1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, Retry};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::PaymentSendFailure;
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
348 err: LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
353 shutdown_finish: None,
357 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
358 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
361 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
363 err: LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
373 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
377 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
383 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 log_level: Level::Warn,
390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 shutdown_finish: None,
410 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
411 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
412 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
413 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
414 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
416 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
417 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
418 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
419 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
420 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
422 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
424 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
428 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
429 struct ClaimingPayment {
431 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
432 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
434 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
435 (0, amount_msat, required),
436 (2, payment_purpose, required),
437 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
440 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
441 struct ClaimablePayments {
442 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
443 /// failed/claimed by the user.
445 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
446 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
448 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
449 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
450 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
452 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
453 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
454 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
455 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
458 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
459 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
460 /// quite some time lag.
461 enum BackgroundEvent {
462 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
463 /// commitment transaction.
464 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
467 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
468 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
469 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
470 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
471 /// event can be generated.
472 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
473 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
474 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
477 /// State we hold per-peer.
478 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
479 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
481 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
482 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
484 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
485 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
486 latest_features: InitFeatures,
487 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
488 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
489 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
492 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
493 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
495 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
498 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
499 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
500 struct PendingInboundPayment {
501 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
502 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
503 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
504 /// this payment being removed.
506 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
507 user_payment_id: u64,
508 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
509 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
510 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
513 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
514 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
515 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
516 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
517 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
518 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
519 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
521 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
522 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
530 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
532 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
537 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
538 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
539 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
540 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
541 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
542 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
543 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
544 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
546 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
547 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
549 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
550 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
552 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
553 /// to individual Channels.
555 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
556 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
557 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
558 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
560 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
561 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
562 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
563 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
564 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
565 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
566 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
568 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
569 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
570 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
571 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
574 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
575 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
576 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
577 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
578 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
580 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
581 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
582 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
583 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
584 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
587 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
588 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
589 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
590 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
591 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
595 // `total_consistency_lock`
597 // |__`forward_htlcs`
599 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
601 // |__`per_peer_state`
603 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
605 // | |__`claimable_payments`
607 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
613 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
615 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
619 // | |__`pending_events`
621 // | |__`pending_background_events`
623 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
625 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
626 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
627 ES::Target: EntropySource,
628 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
629 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
630 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
634 default_configuration: UserConfig,
635 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
636 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
642 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
644 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
646 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
647 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
649 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
650 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
651 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
652 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
654 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
655 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
657 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
658 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
659 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
660 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
661 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
662 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
663 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
664 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
666 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
668 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
669 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
671 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
673 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
674 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
675 /// and via the classic SCID.
677 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
678 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
680 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
684 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
685 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
686 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
688 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
689 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
691 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
692 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
694 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
695 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
697 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
698 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
699 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
700 /// active channel list on load.
702 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
703 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
705 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
707 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
708 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
709 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
711 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
712 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
713 /// the handling of the events.
715 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
716 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
719 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
720 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
721 /// would break backwards compatability.
722 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
723 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
724 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
726 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
727 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
729 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
731 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
732 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
733 /// confirmation depth.
735 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
736 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
737 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
739 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
741 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
743 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
745 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
747 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
749 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
750 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
751 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
753 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
754 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
756 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
757 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
758 /// keeping additional state.
759 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
761 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
762 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
763 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
764 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
766 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
767 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
770 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
771 /// are currently open with that peer.
773 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
774 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
777 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
779 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
780 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
781 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
782 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
783 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
786 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
787 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
789 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
790 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
791 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
792 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
793 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
794 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
795 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
797 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
806 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
808 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
809 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
810 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
811 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
812 pub struct ChainParameters {
813 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
814 pub network: Network,
816 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
818 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
819 pub best_block: BestBlock,
822 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
828 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
829 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
830 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
831 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
832 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
833 /// updates are ready for persistence).
835 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
836 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
837 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
838 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
839 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
841 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
842 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
845 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
846 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
847 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
850 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
851 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
853 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
854 persistence_notifier: notifier,
855 should_persist: persist_check,
856 _read_guard: read_guard,
861 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
863 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
864 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
869 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
870 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
872 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
875 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
876 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
877 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
878 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
880 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
881 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
883 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
885 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
886 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
887 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
888 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
889 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
890 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
891 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
892 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
893 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
894 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
895 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
896 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
897 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
899 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
900 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
902 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
903 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
904 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
905 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
907 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
908 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
909 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
910 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
911 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
912 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
915 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
917 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
918 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
921 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
923 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
924 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
926 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
927 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
928 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
929 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
931 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
932 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
933 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
934 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
935 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
936 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
937 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
938 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
939 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
940 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
941 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
944 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
945 /// to better separate parameters.
946 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
947 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
948 /// The node_id of our counterparty
949 pub node_id: PublicKey,
950 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
951 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
952 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
953 pub features: InitFeatures,
954 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
955 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
956 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
958 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
960 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
961 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
962 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
963 /// payments to us through this channel.
964 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
965 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
966 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
967 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
968 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
969 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
970 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
973 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
974 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
975 pub struct ChannelDetails {
976 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
977 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
978 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
979 /// lifetime of the channel.
980 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
981 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
982 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
983 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
984 /// our counterparty already.
986 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
987 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
988 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
989 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
991 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
992 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
993 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
994 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
996 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
997 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
999 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1000 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1002 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1003 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1004 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1005 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1006 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1007 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1008 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1009 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1010 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1013 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1015 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1016 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1017 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1018 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1019 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1020 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1021 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1023 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1024 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1026 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1027 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1028 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1029 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1030 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1031 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1032 /// this value on chain.
1034 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1036 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1038 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1039 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1040 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1041 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1043 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1044 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1045 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1046 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1048 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1049 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1050 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1051 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1053 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1054 pub balance_msat: u64,
1055 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1056 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1057 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1058 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1060 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1062 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1063 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1064 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1065 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1066 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1067 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1068 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1069 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1071 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1072 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1073 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1074 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1075 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1076 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1077 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1079 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1080 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1081 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1082 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1083 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1084 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1085 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1086 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1087 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1089 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1091 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1092 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1093 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1094 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1095 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1097 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1098 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1099 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1100 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1101 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1102 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1103 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1105 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1106 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1107 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1108 pub is_outbound: bool,
1109 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1110 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1111 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1112 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1113 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1115 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1116 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1117 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1118 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1120 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1121 pub is_usable: bool,
1122 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1123 pub is_public: bool,
1124 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1125 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1126 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1127 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1128 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1129 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1131 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1132 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1135 impl ChannelDetails {
1136 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1137 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1138 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1140 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1141 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1142 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1146 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1147 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1148 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1150 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1151 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1152 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1153 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1157 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1159 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1161 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1162 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1163 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1164 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1166 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1167 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1168 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1171 macro_rules! handle_error {
1172 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1175 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1176 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1178 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1179 // entering the macro.
