1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for MppId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for MppId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
206 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
209 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
219 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
230 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244 err: msgs::LightningError,
245 chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
262 shutdown_finish: None,
266 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
268 err: LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
273 shutdown_finish: None,
277 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
281 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
283 err: LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
297 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
304 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
308 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
328 shutdown_finish: None,
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
347 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375 /// commitment transaction.
376 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
382 latest_features: InitFeatures,
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394 /// this payment being removed.
396 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397 user_payment_id: u64,
398 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
403 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
404 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
405 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
406 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
407 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
408 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
409 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
410 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
412 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
413 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
414 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
415 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
416 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
417 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
418 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
419 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
420 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
422 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
423 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
425 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
426 /// to individual Channels.
428 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
429 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
430 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
431 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
433 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
434 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
435 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
436 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
437 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
438 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
439 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
441 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
442 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
443 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
444 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
447 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
448 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
449 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
450 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
451 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
453 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
454 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
455 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
456 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
458 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
459 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
461 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
465 default_configuration: UserConfig,
466 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
472 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
474 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
475 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
477 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
478 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
480 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
482 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
483 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
484 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
485 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
486 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
487 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
489 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
490 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
491 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
492 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
493 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
494 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
495 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
496 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
498 /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
499 /// payments over a single path).
501 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
502 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
504 our_network_key: SecretKey,
505 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
507 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
508 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
509 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
511 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
512 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
513 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
514 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
516 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
517 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
518 /// are currently open with that peer.
519 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
520 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
523 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
524 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
526 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
527 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
528 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
529 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
530 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
531 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
532 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
533 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
534 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
536 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
543 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
545 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
546 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
547 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
548 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
549 pub struct ChainParameters {
550 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
551 pub network: Network,
553 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
555 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
556 pub best_block: BestBlock,
559 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
565 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
566 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
567 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
568 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
569 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
570 /// updates are ready for persistence).
572 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
573 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
574 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
575 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
576 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
578 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
579 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
582 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
583 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
587 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
588 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
590 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
591 persistence_notifier: notifier,
592 should_persist: persist_check,
593 _read_guard: read_guard,
598 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
600 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
601 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
607 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
611 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
612 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
613 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
614 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
615 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
617 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
618 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
620 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
622 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
623 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
624 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
625 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
626 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
627 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
628 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
630 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
631 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
633 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
634 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
635 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
636 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
638 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
639 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
640 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
641 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
642 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
643 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
646 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
648 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
649 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
652 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
657 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
658 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
659 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
660 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
661 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
662 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
663 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
664 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
668 /// to better separate parameters.
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
671 /// The node_id of our counterparty
672 pub node_id: PublicKey,
673 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
674 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
675 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
676 pub features: InitFeatures,
677 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
678 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
679 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
681 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
683 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686 /// payments to us through this channel.
687 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
690 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
692 pub struct ChannelDetails {
693 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
694 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
695 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
696 /// lifetime of the channel.
697 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
698 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
699 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
700 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
701 /// our counterparty already.
703 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
704 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
705 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
706 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
707 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
708 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
709 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
710 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
711 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
712 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
713 /// this value on chain.
715 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
719 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
720 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
721 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
723 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
724 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
725 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
726 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
728 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
729 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
730 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
731 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
732 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
733 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
734 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
735 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
736 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
738 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
739 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
740 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
741 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
742 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
743 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
744 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
748 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
750 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
753 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
754 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
755 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
756 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
757 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
758 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
760 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
761 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
762 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
763 pub is_outbound: bool,
764 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
765 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
766 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
767 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
768 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
770 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
771 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
781 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
782 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
785 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
786 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
787 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
788 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
789 ParameterError(APIError),
790 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
791 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
792 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
795 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
797 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
798 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
799 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
800 /// paths than the ones selected).
801 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
802 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
803 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
804 /// in over-/re-payment.
806 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
807 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
808 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
810 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
811 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
812 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
813 /// with the latest update_id.
814 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
817 macro_rules! handle_error {
818 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
821 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
822 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
824 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
825 // entering the macro.
826 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
829 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
831 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
832 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
833 if let Some(update) = update_option {
834 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
838 if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
839 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
843 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
844 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
846 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
847 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
848 action: err.action.clone()
852 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
853 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
856 // Return error in case higher-API need one
863 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
864 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
865 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
867 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
868 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
870 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
872 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
873 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
875 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
876 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
877 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
878 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
880 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
881 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
883 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
884 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
885 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
886 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
888 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
889 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
895 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
896 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
900 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
902 $entry.remove_entry();
910 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
911 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
915 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
917 $entry.remove_entry();
925 macro_rules! remove_channel {
926 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
928 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
929 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
930 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
937 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
939 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
943 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
944 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
945 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
946 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
948 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
949 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
950 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
951 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
952 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
953 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
954 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
955 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
956 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
957 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
958 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
961 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
962 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
963 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
964 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
966 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
967 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
969 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
970 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
972 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
973 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
974 if !$resend_commitment {
975 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
978 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
980 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
981 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
985 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
986 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
988 $entry.remove_entry();
994 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
995 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
996 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
998 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
999 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1003 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1004 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1005 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1006 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1007 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1010 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1015 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1016 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1017 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1018 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1019 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1020 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1022 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1023 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1025 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1026 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1027 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1028 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1031 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1032 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1033 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1034 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1035 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1036 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1037 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1038 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1039 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1040 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1041 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1042 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1045 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1046 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1047 // before it should be allowed to.
