1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`per_peer_state`
1186 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1188 // |__`claimable_payments`
1190 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1194 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1196 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1198 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1202 // |__`pending_events`
1204 // |__`pending_background_events`
1206 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1208 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1209 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1210 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1211 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1212 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1213 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1217 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1218 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1219 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1225 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1227 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1229 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1230 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1232 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1233 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1234 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1235 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1237 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1238 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1240 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1241 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1242 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1243 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1244 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1245 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1246 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1247 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1249 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1251 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1252 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1254 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1256 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1257 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1258 /// and via the classic SCID.
1260 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1261 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1263 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1265 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1267 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1268 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1269 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1271 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1272 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1274 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1275 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1277 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1278 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1280 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1281 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1282 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1283 /// active channel list on load.
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1288 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1290 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1291 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1292 /// the handling of the events.
1294 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1295 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1298 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1299 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1300 /// would break backwards compatability.
1301 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1302 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1303 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1305 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1307 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1309 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1311 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1313 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1314 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1315 /// confirmation depth.
1317 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1318 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1319 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1321 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1323 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1325 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1327 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1329 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1331 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1332 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1333 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1335 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1336 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1338 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1339 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1340 /// keeping additional state.
1341 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1343 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1344 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1345 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1346 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1348 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1349 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1351 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1352 /// are currently open with that peer.
1354 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1355 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1358 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1360 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1361 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1362 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1363 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1364 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1366 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1367 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1368 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1369 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1370 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1372 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1373 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1375 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1376 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1377 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1378 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1379 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1381 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1382 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1384 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1385 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1386 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1387 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1388 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1390 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1392 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1394 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1395 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1396 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1397 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1398 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1399 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1400 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1401 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1402 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1403 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1404 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1406 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1407 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1408 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1410 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1412 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1413 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1415 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1419 signer_provider: SP,
1424 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1426 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1427 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1428 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1429 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1430 pub struct ChainParameters {
1431 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1432 pub network: Network,
1434 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1436 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1437 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1440 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1444 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1445 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1448 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1449 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1450 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1451 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1452 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1453 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1455 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1456 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1457 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1458 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1459 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1460 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1462 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1463 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1466 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1467 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1468 /// events to handle.
1470 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1471 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1473 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1474 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1477 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1478 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1479 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1480 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1482 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1483 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1484 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1485 should_persist: move || {
1486 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1487 // processing and return that.
1488 let notify = persist_check();
1489 match (notify, force_notify) {
1490 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1491 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1492 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1493 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1494 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1497 _read_guard: read_guard,
1501 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1502 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1503 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1504 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1505 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1506 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1508 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1509 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1510 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1511 should_persist: persist_check,
1512 _read_guard: read_guard,
1517 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1518 fn drop(&mut self) {
1519 match (self.should_persist)() {
1520 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1521 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1522 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1524 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1525 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1526 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1531 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1532 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1534 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1537 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1538 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1539 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1540 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1542 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1543 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1545 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1547 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1548 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1549 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1550 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1551 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1552 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1553 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1554 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1555 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1556 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1557 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1558 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1559 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1561 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1562 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1564 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1565 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1566 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1567 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1569 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1570 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1571 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1572 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1573 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1574 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1576 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1578 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1579 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1581 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1583 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1584 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1586 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1587 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1588 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1590 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1591 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1592 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1594 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1595 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1596 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1597 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1599 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1600 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1601 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1603 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1604 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1605 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1607 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1608 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1609 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1610 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1611 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1612 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1613 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1614 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1615 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1616 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1617 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1620 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1621 /// to better separate parameters.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1624 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1625 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1626 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1627 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1628 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1629 pub features: InitFeatures,
1630 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1631 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1632 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1634 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1636 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1637 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1638 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1639 /// payments to us through this channel.
1640 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1641 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1642 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1643 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1644 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1645 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1646 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1649 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1650 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1651 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1652 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1653 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1654 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1655 /// lifetime of the channel.
1656 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1657 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1658 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1659 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1660 /// our counterparty already.
1661 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1662 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1664 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1665 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1666 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1667 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1669 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1670 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1672 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1673 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1675 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1676 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1677 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1678 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1679 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1680 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1681 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1682 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1683 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1686 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1688 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1689 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1690 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1691 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1692 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1693 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1694 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1696 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1697 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1699 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1700 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1701 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1702 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1703 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1704 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1705 /// this value on chain.
1707 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1709 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1711 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1712 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1713 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1714 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1715 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1716 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1717 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1719 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1720 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1721 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1722 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1723 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1724 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1726 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1727 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1728 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1729 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1730 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1732 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1733 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1734 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1735 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1737 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1738 pub balance_msat: u64,
1739 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1740 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1741 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1742 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1744 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1746 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1747 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1748 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1749 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1750 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1751 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1752 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1753 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1755 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1756 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1757 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1758 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1759 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1760 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1761 /// route which is valid.
1762 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1763 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1764 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1765 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1766 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1767 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1769 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1770 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1771 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1772 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1773 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1774 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1775 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1776 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1777 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1779 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1781 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1782 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1783 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1784 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1785 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1787 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1788 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1789 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1790 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1791 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1792 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1793 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1795 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1796 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1797 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1798 pub is_outbound: bool,
1799 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1800 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1801 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1802 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1803 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1805 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1806 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1807 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1808 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1809 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1810 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1811 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1813 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1814 pub is_usable: bool,
1815 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1816 pub is_public: bool,
1817 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1818 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1819 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1820 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1821 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1822 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1824 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1825 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1826 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1828 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1829 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1830 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1832 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1833 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1836 impl ChannelDetails {
1837 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1838 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1839 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1841 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1842 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1843 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1844 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1847 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1848 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1849 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1851 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1852 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1853 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1854 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1857 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1858 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1859 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1862 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1863 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1865 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1866 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1867 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1869 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1870 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1871 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1872 features: latest_features,
1873 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1874 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1875 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1876 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1877 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1878 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1879 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1880 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1881 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1882 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1884 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1885 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1886 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1887 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1888 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1889 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1890 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1891 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1892 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1893 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1894 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1895 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1896 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1897 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1898 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1899 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1900 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1901 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1902 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1903 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1904 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1905 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1906 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1907 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1908 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1909 config: Some(context.config()),
1910 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1911 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1912 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1917 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1918 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1919 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1920 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1921 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1922 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1923 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1924 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1925 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1927 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1929 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1930 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1932 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1933 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1934 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1935 /// to drop the channel.
1939 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1940 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1941 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1942 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1943 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1945 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1946 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1947 payment_id: PaymentId,
1949 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1951 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1952 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1953 payment_id: PaymentId,
1954 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1956 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1957 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1958 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1961 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1962 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1963 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1969 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1970 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1972 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1973 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1974 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1976 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1977 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1978 payment_id: PaymentId,
1979 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1980 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1984 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1986 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1988 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1989 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1990 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1991 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1993 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1994 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1995 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1998 macro_rules! handle_error {
1999 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2000 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2001 // entering the macro.
2002 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2003 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2007 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2008 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2010 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2011 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2012 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2013 let logger = WithContext::from(
2014 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2016 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2018 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2019 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2020 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2025 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2028 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2030 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2031 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2032 action: err.action.clone()
2036 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2037 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2039 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2044 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2051 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2052 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2053 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2054 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2056 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2057 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2058 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2060 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2061 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2062 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2063 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2064 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2066 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2067 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2069 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2073 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2074 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2075 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2077 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2078 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2080 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2081 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2083 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2084 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2085 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2086 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2087 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2088 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2090 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2095 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2096 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2098 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2099 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2101 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2102 match $channel_phase {
2103 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2104 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2106 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2107 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2109 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2112 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2113 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2114 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2116 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2117 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2124 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2125 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2129 let key = *$entry.key();
2130 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2132 $entry.remove_entry();
2140 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2141 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2145 let key = *$entry.key();
2146 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2148 $entry.remove_entry();
2156 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2157 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2160 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2166 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2167 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2168 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2169 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2170 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2172 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2173 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2174 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2175 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2176 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2177 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2178 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2179 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2180 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2181 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2186 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2187 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2188 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2189 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2190 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2191 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2192 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2193 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2194 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2195 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2197 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2202 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2203 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2204 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2205 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2206 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2207 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2208 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2209 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2210 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2212 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2217 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2218 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2219 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2220 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2221 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2222 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2223 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2224 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2225 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2226 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2227 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2228 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2230 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2231 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2232 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2238 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2239 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2241 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2242 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2243 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2244 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2245 updates.announcement_sigs);
2246 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2247 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2250 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2251 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2252 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2253 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2255 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2256 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2257 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2258 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2259 let mut batch_completed = false;
2260 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2261 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2262 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2263 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2265 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2266 channel_state.2 = true;
2268 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2270 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2272 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2275 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2276 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2277 if batch_completed {
2278 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2279 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2280 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2281 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2282 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2283 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2284 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2285 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2286 chan.set_batch_ready();
2287 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2288 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2292 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2293 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2294 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2299 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2301 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2302 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2304 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2305 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2306 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2307 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2312 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2313 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2314 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2315 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2317 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2318 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2319 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2320 panic!("{}", err_str);
2322 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2323 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2324 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2327 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2333 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2334 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2335 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2337 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2338 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2339 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2340 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2341 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2342 // filter for uniqueness here.
2343 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2344 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2345 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2346 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2348 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2349 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2351 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2352 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2353 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2359 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2360 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2361 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2362 while !processed_all_events {
2363 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2370 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2371 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2372 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2374 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2375 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2376 result = $self.process_background_events();
2378 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2379 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2380 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2381 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2385 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2386 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2387 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2388 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2391 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2393 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2394 $event_to_handle = event;
2396 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2397 post_event_actions.push(action);
2402 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2403 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2404 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2405 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2406 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2407 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2410 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2411 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2412 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2413 processed_all_events = false;
2417 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2418 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2419 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2421 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2422 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2423 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2429 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2431 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2432 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2433 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2434 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2435 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2440 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2442 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2444 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2445 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2447 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2449 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2450 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2451 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2454 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2455 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2456 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2458 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2459 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2460 current_timestamp: u32,
2462 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2463 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2464 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2465 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2467 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2468 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2469 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2474 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2476 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2477 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2478 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2479 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2480 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2481 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2482 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2483 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2485 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2488 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2489 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2491 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2493 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2495 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2498 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2499 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2500 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2501 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2502 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2503 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2504 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2506 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2516 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2517 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2518 &self.default_configuration
2521 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2522 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2523 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2526 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2527 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2529 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2531 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2535 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2540 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2542 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2543 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2544 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2545 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2546 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2548 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2549 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2551 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2552 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2553 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2555 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2556 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2557 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2559 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2560 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2562 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2563 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2564 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2565 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2566 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2567 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2569 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2570 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2571 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2572 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2573 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2578 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2579 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2583 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2584 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2586 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2588 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2589 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2595 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2596 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2597 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2598 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2599 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2600 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2604 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2609 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2611 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2612 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2617 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2624 node_id: their_network_key,
2627 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2630 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2631 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2632 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2633 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2634 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2635 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2636 // the same channel.
