1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
117 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
118 /// do with the HTLC.
119 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
120 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
122 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
123 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
124 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
125 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
126 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
127 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
129 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
131 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
132 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
134 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
135 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
136 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
137 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
138 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
140 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
141 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
142 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
143 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
144 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
146 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
147 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
148 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
149 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
151 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
152 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
154 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
157 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
159 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
160 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
161 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
163 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
164 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
166 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
167 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
168 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
169 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
170 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
171 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
172 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
174 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
175 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
176 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
177 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
179 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
180 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
181 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
185 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
189 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
190 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
191 pub struct BlindedForward {
192 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
193 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
194 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
195 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
196 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
199 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
200 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
201 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
202 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
203 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
204 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
211 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
213 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
214 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
215 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
216 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
217 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
219 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
220 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
221 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
222 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
225 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
227 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
228 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
229 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
231 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
232 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
233 /// it along another path).
235 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
236 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
237 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
238 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
239 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
240 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
241 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
242 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
243 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
245 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
248 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
250 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
252 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
255 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
256 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
257 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
258 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
261 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
262 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
263 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
264 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
265 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
268 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
269 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
271 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
272 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
273 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
276 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
277 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
279 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
280 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
283 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
284 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
287 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
291 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
292 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
293 enum BlindedFailure {
294 FromIntroductionNode,
295 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
298 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
299 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
300 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
301 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
302 short_channel_id: u64,
303 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
305 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
306 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
307 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
309 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
310 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
315 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
317 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
318 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
319 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
321 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
322 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
325 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
326 struct ClaimableHTLC {
327 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
329 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
331 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
332 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
333 sender_intended_value: u64,
334 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
336 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
337 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
338 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
339 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
341 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
342 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
345 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
346 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
347 events::ClaimedHTLC {
348 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
349 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
350 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
351 value_msat: val.value,
352 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
357 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
358 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
360 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
361 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
362 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
365 /// Number of bytes in the id.
366 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
369 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
370 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
375 impl Readable for PaymentId {
376 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
377 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
382 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
383 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
384 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
388 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
390 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
391 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
392 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
394 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
400 impl Readable for InterceptId {
401 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
402 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
407 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
408 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
409 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
410 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
411 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
414 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
416 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
417 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
418 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
420 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
421 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
426 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
427 (0, short_channel_id, required),
428 (2, htlc_id, required),
430 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
431 (0, session_priv, required),
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
438 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
439 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
440 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
443 session_priv: SecretKey,
444 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
445 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
446 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
447 payment_id: PaymentId,
450 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
451 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
452 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
454 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
456 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
458 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
461 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
462 payment_id.hash(hasher);
463 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
469 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
471 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
472 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
473 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
474 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
476 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
480 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
481 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
482 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
483 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
484 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
485 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
487 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
493 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
494 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
496 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
497 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
498 pub enum FailureCode {
499 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
500 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
501 TemporaryNodeFailure,
502 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
503 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
504 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
505 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
506 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
507 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
508 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
509 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
510 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
511 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
513 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
514 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
515 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
518 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
519 fn into(self) -> u16 {
521 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
522 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
523 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
524 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
529 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
530 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
531 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
532 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
533 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
535 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
536 err: msgs::LightningError,
537 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
538 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
539 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
541 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
543 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
545 err: LightningError {
547 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
548 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
555 shutdown_finish: None,
556 channel_capacity: None,
560 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
561 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
564 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
565 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
566 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
567 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
568 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
569 // commitment upon reconnecting.
570 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
572 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
575 err: LightningError { err, action },
576 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
577 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
578 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
582 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
585 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
587 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
588 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
592 log_level: Level::Warn,
595 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
597 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
599 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
601 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
602 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
610 shutdown_finish: None,
611 channel_capacity: None,
615 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
616 self.chan_id.is_some()
620 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
621 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
622 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
623 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
624 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
626 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
627 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
628 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
629 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
630 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
631 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
632 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
634 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
638 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
639 struct ClaimingPayment {
641 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
642 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
643 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
644 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
646 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
647 (0, amount_msat, required),
648 (2, payment_purpose, required),
649 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
650 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
651 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
654 struct ClaimablePayment {
655 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
656 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
657 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
660 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
661 struct ClaimablePayments {
662 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
663 /// failed/claimed by the user.
665 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
666 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
668 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
669 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
670 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
672 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
673 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
674 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
675 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
678 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
679 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
680 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
681 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
683 enum BackgroundEvent {
684 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
685 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
686 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
687 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
689 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
690 /// are regenerated on startup.
691 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
692 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
693 /// channel to continue normal operation.
695 /// In general this should be used rather than
696 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
697 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
698 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
700 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
701 /// are regenerated on startup.
702 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
703 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
704 funding_txo: OutPoint,
705 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
707 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
708 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
710 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
711 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
712 channel_id: ChannelId,
717 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
718 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
719 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
720 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
721 /// event can be generated.
722 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
723 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
724 /// operation of another channel.
726 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
727 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
728 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
729 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
731 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
732 event: events::Event,
733 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
735 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
736 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
737 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
739 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
740 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
741 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
742 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
743 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
745 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
746 /// stored for later processing.
747 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
748 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
749 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
750 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
754 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
755 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
756 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
757 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
758 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
759 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
760 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
761 (4, blocking_action, required),
763 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
764 (0, event, upgradable_required),
765 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
766 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
767 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
768 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
769 // downgrades to prior versions.
770 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
774 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
775 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
776 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
777 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
778 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
781 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
782 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
783 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
784 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
788 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
789 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
790 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
791 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
792 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
793 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
795 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
796 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
797 channel_id: ChannelId,
798 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
803 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
804 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
805 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
806 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
807 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
812 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
813 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
817 /// State we hold per-peer.
818 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
819 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
821 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
822 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
823 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
825 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
826 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
827 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
828 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
829 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
830 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
831 latest_features: InitFeatures,
832 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
833 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
834 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
835 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
836 /// user but which have not yet completed.
838 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
839 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
840 /// for a missing channel.
841 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
842 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
843 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
845 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
846 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
847 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
848 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
850 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
851 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
852 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
853 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
854 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
855 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
856 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
857 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
858 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
859 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
860 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
861 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
862 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
863 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
864 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
868 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
870 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
871 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
872 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
873 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
876 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
877 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
878 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
881 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
882 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
883 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
886 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
887 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
888 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
889 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
893 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
894 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
895 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
896 /// The original OpenChannel message.
897 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
898 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
899 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
902 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
903 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
904 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
906 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
907 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
909 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
912 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
913 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
914 struct PendingInboundPayment {
915 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
916 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
917 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
918 /// this payment being removed.
920 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
921 user_payment_id: u64,
922 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
923 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
924 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
927 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
928 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
929 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
930 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
931 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
932 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
933 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
934 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
937 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
938 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
946 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
948 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
949 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
950 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
955 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
956 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
957 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
958 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
959 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
960 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
961 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
962 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
963 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
965 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
966 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
967 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
976 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
978 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
979 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
980 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
985 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
987 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
989 pub trait AChannelManager {
990 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
991 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
992 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
993 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
994 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
995 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
996 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
997 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
998 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
999 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1000 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1001 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1002 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1003 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1004 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1005 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1006 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1007 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1008 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1009 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1010 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1011 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1012 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1013 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1014 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1015 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1016 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1017 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1018 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1019 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1020 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1021 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1023 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1024 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1025 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1028 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1029 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1031 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1032 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1033 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1034 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1035 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1036 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1040 type Watch = M::Target;
1042 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1044 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1046 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1048 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1049 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1051 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1053 type Router = R::Target;
1055 type Logger = L::Target;
1057 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1060 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1061 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1063 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1064 /// to individual Channels.
1066 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1067 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1068 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1069 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1071 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1072 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1073 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1074 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1075 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1076 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1077 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1078 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1079 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1081 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1082 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1083 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1085 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1086 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1087 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1088 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1089 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1091 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1092 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1093 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1094 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1096 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1097 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1098 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1100 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1101 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1102 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1103 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1104 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1106 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1107 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1108 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1109 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1110 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1111 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1112 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1113 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1116 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1117 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1118 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1119 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1120 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1124 // `pending_offers_messages`
1126 // `total_consistency_lock`
1128 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1130 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1132 // |__`per_peer_state`
1134 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1136 // |__`claimable_payments`
1138 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1144 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1146 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1150 // |__`pending_events`
1152 // |__`pending_background_events`
1154 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1156 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1157 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1158 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1160 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1165 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1166 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1167 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1173 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1177 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1178 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1180 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1181 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1182 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1183 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1185 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1186 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1188 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1189 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1190 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1191 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1192 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1193 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1194 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1195 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1197 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1200 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1202 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1204 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1205 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1206 /// and via the classic SCID.
1208 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1209 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1211 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1213 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1215 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1216 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1217 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1220 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1222 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1223 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1225 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1226 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1228 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1229 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1230 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1231 /// active channel list on load.
1233 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1234 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1236 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1238 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1239 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1240 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1242 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1243 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1244 /// the handling of the events.
1246 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1247 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1250 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1251 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1252 /// would break backwards compatability.
1253 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1254 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1255 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1257 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1258 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1260 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1262 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1263 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1264 /// confirmation depth.
1266 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1267 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1268 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1270 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1272 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1274 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1276 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1278 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1280 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1281 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1282 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1284 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1285 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1287 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1288 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1289 /// keeping additional state.
1290 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1292 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1293 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1294 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1295 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1297 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1298 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1300 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1301 /// are currently open with that peer.
1303 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1304 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1307 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1309 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1310 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1311 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1312 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1313 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1315 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1316 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1317 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1318 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1319 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1321 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1322 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1324 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1325 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1326 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1327 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1328 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1330 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1331 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1333 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1334 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1335 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1336 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1337 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1339 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1341 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1343 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1344 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1345 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1346 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1347 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1348 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1349 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1350 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1351 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1352 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1353 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1355 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1356 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1357 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1359 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1361 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1362 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1364 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1368 signer_provider: SP,
1373 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1375 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1376 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1377 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1378 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1379 pub struct ChainParameters {
1380 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1381 pub network: Network,
1383 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1385 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1386 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1389 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1393 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1394 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1397 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1398 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1399 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1400 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1401 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1402 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1404 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1405 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1406 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1407 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1408 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1409 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1411 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1412 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1415 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1416 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1417 /// events to handle.
1419 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1420 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1422 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1423 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1426 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1427 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1428 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1429 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1431 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1432 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1433 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1434 should_persist: move || {
1435 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1436 // processing and return that.
1437 let notify = persist_check();
1438 match (notify, force_notify) {
1439 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1440 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1441 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1442 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1443 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1446 _read_guard: read_guard,
1450 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1451 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1452 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1453 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1454 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1455 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1457 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1458 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1459 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1460 should_persist: persist_check,
1461 _read_guard: read_guard,
1466 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1467 fn drop(&mut self) {
1468 match (self.should_persist)() {
1469 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1470 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1471 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1473 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1474 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1475 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1480 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1481 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1483 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1485 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1486 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1487 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1488 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1489 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1491 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1492 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1494 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1496 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1497 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1498 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1499 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1500 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1501 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1502 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1503 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1504 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1505 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1506 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1507 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1508 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1510 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1511 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1513 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1514 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1515 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1516 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1518 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1519 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1520 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1521 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1522 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1523 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1526 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1528 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1529 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1532 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1534 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1535 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1537 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1538 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1539 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1541 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1542 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1543 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1545 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1546 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1547 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1548 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1550 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1551 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1552 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1554 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1555 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1556 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1558 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1559 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1560 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1561 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1562 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1563 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1564 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1565 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1566 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1567 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1568 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1571 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1572 /// to better separate parameters.
