1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
218 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
220 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
221 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
222 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
224 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
225 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
230 impl Readable for PaymentId {
231 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
232 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
243 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
244 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
249 impl Readable for InterceptId {
250 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
251 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
256 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
257 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
258 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
259 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
260 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
263 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
265 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
266 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
267 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
269 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
270 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
274 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
275 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
276 (0, short_channel_id, required),
277 (2, htlc_id, required),
279 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
280 (0, session_priv, required),
285 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
286 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
287 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
288 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
289 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
292 session_priv: SecretKey,
293 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
294 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
295 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
296 payment_id: PaymentId,
299 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
300 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
301 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
303 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
305 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
307 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
310 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
311 payment_id.hash(hasher);
312 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
318 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
320 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
321 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
322 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
323 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
325 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
329 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
330 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
331 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
332 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
333 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
334 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
336 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
342 struct ReceiveError {
348 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
349 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
351 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
352 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
353 pub enum FailureCode {
354 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
355 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
356 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
357 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
358 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
359 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
360 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
361 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
362 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
363 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
364 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
367 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
368 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
369 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
370 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
371 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
373 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 err: msgs::LightningError,
375 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
376 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
378 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
380 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 err: LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
385 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
392 shutdown_finish: None,
396 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
397 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
400 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
402 err: LightningError {
404 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
405 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
411 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
412 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
416 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
419 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
421 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
422 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
426 log_level: Level::Warn,
429 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
433 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
436 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
444 shutdown_finish: None,
449 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
450 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
451 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
452 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
453 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
455 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
456 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
457 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
458 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
459 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
460 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
461 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
463 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
467 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
468 struct ClaimingPayment {
470 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
471 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
473 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
474 (0, amount_msat, required),
475 (2, payment_purpose, required),
476 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
479 struct ClaimablePayment {
480 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
481 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
482 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
485 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
486 struct ClaimablePayments {
487 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
488 /// failed/claimed by the user.
490 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
491 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
493 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
494 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
495 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
497 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
498 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
499 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
500 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
503 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
504 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
505 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
506 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
507 enum BackgroundEvent {
508 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
509 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
510 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
511 /// need the counterparty node_id.
513 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
514 /// are regenerated on startup.
515 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
516 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
517 /// channel to continue normal operation.
519 /// In general this should be used rather than
520 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
521 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
522 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
524 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
525 /// are regenerated on startup.
526 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
527 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
528 funding_txo: OutPoint,
529 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
534 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
535 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
536 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
537 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
538 /// event can be generated.
539 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
540 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
541 /// operation of another channel.
543 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
544 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
545 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
546 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
548 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
549 event: events::Event,
550 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
554 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
555 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
556 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
557 (0, event, upgradable_required),
558 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
559 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
560 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
561 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
562 // downgrades to prior versions.
563 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
567 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
568 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
569 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
570 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
571 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
574 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
575 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
576 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
577 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
581 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
582 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
583 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
584 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
585 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
586 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
588 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
589 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
590 channel_id: [u8; 32],
591 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
596 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
598 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
599 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
600 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
601 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
606 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
607 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
611 /// State we hold per-peer.
612 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
613 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
615 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
616 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
617 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
619 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
620 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
622 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
623 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
625 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
626 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
628 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
629 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
630 latest_features: InitFeatures,
631 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
632 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
633 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
634 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
635 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
637 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
638 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
639 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
640 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
642 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
643 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
644 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
645 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
646 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
647 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
648 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
649 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
650 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
651 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
652 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
653 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
654 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
655 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
656 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
660 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
661 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
662 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
663 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
664 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
665 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
668 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
671 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
672 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
673 self.channel_by_id.len() +
674 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
675 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
678 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
679 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
680 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
681 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
682 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
686 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
687 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
689 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
692 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
693 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
694 struct PendingInboundPayment {
695 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
696 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
697 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
698 /// this payment being removed.
700 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
701 user_payment_id: u64,
702 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
703 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
704 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
707 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
708 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
709 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
710 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
711 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
712 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
713 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
714 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
716 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
717 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
725 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
727 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
728 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
729 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
734 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
735 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
736 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
737 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
738 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
739 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
740 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
741 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
742 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
744 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
745 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
747 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
748 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
749 $vis trait AChannelManager {
750 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
751 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
752 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
753 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
754 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
755 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
756 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
757 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
758 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
759 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
760 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
761 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
762 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
763 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
764 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
765 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
766 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
767 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
770 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
771 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
772 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
773 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
774 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
775 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
777 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
778 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
779 ES::Target: EntropySource,
780 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
781 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
782 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
786 type Watch = M::Target;
788 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
790 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
792 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
794 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
795 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
797 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
799 type Router = R::Target;
801 type Logger = L::Target;
803 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
806 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
807 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
809 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
810 /// to individual Channels.
812 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
813 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
814 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
815 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
817 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
818 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
819 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
820 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
821 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
822 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
823 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
825 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
826 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
827 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
829 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
830 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
831 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
832 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
833 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
835 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
836 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
837 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
838 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
840 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
841 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
842 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
844 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
845 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
846 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
847 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
848 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
850 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
851 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
852 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
853 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
854 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
855 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
856 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
857 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
860 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
861 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
862 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
863 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
864 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
868 // `total_consistency_lock`
870 // |__`forward_htlcs`
872 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
874 // |__`per_peer_state`
876 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
878 // | |__`claimable_payments`
880 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
886 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
888 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
892 // | |__`pending_events`
894 // | |__`pending_background_events`
896 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
898 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
899 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
900 ES::Target: EntropySource,
901 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
903 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
907 default_configuration: UserConfig,
908 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
909 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
915 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
917 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
919 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
920 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
922 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
923 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
924 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
925 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
927 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
930 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
931 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
932 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
933 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
934 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
935 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
936 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
937 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
939 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
941 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
942 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
944 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
946 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
947 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
948 /// and via the classic SCID.
950 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
951 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
953 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
955 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
957 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
958 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
959 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
961 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
962 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
964 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
965 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
970 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
971 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
972 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
973 /// active channel list on load.
975 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
976 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
978 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
980 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
981 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
982 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
984 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
985 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
986 /// the handling of the events.
988 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
989 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
992 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
993 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
994 /// would break backwards compatability.
995 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
996 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
997 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
999 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1000 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1002 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1004 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1005 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1006 /// confirmation depth.
1008 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1009 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1010 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1012 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1014 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1016 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1018 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1020 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1022 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1023 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1024 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1026 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1027 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1029 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1030 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1031 /// keeping additional state.
1032 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1034 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1035 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1036 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1037 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1039 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1040 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1042 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1043 /// are currently open with that peer.
1045 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1046 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1049 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1051 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1052 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1053 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1054 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1055 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1057 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1058 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1059 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1060 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1061 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1063 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1064 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1066 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1068 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1069 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1071 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1072 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1073 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1074 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1075 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1077 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1082 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1083 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1084 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1085 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1086 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1087 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1088 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1089 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1091 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1092 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1094 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1098 signer_provider: SP,
1103 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1105 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1106 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1107 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1108 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1109 pub struct ChainParameters {
1110 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1111 pub network: Network,
1113 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1115 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1116 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1119 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1126 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1127 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1128 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1129 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1130 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1131 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1133 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1134 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1135 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1136 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1137 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1139 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1140 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1143 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1144 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1145 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1146 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1148 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1149 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1150 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1151 _read_guard: read_guard,
1156 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1157 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1158 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1159 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1161 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1162 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1163 should_persist: persist_check,
1164 _read_guard: read_guard,
1169 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1170 fn drop(&mut self) {
1171 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1172 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1177 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1178 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1180 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1183 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1184 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1185 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1186 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1188 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1189 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1191 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1193 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1194 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1195 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1196 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1197 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1198 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1199 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1200 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1201 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1202 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1203 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1204 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1205 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1207 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1208 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1210 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1211 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1212 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1213 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1215 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1216 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1217 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1218 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1219 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1220 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1223 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1225 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1226 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1229 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1231 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1232 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1234 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1235 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1236 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1237 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1239 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1240 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1241 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1243 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1244 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1245 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1247 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1248 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1249 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1250 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1252 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1253 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1254 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1256 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1257 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1258 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1260 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1261 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1262 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1263 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1264 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1265 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1266 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1267 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1268 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1269 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1270 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1273 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1274 /// to better separate parameters.
1275 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1276 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1277 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1278 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1279 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1280 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1281 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1282 pub features: InitFeatures,
1283 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1284 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1285 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1287 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1289 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1290 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1291 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1292 /// payments to us through this channel.
1293 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1294 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1295 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1296 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1297 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1298 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1299 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1302 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1303 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1304 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1305 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1306 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1307 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1308 /// lifetime of the channel.
1309 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1310 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1311 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1312 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1313 /// our counterparty already.
