1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// A forwarded HTLC.
117 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
125 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126 /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127 /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
129 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138 /// settled by this node.
139 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
143 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
145 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
170 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
171 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
172 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
173 // TODO: needs update when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
174 if let Self::Forward { blinded: Some(_), .. } = self {
175 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)
182 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
183 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
184 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
185 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
186 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
187 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
188 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
189 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
190 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
191 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
192 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
193 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
194 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
195 /// may overshoot this in either case)
196 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
197 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
198 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
199 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
200 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
201 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
204 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
205 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
206 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
207 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
210 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
211 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
212 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
213 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
214 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
217 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
218 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
220 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
221 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
222 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
225 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
226 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
228 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
229 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
232 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
233 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
236 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
240 // Used for failing blinded HTLCs backwards correctly.
241 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
242 enum BlindedFailure {
243 FromIntroductionNode,
244 // Another variant will be added here for non-intro nodes.
247 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
248 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
249 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
250 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
251 short_channel_id: u64,
252 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
254 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
255 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
256 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
258 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
259 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
264 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
266 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
267 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
268 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
270 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
271 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
274 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
275 struct ClaimableHTLC {
276 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
278 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
280 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
281 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
282 sender_intended_value: u64,
283 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
285 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
286 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
287 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
288 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
290 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
291 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
294 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
295 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
296 events::ClaimedHTLC {
297 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
298 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
299 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
300 value_msat: val.value,
301 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
306 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
307 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
309 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
310 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
311 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
314 /// Number of bytes in the id.
315 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
318 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
319 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
324 impl Readable for PaymentId {
325 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
326 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
331 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
332 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
333 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
337 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
339 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
340 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
341 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
343 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
344 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
349 impl Readable for InterceptId {
350 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
351 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
356 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
357 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
358 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
359 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
360 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
363 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
365 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
366 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
367 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
369 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
370 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
375 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
376 (0, short_channel_id, required),
377 (2, htlc_id, required),
379 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
380 (0, session_priv, required),
385 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
386 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
387 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
388 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
389 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
392 session_priv: SecretKey,
393 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
394 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
395 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
396 payment_id: PaymentId,
399 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
400 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
401 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
405 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
407 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
410 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
411 payment_id.hash(hasher);
412 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
418 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
420 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
421 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
422 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
423 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
424 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
425 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
429 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
430 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
431 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
432 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
433 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
434 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
436 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
442 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
443 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
445 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
446 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
447 pub enum FailureCode {
448 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
449 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
450 TemporaryNodeFailure,
451 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
452 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
453 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
454 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
455 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
456 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
457 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
458 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
459 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
460 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
462 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
463 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
464 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
467 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
468 fn into(self) -> u16 {
470 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
471 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
472 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
473 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
478 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
479 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
480 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
481 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
482 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
484 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
485 err: msgs::LightningError,
486 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
487 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
488 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
490 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
492 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
494 err: LightningError {
496 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
497 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
510 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
513 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
514 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
515 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
516 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
517 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
518 // commitment upon reconnecting.
519 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
521 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
524 err: LightningError { err, action },
525 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
526 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
527 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
531 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
534 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
536 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
537 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
541 log_level: Level::Warn,
544 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
546 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
548 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
550 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
551 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
559 shutdown_finish: None,
560 channel_capacity: None,
564 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
565 self.chan_id.is_some()
569 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
570 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
571 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
572 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
573 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
575 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
576 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
577 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
578 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
579 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
580 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
581 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
583 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
587 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
588 struct ClaimingPayment {
590 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
591 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
592 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
593 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
596 (0, amount_msat, required),
597 (2, payment_purpose, required),
598 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
599 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
600 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
603 struct ClaimablePayment {
604 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
605 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
606 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
609 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
610 struct ClaimablePayments {
611 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
612 /// failed/claimed by the user.
614 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
615 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
617 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
618 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
619 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
621 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
622 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
623 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
624 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
627 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
628 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
629 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
630 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
632 enum BackgroundEvent {
633 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
634 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
635 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
636 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
638 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
639 /// are regenerated on startup.
640 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
641 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
642 /// channel to continue normal operation.
644 /// In general this should be used rather than
645 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
646 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
647 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
649 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
650 /// are regenerated on startup.
651 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
652 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
653 funding_txo: OutPoint,
654 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
656 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
657 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
659 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
660 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
661 channel_id: ChannelId,
666 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
667 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
668 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
669 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
670 /// event can be generated.
671 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
672 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
673 /// operation of another channel.
675 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
676 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
677 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
678 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
680 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
681 event: events::Event,
682 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
684 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
685 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
686 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
688 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
689 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
690 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
691 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
692 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
694 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
695 /// stored for later processing.
696 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
697 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
698 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
699 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
704 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
705 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
706 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
707 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
708 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
709 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
710 (4, blocking_action, required),
712 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
713 (0, event, upgradable_required),
714 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
715 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
716 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
717 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
718 // downgrades to prior versions.
719 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
723 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
724 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
725 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
726 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
727 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
730 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
731 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
732 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
733 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
737 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
738 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
739 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
740 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
741 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
742 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
744 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
745 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
752 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
753 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
754 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
755 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
756 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
761 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
762 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
766 /// State we hold per-peer.
767 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
768 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
770 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
771 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
772 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
774 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
775 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
776 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
777 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
778 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
779 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
780 latest_features: InitFeatures,
781 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
782 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
783 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
784 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
785 /// user but which have not yet completed.
787 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
788 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
789 /// for a missing channel.
790 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
791 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
792 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
794 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
795 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
796 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
797 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
799 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
800 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
801 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
802 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
803 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
804 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
805 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
806 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
807 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
808 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
809 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
810 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
811 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
812 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
813 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
817 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
818 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
819 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
820 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
821 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
822 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
825 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
826 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
827 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
830 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
831 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
832 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
835 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
836 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
837 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
838 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
842 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
843 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
844 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
845 /// The original OpenChannel message.
846 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
847 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
848 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
851 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
852 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
853 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
855 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
856 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
858 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
861 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
862 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
863 struct PendingInboundPayment {
864 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
865 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
866 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
867 /// this payment being removed.
869 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
870 user_payment_id: u64,
871 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
872 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
873 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
876 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
877 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
878 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
879 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
880 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
881 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
882 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
883 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
885 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
886 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
887 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
895 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
897 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
898 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
899 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
904 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
905 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
906 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
907 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
908 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
909 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
910 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
911 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
912 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
914 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
915 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
916 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
925 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
927 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
928 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
929 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
934 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
936 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
938 pub trait AChannelManager {
939 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
940 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
941 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
942 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
943 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
944 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
945 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
946 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
947 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
948 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
949 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
950 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
951 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
952 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
953 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
954 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
955 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
956 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
957 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
958 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
959 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
960 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
961 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
962 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
963 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
964 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
965 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
966 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
967 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
968 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
969 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
970 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
971 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
972 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
973 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
974 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
978 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
989 type Watch = M::Target;
991 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
993 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
995 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
997 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
998 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1000 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1002 type Router = R::Target;
1004 type Logger = L::Target;
1006 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1009 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1010 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1012 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1013 /// to individual Channels.
1015 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1016 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1017 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1018 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1020 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1021 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1022 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1023 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1024 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1025 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1026 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1027 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1028 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1030 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1031 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1032 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1034 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1035 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1036 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1037 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1038 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1040 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1041 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1042 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1043 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1045 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1046 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1047 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1049 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1050 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1051 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1052 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1053 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1055 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1056 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1057 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1058 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1059 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1060 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1061 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1062 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1065 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1066 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1067 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1068 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1069 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1073 // `pending_offers_messages`
1075 // `total_consistency_lock`
1077 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1079 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1081 // |__`per_peer_state`
1083 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1085 // |__`claimable_payments`
1087 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1093 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1095 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1099 // |__`pending_events`
1101 // |__`pending_background_events`
1103 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1105 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1106 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1107 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1109 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1110 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1114 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1115 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1116 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1122 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1124 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1126 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1127 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1129 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1130 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1131 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1132 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1134 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1135 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1137 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1138 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1139 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1140 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1141 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1142 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1143 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1144 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1146 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1148 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1149 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1151 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1153 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1154 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1155 /// and via the classic SCID.
1157 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1158 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1160 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1164 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1165 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1166 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1168 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1169 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1171 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1172 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1174 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1175 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1177 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1178 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1179 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1180 /// active channel list on load.
1182 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1183 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1185 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1187 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1188 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1189 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1191 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1192 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1193 /// the handling of the events.
1195 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1196 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1199 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1200 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1201 /// would break backwards compatability.
1202 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1203 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1204 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1206 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1207 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1209 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1211 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1212 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1213 /// confirmation depth.
1215 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1216 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1217 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1219 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1221 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1223 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1225 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1227 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1229 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1230 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1231 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1233 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1234 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1236 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1237 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1238 /// keeping additional state.
1239 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1241 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1242 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1243 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1244 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1246 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1247 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1249 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1250 /// are currently open with that peer.
1252 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1253 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1256 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1258 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1259 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1260 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1261 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1262 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1264 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1265 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1266 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1267 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1268 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1270 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1271 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1275 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1276 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1277 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1279 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1280 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1282 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1283 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1284 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1285 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1286 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1288 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1290 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1293 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1294 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1295 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1296 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1297 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1298 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1299 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1300 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1301 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1302 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1304 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1305 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1306 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1308 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1310 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1311 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1313 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1317 signer_provider: SP,
1322 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1324 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1325 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1326 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1327 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1328 pub struct ChainParameters {
1329 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1330 pub network: Network,
1332 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1334 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1335 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1338 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1342 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1343 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1346 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1347 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1348 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1349 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1350 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1351 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1353 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1354 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1355 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1356 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1357 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1358 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1360 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1361 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1364 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1365 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1366 /// events to handle.
1368 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1369 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1371 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1372 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1375 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1376 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1377 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1378 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1380 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1381 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1382 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1383 should_persist: move || {
1384 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1385 // processing and return that.
1386 let notify = persist_check();
1387 match (notify, force_notify) {
1388 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1389 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1390 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1391 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1392 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1395 _read_guard: read_guard,
1399 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1400 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1401 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1402 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1403 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1404 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1406 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1407 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1408 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1409 should_persist: persist_check,
1410 _read_guard: read_guard,
1415 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1416 fn drop(&mut self) {
1417 match (self.should_persist)() {
1418 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1419 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1420 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1422 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1423 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1424 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1429 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1430 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1432 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1435 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1436 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1437 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1438 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1440 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1441 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1443 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1445 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1446 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1447 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1448 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1449 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1450 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1451 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1452 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1453 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1454 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1455 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1456 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1457 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1459 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1460 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1462 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1463 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1464 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1465 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1467 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1468 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1469 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1470 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1471 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1472 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1475 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1477 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1478 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1481 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1483 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1484 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1486 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1487 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1488 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1490 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1491 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1492 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1494 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1495 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1496 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1497 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1499 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1500 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1501 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1503 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1504 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1505 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1507 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1508 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1509 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1510 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1511 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1512 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1513 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1514 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1515 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1516 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1517 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1520 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1521 /// to better separate parameters.