1573 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1574 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1575 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1576 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1577 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1578 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1579 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1580 pub features: InitFeatures,
1581 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1582 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1583 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1585 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1587 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1588 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1589 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1590 /// payments to us through this channel.
1591 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1592 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1593 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1594 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1595 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1596 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1597 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1600 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1602 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1603 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1604 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1605 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1606 /// lifetime of the channel.
1607 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1608 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1609 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1610 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1611 /// our counterparty already.
1613 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1614 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1615 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1616 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1618 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1619 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1620 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1621 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1623 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1624 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1626 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1627 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1629 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1630 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1631 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1632 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1633 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1634 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1635 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1636 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1637 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1640 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1642 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1643 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1644 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1645 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1646 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1647 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1648 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1650 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1651 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1653 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1654 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1655 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1656 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1657 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1658 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1659 /// this value on chain.
1661 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1663 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1665 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1666 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1667 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1668 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1669 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1670 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1671 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1673 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1674 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1675 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1676 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1677 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1678 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1680 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1681 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1682 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1683 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1684 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1686 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1687 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1688 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1689 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1691 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1692 pub balance_msat: u64,
1693 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1694 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1695 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1696 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1698 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1700 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1701 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1702 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1703 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1704 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1705 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1706 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1707 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1709 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1710 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1711 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1712 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1713 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1714 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1715 /// route which is valid.
1716 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1717 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1718 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1719 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1720 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1721 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1723 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1724 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1725 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1726 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1727 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1728 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1729 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1730 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1731 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1733 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1735 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1736 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1737 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1738 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1739 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1741 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1742 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1743 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1744 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1745 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1746 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1747 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1749 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1750 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1751 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1752 pub is_outbound: bool,
1753 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1754 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1755 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1756 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1757 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1759 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1760 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1761 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1762 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1763 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1764 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1765 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1767 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1768 pub is_usable: bool,
1769 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1770 pub is_public: bool,
1771 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1772 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1773 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1774 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1775 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1776 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1778 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1779 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1782 impl ChannelDetails {
1783 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1784 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1785 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1787 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1788 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1789 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1790 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1793 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1794 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1795 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1797 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1798 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1799 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1800 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1803 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1804 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1805 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1808 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1809 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1811 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1812 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1813 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1815 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1816 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1817 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1818 features: latest_features,
1819 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1820 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1821 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1822 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1823 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1824 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1825 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1826 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1827 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1828 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1830 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1831 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1832 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1833 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1834 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1835 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1836 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1837 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1838 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1839 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1840 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1841 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1842 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1843 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1844 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1845 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1846 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1847 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1848 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1849 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1850 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1851 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1852 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1853 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1854 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1855 config: Some(context.config()),
1856 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1861 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1862 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1863 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1864 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1865 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1866 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1867 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1868 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1869 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1871 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1873 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1874 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1876 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1877 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1878 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1879 /// to drop the channel.
1883 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1884 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1885 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1886 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1887 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1889 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1890 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1891 payment_id: PaymentId,
1893 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1895 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1896 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1897 payment_id: PaymentId,
1898 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1900 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1901 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1902 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1905 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1906 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1907 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1909 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1910 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1911 payment_id: PaymentId,
1912 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1913 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1914 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1916 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1917 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1918 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1920 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1921 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1922 payment_id: PaymentId,
1923 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1924 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1928 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1930 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1932 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1933 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1934 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1935 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1937 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1938 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1939 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1942 macro_rules! handle_error {
1943 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1944 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1945 // entering the macro.
1946 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1947 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1951 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1952 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1954 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1955 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1956 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1957 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1961 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1962 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1963 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1964 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1965 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1966 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1971 let logger = WithContext::from(
1972 &$self.logger, Some($counterparty_node_id), chan_id.map(|(chan_id, _)| chan_id)
1974 log_error!(logger, "{}", err.err);
1975 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1977 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1978 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1979 action: err.action.clone()
1983 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1984 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1985 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1986 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1987 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1991 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1998 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1999 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2000 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
2001 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2002 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2003 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2005 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2006 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2007 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2008 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2009 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2011 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2012 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2014 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2018 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2019 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2020 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2022 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2023 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2025 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2026 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2028 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2029 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2030 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2031 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2032 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
2033 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
2034 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
2036 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
2037 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
2041 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2042 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2044 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2045 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2047 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2048 match $channel_phase {
2049 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2050 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2052 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2053 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2056 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2062 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2063 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2067 let key = *$entry.key();
2068 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2070 $entry.remove_entry();
2078 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2079 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2083 let key = *$entry.key();
2084 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2086 $entry.remove_entry();
2094 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2095 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2097 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2098 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2104 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2105 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2106 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2107 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2108 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2110 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2111 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2112 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2113 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2114 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2115 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2116 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2117 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2118 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2119 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2124 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2125 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2126 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2127 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2128 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2129 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2130 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2131 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2132 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2134 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2139 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2140 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2141 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2142 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2143 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2144 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2145 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2146 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2147 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2149 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2154 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2155 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2156 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2157 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2158 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2159 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2160 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2161 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2162 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2163 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2164 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2165 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2167 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2168 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2169 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2175 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2176 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2178 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2179 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2180 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2181 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2182 updates.announcement_sigs);
2183 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2184 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2187 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2188 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2189 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2190 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2192 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2193 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2194 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2195 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2196 let mut batch_completed = false;
2197 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2198 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2199 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2200 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2202 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2203 channel_state.2 = true;
2205 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2207 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2209 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2212 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2213 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2214 if batch_completed {
2215 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2216 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2217 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2218 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2219 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2220 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2221 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2222 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2223 chan.set_batch_ready();
2224 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2225 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2229 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2230 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2231 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2236 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2238 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2239 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2241 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2242 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2243 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2244 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2249 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2250 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2251 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2252 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2254 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2255 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2256 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2257 panic!("{}", err_str);
2259 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2260 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2261 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2270 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2271 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2272 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2274 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2275 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2276 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2277 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2278 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2279 // filter for uniqueness here.
2280 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2281 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2282 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2283 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2285 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2286 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2288 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2289 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2290 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2296 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2297 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2298 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2299 while !processed_all_events {
2300 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2307 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2308 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2309 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2311 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2312 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2313 result = $self.process_background_events();
2315 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2316 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2317 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2318 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2322 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2323 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2324 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2328 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2330 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2331 $event_to_handle = event;
2333 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2334 post_event_actions.push(action);
2339 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2340 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2341 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2342 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2343 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2344 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2347 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2348 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2349 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2350 processed_all_events = false;
2354 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2355 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2356 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2358 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2359 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2360 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2366 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2368 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2369 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2370 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2371 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2372 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2373 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2377 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2379 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2381 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2382 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2384 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2386 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2387 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2388 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2391 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2392 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2393 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2395 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2396 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2397 current_timestamp: u32,
2399 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2400 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2401 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2402 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2404 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2405 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2406 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2411 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2413 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2414 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2415 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2416 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2417 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2418 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2419 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2420 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2422 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2425 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2426 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2428 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2430 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2432 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2434 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2435 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2436 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2437 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2438 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2439 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2440 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2441 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2443 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2453 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2454 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2455 &self.default_configuration
2458 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2459 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2460 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2463 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2464 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2466 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2468 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2472 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2477 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2479 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2480 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2481 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2482 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2483 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2485 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2486 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2488 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2489 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2490 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2492 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2493 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2494 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2496 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2497 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2499 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2500 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2501 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2502 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2503 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2504 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2506 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2507 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2508 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2509 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2510 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2511 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2515 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2516 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2520 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2521 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2523 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2525 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2526 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2527 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2532 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2533 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2534 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2535 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2536 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2537 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2541 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2546 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2548 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2552 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2554 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2560 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2561 node_id: their_network_key,
2564 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2567 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2568 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2569 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2570 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2571 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2572 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2573 // the same channel.
2574 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2576 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2578 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2581 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2582 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2583 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2584 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2588 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2589 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2590 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2598 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2599 /// more information.
2600 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2601 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2602 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2603 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2604 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2605 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2606 // the same channel.
2607 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2609 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2611 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2614 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2615 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2616 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2624 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2625 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2627 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2628 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2630 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2631 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2632 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2633 // really wanted anyway.
2634 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2637 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2638 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2642 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2645 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2646 let context_to_details = |context| {
2647 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2649 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2651 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2652 .map(context_to_details)
2658 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2659 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2661 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2662 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2663 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2665 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2666 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2667 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2668 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2669 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2670 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2672 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2673 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2674 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2676 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2677 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2678 payment_id: *payment_id,
2679 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2680 total_msat: *total_msat,
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2684 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2686 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2687 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2689 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2694 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2695 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2696 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2697 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2698 Some(transaction) => {
2699 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2700 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2705 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2706 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2707 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2708 reason: closure_reason,
2709 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2710 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2714 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2717 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2718 let shutdown_result;
2720 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2722 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2723 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2731 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2732 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2733 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2734 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2735 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2736 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2737 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2739 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2740 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2741 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2743 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2747 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2748 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2750 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2751 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2752 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2753 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2757 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2759 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2760 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2764 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2771 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2772 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2774 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2775 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2776 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2777 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2782 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2783 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2784 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2788 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2789 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2795 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2796 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2797 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2799 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2800 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2802 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2803 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2804 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2805 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2807 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2809 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2810 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2811 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2814 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2815 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2816 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2817 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2818 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2819 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2822 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2823 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2824 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2826 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2827 /// the channel being closed or not:
2828 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2829 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2830 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2831 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2832 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2833 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2834 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2836 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2837 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2838 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2839 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2841 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2843 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2844 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2845 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2848 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2849 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2850 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2851 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2852 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2855 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2856 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2857 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2858 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2859 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2862 let logger = WithContext::from(
2863 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2865 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2866 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2867 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2868 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2869 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2872 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2873 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2874 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2875 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2876 // ignore the result here.
2877 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2879 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2880 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2881 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2882 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2884 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2885 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2886 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2887 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2888 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2889 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2890 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2891 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2894 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2897 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2898 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2901 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2902 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2906 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2907 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2908 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2909 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2911 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2912 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2913 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2914 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2915 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2916 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2918 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2920 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2921 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2922 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2923 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2924 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2925 mem::drop(peer_state);
2926 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2928 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2929 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2930 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2933 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2934 // Unfunded channel has no update
2935 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2938 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2939 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2940 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2941 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2943 (None, *peer_node_id)
2945 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2948 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2949 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2950 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2952 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2953 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2954 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2955 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2956 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2962 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2965 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2967 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2968 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2970 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2971 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2973 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2974 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2975 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2976 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2987 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2988 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2989 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2991 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2992 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2993 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2996 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2997 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2998 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3000 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3001 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3002 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3003 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3004 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3007 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3008 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3009 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3010 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3011 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3015 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3016 /// local transaction(s).