1180 debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1181 debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1184 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1186 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1187 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1188 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1189 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1193 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1194 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1195 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1196 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1201 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1202 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1204 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1205 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1206 action: err.action.clone()
1210 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1211 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1212 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1213 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1214 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1216 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1218 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1219 // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1220 // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1221 let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1223 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1224 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1227 assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1228 if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1229 debug_assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1232 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Unexpected event"),
1238 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1245 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1246 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1247 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1248 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1249 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1250 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1252 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1253 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1254 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1255 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1256 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1258 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1259 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1261 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1265 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1266 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1267 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1269 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1270 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1272 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1273 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1275 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1276 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1277 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1278 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1279 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1280 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1286 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1287 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1291 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1293 $entry.remove_entry();
1301 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1302 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1306 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1308 $entry.remove_entry();
1316 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1317 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1319 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1320 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1326 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1327 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1329 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1330 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1331 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1332 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1333 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1334 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1335 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1336 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1337 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1338 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1339 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1340 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1341 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1342 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1345 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1346 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1347 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1348 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1349 match $action_type {
1350 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1351 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1353 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1354 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1356 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1357 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1358 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1359 if !$resend_commitment {
1360 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1363 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1365 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1366 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1368 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1373 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1374 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1376 $entry.remove_entry();
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1381 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1382 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1385 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1388 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1390 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1391 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1394 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1398 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1399 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1400 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1401 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1402 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1404 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1405 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1406 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1407 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1408 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1409 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1410 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1411 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1412 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1413 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1418 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1419 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1420 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1422 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1423 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1424 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1425 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1426 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1427 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1430 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1435 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1437 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1438 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1439 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1440 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1441 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1442 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1446 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1448 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1449 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1451 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1453 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1454 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1455 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1456 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1457 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1458 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1459 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1460 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1462 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1463 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1464 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1469 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1471 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1472 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1473 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1474 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1475 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1476 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1477 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1478 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1480 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1483 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1484 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1486 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1488 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1490 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1492 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1493 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1494 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1495 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1505 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1506 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1507 &self.default_configuration
1510 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1511 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1512 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1515 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1516 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1518 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1520 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1524 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1529 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1531 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1532 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1533 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1534 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1535 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1537 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1538 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1540 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1541 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1542 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1544 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1545 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1546 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1547 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1548 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1549 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1551 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1552 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1553 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1554 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1555 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1556 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1560 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1561 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1565 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1566 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1570 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1572 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1573 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1574 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1575 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1576 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1577 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1581 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1586 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1588 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1589 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1594 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1600 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1601 node_id: their_network_key,
1604 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1607 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1608 let mut res = Vec::new();
1609 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1610 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1611 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1612 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1613 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1614 // the same channel.
1615 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1617 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1618 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1619 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1620 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1621 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1622 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1623 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1624 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1625 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1626 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1627 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1628 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1629 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1630 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1631 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1632 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1633 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1634 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1635 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1636 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1637 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1638 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1639 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1640 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1642 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1643 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1644 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1645 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1646 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1647 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1648 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1649 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1650 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1651 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1652 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1653 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1654 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1655 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1656 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1657 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1658 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1659 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1660 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1661 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1662 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1663 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1664 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1665 config: Some(channel.config()),
1673 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1674 /// more information.
1675 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1676 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1679 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1680 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1682 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1683 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1686 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1687 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1688 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1689 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1690 // really wanted anyway.
1691 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1694 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1695 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1696 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1697 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1698 Some(transaction) => {
1699 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1703 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1704 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1705 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1706 reason: closure_reason
1710 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1713 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1714 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1717 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1718 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1726 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1727 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1729 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1730 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1731 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1732 let (result, is_permanent) =
1733 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1735 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1741 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1745 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1746 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1747 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1752 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1760 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1761 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1762 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1763 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1766 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1770 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1771 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1772 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1774 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1775 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1777 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1778 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1779 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1780 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1782 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1784 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1785 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1786 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1787 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1788 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1791 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1792 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1793 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1795 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1796 /// the channel being closed or not:
1797 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1798 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1799 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1800 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1801 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1802 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1803 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1805 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1807 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1808 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1809 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1810 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1811 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1815 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1816 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1817 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1818 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1819 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1820 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1821 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1822 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1824 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1825 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1826 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1827 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1828 // ignore the result here.
1829 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1833 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1834 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1835 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1836 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1838 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1840 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1841 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1845 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1846 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1847 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1849 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1851 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1853 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1856 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1857 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1858 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1859 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1860 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1865 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1868 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1870 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1871 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1873 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1874 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1876 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1877 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1878 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1879 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1890 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1891 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1892 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1894 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1895 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1899 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1900 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1901 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1903 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1904 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1905 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1906 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1907 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1910 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1911 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1912 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1913 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1914 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1918 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1919 /// local transaction(s).
1920 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1921 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1922 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1926 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1927 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1929 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1930 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1931 return Err(ReceiveError {
1932 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1934 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1937 // final_expiry_too_soon
1938 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1939 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1941 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1942 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1943 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1944 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1945 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1946 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
1947 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
1948 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
1949 return Err(ReceiveError {
1950 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
1951 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1954 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1955 return Err(ReceiveError {
1957 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
1958 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1962 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1963 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1964 return Err(ReceiveError {
1965 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1966 err_data: Vec::new(),
1967 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1970 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1971 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1972 return Err(ReceiveError {
1973 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1974 err_data: Vec::new(),
1975 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1977 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1978 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1980 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1981 phantom_shared_secret,
1983 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1984 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1985 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1986 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1987 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1988 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1989 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1990 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1991 return Err(ReceiveError {
1992 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1993 err_data: Vec::new(),
1994 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
1998 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2000 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2003 return Err(ReceiveError {
2004 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2005 err_data: Vec::new(),
2006 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2011 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2014 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2015 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2016 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2017 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2021 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2022 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2023 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2025 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2026 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2027 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2028 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2029 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2030 failure_code: $err_code,
2036 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2037 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2040 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2041 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2042 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2044 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2045 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2046 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2047 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2048 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2049 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2050 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2051 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2053 macro_rules! return_err {
2054 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2056 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2057 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2058 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2059 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2060 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2061 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2067 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2069 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2070 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2072 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2073 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2077 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2078 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2080 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2082 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2083 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2084 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2085 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2086 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2088 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2091 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2092 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2093 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2095 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2096 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2097 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2100 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2101 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2102 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2103 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2107 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2109 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2112 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2113 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2114 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2115 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2116 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2122 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2123 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2124 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2125 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2126 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2127 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2128 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2129 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2130 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2131 // phantom or an intercept.
2132 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2133 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2134 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2138 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2141 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2143 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2144 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2145 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2146 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2147 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2149 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2150 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2151 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2153 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2154 // have no consistency guarantees.
2155 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2159 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2160 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2161 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2162 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2163 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2165 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2166 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2167 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2168 // we don't have the channel here.
2169 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2171 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2173 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2174 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2175 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2176 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2177 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2178 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2179 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2181 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2182 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2184 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2185 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2189 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2190 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2191 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2192 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2194 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2201 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2202 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2203 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2204 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2205 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2206 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2208 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2209 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2211 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2212 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2213 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2214 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2215 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2216 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2217 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2218 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2219 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2220 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2226 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2227 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2228 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2229 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2231 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2232 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2234 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2235 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2236 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2238 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2239 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2240 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2241 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2242 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2243 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2244 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2248 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2253 pending_forward_info
2256 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2257 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2258 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2260 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2261 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2262 if !chan.should_announce() {
2263 return Err(LightningError {
2264 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2268 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2269 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2272 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2275 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2276 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2277 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2278 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2279 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2280 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2281 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2282 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2283 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2287 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2289 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2291 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2293 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2294 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2296 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2297 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2298 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2299 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2300 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2301 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2302 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2303 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2305 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2306 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2307 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2309 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2311 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2317 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2318 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2320 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2321 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2323 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2324 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2325 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2326 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2327 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2329 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2333 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2334 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2335 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2336 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2340 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2341 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2342 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2346 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2348 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2349 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2351 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2352 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2354 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2355 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2357 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2358 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2359 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2362 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2363 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2364 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2366 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2367 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2369 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2370 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2371 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2372 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2373 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2374 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2375 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2376 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2377 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2378 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2380 _ => unreachable!(),
2383 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2384 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2385 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2386 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2387 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2388 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2389 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2390 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2399 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2400 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2401 // `channel_by_id` map.