1522 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1523 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1524 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1525 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1526 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1527 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1528 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1529 pub features: InitFeatures,
1530 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1531 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1532 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1534 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1536 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1537 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1538 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1539 /// payments to us through this channel.
1540 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1541 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1542 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1543 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1544 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1545 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1546 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1549 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1550 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1551 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1552 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1553 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1554 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1555 /// lifetime of the channel.
1556 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1557 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1558 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1559 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1560 /// our counterparty already.
1562 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1563 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1564 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1565 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1567 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1568 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1569 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1570 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1572 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1573 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1575 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1576 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1578 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1579 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1580 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1581 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1582 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1583 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1584 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1585 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1586 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1589 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1591 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1592 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1593 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1594 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1595 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1596 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1597 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1599 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1600 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1602 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1603 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1604 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1605 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1606 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1607 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1608 /// this value on chain.
1610 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1612 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1614 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1615 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1616 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1617 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1618 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1619 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1620 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1622 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1623 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1624 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1625 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1626 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1627 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1629 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1630 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1631 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1632 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1633 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1635 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1636 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1637 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1638 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1640 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1641 pub balance_msat: u64,
1642 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1643 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1644 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1645 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1647 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1649 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1650 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1651 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1652 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1653 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1654 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1655 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1656 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1658 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1659 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1660 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1661 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1662 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1663 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1664 /// route which is valid.
1665 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1666 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1667 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1668 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1669 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1670 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1672 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1673 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1674 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1675 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1676 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1677 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1678 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1679 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1680 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1682 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1684 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1685 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1686 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1687 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1688 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1690 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1691 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1692 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1693 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1694 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1695 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1696 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1698 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1699 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1700 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1701 pub is_outbound: bool,
1702 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1703 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1704 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1705 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1706 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1708 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1709 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1710 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1711 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1712 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1713 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1714 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1716 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1717 pub is_usable: bool,
1718 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1719 pub is_public: bool,
1720 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1721 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1722 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1723 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1724 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1725 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1727 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1728 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1731 impl ChannelDetails {
1732 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1733 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1734 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1736 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1737 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1738 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1739 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1742 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1743 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1744 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1746 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1747 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1748 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1749 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1752 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1753 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1754 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1757 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1758 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1760 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1761 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1762 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1764 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1765 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1766 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1767 features: latest_features,
1768 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1769 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1770 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1771 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1772 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1773 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1774 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1775 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1776 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1777 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1779 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1780 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1781 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1782 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1783 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1784 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1785 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1786 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1787 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1788 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1789 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1790 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1791 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1792 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1793 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1794 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1795 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1796 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1797 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1798 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1799 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1800 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1801 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1802 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1803 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1804 config: Some(context.config()),
1805 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1810 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1811 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1812 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1813 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1814 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1815 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1816 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1817 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1818 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1820 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1822 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1823 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1825 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1826 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1827 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1828 /// to drop the channel.
1832 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1833 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1834 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1835 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1836 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1838 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1839 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1840 payment_id: PaymentId,
1842 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1844 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1845 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1846 payment_id: PaymentId,
1847 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1849 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1850 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1851 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1854 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1855 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1856 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1858 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1859 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1860 payment_id: PaymentId,
1861 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1862 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1863 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1865 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1866 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1867 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1869 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1870 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1871 payment_id: PaymentId,
1872 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1873 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1877 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1879 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1881 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1882 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1883 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1884 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1886 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1887 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1888 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1891 macro_rules! handle_error {
1892 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1893 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1894 // entering the macro.
1895 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1896 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1900 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1901 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1903 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1904 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1905 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1906 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1910 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1911 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1912 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1913 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1914 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1915 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1920 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1921 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1923 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1924 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1925 action: err.action.clone()
1929 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1930 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1931 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1932 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1937 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1942 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1945 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1946 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1947 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1953 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1954 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1955 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1956 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1957 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1958 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1960 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1961 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1962 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1963 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1964 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1966 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1967 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1969 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1973 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1974 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1975 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1977 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1978 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1980 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1981 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1983 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1984 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1985 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1986 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1987 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1988 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1990 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1991 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1995 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1996 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1998 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1999 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2001 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2002 match $channel_phase {
2003 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2004 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2007 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2009 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2010 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2016 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2017 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2021 let key = *$entry.key();
2022 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2024 $entry.remove_entry();
2032 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2033 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2037 let key = *$entry.key();
2038 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2040 $entry.remove_entry();
2048 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2049 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2051 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2052 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2058 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2059 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2060 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2061 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2062 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2064 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2065 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2066 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2067 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2068 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2069 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2070 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2071 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2072 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2073 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2078 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2079 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2080 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2081 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2082 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2083 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2084 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2085 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2086 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2088 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2093 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2094 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2095 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2096 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2097 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2098 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2099 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2100 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2101 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2103 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2108 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2109 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2110 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2111 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2112 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2113 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2114 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2115 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2116 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2117 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2118 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2120 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2121 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2122 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2128 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2129 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2131 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2132 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2133 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2134 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2135 updates.announcement_sigs);
2136 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2137 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2140 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2141 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2142 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2143 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2145 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2146 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2147 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2148 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2149 let mut batch_completed = false;
2150 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2151 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2152 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2153 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2155 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2156 channel_state.2 = true;
2158 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2160 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2162 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2165 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2166 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2167 if batch_completed {
2168 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2169 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2170 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2171 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2172 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2173 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2174 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2175 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2176 chan.set_batch_ready();
2177 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2178 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2182 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2183 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2184 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2189 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2191 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2192 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2194 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2195 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2196 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2197 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2202 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2203 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2204 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2206 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2207 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2208 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2209 panic!("{}", err_str);
2211 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2212 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2213 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2216 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2222 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2223 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2224 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2226 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2227 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2228 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2229 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2230 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2231 // filter for uniqueness here.
2232 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2233 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2234 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2235 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2237 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2238 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2240 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2241 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2242 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2248 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2249 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2250 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2251 while !processed_all_events {
2252 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2259 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2260 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2261 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2263 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2264 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2265 result = $self.process_background_events();
2267 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2268 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2269 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2270 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2274 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2275 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2276 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2277 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2280 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2282 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2283 $event_to_handle = event;
2285 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2286 post_event_actions.push(action);
2291 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2292 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2293 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2294 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2295 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2296 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2299 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2300 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2301 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2302 processed_all_events = false;
2306 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2307 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2308 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2310 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2311 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2312 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2318 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2320 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2321 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2322 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2323 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2324 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2325 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2329 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2331 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2333 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2334 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2336 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2338 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2339 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2340 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2343 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2344 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2345 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2347 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2348 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2349 current_timestamp: u32,
2351 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2352 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2353 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2354 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2356 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2357 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2358 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2363 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2365 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2366 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2367 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2368 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2369 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2370 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2371 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2372 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2374 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2377 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2378 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2380 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2382 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2384 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2386 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2387 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2388 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2389 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2390 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2391 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2392 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2393 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2395 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2405 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2406 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2407 &self.default_configuration
2410 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2411 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2412 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2415 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2416 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2418 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2420 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2424 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2429 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2431 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2432 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2433 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2434 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2435 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2437 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2438 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2440 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2441 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2442 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2444 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2445 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2446 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2448 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2449 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2451 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2452 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2453 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2454 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2455 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2456 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2458 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2459 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2460 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2461 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2462 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2463 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2467 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2468 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2472 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2473 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2475 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2477 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2478 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2484 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2485 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2486 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2487 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2488 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2489 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2493 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2498 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2500 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2501 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2504 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2506 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2512 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2513 node_id: their_network_key,
2516 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2519 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2520 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2521 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2522 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2523 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2524 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2525 // the same channel.
2526 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2530 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2533 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2534 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2535 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2536 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2540 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2541 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2542 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2550 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2551 /// more information.
2552 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2553 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2554 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2555 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2556 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2557 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2558 // the same channel.
2559 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2561 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2563 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2566 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2567 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2568 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2576 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2577 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2579 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2580 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2582 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2583 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2584 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2585 // really wanted anyway.
2586 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2589 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2590 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2591 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2592 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2594 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2597 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2598 let context_to_details = |context| {
2599 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2601 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2603 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2604 .map(context_to_details)
2610 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2611 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2613 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2614 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2615 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2617 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2618 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2619 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2620 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2621 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2622 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2624 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2625 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2626 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2628 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2629 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2630 payment_id: *payment_id,
2631 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2632 total_msat: *total_msat,
2635 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2636 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2638 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2639 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2641 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2646 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2647 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2648 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2649 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2650 Some(transaction) => {
2651 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2652 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2657 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2658 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2659 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2660 reason: closure_reason,
2661 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2662 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2666 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2669 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2670 let shutdown_result;
2672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2675 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2677 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2678 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2680 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2682 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2683 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2684 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2685 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2686 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2687 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2688 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2689 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2691 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2692 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2693 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2694 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2695 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2699 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2700 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2702 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2703 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2704 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2705 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2709 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2710 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2711 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2712 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2716 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2723 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2724 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2726 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2727 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2728 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2729 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2734 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2735 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2736 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2740 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2741 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2747 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2748 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2749 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2751 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2752 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2754 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2755 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2756 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2757 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2759 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2761 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2762 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2763 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2766 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2767 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2768 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2769 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2770 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2774 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2775 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2776 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2778 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2779 /// the channel being closed or not:
2780 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2781 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2782 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2783 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2784 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2785 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2786 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2788 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2789 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2790 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2791 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2793 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2795 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2796 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2797 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2800 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2801 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2802 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2803 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2804 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2807 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2808 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2809 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2810 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2811 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2814 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2815 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2816 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2817 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2818 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2821 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2822 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2823 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2824 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2825 // ignore the result here.
2826 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2828 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2829 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2830 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2831 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2833 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2834 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2835 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2836 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2837 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2838 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2839 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2840 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2843 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2846 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2847 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2850 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2851 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2855 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2856 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2857 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2858 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2860 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2861 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2862 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2863 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2864 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2865 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2867 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2869 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2870 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2871 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2872 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2873 mem::drop(peer_state);
2874 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2876 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2877 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2878 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2880 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2881 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2882 // Unfunded channel has no update
2883 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2886 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2887 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2888 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2889 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2891 (None, *peer_node_id)
2893 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2896 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2897 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2898 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2900 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2901 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2902 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2903 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2904 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2910 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2913 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2915 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2916 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2918 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2919 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2921 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2922 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2923 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2924 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2935 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2936 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2937 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2939 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2940 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2941 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2944 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2945 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2946 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2948 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2949 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2950 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2951 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2952 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2955 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2956 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2957 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2958 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2959 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2963 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2964 /// local transaction(s).
2965 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2966 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2967 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2971 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2972 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2974 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2976 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2977 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2980 let is_blinded = match next_hop {
2981 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2982 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward { .. }, ..