1315 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1316 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1317 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1318 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1320 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1321 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1322 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1323 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1325 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1326 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1328 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1329 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1331 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1332 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1333 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1334 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1335 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1336 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1337 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1338 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1339 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1342 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1344 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1345 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1346 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1347 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1348 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1349 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1350 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1352 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1353 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1355 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1356 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1357 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1358 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1359 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1360 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1361 /// this value on chain.
1363 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1365 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1367 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1368 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1369 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1370 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1372 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1373 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1374 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1376 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1377 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1378 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1379 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1380 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1382 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1383 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1384 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1385 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1387 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1388 pub balance_msat: u64,
1389 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1390 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1391 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1392 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1394 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1396 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1397 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1398 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1399 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1400 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1401 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1402 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1403 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1405 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1406 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1407 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1408 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1409 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1410 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1411 /// route which is valid.
1412 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1413 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1414 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1415 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1416 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1417 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1419 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1420 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1421 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1422 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1423 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1424 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1425 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1426 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1427 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1429 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1431 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1432 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1433 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1434 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1435 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1437 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1438 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1439 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1440 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1441 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1442 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1443 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1445 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1446 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1447 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1448 pub is_outbound: bool,
1449 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1450 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1451 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1452 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1453 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1455 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1456 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1457 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1458 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1460 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1461 pub is_usable: bool,
1462 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1463 pub is_public: bool,
1464 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1465 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1466 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1467 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1468 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1469 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1471 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1472 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1475 impl ChannelDetails {
1476 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1477 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1478 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1480 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1481 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1482 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1483 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1486 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1487 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1488 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1490 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1491 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1492 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1493 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1496 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1497 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1499 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1500 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1501 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1503 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1504 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1505 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1506 features: latest_features,
1507 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1508 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1509 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1510 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1511 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1512 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1513 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1514 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1515 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1516 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1518 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1519 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1520 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1521 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1522 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1523 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1524 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1525 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1526 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1527 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1528 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1529 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1530 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1531 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1532 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1533 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1534 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1535 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1536 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1537 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1538 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1539 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1540 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1541 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1542 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1543 config: Some(context.config()),
1548 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1549 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1550 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1551 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1552 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1554 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1556 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1557 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1558 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1561 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1562 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1563 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1565 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1566 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1567 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1569 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1570 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1571 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1573 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1574 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1578 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1580 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1582 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1583 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1584 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1585 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1587 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1588 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1589 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1592 macro_rules! handle_error {
1593 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1594 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1595 // entering the macro.
1596 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1597 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1601 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1602 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1604 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1605 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1606 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1607 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1611 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1612 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1613 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1614 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1619 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1620 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1622 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1623 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1624 action: err.action.clone()
1628 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1629 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1630 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1631 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1632 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1636 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1641 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1644 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1645 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1646 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1652 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1653 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1654 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1655 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1656 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1657 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1659 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1660 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1661 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1662 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1663 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1665 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1666 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1668 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1672 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1673 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1674 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1676 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1677 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1679 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1680 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1682 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1683 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1684 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1685 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1686 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1687 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1691 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1693 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1694 // In any case, just close the channel.
1695 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1696 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1697 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1698 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1699 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1700 shutdown_res, None))
1706 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1707 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1711 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1713 $entry.remove_entry();
1721 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1722 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1726 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1728 $entry.remove_entry();
1736 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1737 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1741 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1743 $entry.remove_entry();
1751 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1752 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1754 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1755 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1761 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1762 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1763 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1764 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1765 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1767 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1768 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1769 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1770 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1771 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1772 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1773 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1774 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1775 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1776 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1781 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1782 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1783 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1784 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1785 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1786 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1787 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1788 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1789 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1791 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1796 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1797 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1798 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1799 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1800 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1801 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1802 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1803 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1804 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1806 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1811 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1812 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1813 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1814 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1815 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1816 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1817 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1818 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1819 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1820 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1821 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1823 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1824 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1825 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1831 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1832 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1834 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1835 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1836 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1837 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1838 updates.announcement_sigs);
1839 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1840 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1843 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1844 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1845 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1847 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1849 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1850 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1852 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1853 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1854 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1855 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1860 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1861 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1862 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1863 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1864 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1865 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1866 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1869 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1870 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1871 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1874 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1875 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1876 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1877 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1878 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1879 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1880 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1881 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1885 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1886 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1887 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1888 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1894 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1895 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1899 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1900 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1901 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1902 while !processed_all_events {
1903 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1907 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1910 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1911 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1912 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1914 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1915 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1916 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1918 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1919 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1920 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1921 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1925 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1926 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1927 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1928 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1931 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1933 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1934 $event_to_handle = event;
1936 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1937 post_event_actions.push(action);
1942 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1943 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1944 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1945 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1948 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1949 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1950 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1951 processed_all_events = false;
1954 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1955 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1961 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1963 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1964 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1965 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1966 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1967 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1972 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1974 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1975 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1977 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1979 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1980 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1981 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1984 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1985 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1986 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1987 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1988 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1989 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1990 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1991 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1993 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1994 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1995 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2000 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2002 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2003 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2004 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2005 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2006 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2007 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2008 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2009 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2011 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2014 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2015 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2017 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2019 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2021 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2023 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2024 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2025 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2026 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2027 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2028 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2029 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2039 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2040 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2041 &self.default_configuration
2044 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2045 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2046 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2049 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2050 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2052 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2054 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2058 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2063 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2065 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2066 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2067 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2068 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2069 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2071 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2072 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2074 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2075 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2076 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2078 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2079 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2080 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2082 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2083 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2084 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2085 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2086 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2087 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2089 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2090 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2091 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2092 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2093 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2094 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2098 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2099 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2101 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2104 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2106 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2108 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2109 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2110 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2111 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2112 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2113 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2117 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2122 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2124 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2125 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2128 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2130 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2136 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2137 node_id: their_network_key,
2140 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2143 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2144 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2145 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2146 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2147 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2148 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2149 // the same channel.
2150 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2152 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2154 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2157 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2158 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2159 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2167 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2168 /// more information.
2169 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2170 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2171 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2172 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2173 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2174 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2175 // the same channel.
2176 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2178 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2180 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2183 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2184 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2185 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2188 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2189 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2190 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2193 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2194 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2195 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2203 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2204 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2206 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2207 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2209 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2210 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2211 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2212 // really wanted anyway.
2213 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2216 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2217 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2218 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2219 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2221 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2222 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2223 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2224 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2225 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2228 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2234 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2235 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2237 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2238 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2239 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2241 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2242 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2243 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2244 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2245 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2246 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2247 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2248 total_msat: *total_msat,
2251 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2252 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2254 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2255 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2257 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2262 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2263 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2264 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2265 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2266 Some(transaction) => {
2267 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2268 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2273 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2274 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2275 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2276 reason: closure_reason
2280 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2283 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2284 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2285 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2287 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2288 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2292 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2293 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2294 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2295 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2296 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2297 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2298 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2300 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2301 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2302 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2304 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2308 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2309 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2310 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2311 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2312 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2315 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2316 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2317 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2318 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2322 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2330 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2331 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2332 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2333 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2336 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2340 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2341 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2342 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2344 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2345 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2347 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2348 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2349 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2350 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2352 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2354 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2355 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2356 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2359 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2360 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2361 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2362 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2363 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2364 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2367 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2368 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2369 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2371 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2372 /// the channel being closed or not:
2373 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2374 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2375 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2376 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2377 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2378 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2379 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2381 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2382 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2383 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2384 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2386 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2388 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2389 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2390 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2393 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2394 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2395 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2396 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2397 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2398 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2402 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2403 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2404 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2405 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2406 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2407 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2408 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2409 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2411 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2412 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2413 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2414 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2415 // ignore the result here.
2416 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2420 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2421 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2422 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2423 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2425 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2426 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2427 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2430 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2431 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2433 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2435 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2436 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2437 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2438 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2439 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2440 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2441 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2442 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2443 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2444 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2445 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2446 // Prefunded channel has no update
2447 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2448 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2449 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2450 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2451 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2452 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2453 // Prefunded channel has no update
2454 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2456 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2459 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2460 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2466 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2469 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2471 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2472 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2474 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2475 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2476 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2477 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2478 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2479 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2480 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2491 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2492 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2493 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2495 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2496 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2497 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2500 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2501 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2502 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2504 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2505 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2506 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2507 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2508 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2511 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2512 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2513 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2514 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2515 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2519 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2520 /// local transaction(s).