2402 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2403 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2408 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2409 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2411 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2416 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2418 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2419 /// fields for more info.
2421 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2422 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2423 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2424 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2427 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2428 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2429 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2430 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2431 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2433 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2434 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2436 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2437 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2438 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2440 /// In general, a path may raise:
2441 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2442 /// node public key) is specified.
2443 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2444 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2446 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2447 /// relevant updates.
2449 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2450 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2451 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2453 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2454 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2455 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2456 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2459 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2460 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2461 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2463 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2464 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2465 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2467 self.pending_outbound_payments
2468 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2469 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2470 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2473 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2474 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2475 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2476 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2477 self.pending_outbound_payments
2478 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2479 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2480 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2481 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2482 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2486 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2487 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2488 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2489 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2490 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2494 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2495 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2496 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2500 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2502 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2503 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2504 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2505 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2506 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2508 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2509 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2510 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2511 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2512 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2513 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2514 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2517 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2519 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2520 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2521 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2523 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2524 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2525 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2527 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2528 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2529 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2530 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2531 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2533 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2534 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2535 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2536 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2537 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2539 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2540 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2544 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2545 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2546 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2547 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2548 /// never reach the recipient.
2550 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2551 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2553 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2554 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2556 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2558 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2559 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2560 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2561 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2562 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2564 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2565 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2568 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2569 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2570 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2572 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2573 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2574 self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2576 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2577 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2580 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2581 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2582 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2583 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2584 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2585 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2586 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2587 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2590 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2593 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2594 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2597 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2598 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2599 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2600 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2601 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2603 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2604 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2605 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2612 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2614 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2616 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2617 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2618 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2619 } else { unreachable!(); })
2622 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2625 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2626 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2629 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2630 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2635 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2636 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2641 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2644 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2645 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2646 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2655 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2656 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2657 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2661 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2663 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2664 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2666 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2667 /// across the p2p network.
2669 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2670 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2672 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2673 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2674 /// keys per-channel).
2676 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2677 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2678 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2680 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2681 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2682 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2684 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2685 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2686 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2687 /// for more details.
2689 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2690 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2691 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2695 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2697 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2702 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2703 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2704 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2705 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2706 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2707 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2708 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2712 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2713 let mut output_index = None;
2714 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2715 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2716 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2717 if output_index.is_some() {
2718 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2719 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2722 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2723 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2724 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2727 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2730 if output_index.is_none() {
2731 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2732 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2735 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2739 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2741 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2742 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2743 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2744 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2746 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2747 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2749 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2750 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2752 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2754 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2755 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2756 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2757 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2758 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2759 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2760 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2761 pub fn update_channel_config(
2762 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2763 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2764 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2766 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2771 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2774 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2775 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2780 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2781 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2782 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2783 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2787 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2788 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2789 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2792 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2793 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2794 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2796 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2804 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2805 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2807 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2808 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2810 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2811 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2812 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2813 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2814 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2816 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2817 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2819 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2822 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2823 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2824 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2825 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2826 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2829 let next_hop_scid = {
2830 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2831 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2834 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2836 if !chan.is_usable() {
2837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2838 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2841 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2843 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2844 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2848 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2852 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2853 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2854 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2857 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2858 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2859 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2861 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2863 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2864 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2867 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2868 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2869 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2870 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2871 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2873 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2877 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2878 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2880 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2883 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2884 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2887 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2888 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2889 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2892 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2893 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2894 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2895 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2896 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2897 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2898 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2901 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2902 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2903 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2904 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2909 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2911 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2912 /// Will likely generate further events.
2913 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2916 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2917 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2918 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2920 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2921 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2923 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2924 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2925 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
2927 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2928 match forward_info {
2929 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
2930 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
2931 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2932 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
2933 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
2936 macro_rules! failure_handler {
2937 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
2938 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2940 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2941 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2942 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2943 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2944 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2945 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2948 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
2949 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
2951 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
2954 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2955 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
2961 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2962 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2964 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
2968 macro_rules! failed_payment {
2969 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2971 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
2975 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2976 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2977 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
2978 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2979 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2981 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2982 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2983 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2984 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2985 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2987 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2989 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2990 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2994 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2995 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2996 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2997 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3003 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3006 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3009 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3010 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3011 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3012 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3013 // problem, not ours.
3019 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3020 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3022 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3027 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3028 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
3029 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3034 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3035 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3036 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3039 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3040 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3041 match forward_info {
3042 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3043 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3044 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3045 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3046 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3050 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3051 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3052 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3053 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3054 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3055 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3056 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3058 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3059 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3060 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3062 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3063 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3065 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3067 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3068 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3069 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3070 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3075 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3076 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3078 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3079 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3080 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3081 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3083 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3084 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3086 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3088 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3089 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3090 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3099 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3100 match forward_info {
3101 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3102 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3103 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3104 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3107 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3108 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3109 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3110 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3112 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3113 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3115 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3118 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3119 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3120 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3121 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3122 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3124 phantom_shared_secret,
3126 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3128 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3133 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3134 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3135 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3136 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3137 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3139 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3140 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3141 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3142 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3143 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3144 phantom_shared_secret,
3146 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3147 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3151 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3152 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3153 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3154 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3155 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3158 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3159 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3160 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3162 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3163 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3164 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3167 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3168 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3169 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3172 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3173 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3174 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3175 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3176 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3177 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3181 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3182 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3183 total_value += htlc.value;
3184 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3185 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3186 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3188 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3189 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3191 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3193 _ => unreachable!(),
3196 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3198 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3199 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3200 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3201 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3202 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3203 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3204 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3207 amount_msat: total_value,
3208 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3209 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3211 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3213 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3214 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3216 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3218 payment_claimable_generated
3222 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3223 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3224 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3225 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3226 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3227 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3228 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3229 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3231 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3232 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3233 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3234 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3235 Ok(result) => result,
3237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3238 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3242 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3243 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3244 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3246 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3247 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3251 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3253 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3254 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3255 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3256 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3259 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3261 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3262 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3263 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3264 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3265 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3267 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3269 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3270 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3275 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3282 if payment_data.is_none() {
3283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3284 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3287 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3288 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3290 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3291 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3293 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3294 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3296 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3297 if payment_claimable_generated {
3298 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3304 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3305 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3313 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3314 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3315 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3316 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3317 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3319 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3320 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3322 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3324 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3325 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3326 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3328 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3330 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3331 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3332 events.append(&mut new_events);
3335 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3337 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3338 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3340 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3341 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3342 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3343 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3344 if background_events.is_empty() {
3348 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3350 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3351 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3352 // monitor updating completing.
3353 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3360 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3361 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3362 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3363 self.process_background_events();
3366 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3367 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3368 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3369 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3371 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3372 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3374 if !chan.is_live() {
3375 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3376 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3377 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3380 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3382 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3383 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3387 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3388 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3389 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3390 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3391 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3392 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3393 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3395 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3398 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3401 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3402 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3403 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3411 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3413 /// This currently includes:
3414 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3415 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3416 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3418 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3419 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3421 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3422 /// estimate fetches.