1048 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1049 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1050 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1053 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1054 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1055 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1056 msg: announcement_sigs,
1059 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1062 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1063 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1064 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1065 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1066 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1067 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1068 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1069 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1070 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1071 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1072 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1073 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1074 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1075 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1076 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1077 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1078 let mut order = $order;
1080 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1082 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1086 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1087 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1088 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1089 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1094 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1095 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1096 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1097 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1098 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1103 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1107 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1112 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1113 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1114 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1119 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1120 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1121 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1122 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1123 assert!(res.is_ok());
1126 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1130 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1131 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1132 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1134 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1136 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1137 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1142 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1143 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1149 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1151 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1152 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1154 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1156 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1158 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1159 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1160 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1161 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1162 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1163 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1166 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1167 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1168 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1172 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1174 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1175 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1176 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1177 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1178 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1179 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1181 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1182 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1184 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1185 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1188 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1189 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1191 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1193 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1194 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1195 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1196 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1204 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1205 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1206 &self.default_configuration
1209 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1211 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1212 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1213 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1214 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1215 /// otherwise ignored.
1217 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1218 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1220 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1221 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1223 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1224 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1225 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1226 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1227 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1228 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1233 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1234 Some(peer_state) => {
1235 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1236 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1237 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1238 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1240 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1243 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1246 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1247 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1249 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1252 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1253 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1255 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1261 node_id: their_network_key,
1267 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1268 let mut res = Vec::new();
1270 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1271 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1272 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1273 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1274 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1275 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1276 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1277 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1278 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1279 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1280 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1281 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1282 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1284 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1285 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1286 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1287 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1288 inbound_capacity_msat,
1289 outbound_capacity_msat,
1290 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1291 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1292 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1293 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1294 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1295 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1296 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1301 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1302 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1303 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1309 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1310 /// more information.
1311 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1312 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1315 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1316 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1318 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1319 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1321 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1322 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1323 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1324 // really wanted anyway.
1325 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1328 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1331 let counterparty_node_id;
1332 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1333 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1334 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1335 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1338 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1340 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1341 Some(peer_state) => {
1342 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1343 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1344 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1346 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1348 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1350 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1351 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1352 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1353 let (result, is_permanent) =
1354 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1356 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1363 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1367 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1368 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1369 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1370 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1374 if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
1375 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1376 channel_id: *channel_id,
1377 reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
1383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1387 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1388 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1391 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1395 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1396 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1397 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1399 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1400 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1402 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1403 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1404 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1405 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1407 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1409 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1410 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1411 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1412 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1413 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1416 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1417 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1418 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1420 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1421 /// the channel being closed or not:
1422 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1423 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1424 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1425 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1426 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1427 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1428 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1430 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1432 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1433 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1434 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1435 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1436 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1440 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1441 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1442 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1443 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1444 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1446 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1447 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1448 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1449 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1450 // ignore the result here.
1451 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1455 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1456 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1457 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1459 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1461 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1462 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1463 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1467 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1468 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1470 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1471 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1472 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1473 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() } });
1476 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed });
1478 chan.remove_entry().1
1480 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1483 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1484 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1485 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1486 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1487 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1492 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1495 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1496 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1497 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1499 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1500 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1501 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1502 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1503 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1504 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1505 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1515 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1516 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1517 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1518 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1519 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1523 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1524 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1525 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1527 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1528 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1529 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1530 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1531 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1532 failure_code: $err_code,
1533 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1538 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1539 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1542 let shared_secret = {
1543 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1544 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1547 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1549 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1550 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1551 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1552 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1553 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1554 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1555 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1556 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1559 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1560 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1561 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1562 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1563 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1566 let mut channel_state = None;
1567 macro_rules! return_err {
1568 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1570 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1571 if channel_state.is_none() {
1572 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1574 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1575 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1576 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1577 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1578 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1583 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1584 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1585 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1586 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1588 let error_code = match err {
1589 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1590 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1591 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1592 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1593 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1595 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1598 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1599 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1600 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1607 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1610 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1611 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1612 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1613 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1614 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1615 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1616 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1617 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1618 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1619 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1620 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1621 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1625 // final_expiry_too_soon
1626 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1627 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1628 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1629 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1630 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1631 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1632 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1634 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1635 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1636 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1638 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1639 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1640 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1643 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1644 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1645 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1646 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1647 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1648 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1649 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1650 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1652 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1654 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1655 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1656 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1657 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1658 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1659 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1660 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1661 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1662 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1665 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1667 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1670 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1675 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1676 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1677 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1678 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1680 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1682 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1683 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1684 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1685 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1688 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1689 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1692 // Check two things:
1693 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1694 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1695 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1697 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1699 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1700 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1701 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1703 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1705 let blinding_factor = {