2521 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2522 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2523 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2527 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2528 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2530 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2531 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2532 return Err(ReceiveError {
2533 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2535 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2538 // final_expiry_too_soon
2539 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2540 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2542 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2543 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2544 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2545 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2546 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2547 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2548 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2549 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2550 return Err(ReceiveError {
2551 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2552 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2555 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2556 return Err(ReceiveError {
2558 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2559 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2563 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2564 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2565 return Err(ReceiveError {
2566 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2567 err_data: Vec::new(),
2568 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2571 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2572 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2573 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2574 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2575 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2576 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2577 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2578 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2579 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2580 return Err(ReceiveError {
2581 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2582 err_data: Vec::new(),
2583 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2586 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2587 return Err(ReceiveError {
2588 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2589 err_data: Vec::new(),
2590 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2593 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2597 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2599 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2600 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2603 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2604 phantom_shared_secret,
2607 return Err(ReceiveError {
2608 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2609 err_data: Vec::new(),
2610 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2615 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2618 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2619 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2620 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2621 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2622 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2626 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2627 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2628 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2629 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2630 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2632 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2633 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2634 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2635 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2636 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2637 failure_code: $err_code,
2643 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2644 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2647 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2648 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2649 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2651 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2652 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2653 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2654 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2655 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2656 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2657 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2658 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2660 macro_rules! return_err {
2661 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2663 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2664 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2665 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2666 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2667 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2668 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2674 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2676 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2677 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2679 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2680 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2683 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2684 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2685 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2686 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2687 outgoing_cltv_value,
2690 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2691 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2692 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2694 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2695 // inbound channel's state.
2696 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2697 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2698 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2700 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2704 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2705 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2706 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2707 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2708 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2709 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2710 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2711 // phantom or an intercept.
2712 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2713 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2714 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2718 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2721 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2723 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2726 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2727 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2731 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2733 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2734 // have no consistency guarantees.
2735 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2739 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2740 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2741 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2742 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2743 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2745 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2746 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2747 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2748 // we don't have the channel here.
2749 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2751 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2753 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2754 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2755 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2756 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2757 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2758 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2759 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2760 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2761 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2762 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2763 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2765 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2768 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2769 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2771 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2772 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2776 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2777 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2778 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2779 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2781 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2788 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2789 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2790 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2791 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2792 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2793 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2795 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2796 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2798 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2799 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2800 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2801 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2802 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2803 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2804 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2805 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2806 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2807 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2813 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2814 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2815 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2816 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2818 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2819 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2821 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2822 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2823 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2825 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2826 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2827 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2828 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2829 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2830 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2831 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2835 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2837 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2840 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2841 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2842 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2843 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2844 macro_rules! return_err {
2845 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2847 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2848 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2849 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2850 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2851 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2852 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2858 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2860 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2862 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2863 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2864 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2865 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2866 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2868 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2871 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2872 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2873 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2875 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2876 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2877 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2880 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2881 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2882 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2883 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2887 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2888 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2889 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2892 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2893 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2894 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2895 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2896 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2897 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2903 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2904 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2905 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2907 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2908 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2909 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2911 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2912 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2913 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2914 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2915 return Err(LightningError {
2916 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2917 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2920 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2921 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2924 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2927 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2928 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2929 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2930 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2932 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2933 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2934 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2936 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2937 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2938 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2939 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2940 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2941 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2945 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2948 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2950 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2952 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2953 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2954 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2955 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2956 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2959 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2960 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2962 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2963 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2964 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2965 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2966 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2967 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2968 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2969 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2971 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2972 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2973 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2975 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2977 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2984 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2985 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2986 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2989 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2990 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2991 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2994 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2995 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2997 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2998 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2999 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3001 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3002 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3004 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3005 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3006 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3007 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3011 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3012 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3015 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3016 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3017 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3019 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3020 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3021 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3023 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3024 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3026 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
3027 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3028 Some(monitor_update) => {
3029 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3030 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
3031 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3034 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
3035 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3036 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3037 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3038 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3039 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3040 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3041 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3047 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3048 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3049 // `channel_by_id` map.
3050 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3051 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3056 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3057 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3059 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3064 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3066 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3067 /// fields for more info.
3069 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3070 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3072 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3074 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3075 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3076 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3077 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3078 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3080 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3081 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3082 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3083 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3084 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3086 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3087 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3088 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3089 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3091 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3093 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3094 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3095 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3097 /// In general, a path may raise:
3098 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3099 /// node public key) is specified.
3100 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3101 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3103 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3104 /// relevant updates.
3106 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3107 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3108 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3110 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3111 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3112 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3113 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3114 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3115 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3116 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3118 self.pending_outbound_payments
3119 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3120 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3121 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3124 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3125 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3126 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3127 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3129 self.pending_outbound_payments
3130 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3131 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3132 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3133 &self.pending_events,
3134 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3135 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3139 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3140 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3142 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3143 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3144 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3148 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3149 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3150 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3154 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3155 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3159 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3160 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3161 /// retries are exhausted.
3163 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3164 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3166 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3167 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3168 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3170 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3171 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3173 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3174 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3175 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3177 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3180 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3181 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3182 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3183 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3184 /// never reach the recipient.
3186 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3187 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3189 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3190 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3192 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3193 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3194 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3196 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3197 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3198 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3199 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3200 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3203 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3204 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3206 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3209 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3210 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3211 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3213 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3214 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3215 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3216 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3217 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3218 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3221 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3222 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3223 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3224 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3225 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3227 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3228 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3229 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3232 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3235 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3236 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3239 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3240 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3241 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3242 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3243 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3245 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3246 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3250 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3252 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3254 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3255 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3256 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3257 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3258 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3259 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3260 } else { unreachable!(); });
3262 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3263 Err((chan, err)) => {
3264 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3265 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3267 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3268 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3269 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3277 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3278 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3284 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3287 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3289 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3292 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3293 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3294 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3303 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3304 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3305 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3309 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3311 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3312 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3314 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3315 /// across the p2p network.
3317 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3318 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3320 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3321 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3322 /// keys per-channel).
3324 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3325 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3326 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3328 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3329 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3330 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3332 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3333 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3334 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3335 /// for more details.
3337 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3338 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3339 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3342 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3343 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3344 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3345 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3350 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3351 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3352 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3353 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3354 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3355 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3356 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3357 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3361 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3362 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3363 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3364 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3368 let mut output_index = None;
3369 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3370 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3371 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3372 if output_index.is_some() {
3373 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3374 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3377 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3380 if output_index.is_none() {
3381 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3382 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3385 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3389 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3391 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3392 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3393 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3394 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3396 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3397 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3399 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3400 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3402 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3404 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3405 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3406 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3407 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3408 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3409 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3410 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3411 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3412 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3413 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3414 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3416 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3423 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3426 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3427 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3428 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3429 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3433 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3434 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3435 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3436 config.apply(config_update);
3437 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3440 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3441 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3442 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3443 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3444 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3452 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3454 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3455 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3456 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3457 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3459 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3460 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3462 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3463 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3465 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3467 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3468 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3469 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3470 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3471 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3472 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3473 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3474 pub fn update_channel_config(
3475 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3476 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3477 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3480 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3481 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3483 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3484 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3486 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3487 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3488 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3489 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3490 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3492 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3493 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3494 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3497 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3500 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3501 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3502 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3503 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3504 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3505 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3508 let next_hop_scid = {
3509 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3510 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3511 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3516 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3517 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3518 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3521 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3523 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3524 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3525 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3530 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3531 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3532 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3535 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3536 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3537 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3539 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3541 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3542 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3543 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3544 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3545 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3548 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3549 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3550 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3551 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3552 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3554 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3558 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3559 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3561 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3564 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3565 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3569 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3570 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3573 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3574 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3575 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3576 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3577 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3578 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3579 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3582 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3583 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3584 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3585 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3590 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3592 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3593 /// Will likely generate further events.
3594 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3597 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3598 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3599 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3601 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3602 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3604 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3605 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3606 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3608 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3609 match forward_info {
3610 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3611 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3612 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3613 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3614 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3617 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3618 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3619 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3621 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3622 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3623 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3624 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3625 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3626 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3629 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3630 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3632 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3635 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3636 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3642 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3643 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3645 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3649 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3650 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3652 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3656 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3657 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3658 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3659 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3660 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3662 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3663 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3664 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3665 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3666 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3668 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3670 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3671 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3675 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3676 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3677 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3678 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3684 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3687 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3690 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3691 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3692 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3693 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3694 // problem, not ours.
3700 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3701 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3703 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3708 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3709 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3710 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3715 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3717 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3721 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3722 match forward_info {
3723 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3724 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3725 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3726 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3727 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, ..