3423 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3424 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3425 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3426 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3428 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3430 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3431 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3434 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3437 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3438 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3439 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3440 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3442 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3443 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3444 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3445 if needs_close { return false; }
3448 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3449 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3450 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3451 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3452 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3453 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3454 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3459 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3460 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3462 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3463 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3468 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3469 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3474 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3481 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3482 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3483 // This should be unreachable
3484 debug_assert!(false);
3487 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3488 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3489 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3490 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3492 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3493 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3494 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3496 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3503 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3504 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3505 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3506 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3507 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3510 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3511 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3516 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3517 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3518 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3519 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3520 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3527 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3528 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3529 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3531 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3532 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3533 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3534 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3536 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3537 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3539 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3540 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3541 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3544 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3545 /// reason for the failure.
3547 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3548 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3551 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3552 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3553 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3554 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3555 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3556 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3557 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3562 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3563 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3564 match failure_code {
3565 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3566 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3567 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3568 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3569 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3570 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3575 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3576 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3578 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3580 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3581 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3582 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3583 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3584 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3585 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3586 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3588 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3590 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3591 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3593 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3598 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3599 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3600 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3601 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3602 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3603 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3604 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3605 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3606 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3607 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3609 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3610 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3611 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3612 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3614 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3615 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3616 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3617 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3618 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3622 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3623 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3624 // be surfaced to the user.
3625 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3626 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3627 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3629 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3630 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3631 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3636 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3640 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3643 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3644 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3645 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3650 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3651 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3652 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3653 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
3655 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3657 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3658 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3659 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3660 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3661 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3662 debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3666 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3667 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3668 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3671 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3672 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3673 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3675 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3676 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3678 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3680 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3682 let mut forward_event = None;
3683 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3684 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3685 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3687 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3689 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3692 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3695 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3696 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3697 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3698 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3699 time_forwardable: time
3702 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3703 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3704 failed_next_destination: destination,
3710 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3711 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3713 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3714 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3715 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3717 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3718 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3719 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3720 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3722 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3723 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3724 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3725 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3726 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3727 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3728 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3730 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3733 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3734 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3735 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3736 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3737 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3738 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3739 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3740 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3745 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3746 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3747 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3749 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3750 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3751 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3752 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3757 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3759 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3760 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3761 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3762 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3763 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3765 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3766 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3768 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3769 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3770 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3771 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3772 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3774 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3775 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3776 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3777 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3778 let mut per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap());
3779 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3780 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3781 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3788 if let None = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.as_ref().unwrap().get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3797 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3802 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3803 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3804 debug_assert!(false);
3809 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3810 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3811 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3812 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3813 if sources.len() != 1 {
3814 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3815 debug_assert!(false);
3821 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3823 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3824 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3825 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3826 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3829 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3830 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3831 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3832 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3833 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3837 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3838 if per_peer_state.is_none() { per_peer_state = Some(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()); }
3839 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(per_peer_state.take().unwrap(),
3840 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3841 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3843 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3844 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3845 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3846 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3847 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3851 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3853 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3854 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3855 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3856 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3857 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3858 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3861 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3864 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3865 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3866 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3867 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3871 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3872 per_peer_state_lock: RwLockReadGuard<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
3873 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3874 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3875 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3877 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3879 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3880 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3884 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3885 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state_lock.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3886 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3887 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3888 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3889 } else { (false, None) };
3892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3893 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3894 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3895 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3896 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3897 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3898 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3899 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3901 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3902 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3903 payment_preimage, e);
3904 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3905 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3906 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3907 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3908 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3911 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3912 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3913 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3914 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3915 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3916 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3917 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3918 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3919 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3920 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3926 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3927 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3928 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3934 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3935 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3936 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3938 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3939 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3940 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
3941 // again on restart.
3942 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3943 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3944 payment_preimage, e);
3947 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3949 chan.remove_entry();
3951 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3952 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3953 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3954 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
3958 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
3959 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
3963 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3964 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3965 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3969 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3970 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
3971 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
3972 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
3973 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
3974 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
3975 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
3976 // again on restart.
3977 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3978 payment_preimage, update_res);
3980 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3981 mem::drop(per_peer_state_lock);
3982 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
3983 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
3984 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
3985 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
3986 // `PaymentForwarded`).
3987 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
3992 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3993 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
3996 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3998 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3999 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4001 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4002 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4003 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(), hop_data, payment_preimage,
4004 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4005 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4006 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4007 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4010 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4011 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4013 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4015 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4021 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4022 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4023 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4029 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4030 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4031 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4034 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4035 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4037 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4038 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4039 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4040 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4041 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4045 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4046 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4052 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4053 /// update completion.
4054 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4055 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4056 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4057 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4058 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4059 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4060 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4062 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4063 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4064 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4065 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4068 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4069 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4071 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4072 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4073 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4078 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4080 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4081 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4083 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4088 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4089 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4091 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4092 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4097 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4101 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4107 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4108 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4109 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4115 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4119 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4120 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4121 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4123 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4124 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4125 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4126 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4127 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4133 let mut peer_state_lock;
4134 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4135 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4136 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4137 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4139 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4140 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4144 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4148 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4149 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4150 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4151 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4152 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4153 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4155 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4156 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4157 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4162 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4163 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4164 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4167 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4169 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4170 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4172 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4173 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4174 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4175 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4179 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4181 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4182 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4185 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4186 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4187 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4189 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4190 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4191 /// used to accept such channels.
4193 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4194 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4195 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4196 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4199 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4200 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4202 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4203 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4204 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4206 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4207 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4209 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4210 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4212 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4213 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4215 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4216 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4217 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4218 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4221 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4225 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4226 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4227 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4229 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4231 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4233 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4234 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4237 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4238 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4239 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4240 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4241 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4242 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4246 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4247 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4250 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4251 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4252 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4256 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4262 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4263 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4264 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4267 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4271 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4272 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4273 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4275 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4277 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4278 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4279 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4283 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4284 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4285 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4288 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4293 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4295 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4296 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4299 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4300 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4304 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4305 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4308 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4309 pending_events.push(
4310 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4311 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4312 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4313 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4314 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4315 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4320 entry.insert(channel);
4326 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4327 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4329 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4330 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4331 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4336 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4337 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4338 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4343 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4344 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4345 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4346 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4347 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4349 user_channel_id: user_id,
4354 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4356 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4357 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4360 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4361 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4364 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4366 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4371 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4372 // lock before watch_channel
4373 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4375 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4376 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4377 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4378 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4379 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4380 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4381 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4382 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4383 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4384 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4387 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4388 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4389 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4390 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4391 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4392 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4393 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4396 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4397 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4398 // the channel above.
4399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4401 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4406 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4407 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4410 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4411 funding_msg.channel_id))
4413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4414 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4418 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4421 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4422 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4430 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4432 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4433 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4434 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4435 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4443 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4444 Ok(update) => update,
4445 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4447 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4448 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4450 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4451 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4452 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4453 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4454 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4455 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4456 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4462 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4463 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4470 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4471 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4475 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4477 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4478 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4479 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4483 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4485 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4486 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4487 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4489 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4490 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4491 msg: announcement_sigs,
4493 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4494 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4495 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4496 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4497 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4498 // announcement_signatures.
