1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1433 signer_provider: SP,
1438 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1440 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1441 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1442 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1444 pub struct ChainParameters {
1445 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1446 pub network: Network,
1448 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1450 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1451 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1454 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1458 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1463 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1464 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1465 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1466 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1467 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1469 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1470 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1471 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1472 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1476 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1477 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1480 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1481 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1482 /// events to handle.
1484 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1485 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1487 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1488 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1491 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1492 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1493 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1496 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1497 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1498 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1499 should_persist: move || {
1500 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1501 // processing and return that.
1502 let notify = persist_check();
1503 match (notify, force_notify) {
1504 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1505 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1506 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1507 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1508 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1511 _read_guard: read_guard,
1515 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1516 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1517 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1518 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1519 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1520 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1523 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1524 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1525 should_persist: persist_check,
1526 _read_guard: read_guard,
1531 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1532 fn drop(&mut self) {
1533 match (self.should_persist)() {
1534 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1535 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1536 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1538 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1540 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1545 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1546 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1548 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1550 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1551 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1552 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1553 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1554 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1556 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1557 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1559 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1561 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1562 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1563 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1564 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1565 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1566 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1567 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1568 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1569 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1570 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1571 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1572 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1573 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1575 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1576 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1578 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1579 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1580 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1581 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1583 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1584 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1585 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1586 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1587 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1590 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1592 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1593 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1595 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1597 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1598 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1601 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1602 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1604 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1605 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1606 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1608 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1609 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1610 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1611 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1613 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1614 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1615 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1617 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1618 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1619 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1621 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1624 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1625 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1626 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1627 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1628 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1629 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1630 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1634 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1635 /// to better separate parameters.
1636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1638 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1639 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1640 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1641 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1642 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1643 pub features: InitFeatures,
1644 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1645 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1646 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1648 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1650 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1651 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1652 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1653 /// payments to us through this channel.
1654 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1655 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1656 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1657 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1658 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1660 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1663 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1666 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1667 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1668 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1669 /// lifetime of the channel.
1670 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1671 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1672 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1673 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1674 /// our counterparty already.
1675 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1676 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1678 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1679 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1683 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1684 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1686 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1687 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1690 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1691 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1692 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1693 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1694 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1695 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1696 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1697 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1700 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1702 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1703 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1704 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1705 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1706 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1707 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1708 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1710 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1711 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1713 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1714 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1715 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1716 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1717 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1718 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1719 /// this value on chain.
1721 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1725 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1726 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1727 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1728 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1730 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1731 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1733 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1735 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1736 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1737 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1738 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1740 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1741 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1742 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1744 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1746 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1747 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1748 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1749 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1751 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1752 pub balance_msat: u64,
1753 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1754 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1755 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1756 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1758 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1760 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1761 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1762 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1763 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1764 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1765 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1766 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1767 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1769 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1770 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1771 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1772 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1774 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1775 /// route which is valid.
1776 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1777 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1778 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1779 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1780 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1781 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1783 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1784 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1785 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1786 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1787 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1788 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1789 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1793 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1795 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1796 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1798 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1799 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1801 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1802 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1803 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1804 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1805 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1806 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1807 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1810 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1811 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1812 pub is_outbound: bool,
1813 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1814 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1815 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1816 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1817 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1819 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1820 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1821 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1822 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1823 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1824 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1825 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1827 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1828 pub is_usable: bool,
1829 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1830 pub is_public: bool,
1831 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1832 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1833 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1834 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1835 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1836 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1838 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1839 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1840 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1842 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1843 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1846 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1847 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1850 impl ChannelDetails {
1851 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1852 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1853 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1855 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1857 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1858 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1861 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1862 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1863 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1865 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1867 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1868 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1871 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1872 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1873 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1879 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1880 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1881 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1883 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1884 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1885 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 features: latest_features,
1887 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1888 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1889 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1890 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1891 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1892 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1893 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1894 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1895 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1896 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1898 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1899 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1900 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1901 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1902 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1903 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1904 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1905 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1906 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1907 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1908 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1909 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1910 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1911 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1912 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1913 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1914 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1915 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1916 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1917 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1918 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1919 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1920 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1921 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1922 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1923 config: Some(context.config()),
1924 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1925 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1926 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1932 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1933 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1934 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1935 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1936 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1937 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1938 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1939 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1941 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1943 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1944 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1946 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1947 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1948 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1949 /// to drop the channel.
1953 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1954 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1955 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1956 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1957 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1963 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1971 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1972 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1975 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1976 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1977 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1979 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1980 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1981 payment_id: PaymentId,
1982 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1983 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1984 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1986 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1987 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1988 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1990 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1991 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1992 payment_id: PaymentId,
1993 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1994 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1998 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2000 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2002 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2003 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2004 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2005 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2007 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2008 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2009 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2012 macro_rules! handle_error {
2013 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2014 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2015 // entering the macro.
2016 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2017 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2022 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2024 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2025 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2026 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2027 let logger = WithContext::from(
2028 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2030 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2032 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2033 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2034 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2044 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: err.action.clone()
2050 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2051 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2052 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2053 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2058 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2065 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2066 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2067 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2068 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2072 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2074 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2075 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2076 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2077 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2078 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2080 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2083 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2087 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2088 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2089 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2091 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2092 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2094 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2095 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2097 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2098 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2099 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2101 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2102 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2104 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2113 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2115 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2116 match $channel_phase {
2117 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2121 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2124 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2126 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2138 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2139 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2143 let key = *$entry.key();
2144 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2146 $entry.remove_entry();
2154 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2155 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let key = *$entry.key();
2160 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2162 $entry.remove_entry();
2170 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2171 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2173 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2174 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2180 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2181 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2182 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2183 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2184 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2186 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2187 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2188 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2189 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2190 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2191 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2192 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2193 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2200 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2201 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2202 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2208 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2209 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2211 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2216 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2217 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2218 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2219 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2220 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2221 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2222 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2223 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2226 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2231 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2232 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2234 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2235 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2236 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2237 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2238 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2239 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2240 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2241 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2242 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2244 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2245 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2253 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2255 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2256 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2257 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2258 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2259 updates.announcement_sigs);
2260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2261 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2264 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2265 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2266 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2267 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2269 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2270 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2271 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2272 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2273 let mut batch_completed = false;
2274 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2275 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2276 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2277 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2279 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2280 channel_state.2 = true;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2284 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2289 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2290 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2291 if batch_completed {
2292 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2293 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2295 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2296 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2298 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2299 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2300 chan.set_batch_ready();
2301 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2306 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2307 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2308 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2313 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2315 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2316 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2318 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2319 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2321 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2322 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2324 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2329 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2331 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2335 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2336 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2337 panic!("{}", err_str);
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2340 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2341 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2350 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2351 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2352 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2354 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2355 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2356 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2357 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2358 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2359 // filter for uniqueness here.
2360 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2361 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2362 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2363 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2365 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2366 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2368 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2369 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2370 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2376 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2377 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2378 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2379 while !processed_all_events {
2380 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2387 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2388 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2389 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2392 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2393 result = $self.process_background_events();
2395 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2396 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2397 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2398 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2402 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2403 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2404 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2405 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2408 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2410 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2411 $event_to_handle = event;
2413 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2414 post_event_actions.push(action);
2419 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2420 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2421 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2422 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2423 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2424 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2427 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2428 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2429 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2430 processed_all_events = false;
2434 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2435 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2436 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2438 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2439 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2440 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2457 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2459 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2462 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2466 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2467 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2468 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2471 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2472 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2473 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2475 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2476 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2477 current_timestamp: u32,
2479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2485 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2499 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2500 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2503 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2506 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2507 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2509 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2511 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2513 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2515 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2516 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2517 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2518 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2519 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2520 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2521 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2522 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2524 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2534 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2535 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2536 &self.default_configuration
2539 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2540 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2544 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2545 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2547 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2549 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2553 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2560 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2561 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2562 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2563 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2564 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2567 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2569 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2570 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2571 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2573 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2574 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2575 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2577 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2578 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2580 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2582 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2583 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2584 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2585 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2588 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2590 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2591 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2596 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2597 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2606 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2607 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2614 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2615 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2616 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2617 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2627 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2629 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2635 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2642 node_id: their_network_key,
2645 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2648 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2650 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2651 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2652 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2653 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2654 // the same channel.
2655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2663 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2664 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2665 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2669 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2670 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2671 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2680 /// more information.
2681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2682 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2683 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2684 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2685 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2686 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2687 // the same channel.
2688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2695 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2696 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2697 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2705 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2706 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2708 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2709 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2711 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2712 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2713 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2714 // really wanted anyway.
2715 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2718 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2719 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let context_to_details = |context| {
2728 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2730 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2732 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2733 .map(context_to_details)
2739 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2740 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2742 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2743 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2744 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2749 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2751 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2753 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2759 payment_id: *payment_id,
2760 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2761 total_msat: *total_msat,
2764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2775 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2778 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2779 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2793 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2794 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2795 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2796 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2797 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2799 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2800 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2801 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2807 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2808 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2810 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2824 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2831 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2837 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2838 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2856 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2863 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2864 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2865 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2866 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2867 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2868 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2871 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2872 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2873 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2875 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2876 /// the channel being closed or not:
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2878 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2881 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2882 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2883 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2885 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2886 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2887 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2888 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2890 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2892 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2893 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2894 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2898 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2899 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2900 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2904 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2906 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2907 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2908 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 let logger = WithContext::from(
2912 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2915 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2916 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2917 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2918 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2919 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2923 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2927 // ignore the result here.
2928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2930 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2931 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2932 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2933 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2936 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2937 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2938 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2939 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2941 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2944 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2947 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2948 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2956 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2957 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2958 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2959 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2960 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2963 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2965 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2969 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2974 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2975 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2976 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2977 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2981 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2982 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2984 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2986 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2988 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2991 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2992 mem::drop(peer_state);
2993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2995 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2996 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2997 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3000 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3001 // Unfunded channel has no update
3002 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3005 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3007 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3008 // Unfunded channel has no update
3009 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3012 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3014 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3015 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3017 (None, *peer_node_id)
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3022 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3023 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3024 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3027 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3028 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3029 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3039 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3045 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3061 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3062 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3063 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3065 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3066 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3067 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3070 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3071 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3072 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3074 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3076 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3081 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3082 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3085 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3089 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3090 /// local transaction(s).