2637 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2639 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2641 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2644 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2645 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2646 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2647 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2651 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2652 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2653 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2661 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2662 /// more information.
2663 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2664 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2665 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2666 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2667 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2668 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2669 // the same channel.
2670 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2672 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2674 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2677 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2678 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2679 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2687 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2688 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2690 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2691 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2693 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2694 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2695 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2696 // really wanted anyway.
2697 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2700 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2701 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2702 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2705 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2708 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2709 let context_to_details = |context| {
2710 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2712 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2714 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2715 .map(context_to_details)
2721 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2722 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2724 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2725 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2726 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2728 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2729 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2730 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2731 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2732 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2733 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2735 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2736 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2737 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2739 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2740 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2741 payment_id: *payment_id,
2742 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2743 total_msat: *total_msat,
2746 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2747 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2749 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2750 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2752 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2757 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2760 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2761 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2774 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2775 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2776 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2777 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2778 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2779 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2781 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2782 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2783 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2785 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2789 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2790 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2792 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2793 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2794 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2795 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2798 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2799 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2803 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2805 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2806 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2813 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2814 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2815 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2816 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2819 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2820 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2826 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2827 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2828 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2830 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2831 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2833 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2834 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2835 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2836 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2838 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2840 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2841 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2842 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2845 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2846 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2847 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2848 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2849 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2850 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2853 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2854 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2855 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2857 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2858 /// the channel being closed or not:
2859 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2860 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2861 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2862 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2863 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2864 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2865 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2867 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2868 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2869 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2870 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2872 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2874 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2875 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2876 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2880 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2881 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2882 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2886 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2887 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2888 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2889 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2890 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2893 let logger = WithContext::from(
2894 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2897 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2898 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2899 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2900 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2901 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2902 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2905 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2906 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2907 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2908 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2909 // ignore the result here.
2910 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2912 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2913 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2914 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2915 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2917 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2918 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2919 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2920 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2921 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2922 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2923 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2926 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2929 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2930 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2935 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2936 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2937 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2938 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2939 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2940 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2941 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2942 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2945 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2946 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2947 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2951 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2952 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2956 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2957 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2958 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2959 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2962 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2963 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2964 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2965 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2966 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2968 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2970 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2971 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2972 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2973 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2974 mem::drop(peer_state);
2975 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2977 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2978 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2979 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2981 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2982 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2983 // Unfunded channel has no update
2984 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2986 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
2987 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2988 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
2989 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2990 // Unfunded channel has no update
2991 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2994 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2995 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2996 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2997 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2999 (None, *peer_node_id)
3001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3004 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3005 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3006 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3007 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3008 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3009 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3010 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3011 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3012 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3018 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3021 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3023 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3024 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3027 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3029 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3032 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3043 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3044 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3045 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3047 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3048 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3049 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3052 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3053 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3054 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3056 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3057 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3058 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3063 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3064 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3065 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3067 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3071 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3072 /// local transaction(s).
3073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3075 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3079 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3080 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3082 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3084 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3085 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3088 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3089 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3090 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3091 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3097 macro_rules! return_err {
3098 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3101 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3102 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3104 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3105 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3106 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3107 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3108 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3109 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3110 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3114 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3115 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3116 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3117 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3118 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3119 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3120 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3121 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3127 let NextPacketDetails {
3128 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3129 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3130 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3131 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3132 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3135 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3136 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3137 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3138 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3139 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3140 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3141 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3142 // phantom or an intercept.
3143 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3144 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3145 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3149 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3152 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3154 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3157 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3158 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3162 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3163 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3166 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3167 // have no consistency guarantees.
3168 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3172 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3173 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3174 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3175 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3176 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3178 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3179 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3180 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3181 // we don't have the channel here.
3182 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3184 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3186 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3187 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3188 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3189 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3190 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3191 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3192 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3193 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3194 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3195 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3196 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3198 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3201 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3202 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3204 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3205 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3212 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3214 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3215 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3217 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3218 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3219 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3220 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3221 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3223 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3224 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3230 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3231 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3232 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3233 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3235 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3236 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3238 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3239 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3240 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3242 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3243 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3244 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3245 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3246 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3247 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3248 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3252 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3254 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3257 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3258 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3259 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3260 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3261 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3262 macro_rules! return_err {
3263 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3265 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3266 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3267 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3268 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3269 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3270 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3271 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3272 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3273 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3277 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3278 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3279 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3280 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3281 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3287 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3289 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3290 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3291 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3292 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3295 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3296 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3297 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3298 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3299 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3301 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3304 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3305 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3306 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3307 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3308 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3314 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3315 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3316 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3318 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3319 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3320 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3322 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3323 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3324 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3325 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3326 return Err(LightningError {
3327 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3331 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3332 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3334 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3336 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3339 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3340 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3341 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3342 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3344 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3345 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3346 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3348 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3349 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3350 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3351 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3352 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3353 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3354 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3358 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3361 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3362 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3363 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3364 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3366 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3374 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3376 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3380 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3381 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3385 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3386 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3387 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3389 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3391 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3398 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3399 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3400 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3401 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3406 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3407 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3408 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3411 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3412 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3413 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3414 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3416 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3417 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3418 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3420 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3421 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3425 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3426 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3428 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3429 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3430 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3435 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3437 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3438 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3441 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3442 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3445 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3446 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3447 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3448 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3449 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3451 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3452 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3453 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3454 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3456 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3457 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3459 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3460 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3461 Some(monitor_update) => {
3462 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3464 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3465 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3466 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3467 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3468 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3469 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3470 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3478 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3481 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3482 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3483 // `channel_by_id` map.
3484 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3485 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3489 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3490 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3492 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3497 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3499 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3500 /// fields for more info.
3502 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3503 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3505 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3507 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3508 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3509 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3510 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3511 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3513 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3514 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3515 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3516 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3517 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3519 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3520 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3521 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3522 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3524 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3526 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3527 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3528 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3530 /// In general, a path may raise:
3531 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3532 /// node public key) is specified.
3533 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3534 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3535 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3536 /// relevant updates.
3538 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3539 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3540 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3542 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3543 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3544 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3545 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3546 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3547 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3548 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3549 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3551 self.pending_outbound_payments
3552 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3553 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3554 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3557 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3558 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3559 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3561 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562 self.pending_outbound_payments
3563 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3564 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3565 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3566 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3570 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3572 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3573 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3574 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3575 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3579 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3585 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3586 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3589 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3590 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3592 self.pending_outbound_payments
3593 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3594 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3595 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3596 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3597 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3601 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3602 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3603 /// retries are exhausted.
3605 /// # Event Generation
3607 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3608 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3610 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3611 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3612 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3614 /// # Requested Invoices
3616 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3617 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3618 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3619 /// once the invoice has been received.
3621 /// # Restart Behavior
3623 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3624 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3625 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3627 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3628 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3630 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3633 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3634 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3635 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3636 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3637 /// never reach the recipient.
3639 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3640 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3642 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3643 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3645 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3646 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3649 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3650 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3651 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3654 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3655 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3657 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3660 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3661 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3664 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3665 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3666 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3667 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3670 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3671 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3672 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3673 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3676 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3677 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3678 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3681 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3684 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3685 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3688 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3689 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3691 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3692 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3693 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3694 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3695 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3696 let payment_params =
3697 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3699 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3701 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3704 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3705 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3707 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3708 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3709 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3710 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3712 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3713 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3714 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3715 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3716 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3717 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3718 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3719 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3720 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3721 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3723 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3724 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3725 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3726 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3730 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3732 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3733 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3736 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3738 let mut res = Vec::new();
3740 for mut path in route.paths {
3741 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3742 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3743 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3744 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3745 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3748 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3751 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3752 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3754 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3756 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3757 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3762 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3765 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3770 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3771 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3772 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3774 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3775 let used_liquidity =
3776 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3778 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3779 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3781 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3784 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3789 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3790 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3791 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3798 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3799 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3800 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3801 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3802 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3803 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3805 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3806 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3811 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3812 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3813 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3815 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3816 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3817 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3818 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3819 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3820 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3821 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3822 } else { unreachable!(); });
3824 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3825 Err((chan, err)) => {
3826 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3827 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3828 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3829 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3830 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3836 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3837 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3839 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3840 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3843 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3844 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3845 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3849 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3850 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3851 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3855 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3857 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3860 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3861 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3863 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3865 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3866 funding_txo, o.get()
3868 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3869 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3870 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3871 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3872 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3873 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3876 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3883 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3884 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3885 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3889 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3891 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3892 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3894 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3895 /// across the p2p network.
3897 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3898 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3900 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3901 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3902 /// keys per-channel).
3904 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3905 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3906 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3908 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3909 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3910 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3912 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3913 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3914 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3915 /// for more details.
3917 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3918 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3919 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3920 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3923 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3925 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3926 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3928 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3929 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3930 /// signature for each channel.