4499 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4500 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4501 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4502 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4508 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4516 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4517 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4518 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4520 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4521 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4526 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4529 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4530 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4531 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4532 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4535 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4536 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4538 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4539 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4540 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4541 let (result, is_permanent) =
4542 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4544 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4549 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4550 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4551 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4561 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4562 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4563 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4567 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4571 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4573 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4574 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4575 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4577 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4580 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4582 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4583 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4584 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4585 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4590 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4591 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4592 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4593 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4594 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4595 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4596 } else { (tx, None) }
4598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4601 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4602 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4603 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4605 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4606 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4609 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4613 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4618 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4619 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4620 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4621 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4623 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4624 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4625 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4626 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4628 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4630 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4631 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4632 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4636 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4639 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4640 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4641 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4642 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4643 match pending_forward_info {
4644 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4645 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4646 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4647 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4649 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4650 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4651 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4652 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4653 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4656 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4658 _ => pending_forward_info
4661 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4668 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4671 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4672 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4677 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4679 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4684 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4688 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4689 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4690 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4691 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4696 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4698 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4705 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4707 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4708 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4715 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4716 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4717 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4719 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4726 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4728 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4729 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4730 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4732 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4734 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4735 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4736 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4737 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4738 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4739 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4740 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4741 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4742 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4747 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4748 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4752 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4753 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4754 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4756 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4757 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4758 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4759 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4760 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4761 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4762 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4763 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4765 commitment_signed: msg,
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4776 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4777 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4778 let mut forward_event = None;
4779 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4780 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4781 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4782 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4783 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4784 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4785 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4786 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4788 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4789 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4791 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4792 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4793 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4795 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4796 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4799 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4800 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4802 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4803 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4804 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4806 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4807 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4808 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4809 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4810 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4813 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4814 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4817 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4818 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4819 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4820 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4821 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4822 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4823 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4826 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4827 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4828 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4833 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4834 // payments are being processed.
4835 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4836 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4838 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4839 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4846 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4850 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4851 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4852 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4855 match forward_event {
4857 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4858 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4859 time_forwardable: time
4867 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4868 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4871 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4872 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4873 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4877 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4879 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4880 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4881 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4882 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4883 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4884 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4885 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4886 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4887 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4888 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4889 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4890 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4892 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4893 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4894 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4895 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4896 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4897 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4899 } else { unreachable!(); }
4901 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4902 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4903 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4907 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4908 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4909 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4910 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4911 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4912 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4917 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4919 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4920 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4922 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4923 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4924 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4926 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4927 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4934 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4937 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4940 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4941 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4951 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4953 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4954 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4959 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4961 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4965 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4966 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4967 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
4968 msg, &self.default_configuration
4970 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4971 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4972 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4980 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4981 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4982 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4983 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4985 // It's not a local channel
4986 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4990 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
4991 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4992 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4996 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4998 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4999 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5000 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5001 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5002 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5003 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5007 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5008 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5009 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5010 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5012 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5013 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5018 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5021 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5023 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5026 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
5027 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
5028 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
5030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5032 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5034 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5035 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5036 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5037 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5038 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5039 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5040 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5041 let mut channel_update = None;
5042 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5043 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5044 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5047 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5048 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5049 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5050 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5051 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5052 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5053 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5058 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5059 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5060 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5061 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5062 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5063 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5071 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5072 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5075 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5076 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5081 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5082 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5083 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5084 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5085 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5086 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5087 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5088 match monitor_event {
5089 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5090 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5091 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5092 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5095 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5096 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5100 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5101 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5102 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5103 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5105 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5106 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5107 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5108 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5111 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5113 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5116 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5117 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5118 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5119 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5120 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5125 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5126 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5128 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5130 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5132 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5133 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5134 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5141 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5142 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5148 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5149 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5152 has_pending_monitor_events
5155 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5156 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5157 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5159 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5160 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5163 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5164 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5165 /// update was applied.
5166 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5167 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5168 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5169 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5173 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5176 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5177 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5178 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5179 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5180 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5182 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5184 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5187 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5188 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5189 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5190 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5191 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5192 updates: commitment_update,
5196 has_monitor_update = true;
5197 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5198 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5199 if close_channel { return false; }
5206 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5207 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5208 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5216 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5217 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5218 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5221 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5222 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5228 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5229 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5230 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5231 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5232 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5233 let mut has_update = false;
5235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5237 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5240 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5241 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5242 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5243 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5244 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5246 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5247 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5250 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5251 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5252 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5253 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5254 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5259 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5261 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5262 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5263 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5269 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5270 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5278 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5279 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5285 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5286 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5288 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5289 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5290 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5291 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5292 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5293 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5294 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5295 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5296 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5297 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5298 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5299 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5300 assert!(should_broadcast);
5301 } else { unreachable!(); }
5302 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5304 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5308 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5309 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5311 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5312 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5315 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5318 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5319 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5321 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5322 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5323 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5324 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5325 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5326 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5327 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5328 // never fail a payment too early.
5329 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5331 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5339 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5342 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5343 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5345 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5346 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5347 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5349 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5351 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5352 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5356 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5357 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5359 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5361 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5362 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5364 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5365 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5366 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5367 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5368 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5369 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5370 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5371 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5372 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5375 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5376 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5378 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5381 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5383 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5385 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5386 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5387 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5388 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5389 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5392 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5393 /// stored external to LDK.
5395 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5396 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5397 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5399 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5400 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5403 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5404 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5405 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5406 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5408 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5409 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5410 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5411 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5412 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5414 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5415 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5416 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5417 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5418 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5420 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5421 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5423 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5424 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5428 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5429 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5431 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5433 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5434 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5436 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5437 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5438 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5439 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5440 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5441 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5442 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5445 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5446 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5448 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5451 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5453 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5455 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5456 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5459 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5460 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5462 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5463 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5464 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5467 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5468 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5470 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5471 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5472 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5473 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5475 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5476 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5477 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5478 Some(_) => continue,
5479 None => return scid_candidate
5484 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5486 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5487 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5489 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5490 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5491 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5495 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5496 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5497 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5499 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5500 /// times to get a unique scid.
5501 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5503 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5505 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5506 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5507 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5508 return scid_candidate
5512 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5513 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5514 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5515 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5519 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5520 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5521 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5522 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5523 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5524 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5533 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5534 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5535 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5536 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5537 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5542 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5543 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5544 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5548 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5549 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5553 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5554 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5557 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5558 /// using the given event handler.
5560 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5561 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5564 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5565 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5566 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5568 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5570 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5571 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5572 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5573 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5576 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5577 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5578 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5581 for event in pending_events {
5582 handler(event).await;
5585 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5586 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5591 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5593 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5594 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5595 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5596 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5597 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5598 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5602 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5603 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5604 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5605 /// is always placed next to each other.
5607 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5608 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5609 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5610 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5612 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5613 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5614 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5615 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5616 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5617 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5618 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5620 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5621 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5622 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5623 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5626 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5627 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5629 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5630 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5633 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5635 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5638 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5639 let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5640 mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5641 pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5645 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5646 events.replace(pending_events);
5655 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5657 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5659 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5661 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5666 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5668 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5669 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5670 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5671 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5672 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5674 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5675 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5676 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5677 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5680 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5681 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5682 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5685 for event in pending_events {
5686 handler.handle_event(event);
5694 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5696 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5698 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5699 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5700 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5701 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5705 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5707 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5708 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5709 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5710 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5711 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5714 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5715 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5718 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5719 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5720 let new_height = height - 1;
5722 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5723 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5724 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5725 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5726 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5727 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5730 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5734 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5736 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5738 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5739 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5740 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5741 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5745 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5746 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5747 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5748 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5750 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5751 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5754 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5755 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5757 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5758 if height < last_best_block_height {
5759 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5760 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5764 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5765 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5766 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5767 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5769 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5770 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5774 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5776 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5778 macro_rules! max_time {
5779 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5781 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5782 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5783 // having an explicit local time source.