3017 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3018 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3019 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3023 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3024 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3026 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3028 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3029 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3032 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
3033 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3034 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
3036 _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
3039 macro_rules! return_err {
3040 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3043 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3044 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3046 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
3047 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3048 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3049 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3050 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3052 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3053 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3059 let NextPacketDetails {
3060 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3061 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3062 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3063 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3064 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3067 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3068 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3069 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3070 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3071 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3072 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3073 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3074 // phantom or an intercept.
3075 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3076 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3077 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3081 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3084 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3086 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3088 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3089 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3090 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3092 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3093 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3094 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3095 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3098 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3099 // have no consistency guarantees.
3100 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3104 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3105 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3106 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3107 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3108 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3110 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3111 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3112 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3113 // we don't have the channel here.
3114 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3116 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3118 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3119 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3120 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3121 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3122 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3123 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3124 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3125 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3126 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3127 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3128 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3130 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3133 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3134 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3136 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3137 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3144 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3146 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3147 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3149 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3150 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3151 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3152 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3153 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3155 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3156 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3162 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3163 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3164 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3165 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3167 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3168 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3170 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3171 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3172 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3174 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3175 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3176 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3177 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3178 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3179 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3180 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3184 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3186 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3189 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3190 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3191 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3192 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3193 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3194 macro_rules! return_err {
3195 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3197 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3198 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3199 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3200 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3201 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3202 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3203 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3209 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3211 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3212 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3213 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3214 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3217 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3218 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3219 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3220 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3221 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3223 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3226 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3227 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3228 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3229 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3230 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3236 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3237 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3238 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3240 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3241 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3242 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3244 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3245 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3246 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3247 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3248 return Err(LightningError {
3249 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3250 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3253 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3254 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3256 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3257 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3258 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3261 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3262 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3263 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3264 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3266 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3267 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3268 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3270 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3271 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3272 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3273 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3274 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3275 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3276 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3280 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3283 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3284 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3285 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id().0));
3286 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3288 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3289 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3290 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3291 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3292 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3295 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3296 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3298 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3299 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3300 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3301 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3302 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3303 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3304 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3305 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3307 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3308 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3309 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3311 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3313 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3320 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3321 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3322 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3323 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3328 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3329 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3330 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3333 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3334 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3335 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3336 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3338 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3339 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3340 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3342 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3343 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3347 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3348 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3350 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3351 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3352 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3354 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3357 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3359 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3360 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3363 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3364 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3366 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3367 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3368 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3369 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3370 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3371 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3373 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3374 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3375 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3376 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3378 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3379 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3381 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3382 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3383 Some(monitor_update) => {
3384 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3386 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3387 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3388 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3389 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3390 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3391 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3392 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3400 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3403 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3404 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3405 // `channel_by_id` map.
3406 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3407 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3411 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3412 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3414 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3419 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3421 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3422 /// fields for more info.
3424 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3425 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3427 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3429 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3430 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3431 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3432 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3433 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3435 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3436 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3437 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3438 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3439 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3441 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3442 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3443 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3444 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3446 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3448 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3449 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3450 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3452 /// In general, a path may raise:
3453 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3454 /// node public key) is specified.
3455 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3456 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3457 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3458 /// relevant updates.
3460 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3461 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3462 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3464 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3465 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3466 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3467 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3468 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3469 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3470 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3471 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3473 self.pending_outbound_payments
3474 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3475 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3476 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3479 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3480 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3481 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3482 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3484 self.pending_outbound_payments
3485 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3486 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3487 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3488 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3492 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3493 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3495 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3496 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3497 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3501 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3507 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3508 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3511 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments
3515 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3516 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3517 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3518 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3519 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3523 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3524 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3525 /// retries are exhausted.
3527 /// # Event Generation
3529 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3530 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3532 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3533 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3534 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3536 /// # Requested Invoices
3538 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3539 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3540 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3541 /// once the invoice has been received.
3543 /// # Restart Behavior
3545 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3546 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3547 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3550 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3551 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3552 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3555 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3556 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3557 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3558 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3559 /// never reach the recipient.
3561 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3562 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3564 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3565 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3567 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3568 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3569 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3572 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3573 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3576 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3577 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3579 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3582 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3583 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3587 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3588 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3589 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3592 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3593 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3594 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3595 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3596 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3598 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3599 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3600 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3603 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3606 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3607 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3610 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3611 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3613 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3614 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3615 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3616 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3617 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3618 let payment_params =
3619 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3621 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3623 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3626 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3627 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3629 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3630 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3631 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3632 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3634 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3635 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3636 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3637 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3638 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3639 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3640 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3641 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3642 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3643 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3645 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3646 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3647 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3648 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3652 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3654 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3655 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3658 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3660 let mut res = Vec::new();
3662 for mut path in route.paths {
3663 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3664 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3665 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3666 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3667 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3670 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3673 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3674 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3676 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3678 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3679 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3684 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3687 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3692 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3693 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3694 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3696 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3697 let used_liquidity =
3698 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3700 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3701 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3703 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3706 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3711 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3712 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3713 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3720 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3721 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3722 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3723 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3724 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3725 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3727 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3728 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3732 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3733 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3734 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3736 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3737 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3738 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3739 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3740 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3741 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3742 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3743 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3744 } else { unreachable!(); });
3746 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3747 Err((chan, err)) => {
3748 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3749 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3750 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3751 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3752 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3758 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3759 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3761 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3762 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3765 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3766 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3767 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3771 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3772 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3773 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3777 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3779 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3782 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3783 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3784 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3786 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3793 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3794 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3795 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3799 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3801 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3802 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3804 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3805 /// across the p2p network.
3807 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3808 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3810 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3811 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3812 /// keys per-channel).
3814 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3815 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3816 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3818 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3819 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3820 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3822 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3823 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3824 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3825 /// for more details.
3827 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3828 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3829 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3830 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3833 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3835 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3836 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3838 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3839 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3840 /// signature for each channel.
3842 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3843 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3845 let mut result = Ok(());
3847 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3848 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3849 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3850 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3851 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3856 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3857 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3858 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3862 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3863 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3864 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3865 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3866 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3867 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3868 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3869 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3871 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3872 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3877 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3878 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3879 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3880 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3884 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3885 match states.entry(txid) {
3886 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3887 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3888 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3892 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3895 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3896 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3897 temporary_channel_id,
3898 counterparty_node_id,
3899 funding_transaction.clone(),
3902 let mut output_index = None;
3903 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3904 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3905 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3906 if output_index.is_some() {
3907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3908 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3911 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3914 if output_index.is_none() {
3915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3916 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3919 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3920 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3921 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3927 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3928 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3929 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3930 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3931 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3932 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3933 .into_iter().flatten()
3934 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3936 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3937 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3939 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3942 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3943 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3944 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3945 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3947 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3948 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3949 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3953 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3954 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3960 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3962 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3963 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3964 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3965 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3967 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3968 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3970 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3971 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3973 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3975 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3976 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3977 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3978 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3979 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3980 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3981 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3982 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3983 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3984 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3985 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3987 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3991 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3994 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3995 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3997 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3998 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3999 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4000 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4004 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4005 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4006 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4007 config.apply(config_update);
4008 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4011 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4012 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4013 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4014 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4016 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4023 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4024 debug_assert!(false);
4025 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4027 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4028 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4035 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4037 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4038 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4039 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4040 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4042 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4043 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4045 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4046 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4048 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4050 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4051 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4052 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4053 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4054 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4055 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4056 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4057 pub fn update_channel_config(
4058 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4059 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4060 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4063 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4064 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4066 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4067 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4069 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4070 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4071 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4072 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4073 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4075 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4076 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4077 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4080 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4083 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4084 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4085 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4086 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4087 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4088 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4091 let next_hop_scid = {
4092 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4093 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4094 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4097 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4098 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4099 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4100 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4101 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4104 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4106 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4107 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4108 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4111 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4112 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4113 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4114 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4115 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4122 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4123 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4124 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4127 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4128 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4129 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4130 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4133 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4135 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4136 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4137 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4138 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4139 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4142 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4143 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4144 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4145 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4146 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4148 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4152 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4153 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4155 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4158 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4159 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4162 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4163 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4164 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4167 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4168 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4169 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4170 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4171 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4172 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4174 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4175 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4178 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4179 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4181 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4186 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4188 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4189 /// Will likely generate further events.
4190 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4193 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4194 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4195 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4197 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4198 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4200 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4201 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4202 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4203 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4205 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4206 match forward_info {
4207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4208 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4209 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4210 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4211 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4214 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4215 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4216 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4217 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4219 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4220 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4221 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4222 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4223 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4224 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4225 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4226 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4229 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4230 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4232 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4235 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4236 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4242 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4243 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4245 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4249 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4250 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4252 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4256 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4257 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4258 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4259 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4260 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4261 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4262 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4266 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4267 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4268 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4269 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4271 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4274 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4278 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4279 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4280 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4281 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4282 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4283 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4285 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4286 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4292 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4295 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4298 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4299 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4300 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4301 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4302 // problem, not ours.
4308 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4309 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4310 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4312 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4316 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4317 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4318 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4319 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4320 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4325 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4326 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4327 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4328 match forward_info {
4329 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4330 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4331 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4332 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4333 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4334 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4335 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4338 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4339 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4340 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4341 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4342 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4343 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4344 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4345 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4346 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4347 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4349 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4350 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4351 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4352 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4353 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4354 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4357 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4358 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4359 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4362 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4363 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4365 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4367 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4368 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4369 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4370 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4375 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4376 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4378 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4379 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4380 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4381 htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger
4383 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4384 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4386 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4388 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4389 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4390 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4397 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4401 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4402 match forward_info {
4403 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4404 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4405 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4406 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4407 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4410 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4411 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4412 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4413 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4414 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4415 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4416 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4417 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4419 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4420 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4421 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4425 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4426 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4429 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4432 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4433 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4434 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4435 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4436 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4437 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4438 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4439 phantom_shared_secret,
4442 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4443 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4444 // if routing nodes overpay
4445 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4446 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4448 total_value_received: None,
4449 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4452 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4455 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4457 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4458 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4459 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4460 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4461 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4462 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4464 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4465 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4466 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4467 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4468 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4470 phantom_shared_secret,
4471 blinded_failure: None,
4473 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4474 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4476 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4479 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4480 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4481 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4482 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4483 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4486 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4487 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4488 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4489 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4490 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4491 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4493 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4494 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4495 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4497 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4498 .entry(payment_hash)
4499 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4500 .or_insert_with(|| {
4501 committed_to_claimable = true;
4503 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4506 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4507 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4509 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4511 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4513 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4515 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4516 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4517 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4520 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4522 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4523 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4524 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4525 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4526 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4527 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4528 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4530 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4531 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4533 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4535 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4536 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4537 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4538 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4539 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4540 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4542 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4543 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4544 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4545 committed_to_claimable = true;
4547 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4548 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4549 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4550 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4551 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4552 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4553 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4554 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4555 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4556 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4560 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4561 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4562 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4563 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4564 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4566 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4568 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4569 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4571 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4572 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4573 committed_to_claimable = true;
4576 payment_claimable_generated
4580 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4581 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4582 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4583 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4584 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4585 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4586 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4587 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4589 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4590 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4591 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4592 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4593 Ok(result) => result,
4595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4596 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4599 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4600 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4601 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4602 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4603 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4604 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4607 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4608 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4609 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4611 check_total_value!(purpose);
4613 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4614 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4615 check_total_value!(purpose);
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4620 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4622 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4624 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4625 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4627 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4628 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4630 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4631 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4633 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4634 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4635 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4637 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4638 if payment_claimable_generated {
4639 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4645 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4646 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4654 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4655 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4656 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4657 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4659 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4660 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4662 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4664 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4665 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4666 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4668 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4670 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4671 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4672 events.append(&mut new_events);
4675 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4677 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4678 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4679 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4681 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4683 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4684 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4685 if background_events.is_empty() {
4686 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4689 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4691 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4692 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4693 // monitor updating completing.