3730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3731 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3732 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3733 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3734 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3735 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3736 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3737 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3739 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3740 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3741 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3743 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3744 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3746 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3748 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3749 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3750 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3751 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3756 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3757 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3759 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3760 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3761 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3762 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3764 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3767 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3769 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3770 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3771 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3780 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3781 match forward_info {
3782 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3783 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3784 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3785 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3788 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3789 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3790 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3792 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3793 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3794 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3796 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3797 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3798 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3801 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3802 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3805 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3808 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3809 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3810 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3811 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3812 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3813 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3814 phantom_shared_secret,
3816 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3817 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3818 // if routing nodes overpay
3819 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3820 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3822 total_value_received: None,
3823 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3828 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3830 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3831 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3832 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3833 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3834 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3835 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3837 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3838 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3839 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3840 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3841 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3842 phantom_shared_secret,
3844 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3845 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3847 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3850 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3851 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3852 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3853 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3854 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3857 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3858 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3859 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3860 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3861 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3862 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3864 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3865 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3866 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3868 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3869 .entry(payment_hash)
3870 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3871 .or_insert_with(|| {
3872 committed_to_claimable = true;
3874 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3877 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3878 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3879 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3880 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3882 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3883 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3884 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3886 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3887 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3888 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3891 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3893 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3894 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3895 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3896 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3897 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3898 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3899 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3901 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3902 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3904 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3906 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3907 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3908 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3909 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3910 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3911 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3912 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3913 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3914 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3915 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3916 committed_to_claimable = true;
3918 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3919 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3920 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3921 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3922 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3923 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3927 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3928 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3929 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3930 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3932 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3934 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3935 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3937 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3938 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3939 committed_to_claimable = true;
3942 payment_claimable_generated
3946 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3947 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3948 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3949 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3950 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3951 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3952 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3953 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3955 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3956 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3957 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3958 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3959 Ok(result) => result,
3961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3962 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3965 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3966 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3967 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3968 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3969 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3970 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3973 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3974 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3975 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3977 check_total_value!(purpose);
3979 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3980 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3981 check_total_value!(purpose);
3985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3986 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3988 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3990 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3991 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3993 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3994 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3995 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3996 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3997 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3999 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4000 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4001 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4003 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4004 if payment_claimable_generated {
4005 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4011 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4012 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4020 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4021 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4022 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4023 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4024 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4025 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4027 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4030 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4032 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4033 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4034 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4036 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4038 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4039 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4040 events.append(&mut new_events);
4043 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4045 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4046 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4047 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4049 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4050 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4052 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4053 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4054 if background_events.is_empty() {
4055 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4058 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4060 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4061 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4062 // monitor updating completing.
4063 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4065 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4066 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4070 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4073 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4075 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4081 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4082 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4083 // however, ensure that.
4085 log_error!(self.logger,
4086 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4088 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4092 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4095 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4096 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4097 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4098 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4099 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4102 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4103 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4104 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4105 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4107 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4108 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4110 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4111 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4112 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4113 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4116 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4118 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4119 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4123 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4124 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4125 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4126 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4127 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4128 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4129 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4131 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4134 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4137 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4138 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4139 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4147 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4149 /// This currently includes:
4150 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4151 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4152 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4154 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4155 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4156 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4158 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4159 /// estimate fetches.
4161 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4162 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4163 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4164 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4165 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4167 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4169 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4170 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4171 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4174 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4175 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4176 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4177 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4178 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4179 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4180 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4181 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4183 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4184 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4185 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4186 if needs_close { return false; }
4189 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4190 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4191 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4192 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4193 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4194 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4195 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4196 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4198 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4199 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4200 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4205 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4207 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4210 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4212 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4213 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4214 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4215 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4219 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4221 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4227 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4229 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4230 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4231 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4232 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4233 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4235 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4236 channel_id: *chan_id,
4237 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4245 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4246 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4251 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4252 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4253 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4254 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4255 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4256 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4257 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4258 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4259 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4260 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4261 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4263 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4264 // have no channels to the peer.
4265 let remove_entry = {
4266 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4267 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4270 entry.remove_entry();
4273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4278 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4279 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4280 // This should be unreachable
4281 debug_assert!(false);
4284 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4285 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4286 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4287 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4288 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4289 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4290 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4293 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4294 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4295 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4297 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4298 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4305 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4306 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4307 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4308 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4309 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4312 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4313 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4316 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4318 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4319 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4320 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4321 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4322 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4329 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4330 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4331 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4333 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4334 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4335 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4336 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4338 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4339 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4340 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4341 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4342 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4343 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4346 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4347 /// reason for the failure.
4349 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4350 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4353 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4354 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4355 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4356 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4357 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4358 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4364 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4365 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4366 match failure_code {
4367 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4368 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4369 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4370 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4371 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4372 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4377 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4378 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4380 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4382 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4383 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4384 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4385 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4386 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4387 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4388 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4390 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4392 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4393 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4395 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4400 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4401 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4402 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4403 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4404 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4405 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4406 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4407 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4408 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4409 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4411 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4412 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4413 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4414 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4416 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4417 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4418 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4419 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4420 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4424 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4425 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4426 // be surfaced to the user.
4427 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4428 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4429 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4431 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4433 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4438 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4442 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4445 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4446 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4447 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4452 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4453 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4454 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4455 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4456 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4457 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4458 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4459 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4460 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4463 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4464 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4465 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4468 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4469 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4470 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4472 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4473 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4474 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4475 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4476 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4478 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4480 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4482 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4483 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4484 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4485 push_forward_ev = true;
4487 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4488 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4489 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4492 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4495 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4496 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4497 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4498 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4499 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4500 failed_next_destination: destination,
4506 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4507 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4509 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4510 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4511 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4512 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4514 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4515 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4516 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4517 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4519 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4520 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4521 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4522 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4523 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4524 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4525 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4526 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4531 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4532 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4533 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4534 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4535 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4536 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4537 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4538 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4543 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4544 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4545 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4547 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4548 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4549 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4550 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4555 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4557 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4558 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4559 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4560 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4561 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4562 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4563 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4564 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4565 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4567 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4568 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4569 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4570 debug_assert!(false);
4574 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4576 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4577 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4578 debug_assert!(false);
4582 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4583 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4585 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4586 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4587 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4588 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4591 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4592 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4593 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4594 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4598 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4599 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4600 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4601 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4603 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4604 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4605 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4606 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4607 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4612 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4613 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4614 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4615 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4616 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4617 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4620 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4623 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4624 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4625 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4626 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4630 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4631 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4632 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4633 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4637 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4638 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4639 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4643 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4644 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4645 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4648 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4652 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4653 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4655 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4656 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4657 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4658 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4659 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4661 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4662 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4663 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4664 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4665 if let Err(e) = res {
4666 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4667 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4668 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4669 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4670 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4677 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4678 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4679 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4683 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4684 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4685 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4686 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4687 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4688 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4689 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4690 // again on restart.
4691 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4692 payment_preimage, update_res);
4694 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4695 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4696 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4697 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4698 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4699 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4703 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4704 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4707 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4709 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4710 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4712 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4713 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4714 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4715 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4716 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4717 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4718 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4721 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4722 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4724 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4725 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4726 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4727 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4729 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4733 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4734 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4735 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4741 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4742 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4743 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4746 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4747 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4749 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4750 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4751 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4752 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4753 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4757 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4758 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4760 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4761 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4762 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4769 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4770 /// update completion.
4771 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4772 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4773 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4774 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4775 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4776 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4778 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4779 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4780 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4781 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4782 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4783 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4785 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4787 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4788 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4789 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4790 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4793 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4794 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4796 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4798 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4803 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4804 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4805 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4806 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4811 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4812 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4813 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4814 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4815 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4820 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4824 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4830 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4831 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4832 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4836 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4837 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4838 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4844 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4845 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4847 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4848 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4850 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4851 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4852 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4853 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4854 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4860 let mut peer_state_lock;
4861 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4862 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4863 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4866 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4871 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4872 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4873 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4876 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4879 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4881 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4882 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4885 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4886 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4887 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4889 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4890 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4891 /// used to accept such channels.
4893 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4894 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4895 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4896 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4899 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4900 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4902 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4903 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4904 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4906 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4907 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4909 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4910 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4912 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4913 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4915 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4916 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4917 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4918 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4921 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4924 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4925 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4926 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4927 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4928 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4929 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4931 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4932 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4934 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
4935 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4938 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4939 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4940 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4941 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4942 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4943 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4947 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4950 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4951 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4952 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4953 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4954 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4955 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4956 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4957 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4960 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4961 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4966 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4967 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4968 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4971 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4978 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4979 /// or 0-conf channels.