5784 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5785 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5786 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5787 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5788 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5794 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5795 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5796 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5797 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5801 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5802 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5803 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5806 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5807 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5808 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5815 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5817 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5818 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5819 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5820 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5821 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5822 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5827 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5829 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5831 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5833 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5838 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5839 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5841 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5842 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5843 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5844 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5845 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5847 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5848 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5851 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5854 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5855 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5856 let res = f(channel);
5857 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5858 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5859 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5860 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5861 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5863 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5864 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5865 if channel.is_usable() {
5866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5867 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5868 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5869 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5878 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5880 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5883 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5884 msg: announcement_sigs,
5886 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5887 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5888 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5890 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5891 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5892 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5897 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5898 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5899 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5900 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5901 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5902 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5903 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5904 // is always consistent.
5905 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5906 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5907 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5908 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5909 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5912 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5913 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5914 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5915 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5916 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5917 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5922 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5923 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5924 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5925 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5926 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5927 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5928 data: reason_message,
5938 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5939 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5940 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5941 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5942 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5943 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5944 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5945 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5946 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5947 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
5949 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
5950 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5951 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5955 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5958 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5959 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
5960 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5961 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5962 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
5963 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
5964 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5965 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5966 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
5969 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
5970 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5971 _ => unreachable!(),
5973 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
5974 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
5975 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
5976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
5982 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5984 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
5989 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5990 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5991 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
5992 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
5994 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5996 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
5997 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
5998 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
5999 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6000 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6001 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6004 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6005 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6006 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6008 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6009 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6010 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6011 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6014 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6015 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6016 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6017 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6018 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6021 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6022 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6023 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6026 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6027 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6028 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6029 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6032 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6033 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6034 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6035 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6038 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6039 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6041 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6042 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6043 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6044 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6045 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6048 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6049 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6050 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6051 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6054 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6055 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6056 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6057 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6060 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6061 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6062 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6063 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6067 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6068 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6070 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6071 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6072 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6073 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6074 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6075 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6079 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6081 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6084 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6086 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6089 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6091 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6094 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6095 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6096 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6099 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6101 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6104 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6105 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6106 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6109 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6110 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6111 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6114 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6115 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6116 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6119 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6121 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6124 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6126 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6129 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6130 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6131 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6134 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6136 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6139 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6140 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6141 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6144 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6146 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6149 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6151 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6154 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6155 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6156 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6159 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6164 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6165 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6166 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6169 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6171 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6172 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6173 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6175 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6176 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6177 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6180 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6181 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6182 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6183 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6184 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6185 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6188 no_channels_remain = false;
6192 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6194 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6195 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6196 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6197 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6198 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6199 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6200 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6201 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6202 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6203 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6204 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6205 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6206 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6207 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6208 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6209 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6210 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6211 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6212 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6218 if no_channels_remain {
6219 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6221 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6223 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6224 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6228 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6229 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6230 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6234 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6236 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6239 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6240 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6242 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6243 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6244 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6245 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6249 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6256 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6259 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6260 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6261 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6262 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6263 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6264 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6265 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6269 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6270 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6271 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6276 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6277 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6278 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6279 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6280 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6289 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6293 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6297 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6298 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6299 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6300 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6303 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6305 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6306 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6307 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6311 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6313 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6314 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6315 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6316 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6317 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6318 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6319 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6320 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6328 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6329 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6333 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6334 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6337 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6338 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6342 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6343 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6344 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6345 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6348 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6351 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6352 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6353 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6354 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6355 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6358 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6360 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6361 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6364 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6365 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6366 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6367 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6370 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6371 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6372 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6373 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6374 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6375 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6376 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6377 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6378 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6379 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6380 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6381 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6382 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6383 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6384 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6385 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6386 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6387 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6389 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6390 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6391 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6397 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6398 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6400 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6401 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6402 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6403 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6406 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6407 (2, node_id, required),
6408 (4, features, required),
6409 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6410 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6411 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6412 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6415 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6416 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6417 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6418 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6419 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6420 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6421 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6422 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6423 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6424 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6425 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6426 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6427 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6428 (7, self.config, option),
6429 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6430 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6431 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6432 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6433 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6434 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6435 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6436 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6437 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6438 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6439 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6440 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6441 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6442 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6443 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6444 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6445 (32, self.is_public, required),
6446 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6447 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6448 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6454 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6455 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6456 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6457 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6458 (2, channel_id, required),
6459 (3, channel_type, option),
6460 (4, counterparty, required),
6461 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6462 (6, funding_txo, option),
6463 (7, config, option),
6464 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6465 (9, confirmations, option),
6466 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6467 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6468 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6469 (16, balance_msat, required),
6470 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6471 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6472 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6473 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6474 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6475 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6476 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6477 (26, is_outbound, required),
6478 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6479 (30, is_usable, required),
6480 (32, is_public, required),
6481 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6482 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6483 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6486 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6487 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6488 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6489 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6490 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6494 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6496 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6497 outbound_scid_alias,
6501 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6502 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6504 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6505 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6506 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6507 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6508 confirmations_required,
6510 force_close_spend_delay,
6511 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6512 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6513 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6514 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6515 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6516 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6521 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6522 (2, channels, vec_type),
6523 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6524 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6527 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6529 (0, onion_packet, required),
6530 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6533 (0, payment_data, required),
6534 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6535 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6537 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6538 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6539 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6543 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6544 (0, routing, required),
6545 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6546 (4, payment_hash, required),
6547 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6548 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6549 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6553 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6554 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6556 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6558 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6559 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6560 reason.write(writer)?;
6562 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6563 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6566 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6567 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6568 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6569 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6576 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6577 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6578 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6581 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6582 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6583 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6584 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6588 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6589 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6591 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6595 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6596 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6597 // messages contained in the variants.
6598 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6599 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6600 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6602 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6603 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6604 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6605 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6606 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6609 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6610 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6611 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6612 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6613 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6615 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6625 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6626 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6627 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6628 (2, outpoint, required),
6629 (4, htlc_id, required),
6630 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6633 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6634 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6635 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6636 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6637 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6639 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6640 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6641 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6642 (2, self.value, required),
6643 (4, payment_data, option),
6644 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6645 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6651 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6652 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6653 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6655 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6656 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6657 let mut total_msat = None;
6658 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6659 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6660 (0, prev_hop, required),
6661 (1, total_msat, option),
6662 (2, value, required),
6663 (4, payment_data, option),
6664 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6665 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6667 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6669 if payment_data.is_some() {
6670 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6672 if total_msat.is_none() {
6673 total_msat = Some(value);
6675 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6678 if total_msat.is_none() {
6679 if payment_data.is_none() {
6680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6682 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6684 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6688 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6691 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6698 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6699 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6700 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6703 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6704 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6705 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6706 let mut payment_id = None;
6707 let mut payment_secret = None;
6708 let mut payment_params = None;
6709 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6710 (0, session_priv, required),
6711 (1, payment_id, option),
6712 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6713 (3, payment_secret, option),
6714 (4, path, vec_type),
6715 (5, payment_params, option),
6717 if payment_id.is_none() {
6718 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6720 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6722 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6723 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6724 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6725 path: path.unwrap(),
6726 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6731 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6732 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6737 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6738 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6740 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6742 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6743 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6744 (0, session_priv, required),
6745 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6746 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6747 (3, payment_secret, option),
6748 (4, *path, vec_type),
6749 (5, payment_params, option),
6752 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6754 field.write(writer)?;
6761 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6762 (0, forward_info, required),
6763 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6764 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6765 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6766 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6769 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6771 (0, htlc_id, required),
6772 (2, err_packet, required),
6777 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6778 (0, payment_secret, required),
6779 (2, expiry_time, required),
6780 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6781 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6782 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6785 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6787 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6789 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6790 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6791 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6797 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6799 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6801 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6803 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6804 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6805 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6810 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6811 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6812 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6813 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6814 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6815 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6816 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6817 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6818 unfunded_channels += 1;
6823 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6825 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6828 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6829 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6830 channel.write(writer)?;
6837 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6838 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6839 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6840 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6841 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6842 for forward in pending_forwards {
6843 forward.write(writer)?;
6848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6850 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6851 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6852 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6854 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6855 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6856 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6857 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6858 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6859 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6860 htlc.write(writer)?;
6862 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6865 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6866 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6867 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6868 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6869 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6872 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6873 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6874 for event in events.iter() {
6875 event.write(writer)?;
6878 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6879 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6880 for event in background_events.iter() {
6882 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6884 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6885 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6890 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6891 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6892 // likely to be identical.
