1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
164 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
165 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
166 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
168 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
169 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
172 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
173 struct ClaimableHTLC {
174 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
176 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
178 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
180 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
184 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
185 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
186 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
187 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
189 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
190 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
195 impl Readable for PaymentId {
196 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
197 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
201 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
202 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
203 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
204 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
205 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
208 session_priv: SecretKey,
209 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
210 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
211 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
212 payment_id: PaymentId,
213 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
214 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
217 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
218 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
219 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
221 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
223 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
225 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
228 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
229 payment_id.hash(hasher);
230 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
231 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
232 payment_params.hash(hasher);
237 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
240 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
241 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
243 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
244 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
245 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
246 payment_secret: None,
247 payment_params: None,
252 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
253 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
255 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
263 struct ReceiveError {
269 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
270 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
272 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
277 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
279 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
280 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
281 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
282 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
283 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
285 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
286 err: msgs::LightningError,
287 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
288 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
290 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
292 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
294 err: LightningError {
296 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
297 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
304 shutdown_finish: None,
308 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
310 err: LightningError {
312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
315 shutdown_finish: None,
319 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
320 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
323 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
325 err: LightningError {
327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
328 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
334 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
335 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
339 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
342 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
345 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
349 log_level: Level::Warn,
352 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
356 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
359 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
365 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
376 shutdown_finish: None,
381 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
382 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
383 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
384 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
385 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
387 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
388 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
389 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
390 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
391 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
393 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
395 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
399 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
400 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
401 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
402 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
403 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
404 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
405 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
406 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
408 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
409 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
410 /// and via the classic SCID.
412 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
413 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
414 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
415 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
416 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 our_network_key: SecretKey,
732 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
734 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
736 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
737 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
738 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
740 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
741 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
743 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
744 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
745 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
747 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
748 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
749 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
750 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
752 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
753 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
754 /// are currently open with that peer.
755 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
756 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
759 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
760 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
762 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
763 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
764 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
765 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
766 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
767 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
768 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
769 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
770 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
772 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
779 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
781 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
782 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
783 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
784 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
785 pub struct ChainParameters {
786 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
787 pub network: Network,
789 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
791 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
792 pub best_block: BestBlock,
795 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
801 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
802 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
803 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
804 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
805 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
806 /// updates are ready for persistence).
808 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
809 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
810 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
811 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
812 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
814 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
815 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
818 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
819 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
820 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
823 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
824 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
826 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
827 persistence_notifier: notifier,
828 should_persist: persist_check,
829 _read_guard: read_guard,
834 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
836 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
837 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
842 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
843 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
845 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
847 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
848 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
849 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
850 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
851 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
853 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
854 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
856 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
858 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
859 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
860 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
861 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
862 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
863 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
864 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
866 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
867 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
869 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
870 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
871 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
872 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
874 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
875 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
876 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
877 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
878 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
879 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
882 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
884 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
885 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
888 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
890 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
891 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
892 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
894 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
895 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
897 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
898 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
899 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
900 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
901 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
902 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
903 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
904 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
905 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
906 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
907 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
910 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
911 /// to better separate parameters.
912 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
913 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
914 /// The node_id of our counterparty
915 pub node_id: PublicKey,
916 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
917 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
918 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
919 pub features: InitFeatures,
920 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
921 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
922 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
924 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
926 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
927 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
928 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
929 /// payments to us through this channel.
930 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
931 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
932 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
933 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
934 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
935 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
936 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
939 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
940 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
941 pub struct ChannelDetails {
942 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
943 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
944 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
945 /// lifetime of the channel.
946 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
947 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
948 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
949 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
950 /// our counterparty already.
952 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
953 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
954 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
955 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
957 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
958 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
959 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
960 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
962 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
963 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
965 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
966 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
967 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
968 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
969 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
970 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
971 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
973 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
974 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
976 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
977 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
978 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
979 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
980 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
981 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
982 /// this value on chain.
984 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
986 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
988 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
989 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
990 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
991 pub user_channel_id: u64,
992 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
993 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
994 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
996 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
997 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
998 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
999 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1001 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1002 pub balance_msat: u64,
1003 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1004 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1005 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1006 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1008 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1010 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1011 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1012 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1013 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1014 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1015 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1016 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1017 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1019 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1020 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1021 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1022 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1023 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1024 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1025 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1027 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1028 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1029 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1030 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1031 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1032 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1033 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1034 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1035 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1037 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1039 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1040 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1041 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1042 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1043 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1044 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1045 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1046 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1047 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1049 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1050 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1051 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1052 pub is_outbound: bool,
1053 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1054 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1055 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1056 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1057 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1059 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1060 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1061 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1062 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1064 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1065 pub is_usable: bool,
1066 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1067 pub is_public: bool,
1068 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1069 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1070 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1071 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1072 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1075 impl ChannelDetails {
1076 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1077 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1078 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1080 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1081 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1082 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1087 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1088 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1089 /// states for more.