4981 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4982 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4983 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4984 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4985 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4986 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4988 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4989 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4990 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4991 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4992 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4993 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
4994 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4998 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5001 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5002 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5004 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5005 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5006 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5007 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5008 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5009 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5011 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5014 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5015 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5016 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5019 num_unfunded_channels
5022 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5023 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5027 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5028 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5031 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5032 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5033 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5034 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5036 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5037 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5038 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5039 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5040 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5043 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5045 debug_assert!(false);
5046 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5051 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5052 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5053 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5054 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5055 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5056 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5058 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5059 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5060 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5063 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5064 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5065 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5066 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5067 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5070 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5071 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5072 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5075 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5080 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5081 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5083 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5084 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5086 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5087 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5088 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5090 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5091 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5092 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5095 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5096 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5097 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5098 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5099 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5100 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5101 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5104 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5109 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5110 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5111 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5112 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5114 debug_assert!(false);
5115 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5119 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5121 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5122 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5127 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5128 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5129 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5130 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5131 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5133 user_channel_id: user_id,
5138 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5139 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5142 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5144 debug_assert!(false);
5145 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5150 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5151 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5152 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5153 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5155 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5156 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5157 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5158 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5159 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5160 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5161 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5162 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5163 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5167 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5172 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5175 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5178 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5179 funding_msg.channel_id))
5181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5182 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5186 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5187 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5188 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5189 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5190 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5191 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5192 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5196 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5198 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5199 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5200 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5202 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5203 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5204 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5205 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5206 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5207 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5208 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5209 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5217 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5218 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5219 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5220 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5222 debug_assert!(false);
5223 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5228 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5230 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5231 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5232 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5233 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5234 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5235 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5236 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5237 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5238 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5239 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5248 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5250 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5252 debug_assert!(false);
5253 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5257 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5259 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5260 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5261 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5263 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5264 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5265 msg: announcement_sigs,
5267 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5268 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5269 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5270 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5271 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5272 // announcement_signatures.
5273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5274 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5275 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5276 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5284 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5293 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5294 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5295 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5297 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5299 debug_assert!(false);
5300 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5304 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5307 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5308 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5309 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5310 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5313 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5314 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5315 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5316 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5318 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5319 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5320 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5321 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5322 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5323 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5328 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5329 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5330 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5331 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5332 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5339 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5340 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5341 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5342 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5348 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5350 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5352 debug_assert!(false);
5353 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5355 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5358 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5360 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5361 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5362 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5363 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5368 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5369 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5370 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5371 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5372 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5373 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5374 } else { (tx, None) }
5376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5379 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5380 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5381 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5383 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5384 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5391 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5396 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5397 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5398 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5399 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5401 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5402 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5403 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5404 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5406 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5408 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5410 debug_assert!(false);
5411 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5415 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5418 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5419 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5420 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop, next_packet_pk_opt),
5421 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5423 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5424 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5425 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5426 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5427 match pending_forward_info {
5428 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5429 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5430 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5431 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5433 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5434 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5435 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5436 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5437 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5440 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5442 _ => pending_forward_info
5445 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5452 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5453 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5455 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5457 debug_assert!(false);
5458 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5462 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5464 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5466 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5469 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5473 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5475 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5477 debug_assert!(false);
5478 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5480 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5481 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5484 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5491 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5492 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5493 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5495 debug_assert!(false);
5496 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5500 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5501 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5502 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5503 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5504 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5506 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5513 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5515 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5517 debug_assert!(false);
5518 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5522 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5524 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5525 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5526 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5527 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5528 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5529 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5530 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5538 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5539 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5540 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5541 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5542 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5543 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5544 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5545 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5546 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5547 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5548 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5550 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5551 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5553 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5554 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5555 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5557 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5558 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5561 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5562 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5564 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5565 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5566 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5567 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5568 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5569 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5570 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5571 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5572 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5575 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5576 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5579 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5580 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5581 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5582 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5583 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5584 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5585 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5588 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5589 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5590 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5595 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5596 // payments are being processed.
5597 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5598 push_forward_event = true;
5600 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5601 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5608 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5612 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5613 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5614 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5616 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5620 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5621 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5622 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5623 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5624 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5626 if !forward_ev_exists {
5627 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5629 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5634 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5635 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5636 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5637 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5638 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5639 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5640 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5642 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5643 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5644 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5645 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5646 channel_funding_outpoint,
5647 counterparty_node_id,
5652 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5653 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5654 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5655 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5657 debug_assert!(false);
5658 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5659 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5663 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5664 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5665 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5666 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5667 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5668 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5669 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5671 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5676 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5682 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5684 debug_assert!(false);
5685 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5689 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5691 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5698 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5700 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5702 debug_assert!(false);
5703 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5705 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5706 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5707 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5709 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5713 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5714 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5715 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5716 msg, &self.default_configuration
5718 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5719 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5720 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5728 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5729 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5730 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5731 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5733 // It's not a local channel
5734 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5740 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5746 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5747 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5748 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5749 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5750 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5751 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5753 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5755 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5756 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5757 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5758 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5760 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5761 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5766 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5769 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5771 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5774 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5776 debug_assert!(false);
5777 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5781 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5783 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5784 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5785 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5786 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5787 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5788 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5789 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5790 let mut channel_update = None;
5791 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5792 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5793 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5796 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5797 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5798 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5799 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5800 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5801 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5802 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5807 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5808 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5809 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5810 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5811 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5812 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5820 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5821 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5824 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5825 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5830 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5831 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5832 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5834 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5835 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5836 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5837 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5838 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5839 match monitor_event {
5840 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5841 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5843 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5845 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5846 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5847 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5851 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5852 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5853 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5854 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5856 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5857 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5858 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5859 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5862 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5864 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5867 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5868 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5869 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5870 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5871 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5876 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5877 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5879 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5881 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5883 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5884 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5885 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5892 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5893 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5899 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5900 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5903 has_pending_monitor_events
5906 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5907 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5908 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5910 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5912 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5915 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5916 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5917 /// update was applied.
5918 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5919 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5920 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5921 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5923 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5924 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5925 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5926 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5929 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5932 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5933 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5934 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5935 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5936 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5937 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5938 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5939 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5941 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5942 has_monitor_update = true;
5944 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5945 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5946 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5947 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5948 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5949 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5950 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5952 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5954 continue 'peer_loop;
5963 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5964 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5965 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5968 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5969 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5975 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5976 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5977 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5978 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5979 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5980 let mut has_update = false;
5982 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5984 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5987 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5988 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5989 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5990 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5991 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5994 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5997 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5998 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5999 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6000 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6001 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6006 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6008 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6009 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6010 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6016 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6017 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6025 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6026 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6032 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6033 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6035 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6036 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6037 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6038 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6039 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6040 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6041 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6042 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6043 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6044 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6045 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6046 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6047 assert!(should_broadcast);
6048 } else { unreachable!(); }
6049 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6050 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6051 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6054 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6058 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6059 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
6061 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
6062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
6065 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6068 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6069 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
6070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6071 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
6072 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
6073 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
6074 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
6075 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
6076 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
6077 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
6078 // never fail a payment too early.
6079 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
6081 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
6084 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
6089 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6092 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6093 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6095 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6096 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6097 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6098 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6100 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6102 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6103 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6107 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6108 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6110 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6112 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6113 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6115 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6116 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6117 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6118 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6119 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6120 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6121 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6122 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6123 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6124 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6125 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6128 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6129 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6131 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6134 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6136 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6138 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
6139 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6140 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
6141 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
6142 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
6145 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6146 /// stored external to LDK.
6148 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6149 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6150 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6152 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6153 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6156 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6157 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6158 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6159 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6161 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6162 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6163 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6164 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6165 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6167 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6168 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6169 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6170 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6171 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6173 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6174 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6176 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6177 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6181 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6182 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6184 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6186 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6187 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6189 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6190 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6191 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6192 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6193 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6194 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6195 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6198 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
6199 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
6201 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
6204 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
6206 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6208 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
6209 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
6212 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6213 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6215 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6216 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6217 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6220 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6221 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6223 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6224 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6225 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6226 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6228 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6229 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6230 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6231 Some(_) => continue,
6232 None => return scid_candidate
6237 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6239 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6240 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6242 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6243 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6244 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6248 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6249 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6250 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6252 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6253 /// times to get a unique scid.
6254 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6255 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6256 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6258 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6259 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6260 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6261 return scid_candidate
6265 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6266 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6267 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6268 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6271 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6274 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6275 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6276 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6277 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6286 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6287 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6288 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6289 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6290 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6294 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6295 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6296 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6297 events.push_back((event, None));
6301 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6302 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6303 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6307 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6308 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6312 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6313 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6316 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6317 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6318 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6319 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6320 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6321 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6324 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6325 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6328 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6329 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6330 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6331 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6333 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6337 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6338 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6339 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6340 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6341 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6343 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6347 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6348 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6349 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6350 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6351 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6352 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6353 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6354 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6355 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6357 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6359 if further_update_exists {
6360 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6366 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6370 log_debug!(self.logger,
6371 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6372 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6376 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6377 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6378 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6382 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6383 for action in actions {
6385 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6386 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6388 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6394 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6395 /// using the given event handler.