4694 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4696 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4697 let mut updated_chan = false;
4699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4700 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4703 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4705 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4706 updated_chan = true;
4707 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4708 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4710 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4718 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4719 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4722 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4724 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4725 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4727 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4728 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4730 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4731 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4732 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4733 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4734 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4740 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4743 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4744 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4745 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4746 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4747 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4750 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4751 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4753 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4755 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4756 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4757 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4758 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4759 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4761 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4763 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4764 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4765 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4766 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4768 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4769 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4771 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4772 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4776 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4777 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4778 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4779 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4780 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4781 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4782 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4784 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4785 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4791 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4792 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4794 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4799 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4800 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4808 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4810 /// This currently includes:
4811 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4812 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4813 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4815 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4816 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4817 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4818 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4819 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4820 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4821 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4822 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4824 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4825 /// estimate fetches.
4827 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4828 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4829 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4830 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4831 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4833 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4834 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4836 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4837 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4838 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4839 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4841 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4842 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4843 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4844 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4845 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4846 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4848 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4849 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4850 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4852 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4853 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4854 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4855 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4856 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4857 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4858 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4859 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4860 channel_id: *chan_id,
4861 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4873 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4874 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4875 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4876 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4877 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4878 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4880 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4881 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4886 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4887 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4889 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4890 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4891 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4892 if needs_close { return false; }
4895 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4896 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4897 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4898 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4899 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4900 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4901 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4902 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4904 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4905 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4906 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4907 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4911 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4913 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4916 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4918 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4919 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4920 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4921 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4925 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4927 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4933 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4935 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4936 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4937 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4938 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4939 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4940 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4941 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4942 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4943 channel_id: *chan_id,
4944 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4952 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4953 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4954 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4956 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4957 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4958 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4963 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4964 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4965 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
4966 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4967 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4968 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4969 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4970 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4971 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4977 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4979 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4980 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4985 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4986 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4987 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4988 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4989 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4990 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4991 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4992 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4993 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4994 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4995 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4997 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4998 // have no channels to the peer.
4999 let remove_entry = {
5000 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5001 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5004 entry.remove_entry();
5007 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5012 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5013 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5014 // This should be unreachable
5015 debug_assert!(false);
5018 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5019 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5020 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5021 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5022 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5023 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5024 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5027 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5028 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5029 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5031 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5032 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5039 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5040 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5041 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5042 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5043 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5046 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5047 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5050 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5051 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5054 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5055 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5056 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5057 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5058 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5059 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5060 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5063 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5064 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5067 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5068 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5069 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5070 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5071 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5078 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5079 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5080 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5082 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5083 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5084 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5085 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5087 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5088 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5089 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5090 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5091 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5092 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5095 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5096 /// reason for the failure.
5098 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5099 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5102 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5103 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5104 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5105 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5106 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5107 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5108 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5113 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5114 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5115 match failure_code {
5116 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5117 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5118 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5119 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5120 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5121 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5123 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5124 let fail_data = match data {
5125 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5128 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5133 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5134 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5136 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5138 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5139 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5140 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5141 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5142 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5143 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5144 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5146 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5148 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5149 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5151 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5156 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5157 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5158 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5159 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5160 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5161 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5162 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5163 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5164 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5165 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5167 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5168 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5169 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5170 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5172 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5173 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5174 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5175 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5176 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5180 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5181 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5182 // be surfaced to the user.
5183 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5184 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5185 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5187 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5189 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5190 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5191 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5192 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5193 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5194 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5195 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5197 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5198 debug_assert!(false);
5199 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5204 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5207 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5208 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5209 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5210 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5214 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5215 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5216 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5217 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5218 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5219 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5220 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5221 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5222 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5223 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5226 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5227 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5228 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5231 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5232 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5233 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5235 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5236 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5237 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5238 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5239 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5241 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5242 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5243 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5246 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5247 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5248 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5250 let err_packet = match blinded_failure {
5251 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5252 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5253 blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5254 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5258 onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret)
5262 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5263 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5264 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5265 push_forward_ev = true;
5267 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5269 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5272 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5275 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5276 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5277 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5278 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5279 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5280 failed_next_destination: destination,
5286 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5287 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5289 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5290 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5291 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5292 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5294 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5295 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5296 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5297 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5299 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5300 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5301 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5303 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5304 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5305 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5306 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5307 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5308 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5309 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5310 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5311 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5314 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5315 /// even type numbers.
5319 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5320 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5322 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5323 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5324 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5327 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5328 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5333 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5334 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5335 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5336 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5337 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5338 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5339 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5340 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5345 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5346 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5347 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5348 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5349 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5351 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5352 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5353 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5357 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5358 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5359 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5360 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5361 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5362 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5363 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5364 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5365 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5366 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5367 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5376 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5378 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5379 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5380 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5381 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5382 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5383 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5384 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5385 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5386 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5388 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5389 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5390 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5391 debug_assert!(false);
5395 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5397 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5398 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5399 debug_assert!(false);
5403 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5404 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5406 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5407 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5408 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5409 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5412 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5413 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5414 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5415 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5419 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5420 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5421 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5422 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5423 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5424 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5425 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5428 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5429 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5430 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5431 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5432 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5433 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5438 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5439 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5440 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5441 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5442 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5443 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5446 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5449 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5450 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5451 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5452 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5456 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5457 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5458 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5459 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5461 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5462 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5463 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5464 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5466 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5467 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5468 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5469 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5473 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5474 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5475 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5479 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5480 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5481 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5484 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5485 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5486 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5487 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5488 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5489 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5490 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5491 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5494 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5495 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5496 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5498 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5501 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5502 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5504 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5505 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5506 // monitor update as a background event.
5507 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5508 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5509 counterparty_node_id,
5510 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5511 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5515 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5516 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5521 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5523 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5525 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5526 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5527 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5528 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5529 blocking_action: blocker,
5531 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5533 debug_assert!(false,
5534 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5537 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5538 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5539 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5540 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5541 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5543 let mut found_blocker = false;
5544 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5545 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5546 // which case we need to only remove the one
5547 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5548 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5549 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5550 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5552 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5555 debug_assert!(false);
5564 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5565 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5566 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5572 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5573 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5574 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5575 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5576 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5577 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5578 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5579 // again on restart.
5580 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5581 payment_preimage, update_res);
5584 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5585 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5587 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5588 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5589 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5590 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5591 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5592 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5593 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5594 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5595 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5596 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5599 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5600 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5601 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5602 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5603 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5604 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5608 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5609 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5612 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5613 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5614 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5617 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5618 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5619 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5620 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5621 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5623 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5624 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5625 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5627 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5628 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5631 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5632 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5633 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5635 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5636 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5637 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5638 let chan_to_release =
5639 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5640 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5642 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5643 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5644 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5645 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5650 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5651 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5652 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5653 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5654 // in the background.
5655 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5656 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5657 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5658 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5660 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5661 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5662 funding_txo, update, ..
5664 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5665 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5666 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5667 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5669 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5675 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5676 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5677 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5679 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5680 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5682 monitor_update.updates[0],
5683 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5688 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5689 // immediately once we get going.
5690 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5693 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5695 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5698 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5699 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5700 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5701 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5702 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5703 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5707 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5708 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5709 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5712 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5713 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5715 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5716 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5717 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5718 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5720 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5724 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5725 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5726 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5732 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5733 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5734 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5737 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5738 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5739 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5740 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5742 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5744 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5745 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5746 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5748 payment_purpose: purpose,
5751 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5753 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5757 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5759 sender_intended_total_msat,
5763 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5764 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5766 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5767 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5768 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5771 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5772 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5774 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5775 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5776 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5777 Some(blocking_action),
5784 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5785 /// update completion.
5786 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5787 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5788 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5789 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5790 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5791 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5792 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5793 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5794 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5795 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5796 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5797 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5798 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5799 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5801 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5803 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5804 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5805 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5806 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5809 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5810 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5812 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5813 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5814 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5819 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5820 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5822 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5827 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5828 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5830 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5831 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5836 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5840 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5846 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5847 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5848 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5852 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5853 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5854 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5860 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5861 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5863 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5864 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5866 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5867 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5868 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5869 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5870 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5875 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5876 let mut peer_state_lock;
5877 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5878 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5879 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5882 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5885 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5886 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5887 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5888 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5889 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5892 let remaining_in_flight =
5893 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5894 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5897 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5898 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5899 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5900 remaining_in_flight);
5901 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5904 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5907 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5909 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5910 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5913 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5914 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5915 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5917 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5918 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5919 /// used to accept such channels.
5921 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5922 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5923 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5924 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5927 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5928 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5930 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5931 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5932 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5934 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5935 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5937 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5938 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5940 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5941 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5943 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5944 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5945 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5946 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5949 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5952 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5953 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5955 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5956 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5959 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5961 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5962 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5963 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5965 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5966 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5967 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5968 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5969 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5970 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5971 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5973 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5977 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5978 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5979 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5980 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5981 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5982 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5983 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5986 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5987 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5989 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5990 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5991 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5992 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5993 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5994 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5995 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5996 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5999 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6004 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6005 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6006 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6008 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6009 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6010 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6013 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6018 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6019 /// or 0-conf channels.
6021 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6022 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6023 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6024 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6025 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6026 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6028 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6029 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6030 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6031 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6032 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6033 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6034 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6038 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6041 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6042 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6044 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6045 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6047 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6048 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6049 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6050 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6051 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6053 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6056 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6057 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6058 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6061 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6062 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6067 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6070 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6071 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6072 // likely to be lost on restart!
6073 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6074 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6077 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6078 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6081 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6082 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6083 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6084 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6085 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6088 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6090 debug_assert!(false);
6091 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6096 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6097 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6098 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6099 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6100 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6101 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6103 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6104 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6105 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6108 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6109 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6111 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6112 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6115 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6116 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6118 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6121 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6122 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6123 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6124 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6125 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6126 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6127 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6128 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6129 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6131 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6132 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6133 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6138 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6139 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6140 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6141 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6142 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6143 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6144 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6152 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6153 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6154 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6156 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6160 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6161 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6163 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6164 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6165 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6167 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6171 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6172 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6173 // likely to be lost on restart!