3932 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3933 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3935 let mut result = Ok(());
3937 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3938 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3939 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3940 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3941 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3946 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3947 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3948 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3952 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3953 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3954 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3955 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3956 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3957 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3958 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3959 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3961 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3962 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3967 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3968 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3969 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3970 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3974 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3975 match states.entry(txid) {
3976 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3977 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3978 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3982 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3985 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3986 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3987 temporary_channel_id,
3988 counterparty_node_id,
3989 funding_transaction.clone(),
3992 let mut output_index = None;
3993 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3994 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3995 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3996 if output_index.is_some() {
3997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3998 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4001 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4004 if output_index.is_none() {
4005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4006 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4009 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4010 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4011 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4012 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4013 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4014 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4020 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4021 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4022 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4023 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4024 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4025 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4026 .into_iter().flatten()
4027 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4029 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4030 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4032 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4036 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4037 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4038 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4041 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4042 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4046 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4047 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4048 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4054 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4056 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4057 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4058 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4059 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4061 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4062 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4064 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4065 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4067 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4069 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4070 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4071 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4072 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4073 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4074 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4075 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4076 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4077 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4078 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4079 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4080 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4081 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4087 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4088 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4091 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4092 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4093 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4094 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4098 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4099 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4100 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4101 config.apply(config_update);
4102 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4105 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4106 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4107 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4108 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4109 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4110 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4117 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4118 debug_assert!(false);
4119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4121 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4122 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4129 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4131 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4132 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4133 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4134 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4136 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4137 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4139 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4140 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4142 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4144 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4145 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4146 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4147 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4148 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4149 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4150 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4151 pub fn update_channel_config(
4152 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4153 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4154 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4157 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4158 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4160 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4161 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4163 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4164 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4165 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4166 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4167 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4169 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4170 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4171 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4174 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4177 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4178 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4179 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4180 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4181 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4182 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4185 let next_hop_scid = {
4186 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4187 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4188 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4191 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4192 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4193 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4194 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4195 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4198 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4200 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4201 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4202 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4205 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4206 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4207 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4208 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4209 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4216 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4217 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4218 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4221 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4222 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4223 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4224 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4227 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4229 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4230 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4231 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4232 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4233 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4236 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4237 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4238 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4239 payment.prev_channel_id,
4240 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4241 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4243 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4247 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4248 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4250 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4253 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4254 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4257 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4258 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4259 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4262 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4263 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4264 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4265 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4266 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4267 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4268 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4270 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4271 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4274 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4275 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4276 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4277 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4282 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4284 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4285 /// Will likely generate further events.
4286 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4289 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4290 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4291 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4293 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4294 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4296 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4297 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4298 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4299 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4301 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4302 match forward_info {
4303 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4304 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4305 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4306 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4307 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4310 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4311 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4312 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4313 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4315 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4316 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4317 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4318 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4319 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4320 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4321 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4322 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4323 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4326 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4327 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4329 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4332 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4333 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4339 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4340 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4342 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4346 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4347 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4349 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4353 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4354 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4355 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4356 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4357 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4358 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4359 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4362 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4363 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4364 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4365 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4366 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4368 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4370 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4371 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4375 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4376 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4377 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4378 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4379 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4380 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4382 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4383 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4389 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4392 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4395 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4396 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4397 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4398 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4399 // problem, not ours.
4405 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4406 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4407 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4409 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4413 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4415 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4416 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4417 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4422 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4423 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4424 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4425 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4426 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4427 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4428 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4429 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4430 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4431 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4432 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4435 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4436 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4437 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4438 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4439 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4440 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4441 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4443 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4444 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4445 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4447 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4448 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4449 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4450 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4451 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4452 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4455 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4456 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4457 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4460 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4461 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4463 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4465 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4466 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4467 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4468 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4474 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4475 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4477 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4478 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4479 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4481 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4482 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4483 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4484 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4486 Some((res, htlc_id))
4489 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4490 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4491 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4492 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4494 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4496 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4497 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4498 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4504 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4508 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4509 match forward_info {
4510 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4511 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4512 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4513 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4514 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4517 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4518 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4519 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4520 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4521 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4523 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4524 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4525 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4526 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4527 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4529 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4530 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4531 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4533 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4534 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4538 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4539 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4542 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4545 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4546 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4547 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4548 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4549 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4550 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4551 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4552 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4553 phantom_shared_secret,
4556 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4557 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4558 // if routing nodes overpay
4559 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4560 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4562 total_value_received: None,
4563 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4566 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4569 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4571 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4572 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4573 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4574 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4575 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4576 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4578 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4579 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4580 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4581 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4582 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4583 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4584 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4585 phantom_shared_secret,
4588 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4589 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4591 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4594 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4595 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4596 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4597 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4598 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4601 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4602 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4603 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4604 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4605 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4606 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4608 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4609 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4610 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4612 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4613 .entry(payment_hash)
4614 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4615 .or_insert_with(|| {
4616 committed_to_claimable = true;
4618 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4621 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4622 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4624 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4626 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4630 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4631 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4635 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4637 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4638 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4639 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4640 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4641 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4642 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4643 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4645 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4646 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4648 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4650 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4651 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4652 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4653 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4654 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4658 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4659 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4660 committed_to_claimable = true;
4662 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4663 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4664 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4665 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4666 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4667 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4668 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4669 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4670 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4674 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4675 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4676 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4677 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4678 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4680 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4682 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4683 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4685 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4686 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4687 committed_to_claimable = true;
4690 payment_claimable_generated
4694 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4695 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4696 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4697 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4698 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4699 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4700 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4701 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4703 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4704 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4705 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4706 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4707 Ok(result) => result,
4709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4710 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4713 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4714 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4715 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4717 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4721 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4722 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4723 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4725 check_total_value!(purpose);
4727 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4728 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4729 check_total_value!(purpose);
4733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4734 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4736 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4738 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4739 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4741 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4742 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4744 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4745 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4747 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4748 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4749 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4751 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4752 if payment_claimable_generated {
4753 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4759 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4760 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4769 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4770 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4771 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4773 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4776 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4778 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4779 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4780 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4782 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4784 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4785 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4786 events.append(&mut new_events);
4789 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4791 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4792 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4793 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4795 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4797 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4798 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4799 if background_events.is_empty() {
4800 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4803 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4805 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4806 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4807 // monitor updating completing.
4808 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4810 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4811 let mut updated_chan = false;
4813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4814 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4817 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4819 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4820 updated_chan = true;
4821 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4822 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4824 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4832 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4833 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4836 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4838 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4842 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4844 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4845 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4846 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4847 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4848 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4854 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4857 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4858 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4859 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4860 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4861 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4864 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4865 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4867 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4869 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4870 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4871 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4873 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4874 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4875 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4876 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4878 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4879 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4881 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4882 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4886 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4887 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4888 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4889 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4890 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4891 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4892 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4894 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4895 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4898 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4901 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4902 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4904 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4909 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4910 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4918 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4920 /// This currently includes:
4921 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4922 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4923 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4925 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4926 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4927 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4928 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4929 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4930 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4931 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4932 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4934 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4935 /// estimate fetches.
4937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4938 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4939 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4940 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4941 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4943 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4944 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4946 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4947 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4948 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4949 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4951 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4952 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4953 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4954 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4955 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4956 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4958 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4959 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4960 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4962 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4963 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4964 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4965 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4968 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4969 channel_id: *chan_id,
4970 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4982 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4985 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4986 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4987 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4989 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4990 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4995 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4996 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4998 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4999 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5000 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5001 if needs_close { return false; }
5004 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5005 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5006 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5007 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5008 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5009 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5010 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5011 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5013 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5014 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5015 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5020 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5022 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5025 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5027 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5028 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5034 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5036 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5042 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5044 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5045 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5046 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5047 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5048 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5049 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5050 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5051 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5052 channel_id: *chan_id,
5053 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5061 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5062 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5063 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5065 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5066 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5067 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5069 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5070 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5071 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5072 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5074 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5075 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5076 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5077 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5082 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5083 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5084 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5085 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5087 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5088 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5089 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5090 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5096 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5098 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5099 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5104 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5105 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5106 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5107 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5108 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5109 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5110 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5111 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5112 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5113 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5114 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5116 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5117 // have no channels to the peer.
5118 let remove_entry = {
5119 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5120 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5123 entry.remove_entry();
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5131 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5132 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5133 // This should be unreachable
5134 debug_assert!(false);
5137 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5138 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5139 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5140 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5141 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5142 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5143 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5146 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5147 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5148 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5150 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5151 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5158 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5159 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5160 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5161 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5162 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5165 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5166 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5169 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5170 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5173 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5174 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5175 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5176 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5177 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5178 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5179 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5182 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5183 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5186 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5187 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5188 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5189 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5190 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5197 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5198 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5199 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5201 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5202 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5203 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5204 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5206 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5207 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5208 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5209 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5210 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5211 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5214 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5215 /// reason for the failure.
5217 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5218 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5221 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5222 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5223 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5224 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5225 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5226 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5227 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5232 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5233 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5234 match failure_code {
5235 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5236 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5237 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5238 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5239 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5240 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5242 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5243 let fail_data = match data {
5244 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5247 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5252 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5253 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5255 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5257 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5258 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5259 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5260 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5261 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5262 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5263 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5265 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5267 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5268 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5270 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5275 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5276 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5277 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5278 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5279 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5280 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5281 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5282 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5283 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5284 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5286 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5287 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5288 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5289 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5291 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5292 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5293 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5294 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5295 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5299 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5300 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5301 // be surfaced to the user.
5302 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5303 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5304 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5306 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5312 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5313 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5314 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5316 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5317 debug_assert!(false);
5318 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5323 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5326 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5327 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5328 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5329 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5333 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5334 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5335 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5336 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5337 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5338 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5339 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5340 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5341 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5342 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5345 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5346 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5347 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5350 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5351 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5352 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5354 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5355 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5356 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5357 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5358 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5360 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5361 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5362 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5365 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5366 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5367 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5369 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5370 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5371 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5372 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5373 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5375 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5377 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5378 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5380 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5381 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5385 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5386 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5388 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5392 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5393 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5394 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5395 push_forward_ev = true;
5397 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5399 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5401 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5402 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5405 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5406 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5407 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5408 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5409 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5410 failed_next_destination: destination,
5416 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5417 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5419 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5420 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5421 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5422 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5424 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5425 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5426 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5427 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5429 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5430 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5431 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5433 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5434 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5435 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5436 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5437 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5438 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5439 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5440 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5441 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5444 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5445 /// even type numbers.
5449 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5450 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5452 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5453 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5454 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5457 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5458 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5463 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5464 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5465 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5466 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5467 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5468 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5469 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5470 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5475 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5476 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5477 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5478 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5479 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5481 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5482 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5483 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5487 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5488 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5489 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5490 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5491 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5492 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5493 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5494 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5495 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5496 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5497 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5506 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5508 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5509 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5510 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5511 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5512 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5513 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5514 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5515 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5516 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5519 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5520 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5521 debug_assert!(false);
5525 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5527 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5528 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5529 debug_assert!(false);
5533 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5534 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5536 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5537 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5538 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5539 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5542 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5543 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5544 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5545 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5549 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5550 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5551 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5552 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5553 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5554 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5555 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5558 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5559 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5560 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5561 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5562 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5563 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5568 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5569 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5570 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5571 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5572 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5573 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5576 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5579 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5580 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5581 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5582 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5587 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5588 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5589 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5591 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5592 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5593 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5594 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5596 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5597 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5598 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5599 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5603 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5604 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5605 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5609 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5610 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5611 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5614 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5617 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5618 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5619 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5620 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5621 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5624 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5625 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5626 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5628 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5631 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5632 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5634 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5635 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5636 // monitor update as a background event.