3091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3093 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3097 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3098 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3099 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3100 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3101 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3102 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3103 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3104 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3106 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3107 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3108 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3109 // we don't have the channel here.
3110 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3114 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3115 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3116 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3117 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3118 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3119 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3120 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3121 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3122 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3123 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3124 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3126 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3129 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3130 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3131 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3133 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3134 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3135 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3141 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3142 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3143 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3144 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3146 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3147 None => return None,
3148 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3151 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3152 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3157 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3158 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3161 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3165 fn can_forward_htlc(
3166 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3167 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3168 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3169 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3172 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3174 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3175 // intercept forward.
3176 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3177 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3178 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3180 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3185 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3186 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3187 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3189 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3190 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3192 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3198 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3199 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3200 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3201 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3202 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3203 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3204 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3205 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3206 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3207 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3209 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3210 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3213 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3214 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3216 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3217 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3218 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3219 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3220 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3221 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3222 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3224 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3228 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3229 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3231 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3232 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3233 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3234 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3235 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3236 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3237 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3241 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3242 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3244 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3246 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3247 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3248 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3249 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3250 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3254 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3255 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3257 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3259 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3260 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3263 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3264 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3265 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3266 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3269 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3270 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3271 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3272 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3273 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3274 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3275 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3279 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3282 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3283 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3284 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3285 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3286 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3287 macro_rules! return_err {
3288 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3290 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3291 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3292 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3293 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3294 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3295 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3296 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3297 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3298 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3302 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3303 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3304 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3305 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3306 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3312 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3314 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3315 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3316 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3317 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3320 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3321 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3322 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3323 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3324 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3326 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3329 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3330 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3331 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3332 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3333 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3339 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3340 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3341 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3343 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3344 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3345 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3347 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3348 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3349 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3350 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3351 return Err(LightningError {
3352 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3353 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3356 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3357 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3359 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3360 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3361 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3364 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3365 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3366 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3367 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3369 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3370 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3371 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3373 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3374 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3375 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3376 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3377 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3378 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3383 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3386 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3387 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3388 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3389 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3391 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3392 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3393 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3394 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3395 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3398 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3399 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3401 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3402 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3403 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3404 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3405 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3406 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3407 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3408 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3410 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3411 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3412 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3414 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3416 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3423 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3424 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3425 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3426 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3431 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3432 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3433 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3436 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3437 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3438 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3439 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3441 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3442 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3443 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3445 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3446 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3450 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3451 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3453 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3454 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3455 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3457 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3460 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3462 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3463 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3466 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3467 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3470 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3471 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3472 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3473 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3474 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3476 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3477 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3478 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3479 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3481 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3482 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3484 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3485 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3486 Some(monitor_update) => {
3487 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3489 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3490 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3491 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3492 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3493 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3494 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3495 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3503 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3506 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3507 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3508 // `channel_by_id` map.
3509 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3514 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3515 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3517 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3522 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3524 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3525 /// fields for more info.
3527 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3528 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3530 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3532 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3533 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3534 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3535 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3536 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3538 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3539 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3540 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3541 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3542 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3544 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3545 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3546 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3547 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3549 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3551 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3552 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3553 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3555 /// In general, a path may raise:
3556 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3557 /// node public key) is specified.
3558 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3559 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3560 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3561 /// relevant updates.
3563 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3564 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3565 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3567 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3568 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3569 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3570 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3571 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3572 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3573 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments
3577 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3578 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3579 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3582 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3583 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3584 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments
3588 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3589 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3590 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3591 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3595 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3599 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3600 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3604 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3605 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3610 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3611 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3614 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3615 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3617 self.pending_outbound_payments
3618 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3619 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3620 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3621 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3622 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3626 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3627 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3628 /// retries are exhausted.
3630 /// # Event Generation
3632 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3633 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3635 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3636 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3637 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3639 /// # Requested Invoices
3641 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3642 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3643 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3644 /// once the invoice has been received.
3646 /// # Restart Behavior
3648 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3649 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3650 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3652 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3653 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3654 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3655 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3658 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3659 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3660 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3661 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3662 /// never reach the recipient.
3664 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3665 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3667 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3668 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3670 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3671 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3674 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3675 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3676 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3679 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3680 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3682 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3685 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3686 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3687 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3689 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3690 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3691 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3692 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3695 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3696 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3697 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3698 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3701 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3702 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3703 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3706 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3709 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3710 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3713 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3714 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3716 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3717 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3718 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3719 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3720 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3721 let payment_params =
3722 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3724 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3726 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3729 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3730 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3732 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3733 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3734 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3735 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3737 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3738 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3739 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3740 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3741 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3742 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3743 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3744 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3745 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3746 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3748 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3749 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3750 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3751 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3755 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3757 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3758 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3761 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3763 let mut res = Vec::new();
3765 for mut path in route.paths {
3766 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3767 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3768 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3769 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3770 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3773 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3776 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3777 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3779 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3781 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3782 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3787 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3790 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3795 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3796 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3797 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3799 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3800 let used_liquidity =
3801 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3803 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3804 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3806 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3809 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3814 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3815 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3816 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3823 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3824 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3825 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3826 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3827 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3828 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3829 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3830 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3831 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3836 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3837 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3838 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3840 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3841 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3842 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3843 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3844 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3845 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3846 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3847 } else { unreachable!(); });
3849 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3850 Err((chan, err)) => {
3851 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3852 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3854 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3855 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3861 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3862 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3864 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3865 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3868 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3869 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3870 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3874 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3876 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3880 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3882 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3885 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3886 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3890 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3891 funding_txo, o.get()
3893 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3894 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3895 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3896 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3897 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3898 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3901 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3908 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3909 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3910 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3914 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3916 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3917 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3919 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3920 /// across the p2p network.
3922 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3923 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3925 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3926 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3927 /// keys per-channel).
3929 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3930 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3931 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3933 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3934 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3935 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3937 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3938 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3939 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3940 /// for more details.
3942 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3943 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3944 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3945 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3948 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3950 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3951 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3953 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3954 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3955 /// signature for each channel.
3957 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3958 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3960 let mut result = Ok(());
3962 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3963 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3964 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3965 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3971 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3972 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3973 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3977 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3978 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3979 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3980 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3981 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3982 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3983 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3984 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3986 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3992 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3993 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3994 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3995 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3999 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4000 match states.entry(txid) {
4001 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4002 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4003 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4007 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4010 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4011 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4012 temporary_channel_id,
4013 counterparty_node_id,
4014 funding_transaction.clone(),
4017 let mut output_index = None;
4018 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4019 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4020 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4021 if output_index.is_some() {
4022 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4023 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4026 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4029 if output_index.is_none() {
4030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4031 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4034 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4035 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4036 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4037 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4038 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4039 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4045 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4046 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4047 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4048 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4049 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4050 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4051 .into_iter().flatten()
4052 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4054 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4055 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4057 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4060 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4061 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4062 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4063 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4065 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4066 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4067 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4071 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4072 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4073 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4079 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4081 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4082 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4083 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4084 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4086 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4087 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4089 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4090 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4092 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4094 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4095 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4096 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4097 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4098 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4099 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4100 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4101 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4102 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4103 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4104 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4105 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4106 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4112 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4113 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4116 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4117 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4119 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4123 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4124 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4125 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4126 config.apply(config_update);
4127 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4131 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4133 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4135 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4142 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4143 debug_assert!(false);
4144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4146 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4147 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4154 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4156 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4157 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4158 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4159 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4161 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4162 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4164 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4165 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4167 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4169 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4170 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4171 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4172 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4173 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4174 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4175 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4176 pub fn update_channel_config(
4177 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4178 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4179 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4182 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4183 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4185 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4186 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4188 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4189 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4190 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4191 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4192 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4194 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4195 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4199 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4202 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4203 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4204 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4205 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4206 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4207 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4210 let next_hop_scid = {
4211 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4212 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4213 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4216 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4217 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4218 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4219 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4220 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4223 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4225 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4226 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4227 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4230 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4231 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4232 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4233 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4234 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4241 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4242 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4243 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4246 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4247 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4248 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4249 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4252 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4254 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4255 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4256 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4257 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4258 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4261 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4262 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4263 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4264 payment.prev_channel_id,
4265 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4266 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4268 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4272 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4273 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4275 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4278 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4279 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4282 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4283 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4284 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4287 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4288 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4289 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4290 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4291 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4292 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4293 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4294 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4295 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4296 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4299 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4300 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4301 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4302 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4307 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4308 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4309 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4311 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4312 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4313 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4314 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4315 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4316 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4317 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4319 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4320 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4324 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4328 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4329 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4330 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4331 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4332 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4333 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4334 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4335 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4338 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4339 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4340 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4341 incoming_channel_details
4343 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4347 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4348 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4349 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4350 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4351 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4353 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4355 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4360 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4361 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4363 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4364 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4365 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4366 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4367 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4371 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4372 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4373 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4374 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4379 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4380 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4381 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4383 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4384 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4387 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4388 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4391 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4392 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4393 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4394 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4396 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4397 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4398 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4400 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4401 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4406 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4407 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4408 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4410 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4411 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4413 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4414 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4415 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4420 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4421 // proposed to as a batch.
4422 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4423 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4424 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4425 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4426 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4427 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4428 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4429 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4431 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4432 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4433 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4434 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4437 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4438 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4439 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4440 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4446 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4448 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4449 /// Will likely generate further events.
4450 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4453 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4455 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4456 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4457 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4459 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4460 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4462 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4463 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4464 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4465 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4467 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4468 match forward_info {
4469 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4470 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4471 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4472 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4473 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4476 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4477 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4478 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4479 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4481 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4482 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4483 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4484 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4485 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4486 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4487 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4488 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4489 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4492 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4493 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4495 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4498 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4499 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4505 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4506 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4508 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4512 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4513 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4515 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4519 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4520 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4521 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4522 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4523 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4524 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4525 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4528 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4529 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4530 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4531 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4532 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4534 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4536 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4537 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4541 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4542 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4543 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4544 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4545 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4546 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4548 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4549 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4555 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4558 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4561 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4562 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4563 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4564 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4565 // problem, not ours.