6893 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6894 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6896 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6897 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6898 hash.write(writer)?;
6899 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6902 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6903 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6904 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6905 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6906 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6909 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6910 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6912 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6913 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6914 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6915 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6918 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6919 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6923 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6924 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6925 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6927 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6928 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6929 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6935 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
6936 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6937 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
6938 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
6941 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
6942 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6943 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
6944 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
6945 pending_claiming_payments = None;
6947 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
6950 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6951 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6952 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
6953 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6954 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
6955 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6956 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6957 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6958 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6965 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6967 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6969 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6970 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6971 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6972 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6973 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6974 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6975 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6976 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6977 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6978 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6979 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6980 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6981 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6983 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6984 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6986 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6987 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6989 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6990 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6991 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6992 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6993 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6994 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6996 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6997 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6999 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7000 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7001 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7002 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7003 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7004 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7008 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7009 pub entropy_source: ES,
7011 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7012 pub node_signer: NS,
7014 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7015 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7017 pub signer_provider: SP,
7019 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7021 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7022 pub fee_estimator: F,
7023 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7025 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7026 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7027 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7028 pub chain_monitor: M,
7030 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7031 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7032 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7033 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7034 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7035 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7037 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7039 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7040 /// deserialization.
7042 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7043 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7044 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7046 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7047 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7049 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7050 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7051 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7052 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7054 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7057 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7058 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7061 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7062 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7064 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7065 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7066 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7067 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7068 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7069 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7073 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7074 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7075 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7076 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7077 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7079 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7080 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7085 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7086 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7087 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7088 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7090 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7091 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7092 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7093 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7094 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7099 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7100 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7101 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7105 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7106 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7108 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7109 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7110 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7111 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7112 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7113 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7117 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7118 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7120 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7122 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7124 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7126 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7127 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7128 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7129 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7130 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7131 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7132 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7133 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7134 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7136 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7137 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7138 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7139 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7140 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7141 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7142 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7143 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7144 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7145 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7146 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7147 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7148 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7149 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7150 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7151 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7152 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7153 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7154 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7155 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7156 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7157 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7158 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7159 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7160 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7161 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7162 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7163 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7164 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7165 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7166 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7167 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7169 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7170 let mut found_htlc = false;
7171 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7172 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7175 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7176 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7177 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7178 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7179 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7180 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7181 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7182 log_info!(args.logger,
7183 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7184 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7185 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7189 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7190 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7191 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7193 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7194 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7196 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7198 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7199 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7202 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7203 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7204 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7208 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7209 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7210 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7211 // safely discard the channel.
7212 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7213 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7214 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7215 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7216 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7219 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7220 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7221 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7222 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7223 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7224 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7228 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7229 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7230 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7231 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7235 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7236 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7238 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7239 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7240 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7241 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7242 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7243 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7245 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7248 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7249 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7250 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7251 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7252 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7253 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7254 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7255 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7257 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7260 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7261 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7262 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7263 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let peer_state = PeerState {
7265 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7266 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7267 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7269 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7272 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7273 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7274 for _ in 0..event_count {
7275 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7276 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7281 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7283 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7284 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7285 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7286 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7290 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7291 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7295 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7296 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7297 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7301 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7303 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7304 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7305 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7307 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7309 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7314 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7315 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7316 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7317 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7318 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7319 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7320 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7321 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7322 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7323 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7324 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7325 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7326 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7327 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7328 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7329 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7330 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7331 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7333 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7334 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7337 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7338 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7341 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7342 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7343 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7344 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7345 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7346 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7348 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7350 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7351 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7352 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7353 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7354 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7355 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7356 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7358 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7359 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7360 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7361 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7362 if path.is_empty() {
7363 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7364 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7366 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7367 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7368 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7369 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7371 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7372 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7373 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7376 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7377 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7378 retry_strategy: None,
7379 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7380 payment_params: None,
7381 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7382 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7384 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7385 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7386 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7387 total_msat: path_amt,
7388 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7390 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7391 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7396 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7397 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7398 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7399 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7400 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7402 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7403 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7404 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7405 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7406 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7407 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7408 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7409 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7410 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7411 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7412 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7417 !forwards.is_empty()
7419 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7420 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7421 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7422 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7423 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7424 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7425 intercepted_id != ev_id
7437 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7438 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7439 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7440 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7441 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7442 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7443 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7444 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7448 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7449 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7451 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7452 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7453 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7456 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7457 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7460 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7461 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7462 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7463 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7464 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7466 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7467 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7468 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7469 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7470 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7471 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7472 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7473 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7475 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7476 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7480 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7482 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7484 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7485 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7487 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7491 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7492 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7494 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7495 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7498 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7500 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7502 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7503 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7504 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7509 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7510 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7511 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7512 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7513 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7514 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7515 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7517 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7518 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7519 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7521 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7522 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7523 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7524 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7525 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7526 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7528 if chan.is_usable() {
7529 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7530 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7531 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7532 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7533 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7539 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7541 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7542 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7543 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7544 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7545 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7546 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7547 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7548 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7549 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7550 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7551 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7553 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7554 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7556 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7557 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7558 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7559 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7561 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7562 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7563 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7564 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7566 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7567 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7568 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7569 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7571 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7572 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7573 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7576 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7577 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7580 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7581 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7584 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7587 purpose: payment_purpose,
7588 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7594 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7596 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7597 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7598 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7599 router: args.router,
7601 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7603 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7604 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7605 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7606 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7608 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7609 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7610 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7611 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7612 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7613 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7615 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7620 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7622 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7624 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7625 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7626 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7627 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7629 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7630 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7631 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7633 logger: args.logger,
7634 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7637 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7638 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7639 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7640 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7641 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7644 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7645 //connection or two.
7647 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7653 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7654 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7655 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7656 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7657 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7658 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7659 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7661 use core::time::Duration;
7662 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7663 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7664 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7665 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7666 use crate::ln::msgs;
7667 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7668 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7669 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7670 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7671 use crate::util::test_utils;
7672 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7673 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7676 fn test_notify_limits() {
7677 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7678 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7679 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7680 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7681 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7682 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7684 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7685 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7686 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7687 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7688 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7690 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7692 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7693 // to connect messages with new values
7694 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7695 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7696 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7697 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7699 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7700 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7701 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7702 // ... but the last node should not.