1706 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1707 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1708 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1709 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1712 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1714 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1716 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1719 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1720 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1723 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1724 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1725 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1726 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1727 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1731 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1732 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1733 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1736 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1737 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1738 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1739 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1743 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1744 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1745 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1746 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1747 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1748 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1749 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1750 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1751 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1752 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1753 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1755 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1758 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1760 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1761 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1762 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1763 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1764 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1767 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1768 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1769 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1770 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1771 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1772 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1773 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1775 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1776 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1778 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1779 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1780 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1781 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1782 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1784 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1785 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1787 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1788 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1789 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1790 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1791 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1793 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1794 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1796 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1797 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1798 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1799 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1805 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1806 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1807 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1808 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1810 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1811 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1813 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1814 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1815 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1817 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1819 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1824 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1827 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1828 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1829 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1831 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1832 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1833 if !chan.should_announce() {
1834 return Err(LightningError {
1835 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1836 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1840 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1843 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1844 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1845 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1846 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1847 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1848 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1849 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1850 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1851 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1855 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1857 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1858 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1860 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1861 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1862 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1863 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1864 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1865 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1866 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1867 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1870 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1871 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1873 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1879 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1880 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1881 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1882 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1883 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1884 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1886 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1887 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1888 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1889 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1890 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1892 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1895 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1896 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1897 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1899 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1901 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1902 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1903 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1907 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1909 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1910 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1912 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1913 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1915 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1917 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1918 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1920 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1922 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1923 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1924 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1925 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1926 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1927 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1928 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1929 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1930 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1933 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1934 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1935 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1936 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1937 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1938 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1939 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1940 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1948 } else { unreachable!(); }
1952 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1953 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1955 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1960 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1962 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1963 /// fields for more info.
1965 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1966 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1967 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1968 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1969 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1970 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1972 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1974 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1975 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1976 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1978 /// In general, a path may raise:
1979 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1980 /// node public key) is specified.
1981 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1982 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1984 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1985 /// relevant updates.
1987 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1988 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1989 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1991 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1992 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1993 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1994 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1996 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1997 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1998 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1999 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2000 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
2003 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2004 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2005 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2007 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2008 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2009 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2010 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2011 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2013 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2014 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2016 let mut total_value = 0;
2017 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2018 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2019 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2020 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2021 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2022 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2023 continue 'path_check;
2025 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2026 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2027 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2028 continue 'path_check;
2031 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2032 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2034 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2035 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2038 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2039 let mut results = Vec::new();
2040 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2041 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2043 let mut has_ok = false;
2044 let mut has_err = false;
2045 for res in results.iter() {
2046 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2047 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2048 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2049 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2056 if has_err && has_ok {
2057 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2059 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2065 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2066 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2067 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2068 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2069 /// never reach the recipient.
2071 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2073 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2074 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2076 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2078 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2079 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2080 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2082 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2084 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2085 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2086 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2091 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2092 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2093 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2094 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2096 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2098 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2100 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2101 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2102 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2103 } else { unreachable!(); })
2106 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2108 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2109 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2112 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2113 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2118 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2120 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2123 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2125 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2135 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2136 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2137 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2141 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2143 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2144 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2146 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2148 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2149 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2150 /// keys per-channel).
2152 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2153 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2154 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2156 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2157 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2158 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2160 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2161 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2164 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2165 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2166 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2167 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2171 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2172 let mut output_index = None;
2173 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2174 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2175 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2176 if output_index.is_some() {
2177 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2178 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2181 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2182 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2183 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2186 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2189 if output_index.is_none() {
2190 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2191 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2194 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2198 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2199 if !chan.should_announce() {
2200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2204 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2206 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2208 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2209 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2211 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2212 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2213 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2214 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2215 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2220 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2221 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2222 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2224 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2227 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2228 // smaller than 500:
2229 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2231 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2232 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2233 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2234 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2235 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2236 /// our network addresses.
2238 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2239 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2241 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2242 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2243 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2244 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2246 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2248 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2249 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2252 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2253 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2256 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2257 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2258 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2260 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2261 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2262 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2263 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2264 rgb, alias, addresses,
2265 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2266 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2268 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2269 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2271 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2274 let mut announced_chans = false;
2275 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2276 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2279 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2284 announced_chans = true;
2286 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2287 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2288 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2292 if announced_chans {
2293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2294 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2295 signature: node_announce_sig,
2296 contents: announcement
2302 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2304 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2305 /// Will likely generate further events.
2306 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2309 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2310 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2311 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2313 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2314 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2316 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2317 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2318 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2319 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2321 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2322 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2323 match forward_info {
2324 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2325 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2326 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2327 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2328 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2329 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2330 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2332 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2333 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2336 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2337 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2338 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2339 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2340 // problem, not ours.
2347 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2348 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2349 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2350 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2351 match forward_info {
2352 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2353 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2355 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2356 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2358 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2359 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2360 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2361 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2362 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2364 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2366 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2369 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2371 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2372 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2373 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2379 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2381 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2382 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2383 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2384 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2385 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2386 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2387 // this channel currently :/.