5637 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5638 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5639 counterparty_node_id,
5640 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5641 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5642 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5646 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5647 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5652 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5654 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5656 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5657 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5658 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5659 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5660 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5662 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5664 debug_assert!(false,
5665 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5668 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5669 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5670 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5671 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5672 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5674 let mut found_blocker = false;
5675 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5676 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5677 // which case we need to only remove the one
5678 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5679 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5680 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5681 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5683 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5686 debug_assert!(false);
5695 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5696 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5697 counterparty_node_id: None,
5698 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5701 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5705 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5706 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5707 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5708 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5709 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5710 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5711 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5712 // again on restart.
5713 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5714 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5715 payment_preimage, update_res);
5718 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5719 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5721 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5722 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5723 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5724 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5725 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5726 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5727 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5728 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5729 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5730 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5733 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5734 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5735 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5736 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5737 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5738 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5742 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5743 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5746 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5747 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5748 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5749 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId,
5752 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5753 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5754 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5755 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5756 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5758 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5759 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5760 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5762 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5763 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5766 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5767 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5768 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5769 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5770 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5771 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5772 let claiming_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5773 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5774 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5775 let chan_to_release =
5776 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5777 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5779 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5780 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5781 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5782 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5787 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5788 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5789 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5790 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5791 // in the background.
5792 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5793 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5794 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5795 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5797 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5798 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5799 funding_txo, update, ..
5801 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5802 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5803 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5804 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5806 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5812 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5813 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5814 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5816 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5817 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5819 monitor_update.updates[0],
5820 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5825 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5826 // immediately once we get going.
5827 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5830 *channel_id == claiming_channel_id,
5832 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5835 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5836 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5837 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5838 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5839 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5840 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5841 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5845 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5846 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5847 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5850 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5851 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5852 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5853 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5854 total_fee_earned_msat,
5855 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5856 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5857 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5858 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5861 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5865 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5866 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5867 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5873 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5874 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5875 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5878 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5879 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5880 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5881 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5883 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5885 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5886 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5887 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5889 payment_purpose: purpose,
5892 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5894 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5898 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5900 sender_intended_total_msat,
5904 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5905 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5907 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5908 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5909 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5912 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5913 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5915 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5916 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5917 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5918 downstream_channel_id,
5919 Some(blocking_action),
5926 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5927 /// update completion.
5928 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5929 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5930 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5931 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5932 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5933 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5934 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5935 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5936 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5937 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5938 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5939 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5940 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5941 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5943 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5945 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5946 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5947 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5948 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5951 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5952 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5954 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5956 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5961 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5962 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5963 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5964 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5969 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5970 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5971 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5973 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5978 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5982 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5988 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5989 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5990 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5994 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5995 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5996 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6002 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6003 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6005 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6006 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6008 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6009 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6010 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6011 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6012 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6018 let mut peer_state_lock;
6019 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6020 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6021 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6024 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6027 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6028 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6029 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6030 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6031 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6034 let remaining_in_flight =
6035 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6036 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6040 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6041 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6042 remaining_in_flight);
6043 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6046 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6049 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6051 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6052 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6055 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6056 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6057 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6059 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6060 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6061 /// used to accept such channels.
6063 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6064 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6065 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6066 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6069 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6070 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6072 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6073 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6074 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6076 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6077 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6079 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6080 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6082 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6083 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6085 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6086 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6087 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6088 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6091 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6093 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6096 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6097 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6099 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6101 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6102 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6104 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6108 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6110 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6111 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6112 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6114 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6115 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6116 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6117 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6118 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6119 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6120 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6121 let err_str = e.to_string();
6122 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6124 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6128 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6129 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6131 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6136 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6137 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6138 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6139 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6140 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6141 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6142 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6145 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6146 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6147 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6151 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6152 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6153 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6154 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6155 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6156 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6161 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6162 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6163 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6165 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6169 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6170 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6171 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6173 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6174 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6175 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6178 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6183 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6184 /// or 0-conf channels.
6186 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6187 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6188 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6189 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6190 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6191 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6193 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6194 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6195 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6196 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6197 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6198 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6199 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6203 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6206 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6207 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6209 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6210 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6212 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6213 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6214 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6215 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6216 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6218 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6222 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6223 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6226 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6227 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6229 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6230 // included in the unfunded count.
6231 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6232 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6233 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6236 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6237 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6240 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6241 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6242 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6243 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6248 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6251 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6252 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6253 // likely to be lost on restart!
6254 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6256 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6259 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6261 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6264 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6265 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6266 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6267 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6268 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6270 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6273 debug_assert!(false);
6274 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6275 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6276 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6281 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6282 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6283 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6284 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6285 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6286 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6288 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6289 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6290 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6293 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6294 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6296 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6297 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6300 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6301 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6303 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6304 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6305 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6308 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6309 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6310 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6311 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6313 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6315 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6316 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6317 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6318 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6319 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6320 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6323 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6324 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6325 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6330 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6331 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6332 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6333 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6334 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6335 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6336 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6344 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6345 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6346 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6347 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6348 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6350 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6352 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6353 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6356 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6357 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6359 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6360 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6361 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6363 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6367 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6368 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6369 // likely to be lost on restart!
6370 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6372 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6374 debug_assert!(false);
6375 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6377 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6378 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6379 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6381 match phase.get_mut() {
6382 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6383 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6384 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6394 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6395 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6396 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6397 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6398 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6400 user_channel_id: user_id,
6405 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6406 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6411 debug_assert!(false);
6412 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6415 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6416 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6417 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6418 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6419 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6420 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6421 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6423 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6424 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6425 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6426 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6427 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6428 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6429 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6430 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6431 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6435 Some(mut phase) => {
6436 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6437 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6438 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6440 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6443 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6445 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6446 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6447 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6448 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6449 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6450 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6452 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6453 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6454 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6457 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6459 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6462 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6463 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6465 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6468 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6469 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6470 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6471 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6473 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6474 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6475 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6476 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6477 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6478 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6479 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6484 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6485 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6486 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6488 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6492 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6493 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6494 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6502 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6503 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6505 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6507 debug_assert!(false);
6508 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6511 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6512 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6513 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6515 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6516 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6517 let logger = WithContext::from(
6519 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6520 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6523 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6525 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6526 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6527 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6528 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6529 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6530 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6531 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6532 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6533 } else { unreachable!(); }
6536 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6537 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6538 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6539 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6540 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6541 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6542 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6546 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6547 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6548 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6549 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6550 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6551 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6562 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6563 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6564 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6565 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6566 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6568 debug_assert!(false);
6569 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6573 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6575 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6576 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6577 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6578 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6579 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6580 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6581 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6582 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6583 msg: announcement_sigs,
6585 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6586 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6587 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6588 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6589 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6590 // announcement_signatures.
6591 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6592 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6593 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6594 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6602 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6607 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6608 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6612 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6617 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6618 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6619 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6622 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6624 debug_assert!(false);
6625 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6629 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6630 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6632 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6633 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6634 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6635 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6637 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6640 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6641 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6642 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6643 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6645 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6646 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6647 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6648 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6649 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6650 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6654 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6655 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6656 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6657 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6661 let context = phase.context_mut();
6662 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6663 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6664 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6665 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6667 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6668 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6669 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6670 let context = phase.context_mut();
6671 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6672 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6673 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6680 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6681 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6682 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6685 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6686 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6692 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6696 debug_assert!(false);
6697 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6699 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6704 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6705 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6706 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6707 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6708 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6714 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6715 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6716 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6717 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6718 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6719 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6720 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6722 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6723 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6729 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6730 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6731 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6732 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6734 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6735 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6738 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6743 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6744 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6745 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6750 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6751 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6752 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6753 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6755 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6756 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6757 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6758 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6760 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6761 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6763 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6765 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6767 debug_assert!(false);
6768 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6774 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6775 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6776 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6777 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6778 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6779 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6781 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6783 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6784 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6785 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6786 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6787 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6788 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6789 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6790 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6794 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6795 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6796 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6797 match pending_forward_info {
6798 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6799 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6801 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6802 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6803 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6804 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6805 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6807 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6808 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6809 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6810 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6811 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6814 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6816 _ => pending_forward_info
6819 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6820 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6822 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6823 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6831 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6833 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6837 debug_assert!(false);
6838 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6842 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6844 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6845 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6846 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6847 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6849 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6851 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6852 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6853 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6855 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6856 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6857 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6858 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6859 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6860 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6861 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6864 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6865 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6868 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6871 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6872 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6873 funding_txo, msg.channel_id
6879 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6880 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6881 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6885 debug_assert!(false);
6886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6892 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6893 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6895 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6896 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6904 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6905 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6906 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6908 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6910 debug_assert!(false);
6911 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6917 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6918 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6919 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6921 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6922 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6924 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6925 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6933 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6937 debug_assert!(false);
6938 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6944 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6945 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6946 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6947 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6948 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6949 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6950 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6954 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6955 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6963 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6964 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6965 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6966 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6967 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6968 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6969 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6970 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6971 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6972 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6973 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6975 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6976 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6978 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6979 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6980 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6982 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6983 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6986 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6987 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6989 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6990 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6991 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6993 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6994 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6995 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6996 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6997 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7000 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7001 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7004 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7005 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7006 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7007 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7008 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7009 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7010 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7011 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7012 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7013 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7014 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7017 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7018 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7019 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7024 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7025 // payments are being processed.
7026 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7027 push_forward_event = true;
7029 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7030 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7037 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7038 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7041 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7042 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7043 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7045 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7049 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7050 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7051 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7052 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7053 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7055 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7056 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7057 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7058 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7059 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7060 // real by taking more time.