6174 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6176 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6178 debug_assert!(false);
6179 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6183 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6185 match phase.get_mut() {
6186 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6187 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6188 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6191 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6198 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6199 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6200 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6201 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6202 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6204 user_channel_id: user_id,
6209 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6210 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6213 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6215 debug_assert!(false);
6216 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6221 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6222 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6223 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6224 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6225 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6227 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6228 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6229 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6230 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6231 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6232 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6233 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6234 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6235 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6239 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6242 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6245 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6247 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6248 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6249 chan.context.channel_id()
6252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6253 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6254 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6256 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6257 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6258 chan.context.channel_id()))
6260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6261 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6262 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6263 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6264 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6266 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6267 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6268 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6269 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6270 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6271 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6272 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6277 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6278 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6279 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6281 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6285 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6286 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6287 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6288 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6289 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6292 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6301 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6302 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6304 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6306 debug_assert!(false);
6307 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6312 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6314 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6315 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6316 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6317 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6318 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6319 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6320 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6323 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6335 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6336 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6337 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6339 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6341 debug_assert!(false);
6342 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6346 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6348 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6349 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6350 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6351 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6352 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6353 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6354 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6355 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6356 msg: announcement_sigs,
6358 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6359 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6360 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6361 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6362 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6363 // announcement_signatures.
6364 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6365 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6367 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6375 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6380 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6381 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6385 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6390 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6391 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6392 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6395 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6397 debug_assert!(false);
6398 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6402 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6403 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6405 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6406 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6407 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6408 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6410 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6413 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6414 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6415 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6416 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6418 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6419 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6420 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6421 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6422 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6423 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6427 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6428 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6429 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6430 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6433 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6434 let context = phase.context_mut();
6435 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6436 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6437 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6438 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6439 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6446 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6447 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6448 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6449 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6451 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6452 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6458 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6459 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6460 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6462 debug_assert!(false);
6463 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6465 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6468 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6470 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6471 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6472 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6473 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6475 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6480 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6481 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6482 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6483 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6484 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6485 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6486 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6488 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6489 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6495 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6496 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6497 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6498 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6500 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6503 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6508 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6510 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6511 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6512 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6517 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6518 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6519 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6520 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6522 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6523 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6524 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6525 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6527 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6528 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6530 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6534 debug_assert!(false);
6535 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6539 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6541 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6542 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6543 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6544 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6545 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6546 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6548 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6550 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6551 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6552 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6553 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6554 match pending_forward_info {
6555 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6556 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6558 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6559 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6560 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6561 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6562 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6564 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6565 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6566 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6567 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6568 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6571 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6573 _ => pending_forward_info
6576 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6577 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6579 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6580 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6588 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6590 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6592 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6594 debug_assert!(false);
6595 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6599 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6601 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6602 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6603 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6604 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6606 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6608 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6609 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6610 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6612 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6613 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6614 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6615 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6616 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6617 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6618 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6621 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6622 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6628 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6632 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6633 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6634 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6636 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6638 debug_assert!(false);
6639 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6641 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6642 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6643 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6645 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6646 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6648 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6649 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6657 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6658 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6659 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6661 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6663 debug_assert!(false);
6664 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6668 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6670 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6671 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6672 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6674 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6675 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6677 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6678 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6686 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6688 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6690 debug_assert!(false);
6691 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6695 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6697 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6698 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6699 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6700 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6701 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6702 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6703 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6707 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6708 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6716 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6717 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6718 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6719 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6720 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6721 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6722 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6723 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6724 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6725 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6726 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6728 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6729 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6731 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6732 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6733 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6735 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6736 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6739 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6740 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6742 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6743 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6744 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6746 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6747 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6748 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6749 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6750 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6753 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6754 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6757 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6758 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6759 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6760 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6761 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6762 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6763 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6764 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6765 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6766 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6769 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6770 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6771 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6776 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6777 // payments are being processed.
6778 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6779 push_forward_event = true;
6781 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6782 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6789 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6790 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6793 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6794 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6795 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6797 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6801 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6802 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6803 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6804 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6805 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6807 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6808 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6809 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6810 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6811 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6812 // real by taking more time.
6813 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6814 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6815 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6820 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6821 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6822 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6823 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6824 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6825 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6826 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6828 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6829 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6830 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6831 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6832 channel_funding_outpoint,
6833 counterparty_node_id,
6838 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6839 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6840 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6843 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6844 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6845 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6847 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6848 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6849 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6855 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6856 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6860 debug_assert!(false);
6861 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6862 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6864 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6866 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6867 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6868 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6869 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6870 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6871 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6872 *counterparty_node_id)
6874 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6875 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6876 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6877 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6878 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6879 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6880 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6884 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6885 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6888 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6891 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6895 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6897 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6899 debug_assert!(false);
6900 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6902 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6903 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6904 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6906 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6907 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6908 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6910 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6911 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6919 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6921 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6923 debug_assert!(false);
6924 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6928 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6930 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6931 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6932 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6935 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6936 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6937 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6938 msg, &self.default_configuration
6939 ), chan_phase_entry),
6940 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6941 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6942 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6945 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6946 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6954 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6955 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6956 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6957 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6959 // It's not a local channel
6960 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6965 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6966 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6970 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6972 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6973 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6974 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6975 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6976 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6977 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6978 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6982 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6983 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6984 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6985 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6987 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6988 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6989 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6990 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6993 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6997 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6998 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7003 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7006 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7008 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7009 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7011 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7013 debug_assert!(false);
7014 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7015 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7019 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7024 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7025 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7026 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7027 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7028 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7029 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7030 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7031 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7032 let mut channel_update = None;
7033 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7034 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7035 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7038 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7039 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7040 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7041 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7042 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7043 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7044 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7049 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7050 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7051 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7052 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7053 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7058 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7059 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7063 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7064 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7065 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7066 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7067 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7068 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7069 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7070 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7072 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7073 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7074 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7075 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7076 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7077 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7078 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7080 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7081 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7082 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7083 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7084 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7085 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7086 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7087 next_funding_txid: None,
7090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7091 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7092 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7098 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7099 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7100 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7101 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7104 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7105 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7110 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7111 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7112 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7114 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7115 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7116 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7117 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7118 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7119 match monitor_event {
7120 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7121 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7122 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7123 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7124 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7126 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7127 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7128 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7129 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7132 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7133 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7134 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7136 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7137 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7138 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7139 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7142 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7144 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7145 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7148 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7149 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7150 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7151 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7156 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7157 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7158 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7159 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7160 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7168 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7169 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7175 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7176 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7179 has_pending_monitor_events
7182 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7183 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7184 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7186 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7188 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7191 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7192 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7193 /// update was applied.
7194 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7195 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7196 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7198 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7199 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7200 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7201 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7204 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7207 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7208 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7209 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7211 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7212 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7213 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7214 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7215 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7216 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7218 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7219 has_monitor_update = true;
7221 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7222 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7223 continue 'peer_loop;
7232 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7233 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7234 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7240 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7241 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7243 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7244 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7246 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7247 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7248 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7249 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7252 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7253 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7254 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7255 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7256 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7262 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7268 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7274 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7275 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7280 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7281 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7282 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7283 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7284 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7285 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7286 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7290 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7293 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7294 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7300 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7301 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7302 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7303 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7304 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7305 let mut has_update = false;
7306 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7310 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7313 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7314 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7316 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7317 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7318 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7319 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7320 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7322 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7323 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7326 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7327 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7328 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7330 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7331 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7332 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7333 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7339 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7341 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7342 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7349 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7350 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7355 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7361 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7362 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7365 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7366 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7372 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7373 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7375 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7376 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7377 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7378 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7379 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7380 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7381 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7382 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7383 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7384 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7385 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7386 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7387 assert!(should_broadcast);
7388 } else { unreachable!(); }
7389 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7390 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7391 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7394 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7398 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7399 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7400 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7404 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7405 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7406 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7407 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7411 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7414 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7416 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7417 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7418 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7419 &self, description: String
7420 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7421 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7422 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7423 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7424 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7425 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7427 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7428 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7432 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7433 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7437 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7438 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7440 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7441 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7442 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7445 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7446 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7447 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7449 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7450 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7454 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7455 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7456 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7457 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7461 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7462 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7466 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7467 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7469 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7471 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7472 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7473 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7474 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7475 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7476 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7477 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7478 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7479 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7480 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7481 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7482 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7484 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7485 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7487 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7488 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7491 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7492 self.pending_outbound_payments
7493 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7494 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7496 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7501 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7502 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7503 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7505 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7506 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7507 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7508 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7509 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7510 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7511 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7513 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7514 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7518 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7519 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7522 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7523 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7524 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7528 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7529 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7530 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7531 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7535 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7536 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7537 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7541 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7542 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7544 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7545 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7546 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7547 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7548 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7550 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7551 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7552 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7553 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7554 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7555 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7556 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7557 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7558 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7561 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7562 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7563 let builder = match quantity {
7565 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7567 let builder = match amount_msats {
7569 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7571 let builder = match payer_note {
7573 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7576 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7577 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7579 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7580 self.pending_outbound_payments
7581 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7582 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7584 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7586 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7587 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7588 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7589 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7590 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7593 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7595 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7596 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7597 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7598 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7599 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7600 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7601 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7602 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7603 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7605 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7612 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7615 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7616 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7617 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7621 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7622 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7623 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7624 /// received and no retries will be made.
7626 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7627 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7628 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7629 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7630 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7632 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7633 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7635 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7636 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7637 let payment_paths = vec![
7638 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7640 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7641 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7642 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7644 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7645 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7646 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7648 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7649 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7650 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7652 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7653 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7655 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7656 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7657 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7658 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7659 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7662 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7664 for path in refund.paths() {
7665 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7666 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7667 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7668 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7670 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7676 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7680 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7683 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7684 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7686 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7687 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7688 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7689 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7691 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7693 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7694 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7698 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7699 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7701 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7703 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7704 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7706 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7707 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7708 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7709 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7710 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7711 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7712 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7713 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7714 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7715 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7716 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7719 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7720 /// stored external to LDK.
7722 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7723 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7724 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7726 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7727 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7730 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7731 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7732 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7733 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7735 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7736 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7737 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7738 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7739 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7741 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7742 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7743 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7744 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7745 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7747 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7748 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7750 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7751 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7755 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7756 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7758 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7760 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7761 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7763 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7764 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7765 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7766 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7767 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7768 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7769 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7772 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7773 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7775 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7776 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7777 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7780 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7782 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7783 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7784 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7785 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7788 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7790 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7791 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7792 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7793 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7794 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7796 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7797 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7798 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7800 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7802 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7805 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7806 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7807 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7811 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7812 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7814 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7815 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7816 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7817 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7819 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7820 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7821 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7822 Some(_) => continue,
7823 None => return scid_candidate
7828 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7830 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7831 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7833 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7834 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7835 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7839 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7840 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7841 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7843 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7844 /// times to get a unique scid.
7845 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7846 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7847 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7849 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7850 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7851 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7852 return scid_candidate
7856 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7857 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7858 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7859 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7862 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7865 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7866 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7868 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7869 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7870 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7879 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7880 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7881 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7882 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7883 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7887 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7888 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7889 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7890 events.push_back((event, None));
7894 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7895 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7896 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7900 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7901 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7905 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7906 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7909 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7910 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7911 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7912 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7913 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7914 let logger = WithContext::from(
7915 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7918 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7919 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7920 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7922 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7923 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7924 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7925 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7927 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7931 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7932 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7933 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7934 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7935 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7936 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7937 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7942 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7943 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7944 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7945 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7946 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7947 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7948 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7949 if further_update_exists {
7950 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7955 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7956 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7962 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7963 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7969 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7970 for action in actions {
7972 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7973 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7975 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7981 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7982 /// using the given event handler.