2984 _ => false, // TODO: update this when we support receiving to multi-hop blinded paths
2987 macro_rules! return_err {
2988 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2990 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2991 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_blinded {
2992 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
2993 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
2994 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2995 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2996 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2997 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
2998 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3004 let NextPacketDetails {
3005 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3006 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3007 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3008 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3009 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3012 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3013 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3014 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3015 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3016 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3017 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3018 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3019 // phantom or an intercept.
3020 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3021 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3022 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3026 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3029 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3031 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3033 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3034 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3035 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3039 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3040 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3043 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3044 // have no consistency guarantees.
3045 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3049 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3050 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3051 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3052 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3053 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3055 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3056 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3057 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3058 // we don't have the channel here.
3059 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3061 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3063 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3064 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3065 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3066 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3067 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3068 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3069 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3070 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3071 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3072 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3073 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3075 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3078 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3079 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3081 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3082 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3089 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3091 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3092 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3094 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3095 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3096 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3097 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3098 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3100 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3101 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3107 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3108 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3109 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3110 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3112 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3113 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3115 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3116 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3117 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3119 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3120 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3121 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3122 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3123 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3124 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3125 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3129 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3131 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3134 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3135 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3136 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3137 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3138 macro_rules! return_err {
3139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3141 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3142 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3143 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3144 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3145 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3146 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3152 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3154 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3155 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3156 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3157 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3160 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3161 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3162 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3163 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3164 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3166 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3169 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3170 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3171 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3172 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3173 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3179 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3180 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3181 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3183 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3184 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3185 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3187 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3188 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3189 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3190 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3191 return Err(LightningError {
3192 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3193 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3196 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3197 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3200 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3203 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3204 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3205 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3206 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3208 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3209 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3210 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3212 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3213 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3214 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3216 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3217 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3221 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3224 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3225 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3226 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3228 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3229 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3230 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3231 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3232 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3235 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3236 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3238 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3239 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3240 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3241 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3242 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3243 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3244 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3245 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3247 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3248 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3249 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3251 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3253 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3260 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3261 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3262 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3263 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3268 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3269 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3270 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3273 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3274 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3276 log_trace!(self.logger,
3277 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3278 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3279 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3280 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3282 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3283 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3284 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3287 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3288 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3289 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3290 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3294 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3295 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3298 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3299 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3300 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3301 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3302 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3304 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3305 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3306 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3308 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3309 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3311 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3312 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3313 Some(monitor_update) => {
3314 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3316 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3317 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3318 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3319 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3320 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3321 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3322 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3330 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3333 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3334 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3335 // `channel_by_id` map.
3336 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3337 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3342 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3343 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3345 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3350 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3352 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3353 /// fields for more info.
3355 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3356 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3358 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3360 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3361 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3362 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3363 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3364 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3366 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3367 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3368 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3369 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3370 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3372 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3373 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3374 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3375 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3377 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3379 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3380 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3381 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3383 /// In general, a path may raise:
3384 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3385 /// node public key) is specified.
3386 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3387 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3388 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3389 /// relevant updates.
3391 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3392 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3393 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3395 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3396 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3397 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3398 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3399 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3400 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3401 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3402 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3404 self.pending_outbound_payments
3405 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3406 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3407 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3410 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3411 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3412 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3413 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3414 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3415 self.pending_outbound_payments
3416 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3417 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3418 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3419 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3423 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3424 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3426 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3427 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3428 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3432 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3433 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3434 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3438 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3439 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3442 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3443 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3445 self.pending_outbound_payments
3446 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3447 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3448 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3449 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3450 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3454 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3455 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3456 /// retries are exhausted.
3458 /// # Event Generation
3460 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3461 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3463 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3464 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3465 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3467 /// # Requested Invoices
3469 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3470 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3471 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3472 /// once the invoice has been received.
3474 /// # Restart Behavior
3476 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3477 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3478 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3480 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3481 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3483 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3486 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3487 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3488 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3489 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3490 /// never reach the recipient.
3492 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3493 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3495 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3496 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3498 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3499 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3500 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3502 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3503 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3504 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3507 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3508 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3510 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3513 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3514 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3515 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3517 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3518 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3519 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3520 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3523 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3524 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3525 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3526 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3527 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3529 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3530 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3531 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3534 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3537 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3538 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3541 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3542 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3544 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3545 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3546 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3547 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3548 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3549 let payment_params =
3550 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3552 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3554 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3557 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3558 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3560 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3561 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3562 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3563 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3565 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3566 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3567 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3568 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3569 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3570 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3571 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3572 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3573 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3574 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3576 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3577 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3578 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3579 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3583 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3585 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3586 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3589 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3591 let mut res = Vec::new();
3593 for mut path in route.paths {
3594 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3595 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3596 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3597 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3598 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3601 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3604 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3605 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3607 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3609 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3610 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3615 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3618 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3623 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3624 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3625 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3627 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3628 let used_liquidity =
3629 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3631 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3632 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3634 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3637 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3642 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3643 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3644 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3651 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3652 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3653 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3654 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3655 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3656 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3658 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3659 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3661 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3662 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3663 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3664 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3665 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3667 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3668 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3669 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3670 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3671 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3672 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3673 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3674 } else { unreachable!(); });
3676 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3677 Err((chan, err)) => {
3678 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3679 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3681 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3682 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3683 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3689 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3692 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3693 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3696 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3697 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3698 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3702 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3703 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3704 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3708 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3710 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3713 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3714 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3715 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3717 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3724 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3725 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3726 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3730 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3732 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3733 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3735 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3736 /// across the p2p network.
3738 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3739 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3741 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3742 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3743 /// keys per-channel).
3745 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3746 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3747 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3749 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3750 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3751 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3753 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3754 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3755 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3756 /// for more details.
3758 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3759 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3760 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3761 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3764 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3766 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3767 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3769 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3770 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3771 /// signature for each channel.
3773 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3774 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3776 let mut result = Ok(());
3778 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3779 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3780 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3781 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3782 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3787 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3788 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3789 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3793 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3794 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3795 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3796 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3797 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3798 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3799 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3800 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3802 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3803 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3808 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3809 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3810 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3811 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3815 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3816 match states.entry(txid) {
3817 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3818 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3819 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3823 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3826 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3827 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3828 temporary_channel_id,
3829 counterparty_node_id,
3830 funding_transaction.clone(),
3833 let mut output_index = None;
3834 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3835 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3836 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3837 if output_index.is_some() {
3838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3839 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3842 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3845 if output_index.is_none() {
3846 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3847 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3850 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3851 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3852 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3858 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3859 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3860 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3861 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3862 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3863 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3864 .into_iter().flatten()
3865 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3867 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3868 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3870 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3873 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3874 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3875 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3876 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3878 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3879 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3880 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3884 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3885 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3891 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3893 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3894 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3895 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3896 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3898 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3899 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3901 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3902 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3904 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3906 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3907 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3908 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3909 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3910 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3911 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3912 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3913 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3914 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3915 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3916 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3918 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3924 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3925 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3928 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3929 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3930 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3931 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3935 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3936 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3937 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3938 config.apply(config_update);
3939 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3942 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3943 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3944 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3945 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3946 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3947 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3954 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3955 debug_assert!(false);
3956 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3958 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3959 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3966 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3968 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3969 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3970 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3971 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3973 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3974 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3976 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3977 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3979 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3981 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3982 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3983 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3984 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3985 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3986 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3987 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3988 pub fn update_channel_config(
3989 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3990 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3991 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3994 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3995 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3997 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3998 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4000 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4001 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4002 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4003 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4004 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4006 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4007 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4008 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4011 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4014 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4015 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4016 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4017 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4018 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4019 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4022 let next_hop_scid = {
4023 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4024 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4025 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4029 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4030 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4031 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4032 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4035 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4037 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4038 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4039 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4042 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4043 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4044 log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4045 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4052 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4053 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4054 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4057 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4058 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4059 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4060 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4063 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4065 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4066 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4067 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4068 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4069 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4072 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4073 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4074 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4075 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4076 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4078 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4082 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4083 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4085 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4088 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4089 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4092 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4093 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4094 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4097 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4098 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4099 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4100 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4101 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4102 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4103 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4104 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4105 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4108 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4109 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4110 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4111 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4116 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4118 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4119 /// Will likely generate further events.
4120 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4123 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4124 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4125 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4127 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4128 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4130 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4131 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4132 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4134 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4135 match forward_info {
4136 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4137 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4138 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4139 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4140 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4143 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4144 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4145 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4147 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4148 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4149 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4150 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4151 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4153 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4154 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4157 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4158 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4160 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4163 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4164 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4170 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4171 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4173 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4177 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4178 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4180 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4184 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4185 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4186 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4187 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4188 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4189 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4190 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4193 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4194 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4195 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4196 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4197 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4199 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4201 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4202 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4206 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4207 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4208 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4209 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4210 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4211 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4213 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4214 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4220 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4223 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4226 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4227 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4228 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4229 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4230 // problem, not ours.
4236 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4237 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4238 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4240 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4245 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4246 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4247 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4252 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4253 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4254 match forward_info {
4255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4256 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4257 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4258 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4259 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4260 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4261 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4265 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4266 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4267 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4268 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4269 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4270 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4271 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4272 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4273 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|_| BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode),
4275 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4276 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4277 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4278 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4279 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4280 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4283 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4284 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4285 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4288 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4291 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4293 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4294 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4295 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4296 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4301 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4302 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4304 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4306 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4307 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4309 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4312 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4314 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4315 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4316 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4323 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4327 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4328 match forward_info {
4329 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4330 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4331 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4332 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4333 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4336 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4337 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4338 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4339 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4340 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4341 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4342 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4343 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4345 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4346 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4347 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4351 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4352 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4355 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4358 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4359 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4360 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4361 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4362 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4363 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4364 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4365 phantom_shared_secret,
4368 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4369 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4370 // if routing nodes overpay
4371 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4372 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4374 total_value_received: None,
4375 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4381 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4383 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4384 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4385 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4386 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4387 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4388 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4390 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4391 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4392 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4393 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4394 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4395 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4396 phantom_shared_secret,
4397 blinded_failure: None,
4399 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4400 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4402 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4405 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4406 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4407 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4408 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4409 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4412 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4413 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4414 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4415 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4416 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4417 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4419 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4420 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4421 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4423 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4424 .entry(payment_hash)
4425 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4426 .or_insert_with(|| {
4427 committed_to_claimable = true;
4429 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4432 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4433 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4435 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4437 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4441 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4442 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4443 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4446 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4448 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4449 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4450 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4451 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4452 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4453 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4454 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4456 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4457 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4459 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4461 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4462 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4463 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4464 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4465 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4468 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4469 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4470 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4471 committed_to_claimable = true;
4473 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4474 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4475 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4476 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4477 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4478 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4479 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4480 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4481 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4482 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4486 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4487 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4488 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4489 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4490 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4492 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4494 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4495 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4497 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4498 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4499 committed_to_claimable = true;
4502 payment_claimable_generated
4506 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4507 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4508 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4509 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4510 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4511 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4512 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4513 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4515 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4516 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4517 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4518 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4519 Ok(result) => result,
4521 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4522 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4525 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4526 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4527 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4529 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4530 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4533 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4534 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4535 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4537 check_total_value!(purpose);
4539 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4540 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4541 check_total_value!(purpose);
4545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4546 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4548 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4550 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4551 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4552 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4553 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4554 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4555 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4556 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4557 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4559 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4560 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4561 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4563 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4564 if payment_claimable_generated {
4565 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4571 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4572 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4580 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4581 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4582 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4583 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4585 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4586 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4588 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4590 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4591 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4592 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4594 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4596 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4597 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4598 events.append(&mut new_events);
4601 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4603 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4604 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4605 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4607 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4609 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4610 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4611 if background_events.is_empty() {
4612 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4615 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4617 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4618 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4619 // monitor updating completing.