7061 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7062 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7063 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7068 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7069 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7070 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7071 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7072 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7073 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7074 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7076 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7077 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7078 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7079 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7080 channel_funding_outpoint,
7082 counterparty_node_id,
7087 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7088 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7089 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7091 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7092 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7093 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7096 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7097 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7098 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7104 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7105 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7107 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7109 debug_assert!(false);
7110 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7111 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7115 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7116 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7117 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7118 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7119 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7120 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7121 *counterparty_node_id)
7123 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7124 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7125 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7126 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7127 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7128 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7129 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7133 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7134 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7140 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7144 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7145 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7146 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7148 debug_assert!(false);
7149 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7153 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7155 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7156 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7157 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7159 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7160 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7168 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7170 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7172 debug_assert!(false);
7173 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7175 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7176 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7177 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7179 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7180 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7181 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7184 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7185 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7186 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7187 msg, &self.default_configuration
7188 ), chan_phase_entry),
7189 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7190 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7191 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7194 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7195 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7203 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7204 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7205 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7206 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7208 // It's not a local channel
7209 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7213 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7214 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7215 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7219 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7221 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7222 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7223 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7224 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7225 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7226 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7227 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7231 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7232 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7233 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7234 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7236 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7237 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7238 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7239 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7242 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7246 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7247 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7252 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7255 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7257 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7260 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7262 debug_assert!(false);
7263 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7264 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7268 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7271 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7273 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7274 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7275 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7276 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7277 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7278 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7279 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7280 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7281 let mut channel_update = None;
7282 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7284 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7287 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7288 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7289 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7290 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7291 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7292 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7293 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7298 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7299 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7300 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7301 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7302 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7307 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7308 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7312 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7314 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7315 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7316 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7317 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7318 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7319 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7321 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7322 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7323 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7324 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7325 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7326 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7327 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7328 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7329 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7330 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7331 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7332 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7333 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7334 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7335 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7336 next_funding_txid: None,
7339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7340 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7341 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7347 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7348 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7349 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7350 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7353 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7354 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7359 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7360 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7361 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7363 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7364 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7365 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7366 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7367 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7368 match monitor_event {
7369 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7370 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7371 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7372 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7373 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7374 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7375 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id);
7377 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7378 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7379 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7380 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7383 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_funding_outpoint) => {
7384 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7385 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7387 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7388 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7389 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7390 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7393 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7395 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7398 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7399 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7400 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7401 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7402 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7407 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7408 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7409 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7410 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7418 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7419 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7425 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7426 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7429 has_pending_monitor_events
7432 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7433 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7434 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7436 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7438 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7441 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7442 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7443 /// update was applied.
7444 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7445 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7446 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7448 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7449 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7450 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7451 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7453 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7454 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7456 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7457 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7458 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7459 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7461 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7462 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7463 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7464 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7465 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7466 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7468 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7469 has_monitor_update = true;
7471 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7472 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7473 continue 'peer_loop;
7482 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7483 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7484 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7490 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7491 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7493 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7494 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7496 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7497 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7498 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7501 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7502 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7504 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7505 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7506 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7512 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7518 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7519 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7522 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7523 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7530 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7535 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7536 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7538 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7539 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7540 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7544 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7547 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7548 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7554 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7555 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7556 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7557 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7558 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7559 let mut has_update = false;
7560 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7564 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7567 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7568 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7570 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7571 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7572 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7573 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7574 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7576 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7577 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7580 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7581 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7582 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7584 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7585 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7586 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7587 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7593 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7594 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7595 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7601 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7602 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7607 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7613 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7614 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7617 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7618 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7624 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7625 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7627 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7628 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7629 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7630 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7631 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7632 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7633 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7634 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7635 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7636 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7637 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7638 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7639 assert!(should_broadcast);
7640 } else { unreachable!(); }
7641 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7642 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7643 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7646 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7651 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7652 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7653 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7654 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7658 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7659 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7660 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7661 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7662 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7664 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7668 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7673 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7675 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7677 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7678 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7679 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7680 &$self, description: String
7681 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7682 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7683 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7684 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7685 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7687 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7688 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7689 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7691 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7698 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7699 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7700 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7704 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7705 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7707 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7708 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7709 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7712 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7713 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7714 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7716 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7717 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7721 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7722 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7723 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7724 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7725 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7727 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7731 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7732 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7737 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7738 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7739 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7741 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7743 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7744 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7745 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7746 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7747 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7748 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7749 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7750 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7751 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7752 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7753 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7754 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7756 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7757 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7758 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7760 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7761 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7766 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7767 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7768 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7769 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7771 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7777 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7779 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7780 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7781 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7782 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7783 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7784 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7788 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7789 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7790 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7791 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7794 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7796 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7798 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7799 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7800 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7802 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7803 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7804 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7805 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7806 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7807 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7808 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7810 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7811 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7815 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7816 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7819 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7820 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7821 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7825 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7826 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7827 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7828 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7832 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7833 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7834 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7839 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7840 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7841 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7842 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7845 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7846 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7847 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7848 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7849 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7850 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7851 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7852 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7853 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7854 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7855 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7856 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7857 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7858 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7859 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7861 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7862 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7864 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7866 let builder = match quantity {
7868 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7870 let builder = match amount_msats {
7872 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7874 let builder = match payer_note {
7876 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7878 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7879 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7883 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7884 self.pending_outbound_payments
7885 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7886 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7888 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7890 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7891 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7892 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7893 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7894 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7897 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7899 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7900 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7901 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7902 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7903 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7904 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7905 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7906 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7907 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7909 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7916 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7919 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7920 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7921 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7925 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7926 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7927 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7928 /// received and no retries will be made.
7933 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7934 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7937 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7938 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7939 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7940 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7941 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7943 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7944 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7946 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7947 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7952 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7953 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7954 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7955 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7957 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7958 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7959 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7961 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7962 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7963 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7965 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7966 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7967 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7969 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
7970 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7971 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7972 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7974 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7975 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7976 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7977 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7978 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7981 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7983 for path in refund.paths() {
7984 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7985 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7986 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7987 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7989 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7995 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7999 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8002 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8003 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8005 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8006 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8007 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8008 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8010 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8012 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8013 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8017 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8018 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8020 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8022 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8023 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8025 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8026 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8027 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8028 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8029 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8030 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8031 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8032 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8033 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8034 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8035 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8038 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8039 /// stored external to LDK.
8041 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8042 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8043 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8045 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8046 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8049 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8050 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8051 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8052 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8054 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8055 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8056 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8057 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8058 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8060 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8061 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8062 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8063 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8064 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8066 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8067 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8069 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8070 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8074 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8075 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8077 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8079 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8080 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8082 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8083 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8084 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8085 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8086 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8087 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8088 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8091 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8092 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8094 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8095 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8096 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8099 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8101 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8102 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8103 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8104 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8106 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8108 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8109 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8110 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8113 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8114 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8117 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8118 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8119 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8120 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8121 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8122 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8124 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8125 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8126 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8127 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8128 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8130 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8132 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8135 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8136 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8140 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8141 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8143 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8144 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8145 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8146 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8148 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8149 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8150 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8151 Some(_) => continue,
8152 None => return scid_candidate
8157 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8159 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8160 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8162 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8163 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8164 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8168 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8169 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8170 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8172 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8173 /// times to get a unique scid.
8174 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8175 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8176 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8178 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8179 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8180 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8181 return scid_candidate
8185 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8186 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8187 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8188 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8190 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8191 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8194 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8195 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8197 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8198 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8199 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8208 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8209 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8210 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8211 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8212 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8216 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8217 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8218 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8219 events.push_back((event, None));
8223 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8224 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8225 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8229 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8230 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8234 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8235 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8238 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8239 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8240 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8241 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8242 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8243 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8244 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8246 let logger = WithContext::from(
8247 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8251 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8252 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8253 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8254 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8255 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8256 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8257 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8259 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8263 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8264 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8265 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8266 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8267 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8268 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8273 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8275 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8276 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8277 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8278 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8280 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8281 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8282 if further_update_exists {
8283 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8288 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8295 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8296 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8302 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8303 for action in actions {
8305 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8306 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8308 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8314 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8315 /// using the given event handler.
8317 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8318 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8322 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8326 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8328 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8329 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8330 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8331 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8332 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8333 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8337 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8338 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8339 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8340 /// is always placed next to each other.
8342 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8343 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8344 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8345 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8347 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8348 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8349 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8350 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8351 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8352 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8353 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8355 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8356 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8357 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8358 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8361 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8362 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8364 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8365 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8368 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8369 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8370 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8371 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8372 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8373 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8374 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8378 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8379 events.replace(pending_events);
8388 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8390 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8391 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8393 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8394 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8399 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8401 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8402 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8403 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8405 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8409 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8411 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8412 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8413 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8414 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8415 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8416 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8420 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8422 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8423 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8424 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8425 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8426 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8429 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8430 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8433 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8434 let _persistence_guard =
8435 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8436 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8437 let new_height = height - 1;
8439 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8440 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8441 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8442 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8443 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8444 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8447 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8451 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8453 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8454 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8455 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8456 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8457 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8462 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8463 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8464 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8465 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8467 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8468 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8470 let _persistence_guard =
8471 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8472 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8473 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8474 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8476 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8477 if height < last_best_block_height {
8478 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8479 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8483 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8484 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8485 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8486 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8488 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8489 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8491 let _persistence_guard =
8492 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8493 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8494 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8496 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8498 macro_rules! max_time {
8499 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8501 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8502 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8503 // having an explicit local time source.
8504 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8505 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8506 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8507 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8508 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8514 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8515 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8516 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8517 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8521 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8522 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8523 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8526 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8527 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8528 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8529 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8530 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8531 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8538 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8539 let _persistence_guard =
8540 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8541 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8542 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8543 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8544 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8545 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8546 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8547 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8552 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8554 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8555 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8556 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8557 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8558 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8559 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8563 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8564 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8566 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8567 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8568 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8569 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8570 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8572 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8573 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8576 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8579 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8580 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8582 // Retain unfunded channels.
8583 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8584 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8585 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8586 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8587 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8588 let res = f(channel);
8589 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8590 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8591 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8592 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8593 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8595 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8596 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8597 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8598 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8599 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8600 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8601 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8602 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8607 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8612 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8613 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8616 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8617 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8619 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8620 msg: announcement_sigs,
8622 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8623 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8624 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8626 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8627 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8628 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8633 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8634 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8635 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8636 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8637 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8638 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8639 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8640 // is always consistent.
8641 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8642 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8643 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8644 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8645 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8648 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8649 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8650 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8651 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8652 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8653 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8654 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8659 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8660 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8661 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8662 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8663 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8664 data: reason_message,
8677 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8678 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8679 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8680 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8681 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8682 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8683 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8684 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8685 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8686 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8688 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8689 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8690 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8694 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8697 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8698 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8699 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8700 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8701 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8702 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8703 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8704 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8705 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8706 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8707 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8708 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8711 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8712 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8713 _ => unreachable!(),
8715 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8716 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8717 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8718 let logger = WithContext::from(
8719 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8721 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8727 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8729 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8734 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8735 /// may have events that need processing.
8737 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8738 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8740 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8741 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8742 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8743 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8746 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8747 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8748 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8751 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8752 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8753 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8756 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8757 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8758 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8759 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8762 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8763 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8764 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8765 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8768 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8769 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8771 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8772 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8773 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8774 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8775 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8778 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8779 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8780 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8781 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8784 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8785 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8786 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8787 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8790 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8791 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8792 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8793 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8796 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8797 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8798 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8799 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8803 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8804 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8806 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8807 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8808 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8809 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8810 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8815 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8816 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8817 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8818 // change to the contents.