7984 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7985 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7989 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7993 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7995 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7996 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7997 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7998 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7999 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8004 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8005 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8006 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8007 /// is always placed next to each other.
8009 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8010 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8011 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8012 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8014 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8015 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8016 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8017 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8018 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8019 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8020 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8022 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8023 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8024 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8025 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8028 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8029 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8031 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8032 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8035 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8037 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8040 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8041 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8045 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8046 events.replace(pending_events);
8055 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8057 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8059 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8061 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8066 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8068 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8069 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8070 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8072 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8076 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8078 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8079 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8080 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8081 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8082 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8083 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8087 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8089 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8090 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8091 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8092 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8093 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8096 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8097 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8100 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8101 let _persistence_guard =
8102 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8103 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8104 let new_height = height - 1;
8106 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8107 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8108 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8109 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8110 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8111 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8114 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8118 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8120 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8121 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8122 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8123 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8124 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8125 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8129 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8130 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8131 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8132 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8134 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8135 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8137 let _persistence_guard =
8138 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8139 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8140 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8141 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8143 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8144 if height < last_best_block_height {
8145 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8146 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8150 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8151 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8152 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8153 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8155 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8156 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8158 let _persistence_guard =
8159 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8160 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8161 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8163 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8165 macro_rules! max_time {
8166 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8168 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8169 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8170 // having an explicit local time source.
8171 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8172 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8173 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8174 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8175 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8181 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8182 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8183 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8184 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8188 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8189 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8190 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8193 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8194 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8195 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8196 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8197 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8198 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8205 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8206 let _persistence_guard =
8207 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8208 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8209 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8210 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8211 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8212 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8213 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8214 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8219 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8230 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8231 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8233 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8234 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8235 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8236 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8237 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8239 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8240 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8243 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8244 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8245 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8246 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8247 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8249 // Retain unfunded channels.
8250 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8251 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8252 let res = f(channel);
8253 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8254 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8255 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8256 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8257 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8259 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8260 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8261 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8262 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8263 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8264 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8266 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8271 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8276 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8277 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8280 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8281 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8283 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8284 msg: announcement_sigs,
8286 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8287 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8290 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8291 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8292 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8297 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8298 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8299 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8300 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8301 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8302 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8303 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8304 // is always consistent.
8305 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8306 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8307 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8308 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8309 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8312 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8313 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8314 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8315 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8316 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8317 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8318 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8322 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8323 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8324 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8325 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8326 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8327 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8328 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8329 data: reason_message,
8342 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8343 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8344 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8345 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8346 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8347 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8348 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8349 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8350 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8351 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8353 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8354 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8355 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8359 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8362 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8363 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8364 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8365 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8366 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8367 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8368 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8369 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8370 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8371 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8372 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8375 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8376 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8377 _ => unreachable!(),
8379 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8380 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8381 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8382 let logger = WithContext::from(
8383 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8385 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8391 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8393 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8398 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8399 /// may have events that need processing.
8401 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8402 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8404 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8405 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8406 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8407 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8410 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8411 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8412 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8415 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8416 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8417 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8420 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8421 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8422 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8423 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8426 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8427 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8428 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8429 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8432 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8433 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8435 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8436 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8437 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8438 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8439 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8442 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8443 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8444 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8445 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8448 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8449 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8450 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8451 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8454 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8455 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8456 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8457 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8460 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8461 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8462 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8463 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8467 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8468 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8470 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8471 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8472 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8473 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8474 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8475 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8479 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8480 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8481 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8482 // change to the contents.
8483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8484 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8485 let persist = match &res {
8486 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8487 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8488 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8490 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8492 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8497 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8498 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8499 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8500 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8503 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8504 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8505 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8506 // change to the contents.
8507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8509 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8513 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8514 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8515 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8519 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8521 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8524 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8529 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8530 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8531 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8532 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8533 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8535 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8536 let persist = match &res {
8537 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8538 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8540 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8545 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8546 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8547 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8548 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8551 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8552 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8553 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8554 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8557 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8558 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8559 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8560 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8563 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8564 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8565 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8566 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8569 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8571 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8574 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8576 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8579 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8580 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8581 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8582 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8584 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8585 let persist = match &res {
8586 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8587 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8588 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8590 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8595 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8597 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8600 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8601 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8602 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8603 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8605 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8606 let persist = match &res {
8607 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8608 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8609 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8611 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8616 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8617 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8618 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8619 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8620 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8621 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8622 let persist = match &res {
8623 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8624 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8625 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8627 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8632 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8637 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8642 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8643 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8644 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8645 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8647 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8648 let persist = match &res {
8649 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8650 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8651 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8653 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8658 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8659 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8660 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8663 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8664 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8665 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8668 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8673 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8675 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8676 let persist = match &res {
8677 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8678 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8679 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8681 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8686 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8688 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8689 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8690 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8693 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8694 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8695 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8697 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8698 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8699 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8700 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8701 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8702 let context = match phase {
8703 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8704 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8705 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8706 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8711 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8712 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8715 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8719 // Clean up for removal.
8720 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8721 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8722 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8725 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8726 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8727 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8728 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8730 // V1 Channel Establishment
8731 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8734 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8735 // V2 Channel Establishment
8736 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8737 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8738 // Common Channel Establishment
8739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8744 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8747 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8754 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8756 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8757 // Channel Operations
8758 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8763 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8765 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8766 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8767 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8768 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8769 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8770 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8771 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8772 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8773 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8776 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8777 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8778 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8779 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8782 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8784 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8786 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8787 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8791 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8792 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8793 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8794 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8798 let mut res = Ok(());
8800 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8801 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8802 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8803 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8804 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8805 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8806 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8809 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8810 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8812 if inbound_peer_limited {
8814 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8816 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8817 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8818 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8819 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8820 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8821 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8822 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8823 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8828 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8829 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8831 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8832 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8833 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8834 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8837 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8840 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8841 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8846 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8849 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8852 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8854 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8855 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8856 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8857 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8858 // worry about closing and removing them.
8859 debug_assert!(false);
8863 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8864 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8865 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8866 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
8871 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8872 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8877 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8880 match &msg.data as &str {
8881 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8882 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8884 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8885 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8886 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8887 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8888 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8889 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8890 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8891 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8893 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8894 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8895 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8896 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8897 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8899 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8904 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8905 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8906 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8907 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8908 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8910 log_level: Level::Trace,
8920 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8921 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8923 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8924 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8927 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8928 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8929 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8930 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8932 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8933 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8934 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8938 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8940 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8941 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8942 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8943 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8944 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8945 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8947 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8955 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8956 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8960 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8961 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8964 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8965 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8968 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8969 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8972 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8973 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8974 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8975 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8978 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8979 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8980 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8981 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8984 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8985 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8986 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8987 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8990 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8991 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8992 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8993 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8996 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8997 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8998 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8999 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9002 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9003 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9004 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9005 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9008 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9009 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9010 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9011 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9014 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9015 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9016 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9017 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9020 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9021 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9022 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9023 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9027 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9028 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9030 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9031 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9032 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9033 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9034 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9035 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9039 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9040 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9041 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9044 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9045 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9048 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9049 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9051 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9052 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9054 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9055 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9058 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9060 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9061 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9062 let payment_paths = vec![
9063 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9065 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9066 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9067 payment_paths, payment_hash
9069 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9070 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9071 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9073 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9074 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9075 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9077 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9078 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9079 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9082 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9083 let payment_paths = vec![
9084 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9086 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9087 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9088 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9089 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9090 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9092 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9093 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9094 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9096 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9097 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9099 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9100 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9101 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9102 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9104 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9105 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9109 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9110 Err(error) => Some(error),
9114 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9118 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9119 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9121 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9123 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9124 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9127 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9128 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9129 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9136 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9143 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9144 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9148 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9149 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9150 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9151 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9152 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9156 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9157 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9159 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9160 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9161 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9162 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9163 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9166 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9168 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9169 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9172 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9173 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9174 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9175 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9178 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9179 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9180 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9181 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9184 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9185 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9186 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9187 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9188 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9189 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9190 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9191 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9192 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9193 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9194 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9195 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9196 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9197 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9198 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9199 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9200 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9201 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9202 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9203 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9208 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9209 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9211 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9212 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9213 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9214 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9217 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9218 (2, node_id, required),
9219 (4, features, required),
9220 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9221 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9222 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9223 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9226 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9228 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9229 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9230 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9231 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9232 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9233 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9234 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9235 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9236 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9237 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9238 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9239 (7, self.config, option),
9240 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9241 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9242 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9243 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9244 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9245 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9246 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9247 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9248 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9249 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9250 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9251 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9252 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9253 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9254 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9255 (32, self.is_public, required),
9256 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9257 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9258 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9259 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9260 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9266 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9267 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9268 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9269 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9270 (2, channel_id, required),
9271 (3, channel_type, option),
9272 (4, counterparty, required),
9273 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9274 (6, funding_txo, option),
9275 (7, config, option),
9276 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9277 (9, confirmations, option),
9278 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9279 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9280 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9281 (16, balance_msat, required),
9282 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9283 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9284 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9285 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9286 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9287 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9288 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9289 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9290 (26, is_outbound, required),
9291 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9292 (30, is_usable, required),
9293 (32, is_public, required),
9294 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9295 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9296 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9297 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9298 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9301 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9302 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9303 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9304 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9305 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9309 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9311 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9312 outbound_scid_alias,
9316 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9317 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9319 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9320 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9321 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9322 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9323 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9324 confirmations_required,
9326 force_close_spend_delay,
9327 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9328 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9329 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9330 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9331 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9332 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9333 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9334 channel_shutdown_state,
9339 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9340 (2, channels, required_vec),
9341 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9342 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9345 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9346 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9349 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9351 (0, onion_packet, required),
9352 (1, blinded, option),
9353 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9356 (0, payment_data, required),
9357 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9358 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9359 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9360 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9362 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9363 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9364 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9365 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9366 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9367 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9371 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9372 (0, routing, required),
9373 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9374 (4, payment_hash, required),
9375 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9376 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9377 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9378 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9382 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9383 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9385 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9387 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9388 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9389 reason.write(writer)?;
9391 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9392 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9395 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9396 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9397 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9398 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9405 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9406 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9407 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9410 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9411 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9412 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9413 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9417 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9418 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9419 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9420 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9421 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9424 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9425 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9426 // messages contained in the variants.