2393 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2394 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2396 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2398 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2400 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2403 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2405 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2406 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2407 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2410 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2412 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2413 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2414 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2415 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2416 // messages when we can.
2417 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2418 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2419 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2426 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2427 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2430 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2431 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2432 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2433 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2434 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2435 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2437 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2439 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2440 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2441 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2443 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2444 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2446 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2448 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2452 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2453 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2456 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2457 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2458 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2459 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2460 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2461 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2462 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2463 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2464 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2474 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2475 match forward_info {
2476 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2477 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2478 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2479 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2480 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2481 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2482 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2483 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2485 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2488 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2489 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2490 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2491 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2492 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2493 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2495 value: amt_to_forward,
2500 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2502 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2503 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2504 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2506 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2507 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2508 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2509 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2510 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2512 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2517 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2518 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2519 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2520 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2521 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2522 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2523 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2524 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2526 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2527 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2529 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2531 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2532 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2534 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2535 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2537 amt: amt_to_forward,
2538 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2551 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2558 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2560 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2561 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2562 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2563 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2564 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2566 let mut total_value = 0;
2567 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2568 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2569 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2570 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2572 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2576 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2577 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2578 total_value += htlc.value;
2579 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2580 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2581 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2582 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2583 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2584 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2586 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2588 _ => unreachable!(),
2591 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2593 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2594 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2597 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2598 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2600 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2601 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2602 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2603 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2607 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2608 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2610 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2612 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2613 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2620 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2621 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2629 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2630 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2633 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2634 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2637 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2638 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2639 events.append(&mut new_events);
2642 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2644 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2645 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2647 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2648 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2649 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2650 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2651 if background_events.is_empty() {
2655 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2657 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2658 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2659 // monitor updating completing.
2660 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2667 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2668 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2669 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2670 self.process_background_events();
2673 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2674 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2675 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2676 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2678 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2679 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2681 if !chan.is_live() {
2682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2683 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2684 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2686 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2687 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2689 let mut retain_channel = true;
2690 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2693 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2694 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2698 let ret_err = match res {
2699 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2700 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2701 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2702 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2706 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2707 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2708 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2709 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2710 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2711 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2712 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2722 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2726 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2727 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2728 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2729 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2730 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2731 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2732 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2734 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2736 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2740 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2741 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2742 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2743 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2744 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2746 handle_errors.push(err);
2756 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2758 /// This currently includes:
2759 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2760 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2761 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2764 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2765 /// estimate fetches.
2766 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2767 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2768 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2769 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2771 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2773 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2775 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2776 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2777 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2778 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2779 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2780 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2781 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2782 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2784 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2786 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2788 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2789 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2790 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2791 if needs_close { return false; }
2794 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2795 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2796 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2797 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2798 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2799 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2800 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2805 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2806 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2808 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2809 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2810 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2814 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2815 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2824 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2825 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2831 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2832 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2833 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2834 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2835 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2836 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2839 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2840 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2841 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2842 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2843 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2844 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2845 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2846 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2847 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2848 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2849 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2855 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2856 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2857 // be surfaced to the user.
2858 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2859 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2861 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2862 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2863 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2865 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2866 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2868 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2873 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2875 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2877 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2878 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2879 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2880 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2881 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2882 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2883 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2884 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2886 rejected_by_dest: false,
2887 network_update: None,
2888 all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
2895 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2907 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2908 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2909 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2910 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2911 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2912 /// still-available channels.
2913 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2914 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2915 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2916 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2919 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2920 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2921 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2923 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2924 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2925 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2926 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2927 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
2928 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2929 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2930 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2933 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2934 all_paths_failed = true;
2938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2942 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2943 match &onion_error {
2944 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2946 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2948 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2949 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2950 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2951 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2952 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2953 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2954 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2955 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2959 error_code: onion_error_code,
2961 error_data: onion_error_data
2965 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2971 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2972 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2973 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2974 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2976 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2977 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2978 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2979 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2980 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2981 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2982 network_update: None,
2985 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2987 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2993 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2994 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2995 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2997 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2998 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3000 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3002 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3006 let mut forward_event = None;
3007 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3008 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3010 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3012 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3015 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3018 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3019 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3020 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3021 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3022 time_forwardable: time
3029 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3030 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3031 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3033 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3034 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3035 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3036 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3038 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3040 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3041 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3042 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3043 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3047 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3048 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3049 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3050 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3052 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3053 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3054 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3055 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3057 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3058 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3059 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3060 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3061 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3063 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3064 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3065 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3071 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3072 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3073 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3075 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3076 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3077 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3078 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3080 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3081 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3083 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3084 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3085 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3086 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3087 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3088 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3089 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3090 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3092 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3093 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3094 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3095 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3096 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3097 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3099 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3104 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3105 // which were generated.