4571 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4572 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4573 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4575 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4579 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4581 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4582 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4583 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4586 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4587 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4588 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4589 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4590 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4591 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4592 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4593 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4594 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4595 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4596 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4597 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4598 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4601 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4602 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4603 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4604 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4605 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4606 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4607 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4608 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4609 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4610 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4611 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4613 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4614 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4615 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4616 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4617 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4618 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4621 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4622 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4623 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4626 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4627 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4629 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4631 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4632 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4633 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4634 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4640 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4641 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4643 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4644 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4645 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4647 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4648 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4649 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4650 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4652 Some((res, htlc_id))
4655 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4656 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4657 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4658 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4660 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4662 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4663 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4664 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4670 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4674 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4675 match forward_info {
4676 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4677 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4678 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4679 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4680 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4683 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4684 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4685 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4686 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4687 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4689 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4690 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4691 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4692 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4693 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4695 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4696 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4697 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4699 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4700 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4704 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4705 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4708 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4711 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4712 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4713 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4714 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4715 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4716 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4717 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4718 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4719 phantom_shared_secret,
4722 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4723 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4724 // if routing nodes overpay
4725 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4726 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4728 total_value_received: None,
4729 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4732 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4735 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4737 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4738 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4739 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4740 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4741 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4742 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4744 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4745 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4746 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4747 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4748 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4749 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4750 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4751 phantom_shared_secret,
4754 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4755 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4757 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4760 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4761 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4762 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4763 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4764 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4767 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4768 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4769 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4770 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4771 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4772 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4774 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4775 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4776 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4778 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4779 .entry(payment_hash)
4780 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4781 .or_insert_with(|| {
4782 committed_to_claimable = true;
4784 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4787 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4788 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4789 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4790 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4792 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4794 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4796 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4797 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4798 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4801 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4803 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4804 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4805 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4806 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4807 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4808 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4809 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4811 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4812 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4814 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4816 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4817 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4818 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4819 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4820 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4821 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4823 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4824 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4825 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4826 committed_to_claimable = true;
4828 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4829 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4830 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4831 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4832 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4833 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4834 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4835 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4836 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4840 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4841 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4842 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4843 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4844 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4846 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4848 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4849 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4851 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4852 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4853 committed_to_claimable = true;
4856 payment_claimable_generated
4860 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4861 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4862 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4863 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4864 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4865 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4866 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4867 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4869 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4870 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4871 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4872 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4873 Ok(result) => result,
4875 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4876 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4879 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4880 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4881 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4883 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4884 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4887 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4888 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4889 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4891 check_total_value!(purpose);
4893 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4894 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4895 check_total_value!(purpose);
4899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4900 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4902 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4904 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4905 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4907 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4908 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4909 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4910 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4911 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4913 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4914 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4915 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4917 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4918 if payment_claimable_generated {
4919 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4925 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4926 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4934 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4935 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4936 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4937 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4939 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4940 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4942 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4944 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4945 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4946 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4948 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4950 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4951 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4952 events.append(&mut new_events);
4955 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4957 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4958 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4959 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4961 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4963 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4964 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4965 if background_events.is_empty() {
4966 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4969 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4971 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4972 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4973 // monitor updating completing.
4974 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4976 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4977 let mut updated_chan = false;
4979 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4980 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4983 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4985 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4986 updated_chan = true;
4987 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4988 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4990 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4998 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4999 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5002 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5004 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5005 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5006 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5007 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5008 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5010 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5011 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5012 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5013 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5014 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5020 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5023 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5024 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5025 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5026 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5027 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5030 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5031 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5033 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5035 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5036 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5037 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5039 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5040 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5041 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5042 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5044 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5045 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5047 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5048 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5052 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5053 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5054 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5055 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5056 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5057 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5058 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5060 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5061 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5063 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5064 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5067 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5068 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5070 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5075 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5076 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5084 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5086 /// This currently includes:
5087 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5088 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5089 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5091 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5092 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5093 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5094 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5095 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5096 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5097 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5098 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5100 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5101 /// estimate fetches.
5103 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5104 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5105 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5106 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5107 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5109 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5110 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5112 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5113 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5114 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5115 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5117 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5118 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5119 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5120 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5121 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5122 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5124 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5125 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5126 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5128 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5129 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5130 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5131 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5132 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5133 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5135 channel_id: *chan_id,
5136 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5148 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5149 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5150 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5151 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5152 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5153 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5155 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5156 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5161 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5162 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5164 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5165 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5166 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5167 if needs_close { return false; }
5170 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5171 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5172 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5173 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5174 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5175 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5176 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5177 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5179 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5180 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5181 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5182 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5186 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5188 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5191 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5193 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5194 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5195 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5200 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5202 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5208 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5210 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5211 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5212 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5213 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5214 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5215 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5216 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5217 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5218 channel_id: *chan_id,
5219 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5227 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5228 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5229 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5231 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5232 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5233 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5235 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5236 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5237 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5238 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5240 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5241 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5242 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5243 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5248 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5249 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5250 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5251 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5252 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5253 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5254 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5255 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5256 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5262 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5264 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5265 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5270 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5271 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5272 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5273 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5274 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5275 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5276 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5277 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5278 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5279 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5280 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5282 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5283 // have no channels to the peer.
5284 let remove_entry = {
5285 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5286 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5289 entry.remove_entry();
5292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5297 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5298 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5299 // This should be unreachable
5300 debug_assert!(false);
5303 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5304 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5305 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5306 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5307 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5308 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5309 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5312 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5313 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5314 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5316 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5317 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5324 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5325 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5326 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5327 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5328 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5331 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5332 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5335 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5336 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5339 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5340 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5341 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5342 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5343 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5344 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5345 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5348 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5349 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5352 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5353 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5354 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5355 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5356 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5363 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5364 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5365 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5367 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5368 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5369 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5370 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5372 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5373 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5374 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5375 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5376 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5380 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5381 /// reason for the failure.
5383 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5384 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5387 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5388 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5389 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5390 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5391 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5392 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5393 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5398 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5399 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5400 match failure_code {
5401 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5402 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5403 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5404 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5405 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5406 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5409 let fail_data = match data {
5410 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5413 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5418 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5419 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5421 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5423 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5424 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5425 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5426 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5427 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5428 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5429 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5431 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5433 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5434 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5436 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5441 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5442 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5443 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5444 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5445 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5446 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5447 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5448 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5449 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5450 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5452 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5453 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5454 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5455 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5457 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5458 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5459 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5460 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5461 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5465 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5466 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5467 // be surfaced to the user.
5468 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5469 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5470 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5472 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5474 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5475 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5476 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5477 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5479 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5480 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5482 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5483 debug_assert!(false);
5484 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5489 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5492 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5493 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5494 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5495 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5499 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5500 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5501 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5504 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5505 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5506 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5507 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5508 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5509 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5510 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5511 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5512 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5513 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5516 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5517 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5518 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5521 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5522 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5523 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5524 let mut push_forward_event;
5526 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5527 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5528 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5529 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5531 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5532 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5533 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5536 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5537 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5538 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5540 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5541 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5542 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5543 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5544 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5546 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5548 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5549 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5551 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5552 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5556 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5557 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5559 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5563 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5564 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5565 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5566 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5568 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5571 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5574 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5575 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5576 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5577 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5578 failed_next_destination: destination,
5585 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5586 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5588 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5589 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5590 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5591 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5593 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5594 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5595 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5596 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5598 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5599 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5600 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5602 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5603 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5604 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5605 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5606 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5607 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5608 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5609 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5610 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5613 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5614 /// even type numbers.
5618 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5619 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5621 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5622 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5623 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5626 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5627 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5632 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5633 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5634 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5635 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5636 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5637 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5638 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5639 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5644 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5645 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5646 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5647 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5648 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5650 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5651 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5652 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5656 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5657 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5658 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5659 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5660 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5661 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5662 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5663 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5664 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5665 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5675 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5677 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5678 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5679 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5680 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5681 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5682 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5683 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5684 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5685 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5687 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5688 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5689 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5690 debug_assert!(false);
5694 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5696 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5697 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5698 debug_assert!(false);
5702 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5703 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5705 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5706 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5707 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5708 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5711 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5712 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5713 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5714 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5718 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5719 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5720 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5721 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5722 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5723 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5724 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5727 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5728 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5729 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5730 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5731 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5732 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5737 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5738 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5739 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5740 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5741 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5742 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5743 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5745 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5748 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5749 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5750 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5751 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5755 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5756 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5757 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5758 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5760 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5761 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5762 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5763 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5765 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5766 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5767 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5768 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5772 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5773 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5774 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5778 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5779 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5780 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5783 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5786 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5787 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5788 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5789 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5790 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5793 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5794 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5795 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5797 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5800 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5801 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5803 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5804 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5805 // monitor update as a background event.
5806 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5807 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5808 counterparty_node_id,
5809 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5810 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5811 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5815 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5816 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5821 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5823 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5825 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5826 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5827 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5828 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5829 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5831 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5833 debug_assert!(false,
5834 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5837 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5838 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5839 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5840 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5841 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5843 let mut found_blocker = false;
5844 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5845 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5846 // which case we need to only remove the one
5847 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5848 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5849 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5850 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5852 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5855 debug_assert!(false);
5864 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5865 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5866 counterparty_node_id: None,
5867 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5870 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5874 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5875 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5876 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5877 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5878 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5879 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5880 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5881 // again on restart.
5882 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5883 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5884 payment_preimage, update_res);
5887 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5888 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5890 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5891 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5892 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5893 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5894 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5895 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5896 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5897 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5898 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5899 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5902 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5903 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5904 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5905 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5906 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5907 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5911 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5912 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5915 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5916 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5917 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5918 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5921 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5922 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5923 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5924 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5925 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5927 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5928 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5929 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5931 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5932 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5935 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5936 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5937 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5938 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5939 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5940 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5941 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5942 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5943 let chan_to_release =
5944 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5945 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5947 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5948 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5949 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5950 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5955 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5956 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5957 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5958 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5959 // in the background.
5960 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5961 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5962 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5963 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5965 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5966 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5967 funding_txo, update, ..
5969 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5970 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5971 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5972 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5974 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5980 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5981 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5982 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5984 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5985 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5987 monitor_update.updates[0],
5988 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5993 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5994 // immediately once we get going.