4620 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4622 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4623 let mut updated_chan = false;
4625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4626 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4629 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4630 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4631 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4632 updated_chan = true;
4633 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4634 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4636 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4644 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4645 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4648 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4650 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4651 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4652 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4653 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4654 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4656 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4657 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4658 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4659 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4660 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4666 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4669 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4670 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4671 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4672 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4673 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4676 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4677 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4678 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4679 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4680 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4681 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4682 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4684 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4686 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4687 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4688 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4689 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4692 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4694 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4695 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4699 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4700 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4701 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4702 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4703 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4704 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4705 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4707 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4708 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4711 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4712 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4713 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4714 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4715 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4717 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4722 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4723 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4731 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4733 /// This currently includes:
4734 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4735 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4736 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4738 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4739 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4740 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4741 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4742 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4743 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4744 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4745 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4747 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4748 /// estimate fetches.
4750 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4751 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4752 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4753 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4754 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4756 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4757 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4759 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4760 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4761 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4762 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4764 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4765 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4766 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4767 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4768 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4769 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4771 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4772 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4773 log_error!(self.logger,
4774 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4775 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4776 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4777 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4778 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4779 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4780 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4781 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4782 channel_id: *chan_id,
4783 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4795 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4798 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4799 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4800 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4802 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4803 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4808 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4809 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4811 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4812 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4813 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4814 if needs_close { return false; }
4817 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4818 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4819 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4820 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4821 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4822 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4823 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4824 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4826 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4827 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4828 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4829 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4833 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4835 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4838 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4840 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4841 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4842 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4847 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4849 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4855 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4857 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4858 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4859 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4860 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4861 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4862 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4863 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4864 channel_id: *chan_id,
4865 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4873 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4874 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4875 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4877 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4878 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4879 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4884 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4885 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4886 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4887 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4888 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4889 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4890 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4891 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4897 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4899 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4900 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4905 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4906 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4907 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4908 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4909 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4910 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4911 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4912 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4913 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4914 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4915 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4917 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4918 // have no channels to the peer.
4919 let remove_entry = {
4920 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4921 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4924 entry.remove_entry();
4927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4932 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4933 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4934 // This should be unreachable
4935 debug_assert!(false);
4938 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4939 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4940 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4941 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4942 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4943 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4944 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4947 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4948 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4949 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4951 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4952 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4959 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4960 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4961 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4962 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4963 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4966 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4967 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4970 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4971 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4974 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4975 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4976 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4977 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4978 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4979 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4980 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4983 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4984 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4987 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4988 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4989 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4990 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4991 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4998 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4999 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5000 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5002 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5003 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5004 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5005 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5007 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5008 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5009 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5010 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5011 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5012 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5015 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5016 /// reason for the failure.
5018 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5019 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5022 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5023 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5024 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5025 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5026 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5027 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5033 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5034 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5035 match failure_code {
5036 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5037 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5038 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5039 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5040 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5041 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5043 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5044 let fail_data = match data {
5045 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5048 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5053 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5054 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5056 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5058 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5059 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5060 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5061 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5062 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5063 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5064 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5066 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5068 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5069 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5071 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5076 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5077 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5078 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5079 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5080 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5081 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5082 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5083 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5084 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5085 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5087 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5088 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5089 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5090 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5092 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5093 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5094 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5095 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5096 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5100 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5101 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5102 // be surfaced to the user.
5103 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5104 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5105 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5107 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5108 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5109 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5112 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5114 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5115 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5117 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5118 debug_assert!(false);
5119 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5124 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5127 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5128 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5129 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5130 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5134 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5135 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5136 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5137 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5138 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5139 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5140 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5141 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5142 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5143 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5146 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5147 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5148 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5151 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5152 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5153 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5155 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5156 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5157 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5158 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5159 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5161 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5163 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5165 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5166 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5167 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5168 push_forward_ev = true;
5170 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5172 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5175 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5178 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5179 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5180 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5181 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5182 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5183 failed_next_destination: destination,
5189 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5190 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5192 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5193 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5194 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5195 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5197 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5198 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5199 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5200 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5202 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5203 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5204 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5206 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5207 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5208 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5209 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5210 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5211 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5212 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5213 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5214 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5217 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5218 /// even type numbers.
5222 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5223 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5225 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5226 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5227 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5230 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5231 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5236 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5237 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5238 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5239 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5240 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5241 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5242 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5243 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5248 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5249 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5250 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5251 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5252 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5254 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5255 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5256 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5260 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5261 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5262 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5263 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5264 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5265 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5266 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5267 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5268 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5269 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5270 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5279 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5281 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5282 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5283 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5284 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5285 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5286 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5287 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5288 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5289 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5291 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5292 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5293 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5294 debug_assert!(false);
5298 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5300 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5301 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5302 debug_assert!(false);
5306 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5307 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5309 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5310 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5311 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5312 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5315 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5316 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5317 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5318 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5322 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5323 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5324 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5325 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5326 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5327 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5330 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5331 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5332 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5333 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5334 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5339 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5340 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5341 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5342 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5343 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5344 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5345 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5347 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5350 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5351 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5352 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5353 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5357 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5358 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5359 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5360 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5362 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5363 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5364 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5365 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5367 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5368 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5369 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5370 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5374 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5375 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5376 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5380 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5381 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5382 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5385 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5388 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5389 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5390 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5391 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5394 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5395 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5398 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5401 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5402 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5404 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5405 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5406 // monitor update as a background event.
5407 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5408 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5409 counterparty_node_id,
5410 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5411 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5415 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5416 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5421 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5425 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5426 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5427 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5428 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5429 blocking_action: blocker,
5431 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5433 debug_assert!(false,
5434 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5437 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5438 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5439 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5440 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5441 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5443 let mut found_blocker = false;
5444 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5445 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5446 // which case we need to only remove the one
5447 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5448 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5449 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5450 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5452 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5455 debug_assert!(false);
5464 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5465 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5466 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5472 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5473 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5474 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5475 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5476 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5477 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5478 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5479 // again on restart.
5480 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5481 payment_preimage, update_res);
5484 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5485 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5487 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5488 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5489 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5490 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5491 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5492 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5493 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5494 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5495 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5496 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5499 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5500 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5501 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5502 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5503 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5504 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5508 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5509 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5512 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5513 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5514 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5517 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5518 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5519 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5520 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5521 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5523 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5524 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5525 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5527 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5528 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5531 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5532 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5533 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5534 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5535 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5536 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5537 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5538 let chan_to_release =
5539 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5540 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5542 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5543 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5544 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5545 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5550 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5551 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5552 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5553 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5554 // in the background.
5555 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5556 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5557 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5558 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5560 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5561 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5562 funding_txo, update, ..
5564 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5565 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5566 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5567 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5569 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5575 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5576 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5577 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5579 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5580 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5582 monitor_update.updates[0],
5583 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5588 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5589 // immediately once we get going.
5590 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5593 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5595 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5598 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5599 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5600 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5601 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5602 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5603 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5607 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5608 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5609 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5612 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5613 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5615 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5616 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5617 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5618 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5620 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5624 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5625 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5626 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5632 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5633 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5634 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5637 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5638 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5639 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5640 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5642 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5644 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5645 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5646 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5648 payment_purpose: purpose,
5651 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5653 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5657 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5659 sender_intended_total_msat,
5663 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5664 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5666 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5667 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5668 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5671 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5672 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5674 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5675 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5676 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5677 Some(blocking_action),
5684 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5685 /// update completion.
5686 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5687 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5688 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5689 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5690 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5691 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5693 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5694 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5695 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5696 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5697 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5698 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5700 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5702 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5703 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5704 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5705 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5708 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5709 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5711 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5712 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5713 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5718 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5719 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5720 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5721 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5726 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5727 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5729 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5730 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5735 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5739 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5745 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5746 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5747 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5751 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5752 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5753 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5759 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5760 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5762 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5763 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5765 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5766 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5767 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5768 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5769 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5775 let mut peer_state_lock;
5776 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5777 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5778 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5781 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5784 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5785 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5786 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5787 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5788 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5791 let remaining_in_flight =
5792 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5793 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5796 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5797 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5798 remaining_in_flight);
5799 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5802 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5805 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5807 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5808 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5811 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5812 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5813 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5815 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5816 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5817 /// used to accept such channels.
5819 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5820 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5821 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5822 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5825 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5826 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5828 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5829 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5830 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5832 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5833 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5835 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5836 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5838 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5839 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5841 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5842 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5843 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5844 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5847 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5850 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5851 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5854 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5857 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5859 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5860 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5861 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5863 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5864 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5865 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5866 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5867 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5868 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5869 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5871 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5875 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5876 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5877 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5878 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5879 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5880 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5881 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5884 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5887 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5888 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5889 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5890 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5891 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5892 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5893 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5894 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5898 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5902 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5903 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5904 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5907 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5908 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5911 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5916 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5917 /// or 0-conf channels.
5919 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5920 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5921 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5922 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5923 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5924 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5926 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5927 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5928 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5929 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5930 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5931 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5932 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5936 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5939 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5940 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5942 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5943 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5945 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5946 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5947 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5948 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5949 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5951 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5954 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5955 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5956 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5959 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5960 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5965 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5968 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5969 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5970 // likely to be lost on restart!
5971 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5972 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5975 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5979 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5980 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5981 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5982 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5983 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5985 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5986 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5988 debug_assert!(false);
5989 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5994 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5995 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5996 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5997 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5998 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5999 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6002 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6003 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6006 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6007 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6008 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6009 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6010 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6013 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6014 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6019 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6020 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6021 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6022 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6023 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6024 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6025 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6026 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6027 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6029 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6030 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6031 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6036 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6037 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6038 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6039 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6040 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6041 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6042 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6050 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6051 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6052 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6054 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6058 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6059 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6062 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6063 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6065 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6069 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6070 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6071 // likely to be lost on restart!