6397 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6398 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6402 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6406 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6408 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6409 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6410 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6411 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6412 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6417 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6418 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6419 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6420 /// is always placed next to each other.
6422 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6423 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6424 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6425 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6427 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6428 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6429 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6430 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6431 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6432 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6433 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6435 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6436 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6437 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6438 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6441 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6442 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6444 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6445 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6448 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6450 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6454 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6458 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6459 events.replace(pending_events);
6468 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6470 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6472 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6473 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6474 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6479 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6481 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6482 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6483 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6485 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6489 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6491 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6492 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6493 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6494 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6495 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6496 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6500 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6502 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6503 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6504 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6505 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6506 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6509 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6510 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6513 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6515 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6516 let new_height = height - 1;
6518 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6519 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6520 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6521 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6522 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6523 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6526 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6530 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6532 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6533 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6534 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6535 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6536 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6537 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6541 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6542 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6543 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6544 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6546 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6547 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6550 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6551 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6552 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6554 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6555 if height < last_best_block_height {
6556 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6557 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6561 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6562 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6563 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6564 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6566 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6567 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6570 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6571 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6573 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6575 macro_rules! max_time {
6576 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6578 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6579 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6580 // having an explicit local time source.
6581 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6582 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6583 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6584 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6585 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6591 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6592 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6593 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6594 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6598 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6599 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6600 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6603 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6604 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6605 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6612 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6614 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6615 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6616 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6617 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6618 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6619 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6620 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6625 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6627 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6628 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6629 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6630 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6631 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6632 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6636 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6637 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6639 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6640 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6641 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6642 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6643 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6645 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6646 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6649 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6652 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6653 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6654 let res = f(channel);
6655 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6656 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6657 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6658 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6659 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6661 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6662 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6663 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6664 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6665 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6667 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6672 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6677 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6678 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6681 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6684 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6685 msg: announcement_sigs,
6687 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6688 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6689 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6691 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6692 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6693 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6698 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6699 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6700 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6701 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6702 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6703 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6704 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6705 // is always consistent.
6706 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6707 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6708 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6709 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6710 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6713 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6714 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6715 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6716 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6717 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6718 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6723 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6724 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6726 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6727 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6728 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6729 data: reason_message,
6739 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6740 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6741 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6742 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6743 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6744 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6745 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6746 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6747 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6748 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6750 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6751 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6752 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6756 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6759 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6760 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6761 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6762 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6763 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6764 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6765 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6766 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6767 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6770 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6771 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6772 _ => unreachable!(),
6774 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6775 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6776 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6777 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6783 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6785 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6790 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6792 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6793 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6795 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6796 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6799 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6800 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6801 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6804 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6805 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6806 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6807 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6810 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6811 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6812 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6813 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6816 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6817 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6819 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6820 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6821 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6822 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6823 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6826 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6827 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6828 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6829 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6832 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6833 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6834 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6835 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6838 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6839 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6840 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6841 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6845 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6846 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6848 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6849 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6850 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6851 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6852 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6857 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6859 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6862 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6863 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6864 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6865 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6868 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6870 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6873 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6874 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6875 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6876 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6879 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6881 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6884 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6886 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6889 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6891 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6894 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6896 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6899 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6904 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6909 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6910 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6911 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6914 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6916 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6919 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6921 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6924 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6926 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6929 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6931 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6934 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6936 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6939 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6941 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6944 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6945 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6946 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6947 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6948 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6950 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6955 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6960 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6962 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6963 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6965 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6966 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6967 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6970 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6971 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6972 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6973 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6974 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6975 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6980 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6981 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6982 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6985 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6986 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6987 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6990 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6992 // V1 Channel Establishment
6993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6994 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6997 // V2 Channel Establishment
6998 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6999 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7000 // Common Channel Establishment
7001 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7002 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7003 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7004 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7005 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7013 // Channel Operations
7014 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7017 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7019 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7022 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7023 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7024 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7032 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7033 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7034 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7035 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7038 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7040 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7042 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7043 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7047 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7048 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7049 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7055 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7056 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7057 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7058 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7059 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7060 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7063 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7064 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7066 if inbound_peer_limited {
7069 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7070 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7071 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7072 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7073 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7074 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7075 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7076 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7081 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7082 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7084 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7085 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7086 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7087 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7092 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7093 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7098 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7101 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7104 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7105 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7106 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7107 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7108 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7109 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7110 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7115 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7116 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7121 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7122 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7123 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7124 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7125 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7134 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7138 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7141 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7142 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7144 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7145 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7148 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7149 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7150 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7152 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7153 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7154 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7158 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7160 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7161 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7164 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7165 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7166 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7167 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7175 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7176 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7180 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7181 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7184 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7185 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7188 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7189 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7192 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7193 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7194 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7195 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7198 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7199 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7200 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7201 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7204 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7205 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7206 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7207 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7210 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7211 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7212 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7213 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7216 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7217 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7218 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7219 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7222 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7223 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7224 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7225 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7228 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7229 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7230 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7231 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7234 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7235 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7236 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7237 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7240 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7241 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7242 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7243 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7247 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7248 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7249 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7250 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7253 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7254 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7256 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7257 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7258 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7259 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7260 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7263 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7264 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7265 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7266 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7269 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7270 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7271 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7272 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7275 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7276 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7277 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7278 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7279 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7280 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7281 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7282 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7283 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7284 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7285 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7286 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7287 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7288 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7289 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7290 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7291 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7292 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7294 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7295 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7296 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7302 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7303 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7305 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7306 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7307 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7308 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7311 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7312 (2, node_id, required),
7313 (4, features, required),
7314 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7315 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7316 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7317 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7320 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7321 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7322 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7323 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7324 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7325 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7326 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7327 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7328 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7329 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7330 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7331 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7332 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7333 (7, self.config, option),
7334 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7335 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7336 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7337 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7338 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7339 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7340 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7341 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7342 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7343 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7344 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7345 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7346 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7347 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7348 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7349 (32, self.is_public, required),
7350 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7351 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7352 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7353 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7359 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7360 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7361 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7362 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7363 (2, channel_id, required),
7364 (3, channel_type, option),
7365 (4, counterparty, required),
7366 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7367 (6, funding_txo, option),
7368 (7, config, option),
7369 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7370 (9, confirmations, option),
7371 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7372 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7373 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7374 (16, balance_msat, required),
7375 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7376 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7377 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7378 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7379 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7380 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7381 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7382 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7383 (26, is_outbound, required),
7384 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7385 (30, is_usable, required),
7386 (32, is_public, required),
7387 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7388 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7389 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7390 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7393 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7394 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7395 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7396 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7397 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7401 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7403 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7404 outbound_scid_alias,
7408 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7409 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7411 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7412 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7413 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7414 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7415 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7416 confirmations_required,
7418 force_close_spend_delay,
7419 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7420 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7421 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7422 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7423 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7424 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7425 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7430 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7431 (2, channels, vec_type),
7432 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7433 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7438 (0, onion_packet, required),
7439 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7442 (0, payment_data, required),
7443 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7444 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7445 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7447 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7448 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7449 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7450 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7451 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7455 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7456 (0, routing, required),
7457 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7458 (4, payment_hash, required),
7459 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7460 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7461 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7462 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7466 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7467 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7469 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7471 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7472 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7473 reason.write(writer)?;
7475 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7476 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7479 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7480 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7481 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7482 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7489 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7490 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7491 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7495 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7496 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7497 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7501 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7502 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7503 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7504 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7505 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7508 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7509 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7510 // messages contained in the variants.