5995 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5998 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6000 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6003 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6004 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6005 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6006 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6007 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6008 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6009 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6013 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6014 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6015 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6018 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6019 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6020 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6021 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6022 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6023 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6024 prev_user_channel_id,
6025 next_user_channel_id,
6026 total_fee_earned_msat,
6028 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6029 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6031 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6035 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6036 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6037 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6043 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6044 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6045 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6048 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6049 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6050 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6051 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6053 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6055 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6056 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6057 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6059 payment_purpose: purpose,
6062 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6064 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6068 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6070 sender_intended_total_msat,
6074 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6075 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6077 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6078 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6079 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6082 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6083 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6085 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6086 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6087 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6088 downstream_channel_id,
6089 Some(blocking_action),
6096 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6097 /// update completion.
6098 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6099 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6100 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6101 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6102 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6103 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6104 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6105 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6106 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6107 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6108 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6109 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6110 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6111 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6112 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6113 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6115 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6116 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6118 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6119 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6120 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6121 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6123 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6124 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6125 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6128 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6129 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6131 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6132 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6133 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6138 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6139 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6140 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6141 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6146 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6147 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6148 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6149 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6150 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6155 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6159 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6165 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6166 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6167 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6171 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6172 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6173 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6176 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6179 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6180 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6182 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6183 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6185 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6186 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6187 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6188 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6189 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6194 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6195 let mut peer_state_lock;
6196 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6197 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6198 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6201 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6204 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6205 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6206 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6207 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6208 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6211 let remaining_in_flight =
6212 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6213 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6216 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6217 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6218 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6219 remaining_in_flight);
6220 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6223 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6226 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6228 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6229 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6232 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6233 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6234 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6236 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6237 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6238 /// used to accept such channels.
6240 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6241 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6242 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6243 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6246 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6247 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6249 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6250 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6251 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6253 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6254 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6256 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6257 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6259 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6260 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6262 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6263 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6264 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6265 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6268 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6270 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6273 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6274 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6276 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6278 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6279 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6281 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6283 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6284 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6285 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6287 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6288 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6289 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6291 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6292 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6293 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6294 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6295 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6296 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6297 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6300 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6301 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6303 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6309 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6310 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6311 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6312 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6314 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6318 Ok(mut channel) => {
6320 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6321 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6322 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6323 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6324 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6326 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6329 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6330 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6331 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6333 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6335 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6336 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6337 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6338 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6339 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6340 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6341 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6342 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6345 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6346 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6347 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6349 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6353 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6354 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6355 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6357 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6358 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6359 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6362 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6369 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6370 /// or 0-conf channels.
6372 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6373 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6374 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6375 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6376 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6379 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6380 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6381 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6382 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6383 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6384 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6385 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6389 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6392 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6393 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6395 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6396 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6398 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6399 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6400 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6401 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6402 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6404 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6407 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6408 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6409 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6412 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6413 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6414 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6415 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6416 // included in the unfunded count.
6417 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6418 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6419 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6422 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6423 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6426 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6427 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6428 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6429 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6434 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6437 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6438 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6439 // likely to be lost on restart!
6440 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6442 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6445 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6446 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6447 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6450 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6451 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6452 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6453 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6454 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6457 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6459 debug_assert!(false);
6460 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6461 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6462 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6467 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6468 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6469 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6470 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6471 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6472 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6475 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6476 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6479 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6480 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6482 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6483 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6486 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6487 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6490 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6491 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6494 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6495 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6496 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6497 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6499 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6502 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6503 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6504 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6505 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6506 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6509 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6510 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6511 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6516 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6517 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6518 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6519 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6520 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6521 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6522 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6530 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6531 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6533 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6534 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6536 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6538 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6539 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6542 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6543 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6546 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6547 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6549 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6553 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6554 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6555 // likely to be lost on restart!
6556 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6560 debug_assert!(false);
6561 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6565 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6567 match phase.get_mut() {
6568 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6569 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6570 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6581 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6582 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6583 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6584 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6586 user_channel_id: user_id,
6591 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6592 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6594 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6595 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6597 debug_assert!(false);
6598 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6603 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6604 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6605 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6606 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6607 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6609 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6610 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6611 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6612 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6613 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6614 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6615 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6616 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6617 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6621 Some(mut phase) => {
6622 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6623 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6624 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6626 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6629 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6631 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6632 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6633 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6634 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6635 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6636 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6638 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6639 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6640 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6643 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6645 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6648 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6649 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6651 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6654 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6655 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6656 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6657 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6659 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6660 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6661 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6662 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6663 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6665 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6670 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6671 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6672 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6674 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6678 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6679 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6680 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6688 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6689 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6691 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6693 debug_assert!(false);
6694 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6699 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6701 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6702 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6703 let logger = WithContext::from(
6705 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6706 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6709 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6711 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6712 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6713 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6714 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6715 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6716 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6717 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6718 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6719 } else { unreachable!(); }
6722 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6723 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6724 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6725 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6726 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6727 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6728 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6732 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6733 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6734 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6735 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6736 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6737 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6748 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6749 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6750 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6754 debug_assert!(false);
6755 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6759 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6761 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6762 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6763 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6764 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6765 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6766 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6767 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6768 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6769 msg: announcement_sigs,
6771 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6772 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6773 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6774 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6775 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6776 // announcement_signatures.
6777 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6778 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6779 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6780 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6787 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6788 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6793 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6794 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6797 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6798 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6803 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6804 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6805 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6808 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6810 debug_assert!(false);
6811 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6815 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6816 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6818 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6819 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6820 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6821 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6823 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6826 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6827 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6828 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6829 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6831 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6832 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6833 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6834 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6836 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6840 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6841 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6842 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6843 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6846 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6847 let context = phase.context_mut();
6848 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6849 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6850 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6851 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6853 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6854 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6855 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6856 let context = phase.context_mut();
6857 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6858 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6859 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6863 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6866 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6867 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6868 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6869 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6871 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6872 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6878 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6882 debug_assert!(false);
6883 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6885 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6888 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6890 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6891 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6892 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6893 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6894 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6895 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6900 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6901 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6902 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6903 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6904 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6905 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6906 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6908 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6909 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6915 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6916 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6917 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6918 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6920 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6921 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6924 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6929 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6930 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6931 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6936 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6937 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6938 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6939 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6941 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6942 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6943 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6944 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6946 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6947 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6949 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6953 debug_assert!(false);
6954 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6958 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6960 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6961 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6962 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6963 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6964 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6965 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6967 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6969 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6970 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6971 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6972 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6973 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
6974 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6975 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6976 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6977 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6978 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6979 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6980 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6984 match pending_forward_info {
6985 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6986 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6988 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6989 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6990 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6991 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6992 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6994 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6995 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6996 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6997 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6998 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7001 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7007 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7009 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7010 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7018 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7020 let next_user_channel_id;
7021 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7023 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7025 debug_assert!(false);
7026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7032 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7033 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7034 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7035 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7037 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7039 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7040 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7041 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7043 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7044 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7045 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7046 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7047 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7048 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7049 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7050 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7053 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7054 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7060 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7061 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7062 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7068 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7069 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7070 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7074 debug_assert!(false);
7075 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7081 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7082 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7084 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7085 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7093 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7094 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7095 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7099 debug_assert!(false);
7100 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7104 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7106 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7107 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7108 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7110 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7111 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7113 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7114 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7122 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7126 debug_assert!(false);
7127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7131 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7133 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7134 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7135 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7136 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7137 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7138 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7139 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7143 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7144 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7151 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7152 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7153 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7154 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7155 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7156 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7160 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7164 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7165 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7166 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7170 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7171 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7172 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7173 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7174 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7175 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7176 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7177 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7178 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7179 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7180 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7182 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7183 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7185 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7186 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7187 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7188 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7190 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7191 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7194 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7195 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7197 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7198 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7199 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7201 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7202 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7203 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7204 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7205 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7208 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7209 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7212 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7213 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7214 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7215 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7216 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7217 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7218 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7219 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7220 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7221 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7222 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7225 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7226 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7227 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7232 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7233 // payments are being processed.
7234 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7235 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7236 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7243 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7244 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7247 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7248 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7249 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7255 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7256 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7257 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7258 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7259 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7261 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7262 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7263 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7264 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7265 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7266 // real by taking more time.
7267 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7268 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7269 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7274 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7275 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7276 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7277 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7278 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7279 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7280 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7282 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7283 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7284 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7285 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7286 channel_funding_outpoint,
7288 counterparty_node_id,
7293 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7294 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7295 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7298 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7299 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7302 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7303 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7304 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7310 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7311 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7313 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7315 debug_assert!(false);
7316 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7317 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7321 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7322 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7323 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7324 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7325 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7326 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7327 *counterparty_node_id)
7329 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7330 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7331 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7332 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7333 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7334 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7335 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7339 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7340 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7346 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7350 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7352 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7354 debug_assert!(false);
7355 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7358 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7361 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7362 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7363 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7365 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7366 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7374 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7378 debug_assert!(false);
7379 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7383 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7385 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7386 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7390 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7391 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7392 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7393 msg, &self.default_configuration
7394 ), chan_phase_entry),
7395 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7396 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7397 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7400 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7401 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7409 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7410 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7411 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7412 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7414 // It's not a local channel
7415 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7418 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7419 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7420 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7421 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7423 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7424 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7425 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7427 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7428 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7429 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7430 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7431 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7432 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7433 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7437 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7438 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7439 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7440 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7442 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7443 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7444 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7445 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7448 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7452 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7453 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7456 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7458 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7461 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7462 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7465 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7467 debug_assert!(false);
7468 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7469 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7473 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7476 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7478 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7479 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7480 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7481 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7482 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7483 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7484 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7485 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7486 let mut channel_update = None;
7487 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7489 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7492 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7493 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7494 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7495 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7496 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7497 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7498 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7503 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7504 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7505 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7506 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7507 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7508 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7509 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7510 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7514 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7515 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7519 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7521 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7522 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7523 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7524 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7525 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7526 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7528 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7529 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7530 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7531 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7532 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7533 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7534 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7535 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7536 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7537 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7538 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7539 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7540 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7541 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7542 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7543 next_funding_txid: None,
7546 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7547 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7548 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7554 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7555 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7557 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7560 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7561 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7562 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7564 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7565 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7566 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7567 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7568 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7569 match monitor_event {
7570 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7571 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7572 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7573 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7574 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7575 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7576 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7578 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7579 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7580 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7581 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7584 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7585 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7586 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7588 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7589 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7590 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7591 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7594 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7595 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7596 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7599 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7600 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7601 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7602 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7605 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7607 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7608 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7609 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7614 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7616 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7624 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7625 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7631 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7632 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7635 has_pending_monitor_events
7638 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7639 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7640 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7642 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7644 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7647 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7648 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7649 /// update was applied.