6072 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6076 debug_assert!(false);
6077 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6081 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6082 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6083 match phase.get_mut() {
6084 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6085 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6086 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6097 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6098 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6099 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6100 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6102 user_channel_id: user_id,
6107 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6108 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6111 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6113 debug_assert!(false);
6114 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6119 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6120 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6121 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6122 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6124 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6125 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6126 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6127 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6128 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6129 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6130 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6132 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6136 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6139 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6144 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6145 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6146 chan.context.channel_id()
6149 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6150 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6151 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6153 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6154 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6155 chan.context.channel_id()))
6157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6158 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6159 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6160 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6161 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6163 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6164 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6165 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6166 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6167 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6169 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6175 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6176 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6178 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6182 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6183 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6184 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6185 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6188 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6197 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6199 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6200 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6202 debug_assert!(false);
6203 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6210 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6211 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6212 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6213 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6214 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6215 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6218 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6230 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6231 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6232 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6233 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6234 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6236 debug_assert!(false);
6237 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6241 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6243 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6244 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6245 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6246 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6248 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6249 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6250 msg: announcement_sigs,
6252 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6253 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6254 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6255 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6256 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6257 // announcement_signatures.
6258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6259 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6260 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6261 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6268 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6269 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6274 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6275 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6278 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6279 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6284 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6285 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6286 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6296 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6297 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6299 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6300 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6301 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6303 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6306 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6307 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6308 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6309 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6311 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6312 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6313 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6314 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6316 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6320 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6321 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6322 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6323 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6326 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6327 let context = phase.context_mut();
6328 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6329 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6330 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6331 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6335 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6338 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6339 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6340 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6343 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6344 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6350 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6354 debug_assert!(false);
6355 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6357 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6360 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6362 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6363 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6364 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6365 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6366 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6367 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6372 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6373 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6374 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6375 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6376 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6377 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6378 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6380 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6381 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6387 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6388 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6389 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6391 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6392 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6399 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6401 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6402 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6403 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6408 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6409 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6410 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6411 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6413 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6414 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6415 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6416 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6418 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6419 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6421 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6423 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6425 debug_assert!(false);
6426 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6430 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6432 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6433 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6434 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6435 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6436 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6437 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6439 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6440 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6441 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6442 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6443 match pending_forward_info {
6444 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6445 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6446 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6447 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6449 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6450 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6451 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6452 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6453 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6456 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6458 _ => pending_forward_info
6461 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6463 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6464 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6472 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6474 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6478 debug_assert!(false);
6479 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6483 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6485 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6486 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6487 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6488 log_trace!(self.logger,
6489 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6491 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6492 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6493 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6495 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6496 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6497 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6498 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6499 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6500 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6501 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6504 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6505 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6511 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6515 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6516 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6517 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6519 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6521 debug_assert!(false);
6522 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6526 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6528 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6529 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6531 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6532 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6535 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6540 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6541 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6542 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6546 debug_assert!(false);
6547 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6551 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6553 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6554 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6555 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6557 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6558 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6560 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6561 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6569 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6570 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6571 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6573 debug_assert!(false);
6574 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6578 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6579 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6580 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6581 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6582 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6583 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6584 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6585 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6589 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6590 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6598 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6599 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6600 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6601 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6602 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6603 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6604 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6605 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6606 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6607 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6608 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6610 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6611 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6613 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6614 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6615 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6617 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6618 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6621 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6622 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6624 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6625 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6626 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6628 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6629 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6630 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6631 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6632 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6635 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6636 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6639 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6640 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6641 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6642 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6643 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6644 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6645 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6646 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6647 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6650 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6651 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6652 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6657 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6658 // payments are being processed.
6659 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6660 push_forward_event = true;
6662 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6663 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6670 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6671 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6674 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6675 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6676 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6678 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6682 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6683 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6684 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6685 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6686 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6688 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6689 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6690 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6691 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6692 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6693 // real by taking more time.
6694 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6695 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6696 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6701 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6702 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6703 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6704 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6705 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6706 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6707 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6709 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6710 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6711 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6712 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6713 channel_funding_outpoint,
6714 counterparty_node_id,
6719 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6720 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6721 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6724 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6725 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6726 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6728 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6729 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6730 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6736 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6737 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6739 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6741 debug_assert!(false);
6742 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6743 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6745 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6747 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6748 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6749 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6750 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6751 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6752 *counterparty_node_id)
6754 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6755 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6756 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6757 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6758 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6759 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6760 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6764 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6765 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6771 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6775 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6776 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6777 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6779 debug_assert!(false);
6780 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6786 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6787 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6789 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6790 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6798 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6802 debug_assert!(false);
6803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6809 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6810 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6814 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6815 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6816 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6817 msg, &self.default_configuration
6818 ), chan_phase_entry),
6819 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6820 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6821 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6824 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6825 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6833 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6834 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6835 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6836 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6838 // It's not a local channel
6839 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6843 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6844 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6845 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6849 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6851 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6852 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6853 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6854 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6855 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6856 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6857 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6859 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6861 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6862 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6863 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6864 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6866 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6867 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6868 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6871 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6875 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6876 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6881 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6884 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6886 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6889 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6891 debug_assert!(false);
6892 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6893 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6897 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6899 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6901 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6902 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6903 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6904 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6905 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6906 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6907 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6908 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6909 let mut channel_update = None;
6910 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6911 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6912 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6915 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6916 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6917 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6918 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6919 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6920 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6921 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6926 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6927 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6928 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6929 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6930 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6931 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6935 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6936 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6940 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6941 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6942 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6943 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6944 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6945 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6946 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6947 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6949 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6950 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6951 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6952 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6953 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6954 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6955 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6956 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6957 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6958 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6959 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6960 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6961 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6962 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6963 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6964 next_funding_txid: None,
6967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6968 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6969 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6975 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6976 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6977 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6978 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6981 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6982 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6987 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6988 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6989 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6991 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6992 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6993 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6994 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6995 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6996 match monitor_event {
6997 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6998 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7000 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7003 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7004 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7005 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7008 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7009 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7010 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7012 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7013 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7014 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7015 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7018 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7020 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7022 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7023 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7024 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7025 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7026 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7027 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7032 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7034 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7035 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7036 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7044 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7045 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7051 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7052 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7055 has_pending_monitor_events
7058 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7059 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7060 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7062 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7064 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7067 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7068 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7069 /// update was applied.
7070 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7071 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7072 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7074 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7075 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7076 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7077 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7079 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7080 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7083 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7084 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7085 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7087 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7088 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7089 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7090 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7091 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7092 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7094 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7095 has_monitor_update = true;
7097 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7098 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7099 continue 'peer_loop;
7108 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7109 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7110 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7116 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7117 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7119 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7120 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7122 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7123 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7124 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7125 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7128 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7129 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7131 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7132 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7133 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7138 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7139 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7144 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7145 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7150 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7151 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7157 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7158 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7161 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7162 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7166 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7167 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7168 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7169 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7170 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7176 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7177 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7178 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7179 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7180 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7181 let mut has_update = false;
7182 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7184 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7186 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7189 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7190 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7192 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7193 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7194 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7195 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7197 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7198 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7201 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7202 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7203 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7205 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7206 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7207 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7208 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7209 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7214 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7216 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7217 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7218 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7224 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7225 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7230 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7236 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7237 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7240 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7241 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7247 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7248 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7250 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7251 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7252 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7253 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7254 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7255 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7256 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7257 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7258 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7259 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7260 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7261 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7262 assert!(should_broadcast);
7263 } else { unreachable!(); }
7264 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7265 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7266 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7269 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7273 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7274 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7275 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7279 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7280 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7281 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7282 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7286 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7289 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7291 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7292 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7293 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7294 &self, description: String
7295 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7296 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7297 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7298 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7299 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7300 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7302 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7303 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7307 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7308 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7312 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7313 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7315 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7316 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7317 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7320 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7321 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7322 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7324 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7325 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7329 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7330 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7331 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7332 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7336 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7337 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7341 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7342 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7344 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7346 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7347 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7348 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7349 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7350 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7351 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7352 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7353 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7354 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7355 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7356 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7357 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7359 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7360 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7362 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7363 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7366 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7367 self.pending_outbound_payments
7368 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7369 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7371 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7376 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7377 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7378 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7380 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7381 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7382 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7383 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7384 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7385 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7386 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7388 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7389 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7393 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7394 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7397 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7398 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7399 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7403 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7404 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7405 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7406 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7410 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7411 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7412 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7416 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7417 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7419 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7420 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7421 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7422 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7423 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7424 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7425 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7426 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7427 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7428 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7429 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7430 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7431 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7432 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7433 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7436 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7437 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7438 let builder = match quantity {
7440 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7442 let builder = match amount_msats {
7444 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7446 let builder = match payer_note {
7448 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7451 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7452 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7454 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7455 self.pending_outbound_payments
7456 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7457 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7459 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7461 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7462 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7463 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7464 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7465 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7468 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7470 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7471 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7472 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7473 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7474 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7475 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7476 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7477 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7478 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7480 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7487 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7490 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7491 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7492 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7496 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7497 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7498 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7499 /// received and no retries will be made.
7501 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7502 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7503 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7504 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7505 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7507 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7508 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7510 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7511 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7512 let payment_paths = vec![
7513 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7515 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7516 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7517 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7519 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7520 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7521 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7523 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7524 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7525 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7527 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7528 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7530 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7531 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7532 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7533 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7534 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7537 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7539 for path in refund.paths() {
7540 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7541 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7542 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7543 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7545 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7551 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7555 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7558 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7559 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7561 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7562 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7563 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7564 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7566 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7568 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7569 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7573 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7574 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7576 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7578 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7579 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7581 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7582 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7583 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7584 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7585 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7586 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7587 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7588 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7589 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7590 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7591 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7594 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7595 /// stored external to LDK.
7597 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7598 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7599 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7601 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7602 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7605 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7606 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7607 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7608 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7610 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7611 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7612 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7613 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7614 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7616 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7617 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7618 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7619 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7620 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7622 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7623 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7625 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7626 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7630 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7631 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7633 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7635 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7636 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7638 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7639 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7640 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7641 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7642 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7643 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7644 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7647 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7648 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7650 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7651 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7652 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7655 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7657 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7658 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7659 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7660 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7663 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7665 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7666 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7667 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7668 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7669 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7671 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7672 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7673 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7675 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7677 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7680 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7681 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7682 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7686 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7687 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7689 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7690 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7692 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7694 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7695 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7696 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7697 Some(_) => continue,
7698 None => return scid_candidate
7703 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7705 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7706 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7708 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7709 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7710 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7714 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7715 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7716 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7718 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7719 /// times to get a unique scid.
7720 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7721 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7722 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7724 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7725 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7726 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7727 return scid_candidate
7731 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7732 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7733 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7734 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7737 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7740 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7741 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7743 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7744 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7745 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7754 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7755 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7756 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7757 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7758 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7762 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7763 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7764 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7765 events.push_back((event, None));
7769 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7770 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7771 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7775 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7776 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7780 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7781 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7784 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7785 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7786 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7787 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7788 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7791 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7792 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7795 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7796 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7797 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7798 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7800 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7804 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7805 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7806 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7807 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7808 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7809 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7810 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7814 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7815 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7816 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7817 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7818 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7819 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7820 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7821 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7822 if further_update_exists {
7823 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7828 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7829 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7834 log_debug!(self.logger,
7835 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7836 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7842 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7843 for action in actions {
7845 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7846 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7848 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7854 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7855 /// using the given event handler.