9427 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9428 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9429 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9431 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9432 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9433 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9434 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9435 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9438 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9439 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9440 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9441 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9442 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9444 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9449 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9454 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9455 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9458 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9459 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9460 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9461 (2, outpoint, required),
9462 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9463 (4, htlc_id, required),
9464 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9465 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9468 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9469 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9470 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9471 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9472 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9474 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9475 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9476 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9477 (2, self.value, required),
9478 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9479 (4, payment_data, option),
9480 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9481 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9482 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9483 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9489 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9490 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9491 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9492 (0, prev_hop, required),
9493 (1, total_msat, option),
9494 (2, value_ser, required),
9495 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9496 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9497 (5, total_value_received, option),
9498 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9499 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9500 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9502 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9503 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9504 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9506 if payment_data.is_some() {
9507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9509 if total_msat.is_none() {
9510 total_msat = Some(value);
9512 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9515 if total_msat.is_none() {
9516 if payment_data.is_none() {
9517 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9519 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9521 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9525 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9528 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9529 total_value_received,
9530 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9532 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9533 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9538 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9539 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9540 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9543 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9544 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9545 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9546 let mut payment_id = None;
9547 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9548 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9549 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9550 (0, session_priv, required),
9551 (1, payment_id, option),
9552 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9553 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9554 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9555 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9557 if payment_id.is_none() {
9558 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9560 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9562 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9563 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9564 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9566 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9567 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9568 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9569 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9573 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9574 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9575 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9577 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9580 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9581 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9586 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9589 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9591 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9592 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9593 (0, session_priv, required),
9594 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9595 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9596 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9597 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9598 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9599 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9602 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9604 field.write(writer)?;
9611 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9612 (0, forward_info, required),
9613 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9614 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9615 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9616 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9619 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9621 (0, htlc_id, required),
9622 (2, err_packet, required),
9627 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9628 (0, payment_secret, required),
9629 (2, expiry_time, required),
9630 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9631 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9632 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9635 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9637 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9638 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9639 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9641 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9647 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9649 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9651 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9653 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9654 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9655 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9658 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9661 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9662 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9663 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9664 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9665 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9666 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9669 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9670 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9674 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9676 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9679 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9680 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9681 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9684 channel.write(writer)?;
9690 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9691 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9692 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9693 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9694 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9695 for forward in pending_forwards {
9696 forward.write(writer)?;
9701 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9703 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9704 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9705 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9707 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9708 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9709 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9710 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9711 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9712 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9713 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9714 htlc.write(writer)?;
9716 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9717 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9720 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9721 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9722 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9723 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9724 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9725 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9726 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9729 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9730 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9731 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9732 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9733 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9735 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9736 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9737 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9738 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9739 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9740 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9741 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9746 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9747 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9748 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9749 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9750 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9751 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9752 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9753 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9754 0u64.write(writer)?;
9756 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9757 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9758 event.write(writer)?;
9762 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9763 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9764 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9765 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9766 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9767 0u64.write(writer)?;
9769 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9770 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9771 // likely to be identical.
9772 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9773 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9775 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9776 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9777 hash.write(writer)?;
9778 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9781 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9782 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9783 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9784 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9785 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9788 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9789 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9793 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9794 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9797 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9798 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9799 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9800 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9804 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9805 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9806 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9808 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9809 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9810 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9816 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9817 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9818 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9819 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9822 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9823 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9824 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9825 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9826 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9829 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9830 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9831 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9832 if !updates.is_empty() {
9833 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9834 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9839 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9840 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9841 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9842 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9843 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9844 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9845 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9846 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9847 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9848 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9849 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9850 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9851 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9858 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9859 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9860 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9861 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9864 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9865 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9866 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9867 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9868 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9869 // check that the event is sane here.
9870 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9871 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9872 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9873 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9879 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9880 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9881 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9882 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9883 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9884 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9887 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9888 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9889 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9890 events.push_back((ev, action));
9891 } else if action.is_some() {
9892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9899 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9900 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9901 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9902 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9903 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9904 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9907 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9909 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9911 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9912 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9913 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9914 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9915 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9916 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9917 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9918 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9919 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9920 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9921 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9922 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9923 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9925 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9926 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9928 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9929 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9931 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9932 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9933 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9934 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9935 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9936 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9938 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9939 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9941 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9942 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9943 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9944 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9945 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9950 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9951 pub entropy_source: ES,
9953 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9954 pub node_signer: NS,
9956 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9957 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9959 pub signer_provider: SP,
9961 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9963 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9964 pub fee_estimator: F,
9965 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9967 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9968 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9969 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9970 pub chain_monitor: M,
9972 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9973 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9974 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9975 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9976 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9977 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9979 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9981 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9982 /// deserialization.
9984 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9985 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9986 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9988 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9989 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9991 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9992 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9993 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9994 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9996 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9999 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10000 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10003 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10004 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10006 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10007 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10008 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10009 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10010 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10015 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10016 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10017 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10018 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10019 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10021 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10022 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10027 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10028 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10029 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10030 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10032 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10033 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10034 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10035 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10036 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10037 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10041 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10042 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10043 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10047 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10048 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10050 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10051 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10052 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10053 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10054 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10055 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10059 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10060 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10062 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10063 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10064 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10068 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10069 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10070 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10071 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10072 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10073 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10074 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10075 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10076 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10077 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10079 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10080 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10081 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10082 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10083 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10084 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10085 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10086 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10087 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10088 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10089 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10090 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10091 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10092 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10094 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10095 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10096 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10098 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10099 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10100 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10102 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10103 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10104 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10106 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10107 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10108 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10110 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10111 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10112 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10115 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10116 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10117 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10118 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10119 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10120 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10121 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10123 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10124 let mut found_htlc = false;
10125 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10126 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10129 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10130 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10131 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10132 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10133 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10134 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10135 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10137 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10138 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10139 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10143 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10144 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10145 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10146 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10147 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10149 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10150 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10152 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10154 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10155 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10158 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10159 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10160 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10164 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10165 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10166 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10167 // safely discard the channel.
10168 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10169 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10170 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10171 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10172 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10173 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10174 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10177 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10178 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10179 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10180 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10181 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10182 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10186 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10187 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10188 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10189 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10190 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10191 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10192 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10195 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10199 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10200 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10201 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10202 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10203 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10204 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10205 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10206 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10207 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10209 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10212 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10213 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10214 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10215 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10216 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10217 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10218 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10219 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10221 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10224 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10227 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10228 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10229 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10230 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10231 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10232 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10233 is_connected: false,
10237 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10238 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10239 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10240 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10241 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10242 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10243 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10244 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10247 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10248 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10249 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10250 for _ in 0..event_count {
10251 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10252 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10257 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10258 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10259 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10261 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10262 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10263 // on-startup monitor updates.
10264 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10265 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10267 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10271 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10272 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10274 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10275 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10276 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10277 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10278 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10282 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10283 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10284 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10285 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10286 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10287 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10288 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10290 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10291 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10295 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10296 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10297 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10298 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10299 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10300 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10301 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10302 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10303 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10304 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10305 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10306 let mut events_override = None;
10307 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10308 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10309 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10310 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10311 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10312 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10313 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10314 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10315 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10316 (8, events_override, option),
10317 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10318 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10319 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10320 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10322 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10323 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10326 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10327 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10330 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10331 pending_events_read = events;
10334 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10335 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10338 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10339 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10340 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10341 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10342 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10343 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10345 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10347 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10348 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10349 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10352 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10353 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10354 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10355 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10356 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10358 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10359 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10360 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10362 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10363 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10364 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10365 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10366 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10368 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10369 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10370 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10371 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10372 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10373 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10374 pending_background_events.push(
10375 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10376 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10377 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10378 update: update.clone(),
10381 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10382 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10383 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10384 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10385 pending_background_events.push(
10386 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10387 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10388 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10391 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10392 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10395 max_in_flight_update_id
10399 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10402 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10403 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10404 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10406 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10408 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10409 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10410 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10411 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10412 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10413 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10414 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10415 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10416 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10419 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10420 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10421 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10422 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10423 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10424 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10425 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10426 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10427 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10428 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10429 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10432 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10433 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10434 debug_assert!(false);
10435 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10440 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10441 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10442 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10443 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10444 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10445 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10446 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10447 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10448 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10450 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10451 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10452 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10454 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10455 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10456 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10457 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10458 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10459 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10460 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10461 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10466 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10467 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10469 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10470 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10471 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10472 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10475 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10476 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10477 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10478 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10479 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10480 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10481 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10483 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10484 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10485 let chan_id = monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id();
10486 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10487 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10488 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10489 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10490 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10491 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10492 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10495 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10496 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10497 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10498 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10500 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10501 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10502 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
10504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10505 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10506 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10507 retry_strategy: None,
10508 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10509 payment_params: None,
10510 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10511 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10512 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10513 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10514 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10515 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10516 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10517 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10518 total_msat: path_amt,
10519 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10520 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10522 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10523 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10528 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10529 match htlc_source {
10530 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10531 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10532 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10533 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10535 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10536 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10537 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10538 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10539 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10540 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10541 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10542 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10543 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10544 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10545 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10550 !forwards.is_empty()
10552 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10553 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10554 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10555 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10556 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10557 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10558 intercepted_id != ev_id
10565 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10566 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10567 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10568 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10569 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10570 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10571 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10572 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10573 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10574 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10575 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10577 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10578 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10579 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10581 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10582 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10583 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10590 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10591 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10593 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10595 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10596 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10597 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10598 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10599 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10600 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10601 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10602 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10603 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10604 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10607 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10608 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10609 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10610 // channel still live case here.
10614 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10615 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10620 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10621 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10622 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10623 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10624 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10625 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10626 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10627 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10631 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10632 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10634 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10635 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10636 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10639 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10640 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10643 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10644 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10646 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10647 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10649 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10652 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10653 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10654 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10656 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10660 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10661 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10662 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10663 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10666 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10667 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10668 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10669 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10670 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10671 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10672 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10673 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10675 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10676 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10680 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10682 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10684 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10685 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10687 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10688 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10693 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10694 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10696 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10698 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10700 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10701 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10702 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10707 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10708 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10709 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10710 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10711 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10712 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10713 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10714 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10715 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10717 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10718 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10719 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10721 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10722 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10723 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10724 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10725 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10728 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10729 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10730 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10731 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10732 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10733 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10737 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10738 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10739 debug_assert!(false);
10740 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10745 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10747 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10748 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10749 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10750 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10751 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10752 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10753 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10754 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10755 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10756 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10757 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10759 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10760 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10762 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10763 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10764 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10765 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10767 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10768 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10769 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10770 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10772 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10773 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10774 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10775 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10777 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10778 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10779 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10782 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10783 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10784 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
10787 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10788 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, previous_hop_monitor);
10789 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &&logger);
10792 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10795 purpose: payment.purpose,
10796 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10797 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10798 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10804 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10805 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10806 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10807 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
10808 for action in actions.iter() {
10809 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10810 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10811 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10813 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10815 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10816 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10817 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10818 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10819 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10821 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10822 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10823 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10824 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10828 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10829 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10833 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10835 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10840 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10842 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10843 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10844 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10845 router: args.router,
10847 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10849 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10850 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10851 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10852 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10854 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10855 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10856 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10857 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10858 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10859 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10861 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10863 our_network_pubkey,
10866 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10868 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10870 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10871 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10872 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10873 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10874 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10876 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10877 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10879 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10881 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10883 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10884 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10885 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10887 logger: args.logger,
10888 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10891 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10892 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10893 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10894 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10895 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10898 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10899 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10900 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10901 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10902 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10903 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10906 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10907 //connection or two.