3106 channel_state.take();
3108 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3109 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3110 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3117 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3118 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3119 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3120 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3121 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3123 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3127 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3128 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3129 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3130 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3131 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3132 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3133 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3134 payment_preimage, e);
3135 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3136 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3137 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3138 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3141 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3142 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3143 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3144 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3145 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3146 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3147 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3148 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3149 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3150 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3156 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3158 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3161 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3162 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3163 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3164 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3165 payment_preimage, e);
3167 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3168 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3170 chan.remove_entry();
3172 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3175 } else { unreachable!(); }
3178 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3180 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
3181 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3182 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3183 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3184 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3185 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&mpp_id) {
3186 sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3189 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3190 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3196 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3197 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3198 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3199 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3200 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3201 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3202 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3205 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3206 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3207 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3208 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3209 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3212 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3213 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3214 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3215 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3216 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3217 payment_preimage, e);
3219 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3220 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3221 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3222 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3225 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3226 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3227 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3228 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3232 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3233 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3234 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3237 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3238 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3240 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3248 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3249 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3250 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3253 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3254 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3257 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3258 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3260 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3261 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3262 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3263 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3265 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3266 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3267 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3268 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3269 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3270 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3271 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3272 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3273 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3276 let chan_restoration_res;
3277 let mut pending_failures = {
3278 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3280 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3284 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3288 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3289 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3290 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3291 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3292 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3293 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3294 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3295 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3296 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3299 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3300 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3301 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3305 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3306 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3307 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3311 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3312 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3316 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3317 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3320 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3324 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3325 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3327 entry.insert(channel);
3333 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3334 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3335 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3339 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3340 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3342 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3343 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3345 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3348 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3349 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3350 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3351 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3353 user_channel_id: user_id,
3358 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3359 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3360 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3361 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3363 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3365 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3366 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3368 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3373 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3374 // lock before watch_channel
3375 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3377 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3378 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3379 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3380 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3381 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3382 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3383 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3384 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3385 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3386 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3389 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3390 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3391 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3392 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3393 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3394 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3398 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3399 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3406 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3415 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3417 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3418 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3419 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3420 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3422 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3423 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3425 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3426 Ok(update) => update,
3427 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3429 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3430 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3437 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3438 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3442 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3443 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3444 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3445 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3447 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3450 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3451 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3453 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3454 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3455 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3456 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3457 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3458 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3459 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3460 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3461 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3463 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3464 msg: announcement_sigs,
3466 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3467 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3468 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3469 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3478 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3479 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3480 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3481 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3482 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3484 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3486 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3487 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3490 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3491 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3492 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3493 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3496 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3497 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3499 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3500 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3501 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3502 let (result, is_permanent) =
3503 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3505 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3511 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3513 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3523 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3524 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3527 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3531 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3532 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3533 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3534 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3535 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3537 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3540 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3541 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3543 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3548 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3549 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3550 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3551 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3552 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3553 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3554 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3556 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3557 } else { (tx, None) }
3559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3562 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3563 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3564 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3566 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3567 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3568 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3573 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure });
3578 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3579 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3580 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3581 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3583 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3584 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3585 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3586 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3588 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3589 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3591 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3593 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3597 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3598 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3599 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3600 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3601 match pending_forward_info {
3602 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3603 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3604 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3605 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3606 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3607 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3608 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3609 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3613 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3614 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3615 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3616 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3617 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3618 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3619 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3620 // no problem just calling this
3621 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3622 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3625 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3627 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3628 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3629 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3632 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3634 _ => pending_forward_info
3637 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3644 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3645 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3646 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3650 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3653 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3658 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3662 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3663 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3664 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3665 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3667 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3668 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3670 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3677 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3678 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3679 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3680 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3682 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3685 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3686 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3687 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3689 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3696 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3697 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3698 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3699 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3701 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3702 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3704 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3705 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3706 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3707 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3708 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3709 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3710 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3715 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3716 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3719 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3720 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3722 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3723 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3725 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3726 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3727 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3728 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3729 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3731 commitment_signed: msg,
3737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3742 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3743 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3744 let mut forward_event = None;
3745 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3746 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3747 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3748 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3750 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3751 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3752 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3753 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3754 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3757 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3758 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3761 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3762 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3767 match forward_event {
3769 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3770 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3771 time_forwardable: time
3779 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3780 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3783 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3784 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3786 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3787 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3789 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3790 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3791 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3792 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3793 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3794 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3795 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3796 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3798 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3800 } else { unreachable!(); }
3803 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3804 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3805 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3809 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3814 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3816 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3817 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3818 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3820 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3827 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3832 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3842 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3846 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3848 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3849 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3851 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3852 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3856 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3857 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3858 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3859 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3867 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3868 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3869 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3870 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3871 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3872 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3874 // It's not a local channel
3875 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3878 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3880 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3881 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3882 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3883 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3884 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3885 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3887 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3889 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3890 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3891 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3892 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3899 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3902 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3903 let chan_restoration_res;
3904 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3905 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3908 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3910 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3913 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3914 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3915 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3916 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3917 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3918 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3919 let mut channel_update = None;
3920 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3925 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3926 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3927 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3928 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3929 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3930 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3931 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3934 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3935 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3936 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3937 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3939 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3941 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3944 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3945 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3947 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3948 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3953 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3954 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3955 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3956 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3957 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3958 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3959 match monitor_event {
3960 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3961 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3962 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3963 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3965 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3969 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
3970 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3971 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3972 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3973 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3974 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3975 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3976 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3977 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3979 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3980 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3985 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
3986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3987 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3988 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3989 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3997 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3998 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4001 has_pending_monitor_events
4004 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4005 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4006 /// update was applied.