7857 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7858 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7862 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7866 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7877 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7878 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7879 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7880 /// is always placed next to each other.
7882 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7883 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7884 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7885 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7887 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7888 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7889 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7890 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7891 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7892 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7893 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7895 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7896 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7897 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7898 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7901 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7902 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7904 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7905 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7908 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7910 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7911 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7912 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7913 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7914 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7918 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7919 events.replace(pending_events);
7928 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7930 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7932 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7933 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7934 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7935 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7939 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7941 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7942 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7943 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7945 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7949 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7951 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7952 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7953 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7954 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7955 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7956 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7960 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7962 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7963 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7964 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7965 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7966 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7969 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7970 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7973 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7974 let _persistence_guard =
7975 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7976 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7977 let new_height = height - 1;
7979 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7980 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7981 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7982 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7983 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7984 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7987 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7991 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7997 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8002 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8003 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8004 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8005 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8007 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8008 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8010 let _persistence_guard =
8011 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8012 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8013 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8014 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8016 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8017 if height < last_best_block_height {
8018 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8019 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8023 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8024 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8025 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8026 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8028 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8029 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8031 let _persistence_guard =
8032 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8033 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8034 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8036 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8038 macro_rules! max_time {
8039 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8041 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8042 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8043 // having an explicit local time source.
8044 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8045 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8046 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8047 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8048 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8054 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8055 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8056 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8057 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8061 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8062 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8063 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8066 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8067 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8068 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8069 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8070 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8071 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8078 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8079 let _persistence_guard =
8080 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8081 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8082 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8083 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8084 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8085 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8086 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8087 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8092 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8094 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8095 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8096 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8097 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8098 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8099 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8103 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8104 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8106 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8107 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8108 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8109 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8110 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8112 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8113 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8116 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8119 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8120 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8122 // Retain unfunded channels.
8123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8124 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8125 let res = f(channel);
8126 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8127 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8128 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8129 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8130 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8132 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8133 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8134 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8136 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8138 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8149 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8152 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8154 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8155 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8156 msg: announcement_sigs,
8158 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8159 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8160 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8162 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8163 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8164 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8169 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8170 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8171 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8172 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8173 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8174 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8175 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8176 // is always consistent.
8177 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8178 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8179 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8180 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8181 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8184 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8185 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8186 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8187 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8188 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8189 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8194 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8195 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8197 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8198 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8199 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8200 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8201 data: reason_message,
8214 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8215 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8216 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8217 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8218 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8219 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8220 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8221 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8222 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8223 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8225 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8226 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8227 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8231 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8234 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8235 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8236 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8237 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8238 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8239 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8240 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8241 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8242 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8243 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8244 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8247 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8248 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8249 _ => unreachable!(),
8251 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8252 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8253 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8260 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8262 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8263 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8267 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8268 /// may have events that need processing.
8270 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8271 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8273 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8274 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8275 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8276 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8279 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8280 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8281 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8284 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8285 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8286 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8289 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8290 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8291 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8292 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8295 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8296 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8297 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8298 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8301 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8302 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8304 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8305 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8306 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8307 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8308 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8311 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8312 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8313 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8314 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8317 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8318 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8319 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8320 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8323 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8324 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8325 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8326 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8329 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8330 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8331 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8332 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8336 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8337 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8339 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8341 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8342 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8343 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8344 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8348 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8349 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8350 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8351 // change to the contents.
8352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8353 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8354 let persist = match &res {
8355 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8356 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8357 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8359 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8361 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8366 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8367 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8368 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8369 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8372 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8373 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8374 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8375 // change to the contents.
8376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8378 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8382 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8383 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8384 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8385 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8388 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8390 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8393 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8394 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8395 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8398 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8399 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8400 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8401 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8402 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8404 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8405 let persist = match &res {
8406 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8407 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8409 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8414 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8415 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8416 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8417 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8420 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8421 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8422 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8423 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8426 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8427 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8428 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8429 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8432 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8433 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8434 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8435 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8438 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8440 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8443 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8445 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8448 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8449 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8450 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8451 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8453 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8454 let persist = match &res {
8455 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8456 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8457 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8459 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8464 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8469 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8470 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8471 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8472 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8473 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8474 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8475 let persist = match &res {
8476 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8477 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8478 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8480 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8485 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8486 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8487 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8488 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8490 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8491 let persist = match &res {
8492 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8493 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8494 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8496 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8501 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8503 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8506 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8507 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8508 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8511 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8512 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8513 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8514 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8516 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8517 let persist = match &res {
8518 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8519 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8520 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8522 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8527 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8532 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8533 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8534 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8537 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8542 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8544 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8545 let persist = match &res {
8546 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8547 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8548 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8550 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8555 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8557 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8558 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8559 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8561 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8562 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8563 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8566 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8567 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8568 let context = match phase {
8569 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8570 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8571 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8576 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8577 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8580 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8584 // Clean up for removal.
8585 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8586 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8587 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8590 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8591 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8592 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8593 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8595 // V1 Channel Establishment
8596 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8597 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8598 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8599 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8600 // V2 Channel Establishment
8601 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8602 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8603 // Common Channel Establishment
8604 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8605 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8607 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8612 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8620 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8622 // Channel Operations
8623 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8628 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8631 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8632 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8633 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8641 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8642 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8643 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8644 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8647 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8649 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8651 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8652 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8656 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8657 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8658 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8662 let mut res = Ok(());
8664 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8665 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8666 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8667 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8668 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8669 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8670 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8673 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8674 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8676 if inbound_peer_limited {
8678 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8680 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8681 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8682 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8683 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8684 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8685 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8686 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8687 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8692 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8693 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8696 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8697 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8698 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8701 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8704 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8705 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8710 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8713 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8716 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8718 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8719 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8720 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8721 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8722 // worry about closing and removing them.
8723 debug_assert!(false);
8727 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8728 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8729 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8734 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8735 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8740 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8743 match &msg.data as &str {
8744 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8745 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8747 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8748 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8749 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8750 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8751 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8752 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8753 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8754 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8756 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8757 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8758 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8759 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8760 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8762 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8766 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8767 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8768 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8769 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8770 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8771 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8773 log_level: Level::Trace,
8783 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8784 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8785 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8786 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8787 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8790 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8791 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8792 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8793 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8795 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8796 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8797 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8801 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8803 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8804 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8807 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8808 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8809 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8810 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8818 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8819 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8823 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8824 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8827 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8828 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8831 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8832 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8835 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8837 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8838 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8841 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8843 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8844 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8847 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8848 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8849 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8850 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8853 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8854 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8855 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8856 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8859 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8860 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8861 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8862 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8865 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8866 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8867 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8868 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8871 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8872 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8873 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8874 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8877 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8878 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8879 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8880 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8883 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8884 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8885 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8886 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8890 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8891 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8893 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8895 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8897 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8902 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8903 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8904 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8907 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8908 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8911 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8912 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8914 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8915 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8917 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8918 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8921 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8923 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8924 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8925 let payment_paths = vec![
8926 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8928 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8929 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8930 payment_paths, payment_hash
8932 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8933 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8934 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8936 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8937 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8938 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8940 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8941 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8942 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8945 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8946 let payment_paths = vec![
8947 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8949 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8950 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8951 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8952 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8953 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8955 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8956 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8957 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8959 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8960 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8962 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8963 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8964 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8965 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8967 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8968 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8972 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8973 Err(error) => Some(error),
8977 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8981 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8982 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8984 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
8986 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8987 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8990 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8992 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
8999 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9000 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9006 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9007 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9011 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9012 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9013 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9014 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9015 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9019 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9020 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9022 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9023 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9024 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9025 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9026 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9029 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9030 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9031 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9032 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9035 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9036 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9037 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9038 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9041 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9042 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9043 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9044 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9047 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9048 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9049 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9050 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9051 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9052 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9053 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9054 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9055 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9056 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9057 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9058 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9059 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9060 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9061 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9062 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9063 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9064 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9065 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9066 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9071 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9072 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9074 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9075 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9076 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9077 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9080 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9081 (2, node_id, required),
9082 (4, features, required),
9083 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9084 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9085 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9086 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9089 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9090 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9091 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9092 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9093 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9094 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9095 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9096 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9097 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9098 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9099 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9100 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9101 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9102 (7, self.config, option),
9103 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9104 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9105 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9106 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9107 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9108 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9109 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9110 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9111 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9112 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9113 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9114 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9115 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9116 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9117 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9118 (32, self.is_public, required),
9119 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9120 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9121 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9122 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9123 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9129 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9130 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9131 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9132 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9133 (2, channel_id, required),
9134 (3, channel_type, option),
9135 (4, counterparty, required),
9136 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9137 (6, funding_txo, option),
9138 (7, config, option),
9139 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9140 (9, confirmations, option),
9141 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9142 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9143 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9144 (16, balance_msat, required),
9145 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9146 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9147 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9148 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9149 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9150 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9151 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9152 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9153 (26, is_outbound, required),
9154 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9155 (30, is_usable, required),
9156 (32, is_public, required),
9157 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9158 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9159 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9160 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9161 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9164 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9165 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9166 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9167 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9168 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9172 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9174 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9175 outbound_scid_alias,
9179 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9180 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9182 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9183 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9184 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9185 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9186 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9187 confirmations_required,
9189 force_close_spend_delay,
9190 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9191 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9192 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9193 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9194 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9195 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9196 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9197 channel_shutdown_state,
9202 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9203 (2, channels, required_vec),
9204 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9205 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9208 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9209 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9212 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9214 (0, onion_packet, required),
9215 (1, blinded, option),
9216 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9219 (0, payment_data, required),
9220 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9221 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9222 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9223 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9225 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9226 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9227 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9228 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9229 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9230 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9234 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9235 (0, routing, required),
9236 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9237 (4, payment_hash, required),
9238 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9239 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9240 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9241 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9245 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9248 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9250 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9251 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9252 reason.write(writer)?;
9254 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9255 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9258 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9259 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9260 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9261 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9268 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9269 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9270 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9273 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9274 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9275 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9276 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9280 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9281 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9282 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9283 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9284 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9287 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9288 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9289 // messages contained in the variants.