7650 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7651 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7652 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7654 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7655 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7656 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7657 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7659 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7660 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7663 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7664 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7665 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7667 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7668 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7669 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7670 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7671 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7672 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7674 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7675 has_monitor_update = true;
7677 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7678 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7679 continue 'peer_loop;
7688 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7689 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7690 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7696 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7697 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7699 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7700 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7702 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7703 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7704 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7705 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7707 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7708 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7710 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7711 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7712 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7713 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7718 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7724 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7725 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7728 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7729 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7730 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7736 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7741 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7742 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7743 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7745 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7746 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7750 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7753 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7754 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7760 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7761 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7762 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7763 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7764 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7765 let mut has_update = false;
7766 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7770 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7773 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7774 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7776 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7777 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7778 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7779 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7780 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7782 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7783 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7786 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7787 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7788 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7790 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7791 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7792 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7793 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7794 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7799 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7800 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7801 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7807 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7808 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7813 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7819 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7820 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7823 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7824 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7830 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7831 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7833 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7834 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7835 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7836 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7837 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7838 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7839 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7840 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7841 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7842 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7843 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7844 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7845 assert!(should_broadcast);
7846 } else { unreachable!(); }
7847 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7848 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7849 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7852 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7857 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7858 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7859 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7860 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7864 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7865 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7866 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7867 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7868 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7870 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7874 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7879 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7881 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7883 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7884 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7885 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7886 &$self, description: String
7887 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7888 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7889 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7890 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7891 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7893 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7894 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7895 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7897 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7904 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7905 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7906 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7910 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7911 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7913 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7914 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7915 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7918 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7919 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7920 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7922 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7923 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7927 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7928 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7929 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7930 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7931 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7933 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7937 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7938 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7943 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7944 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7945 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7947 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7949 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7950 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7951 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7952 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7953 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7954 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7955 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7956 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7957 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7958 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7959 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7960 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7962 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7963 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7964 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7966 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7967 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7972 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7973 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7974 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7975 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7977 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7983 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7985 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7986 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7987 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7988 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7989 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7990 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7994 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7995 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7997 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8000 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8002 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8004 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8005 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8006 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8008 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8009 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8010 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8011 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8012 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8013 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8014 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8016 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8017 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8021 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8022 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8025 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8026 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8027 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8031 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8032 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8033 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8034 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8038 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8039 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8040 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8045 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8046 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8047 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8048 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8051 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8052 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8053 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8054 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8055 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8056 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8057 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8058 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8059 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8060 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8061 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8062 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8063 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8064 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8065 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8067 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8068 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8070 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8072 let builder = match quantity {
8074 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8076 let builder = match amount_msats {
8078 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8080 let builder = match payer_note {
8082 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8084 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8085 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8089 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8090 self.pending_outbound_payments
8091 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8092 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8094 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8096 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8097 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8098 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8099 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8100 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8103 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8105 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8106 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8107 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8108 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8109 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8110 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8111 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8112 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8113 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8115 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8122 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8125 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8126 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8127 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8131 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8132 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8133 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8134 /// received and no retries will be made.
8139 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8140 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8143 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8144 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8145 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8146 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8147 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8149 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8150 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8152 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8153 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8158 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8159 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8160 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8161 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8163 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8164 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8165 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8167 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8168 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8169 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8171 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8172 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8173 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8175 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8176 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8177 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8178 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8180 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8181 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8182 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8183 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8184 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8187 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8189 for path in refund.paths() {
8190 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8191 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8192 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8193 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8195 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8201 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8205 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8208 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8209 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8211 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8212 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8213 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8214 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8216 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8218 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8219 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8223 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8224 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8226 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8228 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8229 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8231 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8232 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8233 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8234 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8235 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8236 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8237 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8238 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8239 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8240 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8241 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8244 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8245 /// stored external to LDK.
8247 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8248 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8249 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8251 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8252 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8255 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8256 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8257 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8258 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8260 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8261 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8262 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8263 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8264 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8266 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8267 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8268 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8269 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8270 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8272 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8273 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8275 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8276 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8280 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8281 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8283 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8285 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8286 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8288 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8289 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8290 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8291 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8292 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8293 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8294 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8297 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8298 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8300 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8301 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8302 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8305 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8307 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8308 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8309 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8310 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8312 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8314 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8315 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8316 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8319 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8320 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8323 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8324 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8325 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8326 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8327 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8328 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8330 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8331 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8332 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8333 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8334 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8336 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8338 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8341 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8342 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8346 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8347 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8349 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8350 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8352 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8354 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8355 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8356 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8357 Some(_) => continue,
8358 None => return scid_candidate
8363 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8365 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8366 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8368 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8369 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8370 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8374 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8375 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8376 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8378 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8379 /// times to get a unique scid.
8380 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8381 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8382 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8384 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8385 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8386 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8387 return scid_candidate
8391 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8392 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8393 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8394 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8397 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8400 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8401 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8403 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8404 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8405 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8414 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8415 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8416 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8417 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8418 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8422 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8423 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8424 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8425 events.push_back((event, None));
8429 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8430 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8431 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8435 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8436 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8440 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8441 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8444 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8445 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8446 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8447 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8448 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8449 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8450 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8452 let logger = WithContext::from(
8453 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8456 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8457 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8458 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8459 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8460 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8461 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8462 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8463 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8465 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8469 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8470 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8471 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8472 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8473 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8474 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8479 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8481 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8482 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8483 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8484 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8486 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8487 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8488 if further_update_exists {
8489 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8494 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8501 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8502 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8508 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8509 for action in actions {
8511 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8512 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8514 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8520 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8521 /// using the given event handler.
8523 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8524 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8528 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8532 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8534 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8535 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8536 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8537 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8538 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8539 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8543 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8544 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8545 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8546 /// is always placed next to each other.
8548 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8549 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8550 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8551 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8553 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8554 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8555 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8556 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8557 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8559 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8561 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8562 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8563 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8564 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8567 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8568 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8570 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8571 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8574 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8576 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8579 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8580 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8584 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8585 events.replace(pending_events);
8594 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8596 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8598 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8599 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8600 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8605 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8607 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8608 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8609 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8611 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8615 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8617 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8619 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8620 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8621 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8626 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8628 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8629 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8630 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8631 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8632 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8635 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8636 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8639 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8640 let _persistence_guard =
8641 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8642 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8643 let new_height = height - 1;
8645 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8646 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8647 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8648 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8649 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8650 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8653 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8657 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8659 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8661 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8662 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8663 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8664 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8668 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8669 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8670 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8671 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8673 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8674 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8676 let _persistence_guard =
8677 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8678 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8679 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8680 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8682 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8683 if height < last_best_block_height {
8684 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8685 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8689 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8690 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8691 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8692 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8694 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8695 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8697 let _persistence_guard =
8698 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8699 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8700 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8702 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8704 macro_rules! max_time {
8705 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8707 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8708 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8709 // having an explicit local time source.
8710 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8711 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8712 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8713 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8714 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8720 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8721 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8722 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8723 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8727 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8728 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8729 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8732 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8733 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8734 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8735 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8736 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8737 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8744 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8745 let _persistence_guard =
8746 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8747 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8748 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8749 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8750 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8751 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8752 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8753 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8758 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8760 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8762 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8763 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8764 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8769 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8770 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8772 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8773 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8774 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8775 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8776 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8778 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8779 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8782 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8785 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8786 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8788 // Retain unfunded channels.
8789 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8790 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8791 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8792 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8793 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8794 let res = f(channel);
8795 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8796 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8797 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8798 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8799 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8801 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8802 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8803 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8804 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8805 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8806 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8807 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8808 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8813 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8818 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8819 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8822 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8823 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8824 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8825 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8826 msg: announcement_sigs,
8828 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8829 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8832 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8833 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8834 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8839 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8840 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8841 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8842 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8843 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8844 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8845 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8846 // is always consistent.
8847 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8848 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8849 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8850 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8851 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8854 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8855 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8856 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8857 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8858 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8859 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8860 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8861 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8865 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8866 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8867 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8868 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8869 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8870 data: reason_message,
8883 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8884 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8885 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8886 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8887 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8888 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8889 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8890 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8891 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8892 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8894 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8895 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8896 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8900 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8903 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8904 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8905 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8906 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8907 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8908 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8909 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8910 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8911 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8912 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8913 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8914 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8917 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8918 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8919 _ => unreachable!(),
8921 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8922 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8923 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8924 let logger = WithContext::from(
8925 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8927 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8933 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8935 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8936 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8940 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8941 /// may have events that need processing.
8943 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8944 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8946 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8947 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8948 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8949 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8952 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8953 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8954 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8957 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8958 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8959 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8962 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8963 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8964 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8965 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8968 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8969 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8970 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8971 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8974 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8975 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8977 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8978 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8979 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8980 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8981 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8984 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8985 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8986 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8987 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8990 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8991 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8992 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8993 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8996 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8997 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8998 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8999 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9002 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9003 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9004 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9005 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9009 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9010 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9012 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9013 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9014 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9015 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9016 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9017 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9021 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9022 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9023 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9024 // change to the contents.
9025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9026 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9027 let persist = match &res {
9028 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9029 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9030 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9032 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9034 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9039 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9040 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9041 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9042 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9045 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9046 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9047 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9048 // change to the contents.