4008 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4009 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4010 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4011 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4012 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4013 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4014 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4015 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4018 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4019 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4020 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4021 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4023 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4024 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4025 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4026 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4027 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4029 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4030 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4031 has_monitor_update = true;
4032 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4033 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4034 if close_channel { return false; }
4036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4037 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4038 updates: commitment_update,
4045 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4046 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4047 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4054 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4055 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4056 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4059 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4060 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4066 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4067 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4068 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4069 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4070 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4071 let mut has_update = false;
4073 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4074 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4075 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4076 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4077 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4079 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4080 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4081 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4082 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4084 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4085 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4088 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4089 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4090 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4091 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4092 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4095 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4096 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4101 if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
4102 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
4103 channel_id: *channel_id,
4104 reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure
4108 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4109 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4115 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4116 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4123 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4124 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4130 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4131 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4133 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4134 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4135 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4136 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4137 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4138 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4139 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4140 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4141 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4142 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4143 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4144 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4145 assert!(should_broadcast);
4146 } else { unreachable!(); }
4147 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4149 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4153 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4154 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4156 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4159 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4160 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4162 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4163 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4164 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4165 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4166 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4167 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4168 // never fail a payment too early.
4169 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4171 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4179 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4182 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4183 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4185 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4186 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4187 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4189 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4191 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4192 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4193 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4194 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4195 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4196 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4197 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4200 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4201 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4204 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4205 /// stored external to LDK.
4207 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4208 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4209 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4211 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4212 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4214 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4215 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4216 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4217 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4218 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4220 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4221 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4222 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4223 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4225 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4226 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4227 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4228 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4229 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4231 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4232 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4233 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4234 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4235 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4237 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4238 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4239 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4241 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4243 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4244 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4246 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4247 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4248 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4249 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4250 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4253 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4254 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4255 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4256 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4257 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4262 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4263 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4265 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4266 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4269 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4270 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4271 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4272 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4274 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4275 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4276 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4277 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4280 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4281 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4283 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4284 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4287 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4288 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4289 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4291 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4292 events.replace(pending_events);
4301 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4303 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4305 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4309 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4311 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4312 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4314 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4315 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4316 /// restarting from an old state.
4317 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4318 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4319 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4321 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4322 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4323 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4324 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4327 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4328 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4329 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4332 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4333 handler.handle_event(&event);
4341 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4343 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4344 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4345 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4346 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4349 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4351 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4352 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4353 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4354 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4355 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4358 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4359 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4360 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4363 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4365 let new_height = height - 1;
4367 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4368 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4369 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4370 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4371 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4372 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4375 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4379 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4381 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4382 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4383 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4384 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4387 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4388 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4389 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4390 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4392 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4393 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4396 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4399 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4400 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4401 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4402 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4404 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4409 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4411 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4413 macro_rules! max_time {
4414 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4416 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4417 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4418 // having an explicit local time source.
4419 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4420 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4421 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4422 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4423 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4429 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4430 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4431 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4432 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4433 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4437 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4438 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4439 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4440 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4441 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4442 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4448 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4449 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4450 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4451 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4452 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4453 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4454 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4455 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4460 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4462 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4463 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4464 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4465 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4468 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4469 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4471 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4472 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4473 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4474 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4475 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4477 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4478 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4480 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4481 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4482 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4483 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4484 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4485 let res = f(channel);
4486 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4487 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4488 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4489 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4490 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4494 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4496 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4497 msg: funding_locked,
4499 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4500 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4501 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4502 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4503 msg: announcement_sigs,
4505 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4508 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4509 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4514 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4516 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4517 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4518 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4520 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4521 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4522 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4523 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4528 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
4529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4530 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4531 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4538 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4539 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4540 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4541 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4542 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4543 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4544 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4545 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4546 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4547 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4548 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4549 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4550 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4555 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4560 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4562 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4563 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4567 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4568 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4569 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4571 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4572 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4573 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4574 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4577 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4578 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4580 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4581 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4584 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4585 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4586 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4587 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4588 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4592 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4593 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4594 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4595 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4599 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4600 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4601 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4603 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4607 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4612 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4617 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4622 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4627 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4632 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4637 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4642 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4647 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4652 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4657 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4662 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4667 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4672 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4677 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4682 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4683 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4684 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4687 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4692 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4694 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4697 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4699 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4700 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4704 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4705 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4706 if no_connection_possible {
4707 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4708 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4709 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4710 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4711 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4713 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4714 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4715 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4719 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4726 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4728 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4729 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4730 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4731 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4732 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4734 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4737 no_channels_remain = false;
4743 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4747 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4751 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4752 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4753 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4754 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4756 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4757 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4758 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4760 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4761 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4762 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4763 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4767 if no_channels_remain {