8819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8820 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8821 let persist = match &res {
8822 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8823 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8824 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8826 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8828 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8833 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8834 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8835 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8836 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8839 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8840 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8841 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8842 // change to the contents.
8843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8844 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8845 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8849 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8850 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8851 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8852 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8855 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8857 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8860 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8862 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8865 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8866 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8867 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8868 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8869 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8870 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8871 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8872 let persist = match &res {
8873 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8874 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8876 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8881 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8882 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8883 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8884 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8887 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8888 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8889 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8890 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8893 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8894 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8895 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8896 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8899 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8900 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8901 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8902 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8905 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8910 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8915 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8916 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8917 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8918 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8920 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8921 let persist = match &res {
8922 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8923 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8924 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8926 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8931 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8933 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8936 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8937 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8938 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8939 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8941 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8942 let persist = match &res {
8943 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8944 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8945 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8947 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8952 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8953 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8954 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8955 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8957 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8958 let persist = match &res {
8959 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8960 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8961 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8963 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8968 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8970 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8973 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8975 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8978 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8979 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8980 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8981 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8983 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8984 let persist = match &res {
8985 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8986 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8987 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8989 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8994 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8996 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8999 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9000 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9001 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9004 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9009 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9011 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9012 let persist = match &res {
9013 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9014 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9015 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9017 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9022 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9024 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9025 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9026 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9029 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9030 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9031 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9033 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9036 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9037 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9038 let context = match phase {
9039 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9040 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9041 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9042 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9047 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9048 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9049 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9052 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9053 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9056 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9057 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9060 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9061 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9065 // Clean up for removal.
9066 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9067 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9070 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9071 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9072 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9073 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9075 // V1 Channel Establishment
9076 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9077 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9080 // V2 Channel Establishment
9081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9082 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9083 // Common Channel Establishment
9084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9090 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9091 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9092 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9093 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9094 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9095 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9096 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9097 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9098 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9099 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9100 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9101 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9102 // Channel Operations
9103 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9104 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9105 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9106 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9107 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9108 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9110 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9111 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9112 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9113 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9114 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9115 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9116 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9117 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9121 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9122 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9123 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9124 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9127 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9129 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9131 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9132 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9136 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9137 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9138 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9139 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9143 let mut res = Ok(());
9145 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9146 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9147 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9148 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9149 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9150 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9151 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9154 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9155 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9156 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9157 if inbound_peer_limited {
9159 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9161 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9162 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9163 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9164 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9165 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9166 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9167 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9168 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9173 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9174 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9176 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9177 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9178 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9179 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9182 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9185 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9186 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9191 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9194 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9197 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9199 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9201 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9202 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9203 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9204 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9205 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9209 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9211 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9212 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9216 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9217 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9218 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9219 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9220 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9221 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9225 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9226 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9227 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9228 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9229 debug_assert!(false);
9232 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9233 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9234 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9235 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9236 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9237 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9238 debug_assert!(false);
9244 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9245 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9250 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9253 match &msg.data as &str {
9254 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9255 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9257 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9258 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9259 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9260 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9261 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9262 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9263 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9264 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9265 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9266 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9267 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9268 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9269 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9270 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9271 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9272 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9276 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9277 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9278 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9279 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9280 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9281 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9283 log_level: Level::Trace,
9293 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9294 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9296 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9297 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9298 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9299 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9300 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9301 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9302 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9303 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9305 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9306 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9307 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9311 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9313 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9314 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9317 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9318 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9319 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9321 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9327 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9328 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9329 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9330 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9331 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9337 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9338 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9339 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9343 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9344 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9348 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9349 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9352 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9353 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9356 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9357 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9360 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9361 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9362 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9363 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9366 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9367 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9368 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9369 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9372 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9373 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9374 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9375 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9378 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9379 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9380 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9381 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9384 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9385 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9386 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9387 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9390 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9391 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9392 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9393 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9396 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9397 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9398 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9399 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9402 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9403 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9404 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9405 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9408 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9409 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9410 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9411 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9415 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9416 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9418 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9419 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9420 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9421 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9422 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9427 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9428 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9429 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9432 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9433 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9436 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9437 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9439 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9440 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9442 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9443 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9447 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9448 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9449 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9451 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9453 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9454 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9458 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9459 amount_msats, payment_secret
9461 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9463 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9464 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9468 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9469 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9470 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9473 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9474 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9475 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9476 payment_paths, payment_hash
9478 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9479 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9480 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9482 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9483 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9484 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9485 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9486 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9489 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9490 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9491 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9492 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9493 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9495 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9496 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9497 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9498 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9499 .and_then(|invoice| {
9501 let mut invoice = invoice;
9502 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9503 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9505 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9506 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9507 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9509 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9510 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9515 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9516 Err(error) => Some(error),
9520 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9521 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9523 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9525 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9526 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9529 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9531 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9538 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9545 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9546 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9550 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9551 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9552 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9553 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9554 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9558 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9559 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9561 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9562 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9563 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9564 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9565 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9568 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9569 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9570 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9571 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9574 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9575 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9576 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9577 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9580 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9581 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9582 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9583 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9586 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9587 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9588 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9589 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9590 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9591 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9592 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9593 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9594 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9595 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9596 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9597 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9598 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9599 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9600 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9601 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9602 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9603 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9604 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9605 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9606 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9611 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9612 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9614 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9615 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9616 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9617 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9620 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9621 (2, node_id, required),
9622 (4, features, required),
9623 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9624 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9625 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9626 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9629 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9630 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9631 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9632 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9633 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9634 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9635 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9636 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9637 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9638 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9639 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9640 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9641 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9642 (7, self.config, option),
9643 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9644 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9645 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9646 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9647 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9648 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9649 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9650 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9651 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9652 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9653 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9654 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9655 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9656 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9657 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9658 (32, self.is_public, required),
9659 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9660 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9661 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9662 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9663 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9664 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9665 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9671 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9672 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9673 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9674 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9675 (2, channel_id, required),
9676 (3, channel_type, option),
9677 (4, counterparty, required),
9678 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9679 (6, funding_txo, option),
9680 (7, config, option),
9681 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9682 (9, confirmations, option),
9683 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9684 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9685 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9686 (16, balance_msat, required),
9687 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9688 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9689 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9690 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9691 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9692 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9693 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9694 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9695 (26, is_outbound, required),
9696 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9697 (30, is_usable, required),
9698 (32, is_public, required),
9699 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9700 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9701 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9702 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9703 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9704 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9705 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9708 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9709 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9710 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9711 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9712 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9716 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9718 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9719 outbound_scid_alias,
9723 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9724 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9726 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9727 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9728 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9729 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9730 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9731 confirmations_required,
9733 force_close_spend_delay,
9734 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9735 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9736 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9737 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9738 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9739 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9740 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9741 channel_shutdown_state,
9742 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9743 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9748 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9749 (2, channels, required_vec),
9750 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9751 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9754 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9755 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9756 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9759 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9761 (0, onion_packet, required),
9762 (1, blinded, option),
9763 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9766 (0, payment_data, required),
9767 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9768 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9769 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9770 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9771 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9773 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9774 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9775 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9776 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9777 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9778 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9779 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9783 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9784 (0, routing, required),
9785 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9786 (4, payment_hash, required),
9787 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9788 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9789 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9790 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9794 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9795 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9797 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9799 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9800 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9801 reason.write(writer)?;
9803 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9804 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9807 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9808 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9809 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9810 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9817 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9818 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9819 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9822 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9823 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9824 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9825 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9829 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9830 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9831 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9832 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9833 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9836 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9837 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9838 // messages contained in the variants.
9839 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9840 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9841 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9843 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9844 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9845 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9846 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9847 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9850 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9851 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9852 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9853 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9854 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9856 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9861 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9866 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9867 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9868 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9871 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9872 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9873 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9874 (2, outpoint, required),
9875 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9876 (4, htlc_id, required),
9877 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9878 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9879 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9880 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9881 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9884 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9885 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9886 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9887 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9888 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9890 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9891 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9892 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9893 (2, self.value, required),
9894 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9895 (4, payment_data, option),
9896 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9897 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9898 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9899 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9905 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9906 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9907 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9908 (0, prev_hop, required),
9909 (1, total_msat, option),
9910 (2, value_ser, required),
9911 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9912 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9913 (5, total_value_received, option),
9914 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9915 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9916 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9918 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9919 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9920 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9922 if payment_data.is_some() {
9923 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9925 if total_msat.is_none() {
9926 total_msat = Some(value);
9928 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9931 if total_msat.is_none() {
9932 if payment_data.is_none() {
9933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9935 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9937 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9941 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9944 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9945 total_value_received,
9946 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9948 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9949 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9954 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9955 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9956 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9959 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9960 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9961 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9962 let mut payment_id = None;
9963 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9964 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9965 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9966 (0, session_priv, required),
9967 (1, payment_id, option),
9968 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9969 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9970 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9971 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9973 if payment_id.is_none() {
9974 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9976 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9978 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9979 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9982 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9983 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9984 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9985 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9989 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9990 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9991 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9993 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9996 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9997 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10002 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10003 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10005 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10006 0u8.write(writer)?;
10007 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10008 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10009 (0, session_priv, required),
10010 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10011 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10012 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10013 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10014 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10015 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10018 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10019 1u8.write(writer)?;
10020 field.write(writer)?;
10027 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10028 (0, forward_info, required),
10029 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10030 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10031 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10032 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10033 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10034 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10035 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10038 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10039 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10040 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10042 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10046 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10047 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10048 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10049 (0, htlc_id, required),
10050 (2, err_packet, required),
10053 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10054 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10055 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10056 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10057 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10058 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10059 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10060 (0, htlc_id, required),
10061 (1, failure_code, required),
10062 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10063 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10071 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10072 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10073 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10075 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10077 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10078 (0, htlc_id, required),
10079 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10080 (2, err_packet, required),
10081 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10083 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10084 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10085 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10087 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10091 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10092 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10096 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10101 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10102 (0, payment_secret, required),
10103 (2, expiry_time, required),
10104 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10105 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10106 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10109 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10111 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10112 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10113 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10114 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10115 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10116 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10121 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10123 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10125 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10127 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10128 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10129 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10132 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10135 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10136 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10139 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10140 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10143 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10144 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10148 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10150 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10153 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10154 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10155 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10158 channel.write(writer)?;
10164 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10165 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10166 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10167 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10168 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10169 for forward in pending_forwards {
10170 forward.write(writer)?;
10175 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10177 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10178 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10179 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10181 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10182 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10183 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10184 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10185 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10186 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10187 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10188 htlc.write(writer)?;
10190 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10191 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10194 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10195 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10196 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10197 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10198 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10199 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10200 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10203 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10204 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10205 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10206 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10207 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10209 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10210 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10211 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10212 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10213 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10214 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10215 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10220 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10221 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10222 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10223 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10224 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10225 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10226 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10227 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10228 0u64.write(writer)?;
10230 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10231 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10232 event.write(writer)?;
10236 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10237 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10238 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10239 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10240 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10241 0u64.write(writer)?;
10243 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10244 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10245 // likely to be identical.
