 let route = find_route(
9736 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9737 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9739 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9740 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9741 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9743 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9744 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9745 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9746 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9749 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9750 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9751 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9753 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9754 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9755 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9756 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9757 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9758 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9759 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9760 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9761 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9763 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9764 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9768 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9769 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9770 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9776 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9777 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9779 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9780 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9781 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9782 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9784 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9785 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9786 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9787 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9788 let route = find_route(
9789 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9790 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9793 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9794 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9795 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9796 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9797 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9798 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9801 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9802 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9803 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9804 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9805 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9806 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9809 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9813 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9814 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9815 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9816 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9817 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9823 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9824 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9826 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9827 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9828 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9829 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9831 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9832 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9833 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9834 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9835 let route = find_route(
9836 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9837 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9840 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9841 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9842 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9843 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9844 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9845 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9847 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9850 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9851 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9852 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9853 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9854 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9855 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9858 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9862 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9863 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9866 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9868 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9869 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9870 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9871 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9873 // Marshall an MPP route.
9874 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9875 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9876 route.paths.push(path);
9877 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9878 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9879 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9880 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9881 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9882 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9884 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9885 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9887 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9888 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9890 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9895 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9896 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9897 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9899 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9901 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9903 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9904 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9906 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9907 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9912 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9913 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9914 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9915 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9916 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9917 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9920 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9923 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9924 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9929 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9930 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9936 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9937 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9939 total_msat: 100_000,
9942 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9943 // payment verification fails as expected.
9944 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9945 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9946 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9947 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9949 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9953 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9954 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9958 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9959 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9960 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9961 // the channel is successfully closed.
9962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9965 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9967 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9968 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9969 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9970 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9971 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9973 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9974 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9976 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9977 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9979 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9982 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9984 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9985 // as it has the funding transaction.
9986 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9987 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9988 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9991 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9993 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9995 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9997 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9998 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9999 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10001 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10004 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10005 // as it has the funding transaction.
10006 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10007 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10008 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10011 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10012 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10014 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10015 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10016 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10017 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10019 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10020 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10021 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10022 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10024 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10025 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10027 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10028 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10029 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10030 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10031 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10032 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10033 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10037 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10038 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10039 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10040 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10041 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10042 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10043 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10046 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10048 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10049 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10050 // closing transaction).
10051 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10052 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10055 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10056 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10057 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10058 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10059 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10062 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10064 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10066 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10067 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10068 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10070 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10072 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10073 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10076 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10077 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10078 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10081 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10082 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10083 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10086 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10088 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10089 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10091 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10092 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10094 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10095 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10100 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10101 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10102 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10103 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10104 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10105 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10106 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10110 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10111 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10112 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10114 // Test the API functions.
10115 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10117 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10119 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10121 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10123 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10125 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10127 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10131 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10132 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10134 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10138 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10140 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10141 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10143 let mut funding_tx = None;
10144 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10145 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10146 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10149 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10150 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10151 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10152 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10153 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10155 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10157 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10159 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10161 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10163 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10165 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10168 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10169 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10170 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10171 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10172 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10174 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10175 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10177 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10178 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10179 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10180 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10181 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10182 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10183 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10186 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10187 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10188 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10189 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10190 }, true).unwrap_err();
10192 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10193 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10194 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10195 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10196 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10197 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10198 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10200 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10201 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10203 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10204 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10205 }, true).unwrap_err();
10207 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10208 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10209 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10210 }, false).unwrap();
10211 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10213 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10214 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10216 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10217 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10218 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10219 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10220 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10222 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10223 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10224 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10226 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10227 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10228 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10230 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10231 // "protected" and can connect again.
10232 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10233 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10234 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10236 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10238 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10240 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10241 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10245 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10246 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10252 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10254 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10255 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10257 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10258 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10259 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10260 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10263 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10266 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10267 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10269 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10270 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10271 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10273 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10274 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10275 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10276 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10280 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10281 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10282 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10285 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10286 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10290 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10292 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10293 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10295 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10296 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10297 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10298 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10299 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10300 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10303 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10304 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10306 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10307 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10309 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10311 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10312 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10315 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10316 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10317 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10318 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10319 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10321 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10322 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10324 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10325 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10326 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10327 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10333 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10334 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10336 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10337 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10338 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10340 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10341 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10345 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10349 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10350 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10351 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10352 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10353 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10354 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10355 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10356 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10358 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10359 payment_metadata: None,
10360 keysend_preimage: None,
10361 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10362 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10364 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10366 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10367 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10368 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10369 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10370 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10372 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10373 } else { panic!(); }
10375 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10376 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10378 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10379 payment_metadata: None,
10380 keysend_preimage: None,
10381 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10382 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10384 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10386 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10387 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10391 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10392 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10393 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10394 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10395 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10397 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10398 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10400 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10401 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10402 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10403 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10404 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10406 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10407 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10409 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10410 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10411 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10412 match &msg_events[0] {
10413 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10414 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10416 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10417 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10418 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10421 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10424 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10425 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10427 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10428 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10429 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10431 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10435 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10436 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10437 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10438 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10441 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10442 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10443 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10445 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10447 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10448 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10449 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10451 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10452 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10454 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10455 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10460 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10461 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10463 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10464 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10466 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10467 // not have generated any events.
10468 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10472 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10473 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10474 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10475 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10476 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10478 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10479 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10481 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10482 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10485 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10486 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10487 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10488 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10489 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10491 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10492 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10495 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10496 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10499 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10500 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10501 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10502 ..Default::default()
10504 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10505 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10506 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10508 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10509 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10512 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10513 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10514 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10515 ..Default::default()
10517 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10518 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10519 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10522 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10523 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10526 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10527 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10528 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10529 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10530 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10533 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10534 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10535 ..Default::default()
10537 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10540 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10541 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10542 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10543 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10547 fn test_payment_display() {
10548 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10549 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10555 use crate::chain::Listen;
10556 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10557 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10558 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10559 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10560 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10561 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10562 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10563 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10564 use crate::util::test_utils;
10565 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10567 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10568 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10569 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10571 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10573 use criterion::Criterion;
10575 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10576 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10577 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10578 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10579 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10580 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10581 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10583 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10584 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10586 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10587 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10589 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10591 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10594 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10595 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10598 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10599 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10600 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10602 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10603 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10605 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10606 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10607 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10608 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10609 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10611 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10612 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10613 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10615 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10616 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10617 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10618 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10620 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10621 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10622 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10624 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10625 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10626 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10627 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10628 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10630 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10631 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10632 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10634 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10635 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10637 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10638 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10639 }, false).unwrap();
10640 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10641 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10642 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10645 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10646 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10647 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10649 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10650 } else { panic!(); }
10652 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10653 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10654 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10655 match events_b[0] {
10656 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10657 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10662 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10663 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10664 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10665 match events_a[0] {
10666 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10667 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10672 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10674 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10675 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10676 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10678 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10679 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10680 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10681 match msg_events[0] {
10682 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10683 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10684 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10688 match msg_events[1] {
10689 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10693 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10694 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10695 match events_a[0] {
10696 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10697 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10702 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10703 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10704 match events_b[0] {
10705 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10706 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10711 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10712 macro_rules! send_payment {
10713 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10714 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10715 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10716 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10717 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10718 payment_count += 1;
10719 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10720 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10722 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10723 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10724 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10725 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10726 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10727 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10728 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10729 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10730 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10731 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10732 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10735 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10736 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10737 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10739 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10740 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10741 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10742 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10743 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10745 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10748 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10749 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10750 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10751 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10753 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10757 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10758 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10759 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);