4768 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4771 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4772 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4776 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4777 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4782 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4783 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4785 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4786 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4790 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4797 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4798 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4799 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4800 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4801 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4802 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4803 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4807 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4808 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4809 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4815 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4818 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4821 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4822 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4823 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4824 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4825 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4829 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4830 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4835 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4836 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4837 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4838 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4839 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4840 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4843 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4846 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4852 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4853 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4858 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4859 let result = *guard;
4867 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4868 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4869 let current_time = Instant::now();
4871 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4872 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4877 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4878 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4879 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4880 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4881 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4883 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4884 let result = *guard;
4885 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4889 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4890 None => return result,
4896 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4898 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4899 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4900 *persistence_lock = true;
4901 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4906 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4907 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4909 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4911 (0, onion_packet, required),
4912 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4915 (0, payment_data, required),
4916 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4918 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4919 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4920 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4925 (0, routing, required),
4926 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4927 (4, payment_hash, required),
4928 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4929 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4932 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4936 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4941 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4942 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4943 (2, outpoint, required),
4944 (4, htlc_id, required),
4945 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4948 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4949 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4950 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4951 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4954 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4955 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4956 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4961 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4962 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4963 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4969 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4970 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4971 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4973 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4974 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4975 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4979 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4980 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4981 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4983 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4985 if payment_data.is_some() {
4986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4988 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4991 if payment_data.is_none() {
4992 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4994 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4998 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5006 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5007 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5008 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5011 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5012 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5013 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5014 let mut mpp_id = None;
5015 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5016 (0, session_priv, required),
5017 (1, mpp_id, option),
5018 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5019 (4, path, vec_type),
5021 if mpp_id.is_none() {
5022 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5024 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5026 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5027 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5028 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5029 path: path.unwrap(),
5030 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
5033 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5034 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5039 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5040 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5042 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
5044 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
5045 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5046 (0, session_priv, required),
5047 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
5048 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5049 (4, path, vec_type),
5052 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5054 field.write(writer)?;
5061 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5062 (0, LightningError) => {
5066 (0, failure_code, required),
5067 (2, data, vec_type),
5071 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5073 (0, forward_info, required),
5074 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5075 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5076 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5079 (0, htlc_id, required),
5080 (2, err_packet, required),
5084 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5085 (0, payment_secret, required),
5086 (2, expiry_time, required),
5087 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5088 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5089 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5092 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5093 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5094 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5095 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5099 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5100 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5102 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5104 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5106 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5107 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5108 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5111 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5112 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5113 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5114 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5115 unfunded_channels += 1;
5118 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5119 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5120 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5121 channel.write(writer)?;
5125 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5126 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5127 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5128 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5129 for forward in pending_forwards {
5130 forward.write(writer)?;
5134 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5135 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5136 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5137 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5138 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5139 htlc.write(writer)?;
5143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5144 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5145 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5146 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5147 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5148 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5151 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5152 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5153 for event in events.iter() {
5154 event.write(writer)?;
5157 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5158 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5159 for event in background_events.iter() {
5161 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5163 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5164 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5169 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5170 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5172 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5173 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5174 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5175 hash.write(writer)?;
5176 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5179 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5180 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5181 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5182 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5183 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5185 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5186 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5187 for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5188 outbound.write(writer)?;
5192 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5193 (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5200 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5202 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5204 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5205 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5206 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5207 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5208 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5209 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5210 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5211 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5212 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5213 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5214 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5216 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5217 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5219 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5220 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5221 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5222 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5223 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5224 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5225 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5226 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5227 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5228 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5229 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5232 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5233 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5235 pub keys_manager: K,
5237 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5239 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5240 pub fee_estimator: F,
5241 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5243 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5244 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5245 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5246 pub chain_monitor: M,
5248 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5249 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5250 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5251 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5252 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5253 /// deserialization.
5255 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5256 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5257 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5259 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5260 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5262 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5263 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5264 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5265 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5267 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5270 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5271 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5274 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5275 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5276 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5278 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5282 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5283 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5284 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5285 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5286 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5288 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5289 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5294 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5295 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5296 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5297 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5298 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5299 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5300 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5304 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5305 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5306 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5310 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5311 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5312 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5314 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5315 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5318 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5319 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5321 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5322 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5323 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5327 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5328 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5329 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5330 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5331 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5332 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5333 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5334 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5335 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5336 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5337 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5338 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5339 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5340 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5341 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5342 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5343 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5344 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5345 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5346 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5347 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5348 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5350 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5351 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5352 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5353 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5354 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5355 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5356 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5357 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5358 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5359 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5360 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5361 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5362 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5363 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5364 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5367 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5368 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5370 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5373 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5374 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5375 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5376 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5377 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5378 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5382 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5383 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5384 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5388 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5389 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5390 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5391 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5392 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5393 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5394 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5395 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5396 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5398 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5401 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5402 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5403 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5404 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5405 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5407 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5408 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5410 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5413 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5414 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5415 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5416 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5417 let peer_state = PeerState {
5418 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5420 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5423 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5424 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5425 for _ in 0..event_count {
5426 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5427 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5432 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5433 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5434 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5435 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5436 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5437 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5441 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5442 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5444 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5445 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5446 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5447 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5452 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5453 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5454 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5455 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5456 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5457 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5458 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5462 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5463 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5464 (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5466 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5467 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5470 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5471 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5473 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5474 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5477 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5479 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5480 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5481 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5483 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5485 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5490 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5492 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5493 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5495 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5496 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5499 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5500 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5502 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5504 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5505 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5506 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5507 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5509 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5510 logger: args.logger,
5511 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5514 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5515 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5518 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5519 //connection or two.