9290 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9291 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9292 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9294 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9295 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9296 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9297 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9298 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9301 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9302 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9303 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9304 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9305 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9307 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9312 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9317 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9318 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {}, ;
9321 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9322 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9323 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9324 (2, outpoint, required),
9325 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9326 (4, htlc_id, required),
9327 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9328 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9331 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9332 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9333 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9334 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9335 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9337 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9338 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9339 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9340 (2, self.value, required),
9341 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9342 (4, payment_data, option),
9343 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9344 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9345 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9346 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9352 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9353 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9354 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9355 (0, prev_hop, required),
9356 (1, total_msat, option),
9357 (2, value_ser, required),
9358 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9359 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9360 (5, total_value_received, option),
9361 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9362 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9363 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9365 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9366 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9367 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9369 if payment_data.is_some() {
9370 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9372 if total_msat.is_none() {
9373 total_msat = Some(value);
9375 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9378 if total_msat.is_none() {
9379 if payment_data.is_none() {
9380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9382 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9384 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9388 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9391 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9392 total_value_received,
9393 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9395 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9396 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9401 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9402 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9403 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9406 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9407 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9408 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9409 let mut payment_id = None;
9410 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9411 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9412 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9413 (0, session_priv, required),
9414 (1, payment_id, option),
9415 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9416 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9417 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9418 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9420 if payment_id.is_none() {
9421 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9423 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9425 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9426 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9427 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9429 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9430 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9431 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9432 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9436 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9437 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9438 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9440 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9443 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9444 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9449 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9450 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9452 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9454 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9455 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9456 (0, session_priv, required),
9457 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9458 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9459 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9460 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9461 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9462 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9465 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9467 field.write(writer)?;
9474 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9475 (0, forward_info, required),
9476 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9477 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9478 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9479 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9482 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9484 (0, htlc_id, required),
9485 (2, err_packet, required),
9490 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9491 (0, payment_secret, required),
9492 (2, expiry_time, required),
9493 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9494 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9495 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9498 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9500 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9501 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9502 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9503 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9504 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9505 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9509 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9510 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9512 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9514 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9516 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9517 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9518 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9521 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9523 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9524 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9525 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9528 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9529 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9532 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9533 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9537 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9539 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9542 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9543 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9544 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9547 channel.write(writer)?;
9553 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9554 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9555 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9556 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9557 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9558 for forward in pending_forwards {
9559 forward.write(writer)?;
9564 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9566 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9567 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9568 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9570 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9571 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9572 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9573 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9574 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9575 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9576 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9577 htlc.write(writer)?;
9579 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9580 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9583 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9584 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9585 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9586 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9587 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9588 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9589 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9592 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9593 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9594 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9595 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9596 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9598 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9599 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9600 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9601 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9602 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9603 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9604 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9609 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9610 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9611 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9612 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9613 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9614 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9615 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9616 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9617 0u64.write(writer)?;
9619 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9620 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9621 event.write(writer)?;
9625 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9626 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9627 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9628 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9629 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9630 0u64.write(writer)?;
9632 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9633 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9634 // likely to be identical.
9635 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9636 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9638 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9639 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9640 hash.write(writer)?;
9641 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9644 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9645 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9646 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9647 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9648 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9651 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9652 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9654 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9655 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9656 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9657 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9660 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9661 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9662 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9663 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9667 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9668 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9669 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9671 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9672 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9673 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9679 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9680 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9681 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9682 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9685 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9686 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9687 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9688 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9689 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9692 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9693 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9694 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9695 if !updates.is_empty() {
9696 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9697 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9702 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9703 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9704 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9705 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9706 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9707 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9708 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9709 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9710 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9711 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9712 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9713 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9714 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9721 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9722 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9723 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9724 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9727 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9728 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9729 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9730 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9731 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9732 // check that the event is sane here.
9733 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9734 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9735 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9736 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9742 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9743 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9744 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9745 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9746 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9747 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9750 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9751 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9752 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9753 events.push_back((ev, action));
9754 } else if action.is_some() {
9755 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9762 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9763 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9764 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9765 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9766 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9767 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9770 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9772 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9774 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9775 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9776 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9777 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9778 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9779 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9780 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9781 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9782 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9783 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9784 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9785 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9786 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9788 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9789 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9791 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9792 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9794 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9795 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9796 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9797 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9798 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9799 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9801 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9802 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9804 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9805 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9806 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9807 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9808 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9809 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9813 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9814 pub entropy_source: ES,
9816 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9817 pub node_signer: NS,
9819 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9820 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9822 pub signer_provider: SP,
9824 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9826 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9827 pub fee_estimator: F,
9828 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9830 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9831 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9832 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9833 pub chain_monitor: M,
9835 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9836 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9837 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9838 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9839 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9840 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9842 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9844 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9845 /// deserialization.
9847 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9848 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9849 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9851 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9852 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9854 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9855 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9856 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9857 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9859 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9862 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9863 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9866 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9867 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9869 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9870 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9871 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9872 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9873 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9874 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9878 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9879 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9880 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9881 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9882 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9884 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9885 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9890 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9891 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9892 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9893 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9904 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9905 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9906 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9910 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9911 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9913 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9915 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9916 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9917 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9922 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9923 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9925 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9926 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9927 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9929 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9931 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9932 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9933 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9934 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9935 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9936 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9937 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9938 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9939 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9940 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9942 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9943 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9944 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9945 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9946 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9947 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9948 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9949 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9950 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9951 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9952 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9953 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9954 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9956 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9957 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9958 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9960 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9961 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9962 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9964 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9965 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9966 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9968 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9969 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9972 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
9973 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9974 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9977 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
9978 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9979 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9980 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9981 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9982 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9983 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9985 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9986 let mut found_htlc = false;
9987 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9988 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9991 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9992 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9993 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9994 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9995 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9996 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9997 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9998 log_info!(args.logger,
9999 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10000 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10001 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10005 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10006 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10007 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10008 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10009 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10011 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10012 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10014 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10016 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10017 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10020 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10021 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10022 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10026 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10027 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10028 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10029 // safely discard the channel.
10030 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10031 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10032 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10033 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10034 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10035 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10036 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10039 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10040 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10041 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10042 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10043 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10044 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10048 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10049 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10050 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10051 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10052 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10053 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10054 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10056 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10060 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10061 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10062 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10063 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10064 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10065 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10067 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10068 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10070 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10073 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10074 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10075 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10076 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10077 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10078 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10079 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10080 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10082 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10085 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10088 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10089 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10090 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10091 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10092 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10093 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10094 is_connected: false,
10098 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10099 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10100 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10101 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10102 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10103 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10104 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10105 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10108 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10109 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10110 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10111 for _ in 0..event_count {
10112 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10113 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10118 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10119 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10120 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10122 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10123 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10124 // on-startup monitor updates.
10125 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10126 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10128 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10132 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10133 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10135 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10136 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10137 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10138 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10139 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10143 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10144 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10145 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10146 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10147 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10148 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10149 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10151 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10152 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10156 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10157 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10158 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10159 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10160 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10161 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10162 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10163 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10164 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10165 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10166 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10167 let mut events_override = None;
10168 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10169 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10170 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10171 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10172 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10173 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10174 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10175 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10176 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10177 (8, events_override, option),
10178 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10179 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10180 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10181 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10183 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10184 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10187 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10188 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10191 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10192 pending_events_read = events;
10195 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10196 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10199 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10200 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10201 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10202 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10203 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10204 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10206 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10208 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10209 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10210 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10213 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10214 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10215 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10216 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10217 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10219 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10220 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10221 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10223 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10224 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10225 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10226 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10227 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10229 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10230 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10231 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10232 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10233 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10234 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10235 pending_background_events.push(
10236 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10237 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10238 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10239 update: update.clone(),
10242 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10243 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10244 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10245 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10246 pending_background_events.push(
10247 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10248 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10249 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10252 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10253 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10254 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10256 max_in_flight_update_id
10260 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10261 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10262 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10263 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10264 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10265 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10267 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10268 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10269 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10270 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10271 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10272 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10273 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10274 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10275 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10278 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10279 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10280 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10281 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10282 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10283 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10284 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10285 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10286 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10287 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10288 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10291 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10292 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10293 debug_assert!(false);
10294 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10299 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10300 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10301 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10302 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10303 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10304 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10305 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10306 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10308 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10309 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10310 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10312 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10313 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10314 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10315 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10316 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10317 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10318 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10319 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10324 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10325 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10327 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10328 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10329 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10330 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10333 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10334 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10335 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10336 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10337 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10338 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10339 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10341 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10342 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10343 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10344 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10345 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10346 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10347 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10351 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10352 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10353 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10354 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10356 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10357 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10358 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10361 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10362 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10363 retry_strategy: None,
10364 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10365 payment_params: None,
10366 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10367 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10368 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10369 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10370 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10371 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10372 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10373 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10374 total_msat: path_amt,
10375 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10376 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10378 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10379 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10384 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10385 match htlc_source {
10386 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10387 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10388 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10389 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10391 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10392 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10393 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10394 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10395 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10396 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10397 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10398 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10399 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10400 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10401 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10406 !forwards.is_empty()
10408 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10409 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10410 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10411 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10412 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10413 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10414 intercepted_id != ev_id
10421 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10422 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10423 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10424 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10425 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10426 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10427 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10428 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10429 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10430 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10431 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10433 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10434 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10435 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10437 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10438 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10439 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10446 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10447 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10449 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10451 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10452 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10453 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10454 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10455 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10456 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10457 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10458 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10459 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10460 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10463 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10464 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10465 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10466 // channel still live case here.
10470 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10471 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10476 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10477 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10478 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10479 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10480 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10481 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10482 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10483 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10487 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10488 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10490 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10491 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10492 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10493 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10495 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10496 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10497 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10499 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10500 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10502 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10503 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10505 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10508 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10509 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10510 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10512 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10516 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10517 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10518 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10519 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10520 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10522 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10523 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10524 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10525 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10526 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10527 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10528 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10529 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10531 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10536 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10538 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10540 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10541 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10543 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10544 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10549 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10550 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10552 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10554 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10556 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10557 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10558 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10563 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10564 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10567 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10568 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10569 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10570 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10572 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10573 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10574 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10576 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10577 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10578 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10579 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10580 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10583 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10584 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10585 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10586 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10587 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10588 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10592 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10593 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10594 debug_assert!(false);
10595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10600 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10602 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10603 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10604 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10605 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10606 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10607 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10608 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10609 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10610 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10611 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10612 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10614 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10615 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10617 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10618 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10619 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10620 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10622 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10623 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10624 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10625 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10627 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10628 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10629 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10630 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10632 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10633 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10634 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10637 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10638 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10641 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10642 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10645 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10648 purpose: payment.purpose,
10649 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10650 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10651 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10657 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10658 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10659 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10660 for action in actions.iter() {
10661 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10662 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10663 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10665 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10666 log_trace!(args.logger,
10667 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10668 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10669 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10670 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10671 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10673 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10674 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10675 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10676 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10680 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10681 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10685 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10687 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10692 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10694 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10695 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10696 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10697 router: args.router,
10699 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10701 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10702 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10703 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10704 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10706 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10707 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10708 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10709 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10710 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10711 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10713 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10715 our_network_pubkey,
10718 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10720 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10722 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10723 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10724 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10725 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10726 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10728 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10729 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10731 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10733 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10735 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10736 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10737 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10739 logger: args.logger,
10740 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10743 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10744 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10745 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10746 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10747 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10750 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10751 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10752 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10753 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10754 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10755 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10758 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10759 //connection or two.