7511 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7512 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7513 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7515 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7517 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7518 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7519 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7522 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7523 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7524 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7525 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7526 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7528 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7533 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7539 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7540 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7541 (2, outpoint, required),
7542 (4, htlc_id, required),
7543 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7546 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7547 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7548 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7549 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7550 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7552 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7553 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7554 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7555 (2, self.value, required),
7556 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7557 (4, payment_data, option),
7558 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7559 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7560 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7566 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7567 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7568 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7570 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7571 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7572 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7573 let mut total_value_received = None;
7574 let mut total_msat = None;
7575 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7576 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7577 (0, prev_hop, required),
7578 (1, total_msat, option),
7579 (2, value, required),
7580 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7581 (4, payment_data, option),
7582 (5, total_value_received, option),
7583 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7584 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7586 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7588 if payment_data.is_some() {
7589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7591 if total_msat.is_none() {
7592 total_msat = Some(value);
7594 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7597 if total_msat.is_none() {
7598 if payment_data.is_none() {
7599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7601 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7603 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7607 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7610 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7611 total_value_received,
7612 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7619 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7620 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7621 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7624 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7625 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7626 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7627 let mut payment_id = None;
7628 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7629 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7630 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7631 (0, session_priv, required),
7632 (1, payment_id, option),
7633 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7634 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7635 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7636 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7638 if payment_id.is_none() {
7639 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7641 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7643 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7644 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7645 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7647 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7648 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7649 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7650 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7654 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7655 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7656 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7658 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7661 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7662 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7667 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7668 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7670 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7672 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7673 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7674 (0, session_priv, required),
7675 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7676 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7677 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7678 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7679 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7680 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7683 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7685 field.write(writer)?;
7692 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7693 (0, forward_info, required),
7694 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7695 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7696 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7697 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7700 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7702 (0, htlc_id, required),
7703 (2, err_packet, required),
7708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7709 (0, payment_secret, required),
7710 (2, expiry_time, required),
7711 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7712 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7713 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7716 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7718 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7719 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7720 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7721 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7722 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7727 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7728 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7730 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7732 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7734 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7735 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7736 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7739 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7742 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7743 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7744 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7747 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7748 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7750 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7751 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7752 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7753 unfunded_channels += 1;
7758 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7760 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7763 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7764 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7765 channel.write(writer)?;
7772 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7773 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7774 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7775 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7776 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7777 for forward in pending_forwards {
7778 forward.write(writer)?;
7783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7785 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7786 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7787 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7789 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7790 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7791 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7792 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7793 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7794 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7795 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7796 htlc.write(writer)?;
7798 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7799 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7802 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7803 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7804 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7805 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7806 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7807 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7808 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7811 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7812 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7813 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7814 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7815 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7817 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7818 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7819 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7820 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7821 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7822 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7823 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7828 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7829 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7830 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7831 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7832 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7833 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7834 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7835 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7836 0u64.write(writer)?;
7838 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7839 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7840 event.write(writer)?;
7844 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7845 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7846 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7847 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7848 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7849 0u64.write(writer)?;
7851 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7852 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7853 // likely to be identical.
7854 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7855 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7857 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7858 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7859 hash.write(writer)?;
7860 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7863 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7864 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7865 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7866 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7867 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7870 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7871 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7873 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7874 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7875 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7876 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7879 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7880 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7884 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7885 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7886 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7888 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7889 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7890 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7896 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7897 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7898 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7899 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7902 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7903 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7904 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7905 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7906 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7909 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7910 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7911 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7912 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7913 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7914 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7915 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7916 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7917 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7918 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7919 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7920 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7927 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7928 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7929 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7930 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7933 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7934 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7935 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7936 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7937 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7938 // check that the event is sane here.
7939 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7940 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7941 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7942 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7948 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7949 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7950 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7952 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7953 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7956 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7957 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7959 events.push_back((ev, action));
7960 } else if action.is_some() {
7961 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7968 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7970 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7972 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7973 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7974 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7975 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7976 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7977 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7978 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7979 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7980 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7981 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7982 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7983 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7984 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7986 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7987 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7989 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7990 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7992 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7993 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7994 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7995 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7996 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7997 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7999 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8000 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8002 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8004 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8005 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8006 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8007 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8011 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8012 pub entropy_source: ES,
8014 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8015 pub node_signer: NS,
8017 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8018 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8020 pub signer_provider: SP,
8022 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8024 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8025 pub fee_estimator: F,
8026 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8028 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8029 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8030 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8031 pub chain_monitor: M,
8033 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8034 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8035 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8036 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8037 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8038 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8040 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8042 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8043 /// deserialization.
8045 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8046 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8047 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8049 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8050 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8052 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8053 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8054 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8055 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8057 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8060 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8061 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8064 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8065 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8067 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8068 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8069 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8070 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8071 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8072 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8076 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8077 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8078 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8079 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8080 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8082 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8083 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8088 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8089 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8090 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8091 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8093 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8094 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8095 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8097 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8098 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8102 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8103 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8104 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8108 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8109 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8111 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8112 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8113 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8114 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8115 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8116 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8120 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8121 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8123 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8124 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8125 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8127 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8129 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8130 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8131 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8132 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8133 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8134 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8135 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8136 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8137 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8138 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8140 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8141 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8142 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8143 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8144 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8145 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8146 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8147 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
8148 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8149 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8150 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8151 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8153 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8154 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8155 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8156 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8157 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8158 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8159 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8160 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8161 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8162 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8163 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8164 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8165 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8168 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8169 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8170 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8171 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8172 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8174 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8175 let mut found_htlc = false;
8176 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8177 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8180 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8181 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8182 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8183 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8184 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8185 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8186 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8187 log_info!(args.logger,
8188 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8189 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8190 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8194 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8195 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8196 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8197 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8198 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8199 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8201 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8202 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8204 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8206 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8207 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8210 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8211 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8212 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8216 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8217 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8218 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8219 // safely discard the channel.
8220 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8221 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8222 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8223 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8224 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8227 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8228 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8229 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8230 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8231 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8232 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8236 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8237 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8238 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8239 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8240 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8241 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8242 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8244 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8248 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8249 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8250 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8251 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8252 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8253 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8254 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8255 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8256 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8258 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8261 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8262 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8263 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8264 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8265 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8266 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8267 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8268 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8270 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8273 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8274 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8275 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8276 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8277 let peer_state = PeerState {
8278 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8279 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8280 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8281 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8282 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8283 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8284 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8285 is_connected: false,
8287 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8290 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8291 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8292 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8293 for _ in 0..event_count {
8294 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8295 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8300 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8301 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8302 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8304 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8305 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8306 // on-startup monitor updates.
8307 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8308 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8310 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8314 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8315 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8316 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8317 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8318 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8319 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8320 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8321 pending_background_events.push(
8322 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8323 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8326 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8332 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8333 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8335 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8336 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8337 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8338 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8339 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8343 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8344 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8345 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8346 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8347 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8348 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8349 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8351 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8356 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8357 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8358 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8359 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8360 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8361 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8362 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8363 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8364 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8365 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8366 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8367 let mut events_override = None;
8368 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8369 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8370 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8371 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8372 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8373 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8374 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8375 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8376 (8, events_override, option),
8377 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8378 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8379 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8381 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8382 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8385 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8386 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8389 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8390 pending_events_read = events;
8393 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8394 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8397 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8398 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8399 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8400 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8401 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8402 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8404 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8406 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8407 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8408 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8412 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8413 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8414 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8415 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8416 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8417 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8418 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8420 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8421 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8422 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8423 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8424 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8425 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8429 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8430 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8431 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8432 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8434 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8435 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8436 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8439 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8440 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8441 retry_strategy: None,
8442 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8443 payment_params: None,
8444 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8445 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8446 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8447 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8448 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8449 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8450 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8451 total_msat: path_amt,
8452 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8454 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8455 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8460 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8462 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8463 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8464 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8465 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8467 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8468 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8469 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8470 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8471 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8472 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8473 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8474 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8475 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8476 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8477 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8482 !forwards.is_empty()
8484 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8485 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8486 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8487 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8488 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8489 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8490 intercepted_id != ev_id
8497 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8498 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8499 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8500 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8501 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8502 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8503 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8504 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8505 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8506 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8507 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8508 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8509 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8518 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8519 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8520 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8521 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8522 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8523 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8524 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8525 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8529 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8530 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8532 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8533 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8534 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8537 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8538 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8539 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8541 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8542 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8544 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8545 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8547 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8550 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8551 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8552 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8554 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8558 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8559 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8560 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8561 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8564 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8565 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8566 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8567 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8568 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8569 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8570 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8571 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8573 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8574 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8578 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8580 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8582 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8583 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8585 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8586 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8591 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8592 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8594 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8596 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8598 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8599 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8600 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8601 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8605 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8606 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8609 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8610 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8611 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8613 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8614 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8615 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8617 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8618 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8619 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8620 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8621 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8624 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8625 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8626 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8627 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8628 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8629 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8635 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8637 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8638 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8639 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8640 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8641 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8642 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8643 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8644 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8645 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8646 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8647 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8649 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8650 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8652 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8653 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8654 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8655 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8657 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8658 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8659 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8660 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8662 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8663 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8664 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8665 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8667 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8668 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8669 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8672 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8673 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8676 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8677 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8680 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8683 purpose: payment.purpose,
8684 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8690 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8691 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8692 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8693 for action in actions.iter() {
8694 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8695 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8696 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8698 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8699 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8700 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8701 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8706 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8708 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8709 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8713 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8715 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8716 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8717 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8718 router: args.router,
8720 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8722 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8723 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8724 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8725 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8727 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8728 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8730 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8731 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8732 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8734 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8739 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8741 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8743 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8744 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8745 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8746 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8747 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8748 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8749 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8751 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8752 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8753 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8755 logger: args.logger,
8756 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8759 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8760 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8761 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8762 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8763 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8766 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8767 //connection or two.