9049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9050 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9051 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9055 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9056 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9057 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9058 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9061 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9063 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9066 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9068 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9071 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9072 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9073 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9074 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9075 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9077 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9078 let persist = match &res {
9079 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9080 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9082 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9087 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9088 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9089 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9090 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9093 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9094 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9095 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9096 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9099 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9100 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9101 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9102 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9105 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9106 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9107 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9108 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9111 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9112 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9113 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9116 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9118 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9121 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9122 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9123 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9124 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9126 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9127 let persist = match &res {
9128 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9129 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9130 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9132 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9137 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9138 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9142 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9143 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9144 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9145 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9147 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9148 let persist = match &res {
9149 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9150 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9151 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9153 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9158 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9159 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9160 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9161 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9163 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9164 let persist = match &res {
9165 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9166 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9167 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9169 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9174 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9176 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9179 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9184 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9185 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9186 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9187 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9189 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9190 let persist = match &res {
9191 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9192 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9193 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9195 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9200 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9202 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9205 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9206 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9207 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9210 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9215 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9217 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9218 let persist = match &res {
9219 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9220 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9221 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9223 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9228 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9230 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9231 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9232 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9235 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9236 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9237 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9239 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9242 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9243 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9244 let context = match phase {
9245 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9246 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9247 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9248 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9253 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9254 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9255 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9258 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9259 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9262 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9263 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9266 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9267 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9271 // Clean up for removal.
9272 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9273 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9276 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9277 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9278 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9279 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9281 // V1 Channel Establishment
9282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9283 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9286 // V2 Channel Establishment
9287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9289 // Common Channel Establishment
9290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9297 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9298 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9307 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9308 // Channel Operations
9309 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9314 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9317 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9318 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9319 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9327 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9328 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9329 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9330 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9333 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9335 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9337 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9338 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9342 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9343 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9344 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9345 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9349 let mut res = Ok(());
9351 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9352 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9353 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9354 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9355 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9356 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9357 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9360 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9361 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9363 if inbound_peer_limited {
9365 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9367 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9368 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9369 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9370 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9371 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9372 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9373 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9374 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9378 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9379 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9380 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9382 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9383 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9384 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9385 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9388 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9391 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9392 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9397 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9400 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9403 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9405 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9407 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9408 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9410 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9411 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9415 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9417 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9418 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9422 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9423 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9424 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9426 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9427 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9431 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9432 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9433 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9434 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9435 debug_assert!(false);
9438 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9439 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9440 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9441 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9442 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9443 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9444 debug_assert!(false);
9450 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9451 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9456 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9457 match &msg.data as &str {
9458 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9459 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9461 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9462 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9463 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9464 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9465 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9466 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9467 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9468 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9469 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9471 || -> NotifyOption {
9472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9473 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9474 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9475 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9476 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9477 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9479 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9483 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9484 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9486 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9487 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9488 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9490 log_level: Level::Trace,
9493 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9494 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9495 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9497 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9508 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9509 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9511 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9512 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9513 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9514 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9515 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9516 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9517 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9518 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9520 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9521 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9522 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9526 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9528 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9529 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9532 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9533 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9534 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9535 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9536 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9542 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9543 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9544 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9545 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9546 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9552 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9553 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9554 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9558 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9559 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9563 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9564 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9567 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9568 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9571 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9572 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9575 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9576 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9577 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9578 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9581 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9582 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9583 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9584 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9587 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9588 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9589 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9590 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9593 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9594 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9595 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9596 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9599 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9600 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9601 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9602 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9605 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9606 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9607 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9608 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9611 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9612 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9613 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9614 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9617 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9618 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9619 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9620 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9623 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9624 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9625 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9626 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9630 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9631 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9633 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9634 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9635 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9636 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9638 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9642 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9643 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9644 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9647 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9648 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9651 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9652 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9654 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9655 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9657 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9658 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9662 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9663 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9664 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9666 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9668 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9669 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9673 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9674 amount_msats, payment_secret
9676 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9678 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9679 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9683 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9684 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9685 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9688 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9689 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9690 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9691 payment_paths, payment_hash
9693 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9694 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9695 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9697 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9698 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9699 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9700 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9701 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9704 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9705 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9706 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9707 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9708 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9710 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9711 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9712 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9713 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9714 .and_then(|invoice| {
9716 let mut invoice = invoice;
9717 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9718 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9720 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9721 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9722 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9724 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9725 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9730 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9731 Err(error) => Some(error),
9735 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9736 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9738 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9740 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9741 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9744 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9746 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9753 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9760 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9761 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9765 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9766 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9767 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9768 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9769 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9773 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9774 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9776 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9777 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9778 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9779 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9780 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9783 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9784 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9785 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9786 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9789 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9790 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9791 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9792 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9795 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9796 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9797 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9798 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9801 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9802 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9803 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9804 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9805 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9806 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9807 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9808 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9809 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9810 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9811 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9812 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9813 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9814 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9815 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9816 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9817 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9818 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9819 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9820 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9821 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9826 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9827 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9829 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9830 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9831 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9832 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9835 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9836 (2, node_id, required),
9837 (4, features, required),
9838 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9839 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9840 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9841 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9844 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9845 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9846 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9847 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9848 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9849 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9850 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9851 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9852 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9853 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9854 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9855 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9856 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9857 (7, self.config, option),
9858 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9859 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9860 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9861 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9862 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9863 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9864 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9865 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9866 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9867 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9868 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9869 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9870 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9871 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9872 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9873 (32, self.is_public, required),
9874 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9875 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9876 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9877 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9878 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9879 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9880 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9886 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9887 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9888 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9889 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9890 (2, channel_id, required),
9891 (3, channel_type, option),
9892 (4, counterparty, required),
9893 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9894 (6, funding_txo, option),
9895 (7, config, option),
9896 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9897 (9, confirmations, option),
9898 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9899 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9900 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9901 (16, balance_msat, required),
9902 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9903 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9904 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9905 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9906 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9907 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9908 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9909 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9910 (26, is_outbound, required),
9911 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9912 (30, is_usable, required),
9913 (32, is_public, required),
9914 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9915 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9916 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9917 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9918 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9919 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9920 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9923 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9924 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9925 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9926 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9927 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9931 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9933 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9934 outbound_scid_alias,
9938 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9939 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9941 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9942 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9943 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9944 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9945 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9946 confirmations_required,
9948 force_close_spend_delay,
9949 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9950 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9951 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9952 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9953 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9954 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9955 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9956 channel_shutdown_state,
9957 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9958 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9963 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9964 (2, channels, required_vec),
9965 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9966 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9969 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9970 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9971 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9974 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9976 (0, onion_packet, required),
9977 (1, blinded, option),
9978 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9981 (0, payment_data, required),
9982 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9983 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9984 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9985 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9986 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9988 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9989 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9990 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9991 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9992 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9993 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9994 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9998 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9999 (0, routing, required),
10000 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10001 (4, payment_hash, required),
10002 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10003 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10004 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10005 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10009 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10010 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10012 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10013 0u8.write(writer)?;
10014 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10015 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10016 reason.write(writer)?;
10018 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10019 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10021 1u8.write(writer)?;
10022 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10023 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10024 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10025 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10032 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10033 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10034 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10037 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10038 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10039 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10040 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10044 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10045 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10046 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10047 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10048 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10051 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10052 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10053 // messages contained in the variants.
10054 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10055 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10056 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10058 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10059 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10060 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10061 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10062 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10065 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10067 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10068 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10069 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10071 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10076 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10081 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10082 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10083 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10086 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10087 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10088 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10089 (2, outpoint, required),
10090 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10091 (4, htlc_id, required),
10092 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10093 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10094 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10095 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10096 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10099 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10100 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10101 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10102 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10103 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10105 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10106 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10107 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10108 (2, self.value, required),
10109 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10110 (4, payment_data, option),
10111 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10112 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10113 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10114 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10120 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10121 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10122 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10123 (0, prev_hop, required),
10124 (1, total_msat, option),
10125 (2, value_ser, required),
10126 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10127 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10128 (5, total_value_received, option),
10129 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10130 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10131 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10133 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10134 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10135 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10137 if payment_data.is_some() {
10138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10140 if total_msat.is_none() {
10141 total_msat = Some(value);
10143 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10146 if total_msat.is_none() {
10147 if payment_data.is_none() {
10148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10150 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10152 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10156 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10159 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10160 total_value_received,
10161 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10163 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10164 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10169 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10170 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10171 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10174 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10175 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10176 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10177 let mut payment_id = None;
10178 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10179 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10180 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10181 (0, session_priv, required),
10182 (1, payment_id, option),
10183 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10184 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10185 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10186 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10188 if payment_id.is_none() {
10189 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10191 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10193 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10194 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10195 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10197 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10198 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10199 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10200 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10204 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10205 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10206 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10208 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10211 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10212 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10217 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10220 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10221 0u8.write(writer)?;
10222 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10223 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10224 (0, session_priv, required),
10225 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10226 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10227 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10228 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10229 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10230 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10233 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10234 1u8.write(writer)?;
10235 field.write(writer)?;
10242 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10243 (0, forward_info, required),
10244 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10245 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10246 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10247 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10248 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10249 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10250 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10253 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10255 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10257 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10261 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10262 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10263 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10264 (0, htlc_id, required),
10265 (2, err_packet, required),
10268 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10269 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10270 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10271 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10272 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10273 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10274 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10275 (0, htlc_id, required),
10276 (1, failure_code, required),
10277 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10278 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10286 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10287 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10288 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10290 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10292 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10293 (0, htlc_id, required),
10294 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10295 (2, err_packet, required),
10296 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10298 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10299 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10300 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10302 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10306 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10307 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10316 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10317 (0, payment_secret, required),
10318 (2, expiry_time, required),
10319 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10320 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10321 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10324 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10326 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10328 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10329 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10330 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10336 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10338 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10340 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10342 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10343 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10344 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10347 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10350 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10351 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10354 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10355 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10358 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10359 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10363 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10365 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10368 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10369 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10370 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10373 channel.write(writer)?;
10379 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10380 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10381 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10382 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10383 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10384 for forward in pending_forwards {
10385 forward.write(writer)?;
10390 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10391 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10392 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10393 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10398 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10399 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10400 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10402 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10403 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10404 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10405 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10406 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10407 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10408 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10409 htlc.write(writer)?;
10411 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10412 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10415 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10416 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10417 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10418 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10419 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10420 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10421 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10424 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10425 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10426 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10427 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10428 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10430 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10431 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10432 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10433 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10434 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10435 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10436 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10441 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10442 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10443 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10444 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10445 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10446 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10447 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10448 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10449 0u64.write(writer)?;
10451 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10452 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10453 event.write(writer)?;
10457 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10458 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10459 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10460 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10461 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10462 0u64.write(writer)?;
10464 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10465 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10466 // likely to be identical.