5521 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5527 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5528 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5529 use core::time::Duration;
5530 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5531 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5532 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5533 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5535 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5536 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5537 use util::errors::APIError;
5538 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5539 use util::test_utils;
5541 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5543 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5544 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5546 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5549 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5550 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5552 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5553 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5554 thread::spawn(move || {
5556 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5557 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5558 *persistence_lock = true;
5561 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5567 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5568 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5570 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5573 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5578 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5580 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5583 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5590 fn test_notify_limits() {
5591 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5592 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5596 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5598 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5599 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5600 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5601 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5602 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5604 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5606 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5607 // to connect messages with new values
5608 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5609 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5610 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5611 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5613 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5614 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5615 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5616 // ... but the last node should not.
5617 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5618 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5619 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5620 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5622 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5623 // about the channel.
5624 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5625 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5626 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5628 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5630 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5631 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5632 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5633 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5634 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5635 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5637 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5638 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5639 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5641 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5642 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5643 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5644 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5645 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5646 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5648 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5649 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5650 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5651 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5652 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5653 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5654 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5655 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5657 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5658 // the channel info has updated.
5659 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5660 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5661 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5662 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5663 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5664 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5668 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5669 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5675 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5676 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5678 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5679 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5680 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5681 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5682 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5683 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5684 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5685 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5686 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5687 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5688 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5690 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5692 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5693 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5695 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5696 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5697 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5698 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5699 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5701 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5702 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5703 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5705 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5706 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5707 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5708 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5709 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5710 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5713 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5715 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5716 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5719 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5720 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5722 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5723 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5724 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5725 // lightning messages manually.
5726 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5728 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5729 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5730 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5732 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5733 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5735 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5736 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5738 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5739 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5740 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5742 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5743 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5744 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5746 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5748 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5751 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5754 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5755 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5756 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5758 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5759 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5766 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5767 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5768 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5769 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5770 // fails as expected.
5771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5775 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5778 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5779 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5780 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5782 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5783 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5784 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5786 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5787 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5788 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5789 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5790 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5792 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5793 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5794 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5796 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5797 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5798 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5799 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5800 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5801 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5802 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5803 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5804 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5806 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5807 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5809 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5810 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5811 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5812 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5814 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5815 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5816 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5817 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5818 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5820 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5821 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5822 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5824 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5826 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5827 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5828 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5830 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5834 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5835 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5836 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5837 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5838 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5839 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5841 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5842 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5844 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5845 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5849 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5850 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5851 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5857 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5858 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5859 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5860 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5862 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5863 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5864 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5865 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5866 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5867 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5869 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5870 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5871 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5874 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5875 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5876 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5877 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5878 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5879 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5880 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5882 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5886 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5887 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5888 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5891 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5893 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5894 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5895 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5896 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5898 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5899 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5900 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5901 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5902 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5903 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5905 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5906 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5907 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5908 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5912 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5913 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5914 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5915 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5916 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5917 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5919 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5923 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5927 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5929 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5930 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5931 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5932 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5933 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5935 // Marshall an MPP route.
5936 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5937 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5938 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5939 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5940 route.paths.push(path);
5941 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5942 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5943 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5944 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5945 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5946 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5948 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5949 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5950 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5951 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5956 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5959 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5960 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5961 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5962 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5963 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5964 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5965 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5966 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5967 use routing::router::get_route;
5968 use util::test_utils;
5969 use util::config::UserConfig;
5970 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5972 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5973 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5974 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5976 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5980 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5981 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5982 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5983 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5984 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5985 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5986 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5991 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5992 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5995 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5996 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5997 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5999 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6000 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6002 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6003 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6005 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6006 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6008 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6009 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6010 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6011 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6012 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6014 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6016 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6018 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6019 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6020 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6021 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6022 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6024 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6026 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6028 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6029 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6030 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6031 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6032 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6035 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6036 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6037 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6039 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6040 } else { panic!(); }
6042 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6043 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6045 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6048 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6051 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6052 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6054 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6055 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6056 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6057 match msg_events[0] {
6058 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6059 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6060 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6064 match msg_events[1] {
6065 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6069 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6071 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6072 macro_rules! send_payment {
6073 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6074 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6075 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6076 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6078 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6079 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6081 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6082 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6084 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6085 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6086 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6087 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6088 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6089 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6090 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6091 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6094 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6095 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6097 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6098 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6099 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6100 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6101 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6103 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6106 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6107 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6108 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6109 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6111 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6116 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6117 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);