8769 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8775 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8776 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8777 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8778 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8779 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8780 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8781 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8782 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8783 use crate::ln::msgs;
8784 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8785 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8786 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8787 use crate::util::test_utils;
8788 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8789 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8792 fn test_notify_limits() {
8793 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8794 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8795 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8796 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8798 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8800 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8801 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8803 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8804 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8806 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8808 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8809 // to connect messages with new values
8810 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8811 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8812 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8813 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8814 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8815 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8817 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8819 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8820 // ... but the last node should not.
8821 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8822 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8823 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8824 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8826 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8827 // about the channel.
8828 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8829 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8830 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8832 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8834 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8835 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8836 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8837 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8838 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8839 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8841 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8842 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8843 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8845 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8846 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8847 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8848 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8849 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8850 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8852 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8853 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8854 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8855 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8856 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8857 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8858 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8859 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8861 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8862 // the channel info has updated.
8863 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8864 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8865 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8866 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8867 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8868 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8872 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8873 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8879 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8881 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8882 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8883 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8884 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8886 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8887 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8888 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8889 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8890 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8891 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8892 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8893 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8895 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8896 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8897 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8899 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8900 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8901 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8903 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8905 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8906 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8907 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8909 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8913 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8914 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8915 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8916 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8917 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8918 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8919 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8920 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8921 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8923 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8924 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8925 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8927 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8929 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8931 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8932 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8933 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8934 // lightning messages manually.
8935 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8936 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8939 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8940 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8941 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8943 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8946 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8947 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8949 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8950 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8951 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8953 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8954 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8955 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8957 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8959 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8961 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8962 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8965 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8966 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8967 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8968 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8970 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8971 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8972 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8973 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8978 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8979 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8980 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8981 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8986 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8987 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8988 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8989 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8996 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8997 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8998 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9001 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9002 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9003 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9004 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9005 // fails as expected.
9006 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9007 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9008 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9009 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9010 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9011 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9012 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9013 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9014 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9015 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9017 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9018 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9019 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9020 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9022 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9023 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9024 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9026 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9027 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9028 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9029 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9031 let route = find_route(
9032 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9033 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9035 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9036 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9040 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9041 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9045 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9046 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9050 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9051 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9052 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9053 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9054 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9055 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9056 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9058 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9060 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9061 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9063 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9064 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9065 let route = find_route(
9066 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9067 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9069 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9070 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9072 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9074 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9075 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9076 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9078 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9079 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9080 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9081 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9083 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9085 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9086 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9087 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9093 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9094 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9095 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9096 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9097 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9098 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9099 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9100 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9101 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9103 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9104 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9106 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9107 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9108 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9109 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9111 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9113 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9114 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9115 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9117 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9118 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9119 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9120 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9122 let route = find_route(
9123 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9124 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9126 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9127 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9128 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9130 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9132 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9134 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9136 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9137 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9138 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9140 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9141 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9142 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9143 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9144 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9145 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9146 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9147 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9148 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9150 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9151 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9155 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9156 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9157 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9158 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9160 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9161 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9163 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9164 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9166 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9167 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9168 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9169 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9171 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9172 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9173 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9174 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9175 let route = find_route(
9176 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9177 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9180 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9181 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9182 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9183 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9184 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9185 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9188 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9189 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9190 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9191 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9192 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9193 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9196 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9200 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9201 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9202 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9203 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9204 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9210 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9211 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9213 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9214 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9215 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9216 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9218 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9219 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9220 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9221 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9222 let route = find_route(
9223 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9224 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9227 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9228 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9229 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9230 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9231 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9232 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9233 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9234 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9237 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9238 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9239 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9240 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9241 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9242 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9243 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9245 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9249 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9250 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9253 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9255 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9256 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9257 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9258 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9260 // Marshall an MPP route.
9261 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9262 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9263 route.paths.push(path);
9264 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9265 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9266 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9267 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9268 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9269 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9271 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9272 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9274 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9275 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9277 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9282 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9288 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9290 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9291 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9293 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9294 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9296 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9299 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9300 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9301 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9302 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9303 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9304 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9307 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9310 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9311 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9316 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9317 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9323 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9324 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9326 total_msat: 100_000,
9329 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9330 // payment verification fails as expected.
9331 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9332 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9333 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9334 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9336 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9340 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9341 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9345 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9346 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9347 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9348 // the channel is successfully closed.
9349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9352 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9354 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9355 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9356 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9357 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9358 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9360 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9361 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9363 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9364 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9365 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9366 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9369 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9371 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9372 // as it has the funding transaction.
9373 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9374 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9375 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9378 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9380 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9382 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9384 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9385 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9386 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9388 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9391 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9392 // as it has the funding transaction.
9393 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9394 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9395 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9398 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9399 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9401 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9402 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9403 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9404 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9406 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9407 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9408 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9409 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9411 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9412 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9414 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9415 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9416 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9417 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9418 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9419 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9420 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9424 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9425 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9426 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9427 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9428 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9429 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9430 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9433 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9435 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9436 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9437 // closing transaction).
9438 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9439 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9442 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9443 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9444 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9445 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9446 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9449 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9451 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9453 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9454 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9455 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9457 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9463 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9464 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9465 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9468 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9469 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9470 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9473 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9475 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9476 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9478 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9479 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9481 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9482 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9487 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9488 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9489 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9490 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9491 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9492 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9493 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9497 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9498 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9499 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9501 // Test the API functions.
9502 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9504 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9506 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9508 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9510 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9512 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9514 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9518 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9519 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9525 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9527 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9528 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9530 let mut funding_tx = None;
9531 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9536 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9537 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9538 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9539 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9540 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9542 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9544 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9546 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9548 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9550 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9552 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9555 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9556 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9557 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9558 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9559 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9561 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9562 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9564 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9565 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9566 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9567 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9568 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9569 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9570 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9573 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9574 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9575 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9576 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9577 }, true).unwrap_err();
9579 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9580 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9582 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9583 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9584 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9585 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9588 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9592 }, true).unwrap_err();
9594 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9595 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9596 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9598 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9600 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9601 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9603 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9604 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9606 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9607 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9609 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9610 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9611 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9613 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9614 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9615 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9617 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9618 // "protected" and can connect again.
9619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9620 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9621 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9623 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9625 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9628 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9632 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9633 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9639 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9641 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9642 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9644 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9645 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9646 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9647 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9650 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9653 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9654 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9656 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9657 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9658 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9660 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9661 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9662 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9663 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9667 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9668 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9669 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9670 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9671 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9672 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9673 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9674 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9675 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9677 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9679 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9680 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9682 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9683 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9684 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9685 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9686 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9687 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9690 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9691 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9693 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9694 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9696 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9698 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9699 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9702 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9703 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9704 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9705 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9706 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9711 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9712 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9713 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9714 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9718 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9720 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9721 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9723 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9724 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9725 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9727 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9728 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9732 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9737 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9738 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9739 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9740 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9743 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9744 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9745 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9749 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9750 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9751 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9753 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9754 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9756 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9757 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9762 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9763 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9765 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9766 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9768 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9772 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9773 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9774 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9775 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9776 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9777 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9778 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9779 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9781 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9782 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9785 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9786 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9787 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9788 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9791 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9792 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9795 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9796 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9799 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9800 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9801 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9802 ..Default::default()
9804 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9805 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9808 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9809 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9812 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9813 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9814 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9815 ..Default::default()
9817 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9819 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9822 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9823 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9830 use crate::chain::Listen;
9831 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9832 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9833 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9834 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9835 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9836 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9837 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9838 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9839 use crate::util::test_utils;
9840 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9842 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9843 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9844 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9846 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9848 use criterion::Criterion;
9850 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9851 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9852 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9853 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9854 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9855 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9856 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9858 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9859 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9861 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9862 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9864 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9866 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9869 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9870 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9873 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9874 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9875 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9877 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9879 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9880 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9881 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9882 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9883 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9885 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9886 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9888 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9889 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9890 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9891 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9893 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9895 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9897 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9898 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9899 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9900 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9901 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9903 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9905 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9907 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9908 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9910 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9911 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9913 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9914 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9915 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9918 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9919 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9920 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9922 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9923 } else { panic!(); }
9925 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9926 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9927 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9929 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9930 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9935 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9936 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9937 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9939 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9940 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9945 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9947 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9948 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9949 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9951 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9952 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9953 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9954 match msg_events[0] {
9955 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9956 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9957 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9961 match msg_events[1] {
9962 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9966 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9967 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9969 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9970 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9975 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9976 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9978 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9979 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9984 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9985 macro_rules! send_payment {
9986 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9987 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9988 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9989 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9990 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9992 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9993 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9995 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9996 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9997 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9998 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9999 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10000 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10001 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10002 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10003 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10004 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10005 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10008 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10009 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10010 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10012 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10014 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10015 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10016 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10018 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10021 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10022 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10023 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10024 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10026 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10030 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10031 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10032 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);