10467 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10468 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10470 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10471 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10472 hash.write(writer)?;
10473 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10476 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10477 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10478 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10479 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10480 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10483 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10484 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10486 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10487 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10488 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10489 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10492 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10493 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10494 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10495 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10499 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10500 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10501 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10503 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10504 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10505 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10511 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10512 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10513 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10514 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10517 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10518 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10519 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10520 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10521 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10524 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10525 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10526 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10527 if !updates.is_empty() {
10528 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10529 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10534 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10535 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10536 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10537 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10538 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10539 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10540 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10541 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10542 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10543 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10544 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10545 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10546 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10547 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10554 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10556 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10557 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10560 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10561 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10562 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10563 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10564 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10565 // check that the event is sane here.
10566 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10567 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10568 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10569 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10575 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10576 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10577 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10578 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10579 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10580 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10583 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10584 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10585 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10586 events.push_back((ev, action));
10587 } else if action.is_some() {
10588 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10595 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10596 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10597 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10598 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10599 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10600 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10603 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10605 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10607 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10608 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10609 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10610 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10611 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10612 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10613 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10614 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10615 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10616 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10617 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10618 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10619 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10621 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10622 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10624 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10625 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10627 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10628 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10629 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10630 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10631 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10632 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10634 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10635 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10637 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10639 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10641 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10646 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10647 pub entropy_source: ES,
10649 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10650 pub node_signer: NS,
10652 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10653 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10655 pub signer_provider: SP,
10657 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10659 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10660 pub fee_estimator: F,
10661 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10663 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10664 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10665 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10666 pub chain_monitor: M,
10668 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10669 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10670 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10671 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10672 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10673 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10675 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10677 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10678 /// deserialization.
10680 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10681 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10682 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10684 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10685 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10687 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10688 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10689 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10690 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10692 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10695 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10696 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10699 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10700 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10702 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10704 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10706 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10711 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10712 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10713 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10714 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10715 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10717 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10718 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10719 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10725 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10726 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10727 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10728 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10730 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10732 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10733 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10734 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10735 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10739 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10740 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10741 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10745 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10746 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10757 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10758 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10760 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10761 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10762 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10764 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10766 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10767 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10768 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10769 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10770 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10771 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10772 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10773 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10774 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10775 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10776 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10778 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10779 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10780 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10781 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10782 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10783 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10784 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10785 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10786 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10787 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10788 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10789 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10790 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10791 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10792 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10794 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10795 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10796 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10798 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10799 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10800 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10802 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10803 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10804 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10806 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10807 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10810 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10811 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10812 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10815 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10816 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10817 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10818 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10819 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10820 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10821 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10822 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10824 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10825 let mut found_htlc = false;
10826 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10827 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10830 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10831 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10832 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10833 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10834 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10835 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10836 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10838 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10839 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10840 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10844 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10845 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10846 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10847 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10848 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10850 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10851 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10853 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10855 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10856 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10859 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10860 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10861 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10865 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10866 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10867 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10868 // safely discard the channel.
10869 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10870 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10871 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10872 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10873 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10874 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10875 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10876 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10879 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10880 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10881 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10882 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10883 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10884 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10888 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10889 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10890 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10891 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10892 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10894 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10895 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10896 counterparty_node_id: None,
10897 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10898 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10900 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10904 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10905 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10906 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10907 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10908 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10909 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10910 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10911 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10912 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10914 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10917 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10918 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10919 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10920 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10921 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10922 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10923 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10924 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10926 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10929 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10932 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10933 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10934 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10935 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10936 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10937 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10938 is_connected: false,
10942 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10943 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10944 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10945 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10946 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10947 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10948 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10949 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10952 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10953 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10954 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10955 for _ in 0..event_count {
10956 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10957 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10962 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10963 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10964 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10966 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10967 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10968 // on-startup monitor updates.
10969 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10970 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10972 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10976 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10977 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10979 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10980 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10981 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10982 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10987 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10988 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10989 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10990 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10991 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10992 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10993 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10995 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10996 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11000 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11001 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11002 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11003 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11004 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11005 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11006 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11007 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11008 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11009 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11010 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11011 let mut events_override = None;
11012 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11013 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11014 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11015 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11016 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11017 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11018 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11019 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11020 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11021 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11022 (8, events_override, option),
11023 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11024 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11025 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11026 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11027 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11029 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11030 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11031 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11034 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11035 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11038 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11039 pending_events_read = events;
11042 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11043 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11046 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11047 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11048 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11049 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11050 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11051 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11053 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11055 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11056 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11057 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11060 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11061 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11062 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11063 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11064 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11066 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11067 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11068 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11070 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11071 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11072 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11073 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11074 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11076 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11077 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11078 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11079 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11080 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11081 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11082 pending_background_events.push(
11083 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11084 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11085 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11086 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11087 update: update.clone(),
11090 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11091 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11092 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11093 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11094 pending_background_events.push(
11095 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11096 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11097 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11100 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11101 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11102 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11104 max_in_flight_update_id
11108 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11109 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11110 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11111 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11112 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11113 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11115 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11117 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11118 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11119 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11120 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11121 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11122 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11123 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11124 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11125 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11128 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11129 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11130 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11131 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11132 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11133 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11134 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11135 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11136 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11137 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11138 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11141 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11142 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11143 debug_assert!(false);
11144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11149 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11150 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11151 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11152 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11153 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11154 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11155 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11156 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11157 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11158 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11160 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11161 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11162 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11164 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11165 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11166 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11167 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11168 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11169 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11170 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11171 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11176 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11177 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11179 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11180 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11181 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11182 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11185 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11186 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11187 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11188 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11189 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11190 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11191 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11193 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11194 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11195 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11196 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11197 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11198 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11199 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11200 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11201 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11204 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11205 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11206 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11207 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11209 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11210 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11211 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11214 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11215 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11216 retry_strategy: None,
11217 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11218 payment_params: None,
11219 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11220 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11221 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11222 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11223 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11224 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11225 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11226 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11227 total_msat: path_amt,
11228 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11229 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11231 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11232 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11237 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11238 match htlc_source {
11239 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11240 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11241 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11242 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11244 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11245 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11246 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11247 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11248 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11249 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11250 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11251 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11252 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11254 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11255 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11259 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11261 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11262 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11263 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11264 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11265 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11266 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11271 !forwards.is_empty()
11273 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11274 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11275 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11276 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11277 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11278 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11279 intercepted_id != ev_id
11286 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11287 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11288 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11289 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11290 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11291 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11292 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11293 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11294 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11295 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11296 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11298 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11299 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11300 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11301 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11303 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11304 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11305 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11312 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11313 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11315 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11317 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11318 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11319 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11320 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11321 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11322 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11323 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11324 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11325 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11326 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11329 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11330 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11331 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11332 // channel still live case here.
11336 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11337 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11342 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11343 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11344 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11345 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11346 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11347 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11348 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11349 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11353 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11354 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11356 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11357 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11358 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11361 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11362 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11363 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11365 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11366 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11368 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11369 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11371 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11374 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11375 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11376 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11378 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11382 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11383 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11384 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11385 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11386 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11388 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11389 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11390 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11391 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11392 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11393 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11394 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11395 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11397 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11398 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11402 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11404 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11406 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11407 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11409 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11410 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11415 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11416 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11418 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11420 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11422 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11423 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11424 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11425 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11429 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11430 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11433 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11434 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11435 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11436 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11437 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11439 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11440 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11441 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11443 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11444 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11445 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11446 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11447 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11450 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11451 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11452 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11453 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11454 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11455 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11459 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11460 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11461 debug_assert!(false);
11462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11467 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11469 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11470 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11471 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11472 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11473 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11474 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11475 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11476 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11477 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11478 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11479 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11481 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11482 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11484 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11485 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11486 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11487 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11489 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11490 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11491 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11492 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11494 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11495 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11496 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11497 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11499 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11500 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11501 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11503 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11504 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11505 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11506 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11509 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11510 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11513 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11516 purpose: payment.purpose,
11517 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11518 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11519 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11525 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11526 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11527 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11528 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11529 for action in actions.iter() {
11530 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11531 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11532 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11534 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11536 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11537 blocked_channel_id);
11538 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11539 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11540 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11542 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11543 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11544 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11545 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11549 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11550 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11554 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11556 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11561 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11563 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11564 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11565 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11566 router: args.router,
11568 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11570 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11571 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11572 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11573 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11575 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11576 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11577 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11578 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11579 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11580 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11581 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11583 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11585 our_network_pubkey,
11588 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11590 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11592 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11593 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11594 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11595 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11596 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11598 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11599 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11601 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11603 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11605 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11606 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11607 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11609 logger: args.logger,
11610 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11613 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11614 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11615 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11616 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11617 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11620 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11621 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11622 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11623 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11624 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11625 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11626 downstream_channel_id, None
11630 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11631 //connection or two.
11633 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11639 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11640 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11641 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11642 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11643 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11644 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11645 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11646 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11647 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11648 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11649 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11650 use crate::prelude::*;
11651 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11652 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11653 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11654 use crate::util::test_utils;
11655 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11656 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11659 fn test_notify_limits() {
11660 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11661 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11667 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11668 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11670 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11671 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11673 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11675 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11676 // to connect messages with new values
11677 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11678 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11679 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11680 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11681 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11682 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11684 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11685 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11686 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11687 // ... but the last node should not.
11688 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11689 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11690 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11691 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11693 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11694 // about the channel.
11695 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11696 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11697 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11699 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11701 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11702 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11703 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11704 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11705 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11706 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11708 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11709 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11710 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11712 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11713 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11714 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11715 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11716 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11717 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11719 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11720 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11721 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11722 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11723 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11724 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11725 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11726 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11728 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11729 // the channel info has updated.
11730 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11731 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11732 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11733 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11734 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11735 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11739 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11740 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11742 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11743 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11744 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11745 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11748 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11749 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11750 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11751 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11753 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11754 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11755 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11756 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11757 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11758 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11759 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11760 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11762 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11763 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11764 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11766 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11767 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11768 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11770 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11772 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11773 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11777 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11778 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11780 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11781 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11782 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11783 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11784 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11785 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11786 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11788 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11790 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11791 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11792 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11796 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11798 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11799 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11800 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11801 // lightning messages manually.