10761 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10767 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10768 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10769 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10770 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10771 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10772 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10773 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10774 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10775 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10776 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10777 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10778 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10779 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10780 use crate::util::test_utils;
10781 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10782 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10785 fn test_notify_limits() {
10786 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10787 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10791 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10793 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10794 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10795 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10796 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10797 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10799 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10801 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10802 // to connect messages with new values
10803 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10804 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10805 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10806 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10807 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10808 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10810 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10811 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10813 // ... but the last node should not.
10814 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10815 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10816 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10817 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10819 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10820 // about the channel.
10821 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10822 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10823 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10825 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10827 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10828 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10829 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10830 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10831 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10832 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10834 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10836 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10838 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10839 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10840 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10841 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10842 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10843 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10845 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10846 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10847 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10848 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10849 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10850 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10851 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10852 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10854 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10855 // the channel info has updated.
10856 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10857 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10858 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10859 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10860 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10861 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10865 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10866 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10872 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10874 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10875 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10876 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10877 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10879 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10880 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10881 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10882 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10883 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10884 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10885 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10886 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10888 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10889 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10890 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10892 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10893 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10894 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10896 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10898 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10899 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10900 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10902 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10906 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10907 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10908 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10909 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10910 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10911 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10913 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10914 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10916 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10917 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10918 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10920 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10922 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10924 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10925 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10926 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10927 // lightning messages manually.
10928 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10929 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10932 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10934 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10935 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10937 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10940 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10941 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10943 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10944 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10945 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10947 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10948 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10949 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10951 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10953 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10955 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10956 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10959 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10960 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10961 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10962 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10964 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10965 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10967 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10972 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10973 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10975 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10982 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10983 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10984 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10987 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10988 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10989 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10990 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10991 // fails as expected.
10992 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10993 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10994 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10995 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10996 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10997 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11000 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11001 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11002 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11003 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11005 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11006 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11008 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11009 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11010 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11012 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11013 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11014 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11015 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11016 let route = find_route(
11017 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11018 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11020 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11021 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11023 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11025 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11026 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11027 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11029 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11030 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11031 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11032 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11033 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11034 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11035 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11036 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11037 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11038 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11039 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11040 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11041 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11043 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11045 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11048 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11049 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11050 let route = find_route(
11051 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11052 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11054 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11055 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11057 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11059 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11060 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11061 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11063 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11064 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11065 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11066 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11068 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11070 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11071 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11072 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11074 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11078 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11079 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11080 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11081 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11082 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11083 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11084 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11085 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11086 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11088 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11089 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11091 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11092 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11093 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11094 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11096 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11097 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11098 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11099 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11100 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11102 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11103 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11104 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11107 let route = find_route(
11108 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11109 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11111 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11112 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11113 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11117 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11118 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11119 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11122 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11125 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11126 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11127 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11128 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11129 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11130 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11131 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11132 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11133 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11135 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11140 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11141 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11142 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11148 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11149 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11151 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11152 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11153 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11154 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11155 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11156 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11157 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11158 let route = find_route(
11159 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11160 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11163 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11164 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11165 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11166 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11167 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11168 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11171 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11172 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11173 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11174 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11175 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11176 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11177 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11179 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11183 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11184 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11185 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11186 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11187 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11191 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11193 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11194 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11196 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11197 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11198 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11199 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11200 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11201 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11202 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11203 let route = find_route(
11204 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11205 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11208 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11209 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11210 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11211 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11212 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11213 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11214 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11215 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11218 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11219 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11220 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11221 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11222 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11223 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11226 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11230 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11234 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11236 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11237 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11238 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11239 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11241 // Marshall an MPP route.
11242 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11243 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11244 route.paths.push(path);
11245 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11246 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11247 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11248 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11249 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11250 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11252 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11253 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11255 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11256 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11258 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11263 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11269 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11271 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11272 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11274 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11277 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11280 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11281 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11282 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11283 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11284 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11285 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11288 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11291 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11292 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11297 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11298 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11302 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11304 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11305 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11307 total_msat: 100_000,
11310 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11311 // payment verification fails as expected.
11312 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11313 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11314 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11315 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11317 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11321 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11322 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11326 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11327 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11328 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11329 // the channel is successfully closed.
11330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11336 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11337 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11338 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11339 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11341 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11342 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11344 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11345 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11346 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11347 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11350 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11352 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11353 // as it has the funding transaction.
11354 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11355 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11356 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11361 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11363 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11365 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11366 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11367 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11369 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11372 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11373 // as it has the funding transaction.
11374 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11375 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11376 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11379 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11380 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11382 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11383 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11384 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11385 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11387 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11388 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11389 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11390 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11392 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11393 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11395 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11396 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11397 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11398 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11399 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11400 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11401 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11405 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11406 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11407 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11408 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11409 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11410 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11411 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11414 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11416 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11417 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11418 // closing transaction).
11419 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11420 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11421 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11423 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11424 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11425 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11426 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11427 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11430 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11432 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11434 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11435 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11436 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11438 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11440 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11444 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11445 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11446 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11449 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11450 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11451 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11454 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11455 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11456 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11459 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11460 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11461 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11464 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11466 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11467 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11469 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11470 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11472 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11473 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11478 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11479 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11480 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11481 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11482 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11483 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11484 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11488 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11489 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11490 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11492 // Test the API functions.
11493 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11495 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11497 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11499 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11501 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11503 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11505 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11509 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11510 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11511 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11512 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11513 // the given `channel_id`.
11514 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11515 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11516 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11517 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11519 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11522 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11524 // Test the API functions.
11525 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11527 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11529 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11531 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11533 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11535 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11539 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11540 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11546 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11548 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11549 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11551 let mut funding_tx = None;
11552 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11553 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11554 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11557 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11558 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11559 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11560 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11561 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11563 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11565 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11567 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11569 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11571 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11573 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11576 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11577 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11578 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11579 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11580 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11582 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11583 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11585 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11586 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11587 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11588 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11589 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11594 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11595 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11596 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11597 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11598 }, true).unwrap_err();
11600 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11601 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11602 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11603 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11604 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11605 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11606 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11611 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11612 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11613 }, true).unwrap_err();
11615 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11616 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11617 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11618 }, false).unwrap();
11619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11621 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11622 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11624 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11625 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11627 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11628 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11631 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11632 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11634 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11635 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11636 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11638 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11639 // "protected" and can connect again.
11640 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11641 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11642 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11644 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11648 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11649 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11653 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11654 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11658 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11660 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11662 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11663 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11665 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11666 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11667 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11668 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11671 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11673 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11674 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11675 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11677 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11678 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11679 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11681 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11683 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11684 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11688 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11689 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11690 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11693 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11694 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11695 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11696 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11698 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11700 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11701 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11703 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11704 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11705 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11706 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11707 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11708 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11711 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11712 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11714 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11715 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11719 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11720 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11723 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11724 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11725 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11726 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11727 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11732 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11733 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11734 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11735 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11741 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11742 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11744 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11746 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11748 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11749 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11753 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11757 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11758 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11759 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11760 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11761 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11762 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11763 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11764 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11766 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11767 payment_metadata: None,
11768 keysend_preimage: None,
11769 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11770 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11772 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11774 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11775 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11776 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11777 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11778 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11779 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11780 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11782 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11783 } else { panic!(); }
11785 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11786 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11788 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11789 payment_metadata: None,
11790 keysend_preimage: None,
11791 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11792 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11794 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11796 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11797 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11798 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11799 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11803 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11804 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11805 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11806 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11807 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11809 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11810 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11812 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11813 payment_metadata: None,
11814 keysend_preimage: None,
11815 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11816 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11818 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11819 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11820 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11822 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11823 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11824 // is not satisfied.
11825 assert!(result.is_ok());
11829 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11830 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11831 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11832 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11833 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11835 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11836 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11841 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11842 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11844 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11845 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11847 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11848 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11849 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11850 match &msg_events[0] {
11851 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11852 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11854 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11855 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11856 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11862 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11863 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11865 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11866 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11869 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11873 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11874 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11875 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11876 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11877 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11878 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11879 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11880 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11881 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11885 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11886 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11887 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11889 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11892 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11893 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11898 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11899 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11901 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11902 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11904 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11905 // not have generated any events.
11906 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11910 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11911 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11912 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11913 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11914 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11916 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11917 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11919 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11920 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11921 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11923 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11924 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11925 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11926 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11929 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11930 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11933 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11934 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11935 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11937 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11938 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11939 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11940 ..Default::default()
11942 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11943 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11944 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11946 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11947 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11950 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11951 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11952 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11953 ..Default::default()
11955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11957 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11960 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11961 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11964 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11965 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11966 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11967 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11968 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11971 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11972 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11973 ..Default::default()
11975 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11978 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11979 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11980 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11985 fn test_payment_display() {
11986 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11987 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11988 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11989 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11990 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11991 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11995 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11996 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11997 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11998 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11999 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12002 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12003 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12004 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12005 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12006 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12007 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12008 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12009 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12011 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12012 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12013 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12016 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12017 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12019 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12020 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12022 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12023 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12024 }, false).unwrap();
12025 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12026 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12027 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12029 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12031 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12032 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12033 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12034 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12035 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12036 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12037 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12038 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12039 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12040 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12041 } else { panic!() };
12042 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12043 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12044 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12045 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12047 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12049 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12050 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12051 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12058 use crate::chain::Listen;
12059 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12060 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12061 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12062 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12063 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12064 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12065 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12066 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12067 use crate::util::test_utils;
12068 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12070 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12071 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12072 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12073 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12075 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12077 use criterion::Criterion;
12079 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12080 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12081 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12082 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12083 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12084 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12085 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12087 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12088 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12090 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12091 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12093 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12095 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12098 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12099 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12102 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12103 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12104 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12106 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12107 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12109 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12110 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12111 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12112 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12113 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12115 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12116 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12117 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12119 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12120 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12121 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12122 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12124 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12125 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12126 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12128 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12129 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12130 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12131 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12132 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12134 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12135 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12136 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12138 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12139 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12141 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12142 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12143 }, false).unwrap();
12144 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12145 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12146 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12149 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12150 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12151 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12153 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12154 } else { panic!(); }
12156 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12157 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12158 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12159 match events_b[0] {
12160 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12161 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12166 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12167 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12168 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12169 match events_a[0] {
12170 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12171 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12176 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12178 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12179 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12180 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12182 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12183 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12184 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12185 match msg_events[0] {
12186 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12187 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12188 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12192 match msg_events[1] {
12193 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12197 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12198 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12199 match events_a[0] {
12200 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12201 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12206 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12207 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12208 match events_b[0] {
12209 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12210 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12215 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12216 macro_rules! send_payment {
12217 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12218 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12219 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12220 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12221 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12222 payment_count += 1;
12223 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12224 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12226 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12227 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12228 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12229 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12230 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12231 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12232 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12233 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12234 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12235 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12236 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12239 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12240 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12241 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12243 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12244 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12245 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12246 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12247 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12249 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12252 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12253 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12254 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12255 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12257 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12261 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12262 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12263 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);