10246 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10247 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10249 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10250 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10251 hash.write(writer)?;
10252 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10255 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10256 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10257 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10258 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10259 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10262 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10263 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10265 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10266 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10267 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10268 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10271 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10272 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10273 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10274 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10278 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10279 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10280 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10282 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10283 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10284 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10290 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10291 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10292 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10293 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10296 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10297 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10298 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10299 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10300 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10303 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10304 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10305 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10306 if !updates.is_empty() {
10307 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10308 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10313 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10314 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10315 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10316 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10317 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10318 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10319 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10320 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10321 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10322 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10323 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10324 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10325 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10332 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10333 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10334 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10335 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10338 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10339 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10340 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10341 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10342 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10343 // check that the event is sane here.
10344 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10345 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10346 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10347 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10353 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10354 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10355 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10356 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10357 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10358 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10361 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10362 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10363 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10364 events.push_back((ev, action));
10365 } else if action.is_some() {
10366 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10373 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10374 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10375 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10376 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10377 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10378 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10381 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10383 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10385 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10386 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10387 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10388 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10389 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10390 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10391 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10392 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10393 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10394 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10395 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10396 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10397 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10399 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10400 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10402 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10403 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10405 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10406 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10407 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10408 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10409 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10410 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10412 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10413 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10415 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10417 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10418 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10419 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10420 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10424 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10425 pub entropy_source: ES,
10427 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10428 pub node_signer: NS,
10430 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10431 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10433 pub signer_provider: SP,
10435 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10437 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10438 pub fee_estimator: F,
10439 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10441 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10442 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10443 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10444 pub chain_monitor: M,
10446 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10447 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10448 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10449 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10450 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10451 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10453 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10455 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10456 /// deserialization.
10458 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10459 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10460 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10462 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10463 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10465 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10466 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10467 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10468 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10470 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10473 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10474 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10477 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10478 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10480 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10481 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10482 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10483 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10484 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10485 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10489 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10490 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10491 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10492 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10493 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10495 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10496 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10497 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10503 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10504 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10505 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10506 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10508 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10510 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10511 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10512 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10513 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10517 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10518 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10519 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10523 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10524 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10526 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10528 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10529 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10530 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10535 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10536 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10538 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10539 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10540 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10542 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10544 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10545 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10546 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10547 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10548 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10549 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10550 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10551 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10552 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10553 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10554 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10556 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10557 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10558 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10559 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10560 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10561 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10562 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10563 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10564 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10565 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10566 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10567 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10568 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10569 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10570 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10572 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10573 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10574 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10576 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10577 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10578 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10580 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10581 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10582 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10584 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10585 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10586 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10588 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10589 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10590 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10593 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10594 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10595 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10596 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10597 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10598 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10599 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10600 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10602 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10603 let mut found_htlc = false;
10604 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10605 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10608 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10609 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10610 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10611 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10612 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10613 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10614 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10616 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10617 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10618 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10622 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10623 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10624 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10625 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10626 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10628 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10629 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10631 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10633 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10634 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10636 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10637 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10638 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10639 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10643 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10644 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10645 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10646 // safely discard the channel.
10647 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10648 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10649 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10650 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10651 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10652 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10653 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10654 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10657 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10658 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10659 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10660 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10661 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10666 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10667 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10668 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10669 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10670 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10672 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10673 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10674 counterparty_node_id: None,
10675 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10676 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10678 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10682 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10683 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10684 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10685 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10686 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10687 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10688 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10689 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10690 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10692 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10695 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10696 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10697 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10698 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10699 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10700 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10701 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10702 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10704 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10707 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10710 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10711 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10712 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10713 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10714 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10715 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10716 is_connected: false,
10720 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10721 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10722 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10723 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10724 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10725 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10726 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10727 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10730 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10731 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10732 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10733 for _ in 0..event_count {
10734 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10735 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10740 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10741 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10742 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10744 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10745 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10746 // on-startup monitor updates.
10747 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10748 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10750 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10754 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10755 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10757 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10758 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10759 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10760 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10761 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10765 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10766 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10767 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10768 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10769 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10770 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10771 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10773 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10774 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10778 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10779 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10780 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10781 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10782 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10783 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10784 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10785 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10786 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10787 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10788 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10789 let mut events_override = None;
10790 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10791 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10792 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10793 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10794 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10795 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10796 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10797 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10798 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10799 (8, events_override, option),
10800 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10801 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10802 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10803 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10805 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10806 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10809 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10810 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10813 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10814 pending_events_read = events;
10817 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10818 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10821 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10822 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10823 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10824 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10825 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10826 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10828 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10830 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10831 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10832 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10835 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10836 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10837 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10838 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10839 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10841 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10842 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10843 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10845 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10846 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10847 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10848 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10849 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10851 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10852 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10853 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10854 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10855 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10856 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10857 pending_background_events.push(
10858 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10859 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10860 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10861 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10862 update: update.clone(),
10865 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10866 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10867 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10868 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10869 pending_background_events.push(
10870 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10871 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10872 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10875 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10876 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10877 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10879 max_in_flight_update_id
10883 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10886 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10887 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10888 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10890 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10892 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10893 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10894 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10895 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10896 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10897 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10898 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10899 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10900 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10903 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10904 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10905 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10906 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10907 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10908 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10909 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10910 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10911 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10912 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10913 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10916 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10917 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10918 debug_assert!(false);
10919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10924 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10925 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10926 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10927 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10928 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10929 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10930 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10931 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10932 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10933 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10935 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10936 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10937 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10939 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10940 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10941 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10942 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10943 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10944 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10945 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10946 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10951 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10952 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10954 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10955 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10956 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10957 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10960 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10961 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10962 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10963 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10964 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10965 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10966 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10968 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10969 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10970 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10971 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10972 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10973 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10974 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10975 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10976 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10979 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10980 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10981 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10982 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10984 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10985 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10986 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10989 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10990 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10991 retry_strategy: None,
10992 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10993 payment_params: None,
10994 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
10995 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10996 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10997 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10998 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10999 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11000 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11001 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11002 total_msat: path_amt,
11003 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11004 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11006 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11007 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11012 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11013 match htlc_source {
11014 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11015 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11016 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11017 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11019 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11020 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11021 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11022 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11023 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11024 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11025 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11026 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11027 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11028 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11029 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11034 !forwards.is_empty()
11036 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11037 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11038 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11039 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11040 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11041 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11042 intercepted_id != ev_id
11049 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11050 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11051 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11052 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11053 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11054 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11055 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11056 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11057 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11058 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11059 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11061 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11062 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11063 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11064 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11066 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11067 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11068 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11075 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11076 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11078 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11080 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11081 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11082 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11083 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11084 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11085 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11086 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11087 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11088 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11089 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11092 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11093 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11094 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11095 // channel still live case here.
11099 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11100 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11105 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11106 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11107 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11108 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11109 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11110 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11111 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11112 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11116 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11117 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11119 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11120 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11121 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11122 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11124 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11125 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11128 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11129 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11131 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11132 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11134 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11137 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11138 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11139 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11141 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11145 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11146 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11147 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11148 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11151 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11152 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11153 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11154 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11155 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11156 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11157 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11158 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11160 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11161 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11165 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11167 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11169 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11170 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11172 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11173 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11178 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11179 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11181 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11183 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11185 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11186 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11187 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11188 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11192 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11193 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11196 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11197 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11198 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11199 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11200 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11202 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11203 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11204 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11206 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11207 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11208 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11209 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11210 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11211 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11213 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11214 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11215 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11216 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11217 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11218 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11222 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11223 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11224 debug_assert!(false);
11225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11230 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11232 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11233 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11234 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11235 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11236 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11237 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11238 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11239 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11240 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11241 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11242 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11244 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11245 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11247 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11248 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11249 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11250 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11252 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11253 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11254 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11255 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11257 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11258 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11259 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11260 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11262 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11263 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11264 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11265 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11266 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11267 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11268 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11269 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11272 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11273 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11276 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11279 purpose: payment.purpose,
11280 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11281 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11282 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11288 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11289 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11290 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11291 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11292 for action in actions.iter() {
11293 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11294 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11295 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11297 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11299 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11300 blocked_channel_id);
11301 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11302 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11303 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11305 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11306 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11307 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11308 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11312 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11313 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11317 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11319 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11320 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11324 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11326 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11327 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11328 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11329 router: args.router,
11331 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11333 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11334 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11335 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11336 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11338 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11339 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11340 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11341 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11342 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11343 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11345 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11347 our_network_pubkey,
11350 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11352 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11354 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11355 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11356 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11357 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11358 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11360 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11361 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11363 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11365 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11367 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11368 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11369 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11371 logger: args.logger,
11372 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11375 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11376 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11377 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11378 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11379 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11382 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11383 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11384 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11385 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11386 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11387 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id);
11390 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11391 //connection or two.
11393 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11399 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11400 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11401 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11402 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11403 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11404 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11405 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11406 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11407 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11408 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11409 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11410 use crate::prelude::*;
11411 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11412 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11413 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11414 use crate::util::test_utils;
11415 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11416 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11419 fn test_notify_limits() {
11420 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11421 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11425 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11427 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11428 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11429 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11430 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11431 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11433 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11435 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11436 // to connect messages with new values
11437 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11438 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11439 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11440 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11441 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11442 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11444 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11445 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11446 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11447 // ... but the last node should not.
11448 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11449 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11450 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11451 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11453 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11454 // about the channel.
11455 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11456 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11457 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11459 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11461 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11462 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11463 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11464 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11465 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11466 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11468 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11469 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11470 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11472 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11473 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11474 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11475 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11476 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11477 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11479 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11480 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11481 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11482 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11483 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11484 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11485 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11486 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11488 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11489 // the channel info has updated.