10909 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10915 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10916 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10917 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10918 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10919 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10920 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10921 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10922 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10923 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10924 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10925 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10926 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10927 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10928 use crate::util::test_utils;
10929 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10930 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10933 fn test_notify_limits() {
10934 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10935 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10939 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10941 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10942 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10943 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10944 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10945 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10947 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10949 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10950 // to connect messages with new values
10951 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10952 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10953 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10954 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10955 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10956 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10958 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10959 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10960 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10961 // ... but the last node should not.
10962 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10963 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10964 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10965 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10967 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10968 // about the channel.
10969 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10970 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10971 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10973 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10975 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10976 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10977 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10978 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10979 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10980 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10982 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10984 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10986 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10987 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10988 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10989 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10990 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10991 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10993 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10994 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10995 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10996 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10997 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10998 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10999 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11000 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11002 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11003 // the channel info has updated.
11004 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11005 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11006 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11007 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11008 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11009 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11013 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11014 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11016 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11017 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11018 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11019 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11020 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11022 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11023 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11024 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11025 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11027 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11028 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11029 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11030 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11031 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11032 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11033 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11034 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11036 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11038 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11040 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11041 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11042 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11044 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11046 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11047 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11048 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11050 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11051 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11052 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11054 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11055 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11056 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11057 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11058 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11059 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11060 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11062 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11064 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11065 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11066 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11068 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11070 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11072 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11073 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11074 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11075 // lightning messages manually.
11076 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11077 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11080 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11082 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11083 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11085 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11086 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11088 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11089 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11091 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11092 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11093 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11095 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11096 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11097 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11101 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11103 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11104 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11107 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11108 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11109 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11112 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11113 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11114 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11115 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11120 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11121 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11122 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11123 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11130 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11131 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11132 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11135 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11136 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11137 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11138 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11139 // fails as expected.
11140 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11141 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11142 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11143 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11144 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11145 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11148 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11149 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11150 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11152 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11154 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11156 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11157 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11158 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11160 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11161 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11162 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11163 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11164 let route = find_route(
11165 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11166 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11168 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11169 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11173 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11174 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11175 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11178 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11179 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11181 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11183 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11184 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11185 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11186 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11187 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11188 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11189 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11190 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11191 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11193 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11196 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11197 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11198 let route = find_route(
11199 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11200 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11202 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11203 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11205 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11207 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11208 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11209 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11211 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11212 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11213 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11214 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11216 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11218 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11219 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11220 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11222 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11224 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11226 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11227 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11228 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11229 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11230 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11231 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11232 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11233 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11234 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11236 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11237 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11239 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11240 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11241 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11242 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11244 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11246 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11247 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11248 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11250 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11251 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11252 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11255 let route = find_route(
11256 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11257 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11259 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11260 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11261 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11263 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11264 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11265 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11266 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11271 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11273 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11274 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11275 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11276 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11277 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11278 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11280 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11281 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11283 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11284 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11288 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11289 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11290 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11294 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11296 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11297 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11299 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11300 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11301 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11302 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11303 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11304 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11305 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11306 let route = find_route(
11307 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11308 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11311 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11312 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11313 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11314 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11315 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11316 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11319 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11320 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11321 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11322 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11323 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11324 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11327 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11331 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11332 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11333 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11334 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11335 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11339 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11341 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11342 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11344 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11345 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11346 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11347 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11348 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11349 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11350 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11351 let route = find_route(
11352 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11353 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11356 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11357 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11358 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11359 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11360 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11361 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11362 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11363 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11366 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11367 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11368 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11369 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11370 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11371 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11372 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11374 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11378 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11382 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11384 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11385 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11386 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11387 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11389 // Marshall an MPP route.
11390 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11391 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11392 route.paths.push(path);
11393 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11394 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11395 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11396 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11397 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11398 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11400 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11401 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11403 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11404 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11406 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11411 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11415 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11417 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11419 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11422 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11423 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11425 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11428 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11429 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11430 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11431 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11432 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11433 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11436 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11439 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11445 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11446 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11447 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11448 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11449 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11450 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11452 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11453 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11455 total_msat: 100_000,
11458 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11459 // payment verification fails as expected.
11460 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11461 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11462 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11463 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11465 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11469 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11470 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11474 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11475 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11476 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11477 // the channel is successfully closed.
11478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11483 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11484 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11485 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11486 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11487 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11489 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11490 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11492 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11493 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11494 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11495 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11498 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11500 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11501 // as it has the funding transaction.
11502 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11503 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11504 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11507 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11509 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11511 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11513 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11514 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11515 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11517 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11520 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11521 // as it has the funding transaction.
11522 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11523 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11524 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11527 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11528 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11530 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11531 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11532 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11533 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11535 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11536 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11537 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11538 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11540 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11541 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11543 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11544 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11545 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11546 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11547 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11548 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11549 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11553 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11554 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11555 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11556 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11557 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11558 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11559 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11562 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11564 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11565 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11566 // closing transaction).
11567 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11568 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11569 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11571 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11572 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11573 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11574 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11575 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11578 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11580 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11582 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11583 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11584 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11586 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11588 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11589 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11592 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11593 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11594 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11597 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11598 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11599 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11602 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11603 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11604 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11607 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11608 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11609 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11612 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11614 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11615 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11617 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11618 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11620 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11621 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11626 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11627 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11628 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11629 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11630 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11631 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11632 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11636 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11637 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11638 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11640 // Test the API functions.
11641 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11643 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11645 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11647 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11649 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11651 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11653 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11657 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11658 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11659 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11660 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11661 // the given `channel_id`.
11662 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11663 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11664 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11665 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11667 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11670 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11672 // Test the API functions.
11673 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11675 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11677 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11679 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11681 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11683 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11687 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11688 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11694 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11696 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11697 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11699 let mut funding_tx = None;
11700 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11701 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11702 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11705 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11706 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11707 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11708 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11709 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11711 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11713 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11715 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11717 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11719 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11721 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11724 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11725 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11726 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11727 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11728 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11730 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11731 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11733 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11734 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11735 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11736 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11737 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11738 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11739 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11742 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11743 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11744 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11745 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11746 }, true).unwrap_err();
11748 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11749 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11750 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11751 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11752 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11753 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11754 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11756 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11757 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11759 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11760 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11761 }, true).unwrap_err();
11763 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11764 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11765 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11766 }, false).unwrap();
11767 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11769 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11770 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11772 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11773 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11775 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11776 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11778 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11779 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11780 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11782 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11783 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11784 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11786 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11787 // "protected" and can connect again.
11788 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11789 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11790 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11792 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11794 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11796 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11797 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11801 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11802 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11803 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11804 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11806 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11808 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11810 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11811 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11813 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11814 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11815 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11816 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11819 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11821 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11822 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11823 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11825 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11826 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11827 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11829 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11831 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11832 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11836 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11837 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11838 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11839 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11840 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11841 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11842 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11846 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11848 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11849 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11851 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11852 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11853 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11854 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11855 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11856 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11859 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11860 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11862 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11863 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11867 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11868 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11871 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11872 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11873 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11874 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11875 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11877 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11878 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11880 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11881 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11882 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11883 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11889 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11890 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11892 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11893 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11894 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11896 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11897 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11901 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11905 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11906 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11907 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11908 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11909 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11910 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11911 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11912 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11914 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11915 payment_metadata: None,
11916 keysend_preimage: None,
11917 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11918 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11920 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11922 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11923 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11924 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11925 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11926 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11927 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11928 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11930 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11931 } else { panic!(); }
11933 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11934 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11936 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11937 payment_metadata: None,
11938 keysend_preimage: None,
11939 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11940 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11942 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11944 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11945 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11946 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11947 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11951 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11952 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11953 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11954 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11955 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11957 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11958 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11960 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11961 payment_metadata: None,
11962 keysend_preimage: None,
11963 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11964 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11966 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11967 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11968 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11970 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11971 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11972 // is not satisfied.
11973 assert!(result.is_ok());
11977 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11978 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11979 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11980 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11981 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11983 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11984 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11986 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11987 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11988 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11989 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11990 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11992 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11993 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11995 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11996 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11997 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11998 match &msg_events[0] {
11999 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12000 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12002 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12003 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12004 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12010 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12011 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12013 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12014 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12015 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12017 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12021 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12022 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12023 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12024 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12027 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12028 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12029 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12033 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12034 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12035 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12037 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12038 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12040 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12041 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12046 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12047 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12049 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12050 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12052 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12053 // not have generated any events.
12054 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12058 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12059 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12060 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12061 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12062 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12063 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12064 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12065 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12067 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12071 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12072 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12074 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12077 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12078 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12081 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12082 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12085 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12086 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12087 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12088 ..Default::default()
12090 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12091 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12094 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12095 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12098 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12099 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12100 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12101 ..Default::default()
12103 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12104 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12105 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12108 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12109 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12112 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12113 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12114 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12115 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12116 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12119 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12120 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12121 ..Default::default()
12123 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12126 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12127 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12128 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12133 fn test_payment_display() {
12134 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12135 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12136 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12137 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12138 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12139 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12143 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12144 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12145 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12146 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12147 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12148 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12150 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12151 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12152 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12153 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12154 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12155 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12156 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12157 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12159 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12160 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12161 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12164 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12165 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12167 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12168 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12170 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12171 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12172 }, false).unwrap();
12173 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12174 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12175 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12177 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12179 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12180 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12181 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12182 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12183 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12184 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12185 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12186 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12187 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12188 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12189 } else { panic!() };
12190 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12191 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12192 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12193 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12197 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12198 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12199 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12206 use crate::chain::Listen;
12207 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12208 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12209 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12210 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12211 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12212 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12213 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12214 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12215 use crate::util::test_utils;
12216 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12218 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12219 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12220 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12221 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12223 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12225 use criterion::Criterion;
12227 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12228 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12229 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12230 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12231 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12232 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12233 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12235 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12236 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12238 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12239 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12241 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12243 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12246 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12247 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12250 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12251 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12252 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12254 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12255 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12257 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12258 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12259 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12260 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12261 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12263 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12264 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12265 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12267 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12268 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12269 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12270 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12272 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12273 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12274 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12276 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12277 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12278 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12279 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12280 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12282 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12283 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12284 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12286 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12287 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12289 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12290 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12291 }, false).unwrap();
12292 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12293 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12294 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12297 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12298 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12299 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12301 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12302 } else { panic!(); }
12304 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12305 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12306 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12307 match events_b[0] {
12308 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12309 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12314 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12315 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12316 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12317 match events_a[0] {
12318 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12319 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12324 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12326 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12327 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12328 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12330 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12331 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12332 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12333 match msg_events[0] {
12334 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12335 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12336 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12340 match msg_events[1] {
12341 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12345 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12346 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12347 match events_a[0] {
12348 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12349 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12354 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12355 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12356 match events_b[0] {
12357 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12358 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12363 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12364 macro_rules! send_payment {
12365 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12366 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12367 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12368 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12369 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12370 payment_count += 1;
12371 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12372 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12374 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12375 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12376 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12377 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12378 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12379 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12380 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12381 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12382 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12383 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12384 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12386 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12387 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12388 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12389 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12391 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12392 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12393 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12394 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12395 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12397 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12400 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12401 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12402 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12403 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12405 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12409 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12410 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12411 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);