7703 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7704 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7705 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7706 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7708 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7709 // about the channel.
7710 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7711 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7712 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7714 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7716 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7717 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7718 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7719 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7720 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7721 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7723 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7724 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7725 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7727 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7728 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7729 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7730 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7731 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7732 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7734 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7735 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7736 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7737 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7738 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7739 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7740 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7741 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7743 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7744 // the channel info has updated.
7745 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7746 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7747 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7748 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7749 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7750 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7754 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7755 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7757 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7760 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7761 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7763 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7764 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7765 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7766 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7768 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7769 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7770 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7771 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7772 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7773 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7775 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7776 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7777 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7779 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7780 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7784 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7790 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7792 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7793 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7794 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7795 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7796 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7797 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7798 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7799 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7800 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7802 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7803 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7805 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7806 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7807 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7809 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7810 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7811 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7812 // lightning messages manually.
7813 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7814 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7817 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7818 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7819 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7821 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7822 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7824 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7825 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7827 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7828 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7829 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7831 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7832 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7833 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7835 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7837 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7839 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7840 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7843 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7844 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7845 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7846 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7848 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7849 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7850 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7851 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7853 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7856 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7857 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7858 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7859 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7864 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7865 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7866 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7867 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7874 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7875 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7876 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7877 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7878 // fails as expected.
7879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7883 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7884 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7885 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7887 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7888 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7889 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7891 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7892 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7893 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7894 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7895 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7897 let route = find_route(
7898 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7899 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7901 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7903 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7905 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7906 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7907 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7909 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7910 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7911 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7915 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7916 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7917 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7919 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7920 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7921 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7922 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7923 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7925 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7926 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7928 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7929 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7930 let route = find_route(
7931 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7932 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7934 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7936 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7938 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7939 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7940 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7942 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7943 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7944 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7946 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7948 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7949 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7956 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7957 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7958 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7959 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7960 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7961 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7964 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7966 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7971 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7972 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7973 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7979 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7980 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7981 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7982 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7984 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
7985 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7986 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
7987 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7988 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7990 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
7991 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7992 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7993 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7994 let route = find_route(
7995 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7996 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7999 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8000 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8001 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8002 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8005 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8006 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8007 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8008 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8009 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8010 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8011 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8013 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8017 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8018 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8019 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8020 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8021 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8022 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8024 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8025 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8026 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8027 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8029 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8030 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8031 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8032 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8033 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8035 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8036 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8037 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8038 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8039 let route = find_route(
8040 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8041 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8044 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8045 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8046 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8047 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8048 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8051 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8053 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8054 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8055 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8056 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8057 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8059 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8063 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8067 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8069 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8070 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8071 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8072 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8074 // Marshall an MPP route.
8075 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8076 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8077 route.paths.push(path);
8078 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8079 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8080 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8081 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8082 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8083 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8085 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8086 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8087 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8088 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8093 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8094 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8100 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8101 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8103 total_msat: 100_000,
8106 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8107 // payment verification fails as expected.
8108 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8109 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8110 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8111 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8113 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8117 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8118 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8122 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8123 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8124 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8125 // the channel is successfully closed.
8126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8131 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8132 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8133 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8134 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8137 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8138 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8140 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8141 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8142 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8143 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8146 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8148 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8149 // as it has the funding transaction.
8150 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8151 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8152 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8154 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8157 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8159 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8161 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8162 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8163 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8165 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8166 // as it has the funding transaction.
8167 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8168 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8169 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8172 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8173 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8175 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8176 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8177 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8179 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8180 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8181 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8182 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8184 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8185 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8187 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8188 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8189 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8190 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8191 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8192 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8193 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8195 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8196 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8197 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8198 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8199 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8200 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8201 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8204 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8206 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8207 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8208 // closing transaction).
8209 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8210 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8211 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8213 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8214 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8215 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8216 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8217 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8220 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8222 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8224 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8225 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8226 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8228 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8230 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8231 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8234 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8235 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8236 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8239 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8240 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8241 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8244 fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8246 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8247 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8249 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8250 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8255 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8256 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8257 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8258 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8259 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8260 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8261 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8262 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8264 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8265 // creating dummy ones.
8266 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8267 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8268 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8269 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8272 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8273 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8274 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8275 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8278 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8279 temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8280 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8281 funding_output_index: 0,
8282 signature: signature,
8285 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8286 channel_id: channel_id,
8287 signature: signature,
8290 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8291 channel_id: channel_id,
8292 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8293 short_channel_id_alias: None,
8296 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8297 channel_id: channel_id,
8298 short_channel_id: 0,
8299 node_signature: signature,
8300 bitcoin_signature: signature,
8303 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8304 channel_id: channel_id,
8305 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8306 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8307 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8310 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8311 channel_id: channel_id,
8313 signature: signature,
8317 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8318 channel_id: channel_id,
8319 scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8322 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8324 public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8325 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8329 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8330 channel_id: channel_id,
8332 amount_msat: 1000000,
8333 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8334 cltv_expiry: 821716,
8335 onion_routing_packet
8338 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8339 channel_id: channel_id,
8340 signature: signature,
8341 htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8344 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8345 channel_id: channel_id,
8346 feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8349 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8350 channel_id: channel_id,
8352 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8353 failure_code: 0x8000,
8356 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8357 channel_id: channel_id,
8359 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8362 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8363 channel_id: channel_id,
8365 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8368 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8369 channel_id: channel_id,
8370 per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8371 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8374 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8375 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8377 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, &open_channel_msg);
8379 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, &accept_channel_msg);
8381 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8383 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8385 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8387 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8389 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8391 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8393 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8395 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8397 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8399 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8401 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &shutdown_msg);
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8405 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8407 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8409 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8411 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8413 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8415 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8417 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8424 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8425 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8426 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8427 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8430 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8431 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8432 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8436 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8437 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8440 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8441 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8443 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8444 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8449 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8452 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8453 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8455 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8459 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8461 use crate::chain::Listen;
8462 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8463 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8464 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8465 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8466 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8467 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8468 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8469 use crate::util::test_utils;
8470 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8471 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8473 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8474 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8475 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8477 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8481 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8482 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8483 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8484 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8485 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8486 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8487 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8488 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8493 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8494 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8497 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8498 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8499 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8501 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8502 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8504 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8505 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8506 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8507 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8509 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8510 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8512 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8513 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8514 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8515 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8517 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8519 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8521 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8522 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8523 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8524 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8525 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8527 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8529 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8531 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8532 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8533 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8534 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8535 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8538 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8539 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8540 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8542 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8543 } else { panic!(); }
8545 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8546 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8548 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8551 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8554 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8555 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8557 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8558 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8559 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8560 match msg_events[0] {
8561 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8562 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8563 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8567 match msg_events[1] {
8568 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8572 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8573 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8575 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8576 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8581 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8582 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8584 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8585 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8590 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8592 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8593 macro_rules! send_payment {
8594 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8595 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8596 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8597 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8598 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8599 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8600 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8601 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8602 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8603 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8605 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8606 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8608 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8609 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8611 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8612 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8613 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8614 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8615 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8616 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8617 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8618 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8620 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8621 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8622 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8623 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8625 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8626 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8627 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8628 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8629 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8631 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8634 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8635 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8636 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8637 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8639 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8644 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8645 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);