11490 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11491 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11492 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11494 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11495 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11499 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11500 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11505 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11506 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11508 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11509 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11510 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11511 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11513 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11514 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11515 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11516 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11517 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11518 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11519 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11520 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11522 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11523 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11524 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11526 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11527 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11528 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11530 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11531 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11532 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11533 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11534 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11536 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11537 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11538 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11540 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11541 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11542 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11543 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11544 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11545 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11546 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11547 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11548 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11550 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11551 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11552 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11554 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11555 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11556 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11558 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11559 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11560 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11561 // lightning messages manually.
11562 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11563 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11566 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11567 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11568 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11569 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11571 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11572 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11574 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11575 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11577 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11578 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11579 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11581 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11582 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11583 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11585 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11587 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11589 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11590 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11593 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11594 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11595 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11598 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11599 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11600 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11601 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11606 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11607 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11608 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11609 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11611 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11616 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11617 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11618 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11621 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11622 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11623 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11624 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11625 // fails as expected.
11626 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11627 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11628 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11629 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11630 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11631 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11634 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11635 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11638 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11639 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11640 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11642 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11643 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11644 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11646 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11647 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11648 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11649 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11650 let route = find_route(
11651 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11652 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11654 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11655 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11657 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11659 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11660 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11661 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11663 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11664 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11665 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11666 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11667 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11669 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11671 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11672 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11673 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11674 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11675 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11676 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11677 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11679 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11680 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11682 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11683 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11684 let route = find_route(
11685 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11686 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11688 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11689 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11691 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11692 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11693 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11694 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11695 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11697 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11698 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11699 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11700 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11702 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11704 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11705 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11706 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11708 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11709 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11710 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11712 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11713 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11714 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11715 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11716 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11717 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11718 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11719 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11720 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11722 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11723 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11725 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11726 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11727 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11728 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11730 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11731 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11732 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11733 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11734 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11736 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11737 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11738 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11741 let route = find_route(
11742 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11743 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11745 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11746 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11747 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11751 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11752 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11757 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11759 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11760 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11761 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11762 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11763 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11764 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11765 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11766 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11767 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11769 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11774 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11775 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11776 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11782 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11783 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11785 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11786 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11787 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11788 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11789 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11790 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11791 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11792 let route = find_route(
11793 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11794 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11797 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11798 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11799 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11800 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11801 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11802 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11805 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11806 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11807 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11808 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11809 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11810 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11811 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11813 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11817 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11818 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11819 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11820 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11821 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11827 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11828 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11830 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11831 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11832 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11833 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11834 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11835 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11836 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11837 let route = find_route(
11838 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11839 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11842 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11843 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11844 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11845 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11846 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11847 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11848 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11849 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11853 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11854 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11855 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11858 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11860 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11864 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11868 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11870 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11871 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11872 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11873 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11875 // Marshall an MPP route.
11876 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11877 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11878 route.paths.push(path);
11879 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11880 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11881 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11882 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11883 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11884 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11886 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11887 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11889 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11890 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11892 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11897 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11898 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11901 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11903 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11905 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11906 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11908 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11909 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11911 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11914 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11915 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11916 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11917 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11918 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11919 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11922 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11925 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11926 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11931 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11932 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11936 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11938 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11939 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11941 total_msat: 100_000,
11944 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11945 // payment verification fails as expected.
11946 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11947 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11948 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11949 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11951 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11955 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11956 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11960 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11961 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11962 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11963 // the channel is successfully closed.
11964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11969 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11970 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11971 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11972 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11973 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11975 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11976 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11978 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11979 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11980 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11981 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11984 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11986 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11987 // as it has the funding transaction.
11988 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11989 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11990 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11993 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11995 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11997 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11999 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12000 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12001 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12003 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12006 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12007 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12008 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12009 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12010 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12013 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12014 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12016 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12017 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12018 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12019 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12021 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12022 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12023 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12024 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12026 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12027 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12029 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12030 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12031 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12032 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12033 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12034 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12035 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12039 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12040 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12041 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12042 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12043 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12044 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12045 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12048 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12050 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12051 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12052 // closing transaction).
12053 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12054 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12057 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12058 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12059 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12060 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12061 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12064 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12066 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12068 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12069 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12070 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12072 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12074 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12075 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12078 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12079 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12080 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12083 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12084 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12085 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12088 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12089 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12090 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12093 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12094 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12095 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12098 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12100 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12101 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12103 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12104 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12106 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12107 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12112 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12113 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12114 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12115 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12116 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12117 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12118 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12122 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12123 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12124 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12126 // Test the API functions.
12127 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12129 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12131 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12133 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12135 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12137 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12139 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12143 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12144 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12145 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12146 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12147 // the given `channel_id`.
12148 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12149 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12150 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12151 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12153 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12156 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12158 // Test the API functions.
12159 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12161 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12163 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12165 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12167 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12169 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12173 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12174 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12180 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12182 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12183 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12185 let mut funding_tx = None;
12186 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12187 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12188 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12191 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12192 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12193 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12194 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12195 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12197 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12199 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12201 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12203 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12205 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12207 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12210 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12211 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12212 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12213 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12214 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12215 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12217 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12218 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12220 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12221 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12222 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12223 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12224 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12225 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12226 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12229 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12230 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12231 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12232 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12233 }, true).unwrap_err();
12235 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12236 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12237 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12238 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12239 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12240 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12241 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12243 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12244 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12246 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12247 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12248 }, true).unwrap_err();
12250 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12251 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12252 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12253 }, false).unwrap();
12254 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12256 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12257 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12259 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12260 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12261 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12262 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12263 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12266 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12267 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12269 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12270 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12271 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12273 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12274 // "protected" and can connect again.
12275 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12276 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12277 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12279 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12281 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12283 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12284 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12288 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12289 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12293 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12295 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12297 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12298 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12300 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12301 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12302 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12303 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12306 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12308 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12309 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12310 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12312 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12313 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12314 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12316 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12317 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12318 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12319 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12323 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12324 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12325 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12328 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12329 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12331 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12333 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12336 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12338 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12339 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12340 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12341 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12342 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12343 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12346 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12347 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12349 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12350 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12354 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12355 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12358 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12359 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12360 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12361 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12362 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12364 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12367 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12368 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12369 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12370 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12376 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12377 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12379 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12380 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12381 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12383 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12384 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12386 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12388 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12392 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12393 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12394 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12395 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12396 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12397 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12398 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12399 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12400 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12401 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12402 payment_metadata: None,
12403 keysend_preimage: None,
12404 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12405 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12407 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12409 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12410 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12411 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12412 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12413 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12414 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12415 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12417 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12418 } else { panic!(); }
12420 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12421 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12422 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12423 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12424 payment_metadata: None,
12425 keysend_preimage: None,
12426 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12427 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12429 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12431 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12432 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12433 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12434 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12438 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12439 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12440 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12441 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12442 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12444 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12445 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12446 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12447 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12448 payment_metadata: None,
12449 keysend_preimage: None,
12450 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12453 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12454 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12455 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12457 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12458 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12459 // is not satisfied.
12460 assert!(result.is_ok());
12464 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12465 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12466 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12467 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12468 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12470 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12471 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12473 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12474 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12475 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12476 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12477 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12479 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12480 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12482 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12484 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12485 match &msg_events[0] {
12486 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12487 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12489 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12490 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12491 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12497 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12498 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12500 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12501 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12502 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12504 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12508 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12509 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12510 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12511 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12514 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12515 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12516 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12520 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12521 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12522 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12524 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12525 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12527 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12528 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12533 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12534 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12536 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12537 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12539 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12540 // not have generated any events.
12541 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12545 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12546 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12547 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12548 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12549 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12550 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12551 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12552 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12554 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12555 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12558 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12559 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12561 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12564 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12565 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12568 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12569 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12572 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12573 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12574 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12575 ..Default::default()
12577 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12578 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12579 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12581 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12582 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12585 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12586 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12587 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12588 ..Default::default()
12590 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12591 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12592 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12593 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12595 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12596 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12599 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12600 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12601 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12602 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12603 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12606 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12607 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12608 ..Default::default()
12610 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12613 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12614 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12615 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12616 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12620 fn test_payment_display() {
12621 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12622 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12623 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12624 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12625 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12626 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12630 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12631 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12632 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12633 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12634 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12635 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12637 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12638 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12639 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12640 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12641 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12642 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12643 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12644 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12646 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12647 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12648 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12651 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12652 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12654 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12655 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12657 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12658 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12659 }, false).unwrap();
12660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12661 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12662 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12664 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12666 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12667 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12668 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12669 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12670 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12671 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12672 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12673 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12674 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12675 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12676 } else { panic!() };
12677 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12678 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12679 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12680 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12682 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12684 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12685 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12686 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12691 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12692 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12693 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12694 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12697 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12698 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12699 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12701 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12702 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12704 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12705 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12708 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12709 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12710 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12712 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12716 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12717 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12718 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12720 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12725 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12726 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12727 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12728 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12730 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12731 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12732 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12734 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12736 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12737 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12738 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12739 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12741 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12742 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12744 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12750 use crate::chain::Listen;
12751 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12752 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12753 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12754 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12755 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12756 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12757 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12758 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12759 use crate::util::test_utils;
12760 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12762 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12763 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12764 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12765 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12767 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12769 use criterion::Criterion;
12771 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12772 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12773 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12774 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12775 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12776 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12777 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12779 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12780 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12782 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12783 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12785 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12787 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12790 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12791 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12794 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12795 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12796 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12798 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12799 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12801 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12802 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12803 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12804 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12805 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12807 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12808 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12809 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12811 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12812 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12813 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12814 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12816 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12817 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12818 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12820 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12821 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12822 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12823 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12824 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12826 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12827 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12828 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12830 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12831 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12833 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12834 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12835 }, false).unwrap();
12836 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12837 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12838 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12841 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12842 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12843 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12845 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12846 } else { panic!(); }
12848 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12849 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12850 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12851 match events_b[0] {
12852 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12853 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12855 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12858 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12859 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12860 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12861 match events_a[0] {
12862 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12863 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12868 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12870 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12871 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12872 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12874 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12875 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12876 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12877 match msg_events[0] {
12878 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12879 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12880 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12884 match msg_events[1] {
12885 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12889 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12890 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12891 match events_a[0] {
12892 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12893 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12898 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12899 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12900 match events_b[0] {
12901 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12902 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12907 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12908 macro_rules! send_payment {
12909 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12910 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12911 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12912 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12913 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12914 payment_count += 1;
12915 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12916 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12918 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12919 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12920 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12921 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12922 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12923 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12924 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12925 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12926 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12927 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12928 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12930 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12931 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12932 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12933 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12935 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12936 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12937 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12938 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12939 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12941 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12944 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12945 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12946 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12947 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12949 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12953 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12954 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12955 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);