11802 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11803 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11806 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11807 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11808 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11809 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11811 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11814 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11815 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11817 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11818 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11821 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11822 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11823 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11827 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11829 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11830 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11833 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11834 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11835 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11838 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11839 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11840 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11841 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11846 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11847 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11848 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11849 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11856 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11857 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11858 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11861 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11862 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11863 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11864 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11865 // fails as expected.
11866 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11867 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11868 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11869 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11870 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11871 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11872 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11873 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11874 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11875 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11876 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11877 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11878 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11879 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11880 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11882 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11883 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11884 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11886 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11887 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11888 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11889 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11890 let route = find_route(
11891 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11892 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11894 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11895 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11897 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11898 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11899 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11900 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11901 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11903 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11904 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11905 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11906 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11907 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11909 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11910 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11911 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11912 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11913 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11914 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11915 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11916 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11917 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11919 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11922 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11923 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11924 let route = find_route(
11925 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11926 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11928 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11929 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11931 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11932 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11933 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11934 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11935 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11937 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11938 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11939 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11940 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11942 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11944 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11945 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11946 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11948 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11952 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11953 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11954 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11955 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11960 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11962 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11965 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11966 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11967 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11968 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11972 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11973 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11974 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11976 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11977 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11978 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11981 let route = find_route(
11982 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11983 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11985 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11986 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11987 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11991 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11992 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12002 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12003 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12009 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12014 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12015 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12016 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12017 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12018 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12019 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12020 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12022 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12023 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12025 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12026 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12027 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12028 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12029 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12030 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12031 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12032 let route = find_route(
12033 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12034 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12037 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12038 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12039 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12040 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12041 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12042 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12046 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12048 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12051 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12053 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12057 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12058 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12059 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12060 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12061 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12065 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12067 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12068 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12070 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12071 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12072 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12073 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12074 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12075 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12076 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12077 let route = find_route(
12078 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12079 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12082 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12083 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12084 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12085 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12086 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12087 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12088 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12089 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12093 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12095 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12096 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12100 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12104 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12108 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12110 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12111 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12112 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12113 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12115 // Marshall an MPP route.
12116 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12117 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12118 route.paths.push(path);
12119 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12120 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12121 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12122 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12123 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12124 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12126 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12127 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12129 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12130 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12132 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12137 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12143 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12145 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12146 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12148 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12149 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12151 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12154 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12155 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12156 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12157 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12158 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12159 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12162 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12165 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12166 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12171 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12172 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12178 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12179 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12181 total_msat: 100_000,
12184 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12185 // payment verification fails as expected.
12186 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12187 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12188 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12189 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12191 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12195 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12196 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12200 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12201 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12202 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12203 // the channel is successfully closed.
12204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12207 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12209 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12210 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12212 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12213 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12215 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12216 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12218 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12219 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12220 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12221 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12224 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12226 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12227 // as it has the funding transaction.
12228 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12229 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12230 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12233 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12235 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12237 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12239 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12240 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12241 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12243 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12246 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12247 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12248 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12249 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12250 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12253 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12254 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12256 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12257 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12258 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12259 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12261 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12262 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12263 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12264 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12266 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12269 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12270 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12271 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12272 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12273 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12274 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12275 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12279 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12280 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12281 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12282 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12283 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12284 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12285 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12288 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12290 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12291 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12292 // closing transaction).
12293 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12294 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12297 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12298 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12299 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12300 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12301 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12304 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12306 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12308 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12309 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12310 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12312 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12315 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12318 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12319 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12320 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12323 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12324 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12325 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12328 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12329 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12330 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12333 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12334 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12335 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12338 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12340 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12341 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12343 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12344 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12346 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12347 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12352 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12353 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12354 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12355 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12356 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12357 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12358 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12362 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12363 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12364 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12366 // Test the API functions.
12367 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12369 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12371 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12373 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12375 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12377 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12379 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12383 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12384 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12385 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12386 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12387 // the given `channel_id`.
12388 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12389 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12390 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12391 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12393 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12396 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12398 // Test the API functions.
12399 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12401 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12403 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12405 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12407 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12409 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12413 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12414 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12420 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12422 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12423 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12425 let mut funding_tx = None;
12426 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12427 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12428 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12431 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12432 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12433 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12434 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12435 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12437 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12439 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12441 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12443 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12445 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12447 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12450 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12451 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12452 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12453 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12454 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12455 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12457 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12458 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12460 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12461 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12462 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12463 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12464 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12465 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12466 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12469 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12470 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12471 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12472 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12473 }, true).unwrap_err();
12475 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12476 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12477 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12478 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12479 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12480 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12481 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12483 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12484 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12486 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12487 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12488 }, true).unwrap_err();
12490 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12491 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12492 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12493 }, false).unwrap();
12494 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12496 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12497 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12499 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12500 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12501 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12502 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12503 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12505 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12506 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12507 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12509 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12510 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12511 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12513 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12514 // "protected" and can connect again.
12515 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12516 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12517 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12519 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12521 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12524 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12528 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12529 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12530 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12531 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12532 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12533 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12535 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12537 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12538 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12540 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12541 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12542 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12543 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12546 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12548 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12549 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12550 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12552 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12553 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12554 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12556 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12557 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12558 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12559 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12563 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12564 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12565 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12568 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12569 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12573 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12575 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12576 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12578 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12579 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12580 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12581 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12582 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12583 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12586 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12587 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12589 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12590 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12592 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12594 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12595 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12598 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12599 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12600 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12601 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12602 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12604 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12605 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12607 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12608 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12609 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12610 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12616 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12617 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12619 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12621 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12623 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12624 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12626 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12628 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12632 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12633 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12634 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12635 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12636 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12637 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12638 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12639 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12640 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12641 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12642 payment_metadata: None,
12643 keysend_preimage: None,
12644 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12645 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12647 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12649 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12650 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12651 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12652 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12653 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12654 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12655 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12657 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12658 } else { panic!(); }
12660 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12661 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12662 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12663 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12664 payment_metadata: None,
12665 keysend_preimage: None,
12666 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12667 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12669 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12671 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12672 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12673 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12674 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12678 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12679 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12680 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12681 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12682 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12684 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12685 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12686 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12687 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12688 payment_metadata: None,
12689 keysend_preimage: None,
12690 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12691 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12693 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12694 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12695 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12697 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12698 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12699 // is not satisfied.
12700 assert!(result.is_ok());
12704 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12705 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12706 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12707 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12708 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12710 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12711 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12716 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12717 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12719 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12720 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12722 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12723 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12724 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12725 match &msg_events[0] {
12726 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12727 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12729 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12730 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12731 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12734 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12737 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12738 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12740 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12741 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12744 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12748 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12749 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12750 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12751 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12754 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12755 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12756 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12758 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12760 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12761 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12762 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12764 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12765 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12767 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12768 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12773 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12774 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12776 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12777 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12779 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12780 // not have generated any events.
12781 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12785 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12786 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12787 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12788 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12789 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12791 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12792 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12794 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12795 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12796 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12798 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12799 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12801 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12802 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12804 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12805 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12808 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12809 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12812 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12813 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12814 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12815 ..Default::default()
12817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12818 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12819 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12821 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12822 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12825 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12826 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12827 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12828 ..Default::default()
12830 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12831 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12832 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12833 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12835 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12836 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12839 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12840 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12841 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12842 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12843 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12846 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12847 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12848 ..Default::default()
12850 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12853 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12854 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12860 fn test_payment_display() {
12861 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12862 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12863 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12864 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12865 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12866 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12870 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12871 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12872 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12873 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12874 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12875 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12877 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12878 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12879 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12880 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12881 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12882 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12883 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12884 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12886 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12887 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12888 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12891 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12892 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12894 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12895 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12897 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12898 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12899 }, false).unwrap();
12900 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12901 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12902 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12904 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12906 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12907 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12908 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12909 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12910 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12911 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12912 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12913 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12914 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12915 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12916 } else { panic!() };
12917 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12918 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12919 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12920 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12922 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12924 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12925 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12926 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12931 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12932 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12933 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12934 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12937 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12938 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12939 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12941 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12942 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12944 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12945 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12948 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12949 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12950 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12952 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12956 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12957 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12958 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12960 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12965 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12966 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12967 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12968 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12970 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12971 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12972 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12974 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12976 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12977 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12978 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12979 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12981 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12982 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12984 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12990 use crate::chain::Listen;
12991 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12992 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12993 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12994 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12995 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12996 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12997 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12998 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12999 use crate::util::test_utils;
13000 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13002 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13003 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13004 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13005 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13007 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13009 use criterion::Criterion;
13011 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13012 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13013 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13014 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13015 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13016 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13017 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13019 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13020 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13022 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13023 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13025 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13027 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13030 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13031 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13034 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13035 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13036 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13038 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13039 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13041 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13042 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13043 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13044 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13045 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13047 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13048 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13049 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13051 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13052 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13053 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13054 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13056 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13057 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13058 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13060 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13061 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13062 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13063 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13064 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13066 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13067 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13068 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13070 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13071 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13073 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13074 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13075 }, false).unwrap();
13076 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13077 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13078 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13081 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13082 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13083 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13085 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13086 } else { panic!(); }
13088 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13089 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13090 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13091 match events_b[0] {
13092 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13093 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13098 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13099 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13100 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13101 match events_a[0] {
13102 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13103 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13105 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13108 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13110 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13111 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13112 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13114 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13115 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13116 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13117 match msg_events[0] {
13118 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13119 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13120 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13124 match msg_events[1] {
13125 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13129 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13130 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13131 match events_a[0] {
13132 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13133 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13138 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13139 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13140 match events_b[0] {
13141 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13142 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13144 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13147 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13148 macro_rules! send_payment {
13149 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13150 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13151 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13152 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13153 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13154 payment_count += 1;
13155 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13156 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13158 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13159 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13160 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13161 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13162 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13163 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13164 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13165 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13166 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13167 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13168 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13171 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13172 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13173 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13175 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13176 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13177 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13178 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13179 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13181 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13184 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13185 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13186 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13187 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13189 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13193 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13194 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13195 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);