1090 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1091 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1092 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1093 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1094 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1095 ParameterError(APIError),
1096 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1097 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1098 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1099 /// payment in full.
1101 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1103 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1104 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1105 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1106 /// paths than the ones selected).
1107 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1108 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1109 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1110 /// in over-/re-payment.
1112 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1113 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1114 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1116 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1117 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1118 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1119 /// with the latest update_id.
1121 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1122 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1123 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1124 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1125 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1126 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1127 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1128 payment_id: PaymentId,
1132 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1134 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1136 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1137 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1138 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1139 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1141 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1142 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1143 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1146 macro_rules! handle_error {
1147 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1150 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1151 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1153 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1154 // entering the macro.
1155 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1156 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1159 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1161 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1162 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1163 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1164 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1168 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1169 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1170 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1171 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1176 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1177 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1179 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1180 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1181 action: err.action.clone()
1185 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1186 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1189 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1196 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1197 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1198 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1199 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1201 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1202 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1203 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1204 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1205 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1207 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1208 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1210 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1214 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1215 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1216 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1218 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1219 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1221 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1222 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1224 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1225 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1226 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1227 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1228 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1229 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1231 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1232 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1233 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1234 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1235 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1236 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1242 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1243 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1247 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1249 $entry.remove_entry();
1257 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1258 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1262 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1264 $entry.remove_entry();
1272 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1273 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1275 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1276 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1282 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1283 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1285 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1286 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1287 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1288 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1289 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1290 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1291 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1292 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1293 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1294 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1295 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1296 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1297 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1298 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1301 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1302 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1303 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1304 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1305 match $action_type {
1306 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1307 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1309 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1310 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1312 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1313 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1314 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1315 if !$resend_commitment {
1316 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1319 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1321 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1322 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1326 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1327 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1329 $entry.remove_entry();
1333 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1334 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1335 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1337 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1338 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1340 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1341 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1343 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1344 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1348 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1349 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1350 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1352 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1353 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1357 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1358 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1359 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1360 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1361 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1364 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1369 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1370 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1371 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1372 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1373 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1375 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1376 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1377 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1378 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1379 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1380 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1381 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1382 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1383 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1388 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1389 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1390 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1391 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1392 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1394 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1395 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1396 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1398 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1399 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1400 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1401 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1404 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1405 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1406 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1407 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1408 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1409 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1410 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1411 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1412 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1413 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1414 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1415 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1418 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1419 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1420 // before it should be allowed to.
1421 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1422 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1424 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1425 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1426 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1431 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1432 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1433 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1434 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1435 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1436 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1437 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1438 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1439 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1440 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1441 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1442 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1443 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1444 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1445 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1446 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1447 let mut order = $order;
1449 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1451 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1455 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1456 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1457 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1458 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1463 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1464 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1465 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1466 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1467 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1472 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1476 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1481 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1482 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1483 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1488 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1489 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1490 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1491 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1492 assert!(res.is_ok());
1495 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1499 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1500 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1501 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1503 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1505 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1506 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1511 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1512 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1513 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1514 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1518 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1520 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1521 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1523 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1525 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1526 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1527 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1528 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1529 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1530 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1531 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1532 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1534 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1535 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1536 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1540 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1542 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1543 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1544 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1545 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1546 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1547 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1549 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1550 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1551 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1553 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1554 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1557 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1558 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1560 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1561 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1563 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1565 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1566 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1567 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1568 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1576 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1577 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1578 &self.default_configuration
1581 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1582 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1583 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1586 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1587 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1589 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1591 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1595 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1600 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1602 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1603 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1604 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1605 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1606 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1609 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1610 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1612 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1613 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1614 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1616 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1617 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1618 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1619 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1620 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1621 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1623 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1624 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1625 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1626 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1627 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1633 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1634 Some(peer_state) => {
1635 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1636 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1637 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1638 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1639 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1640 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1641 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1645 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1650 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1653 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1656 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1657 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1659 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1660 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1664 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1666 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1671 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1672 node_id: their_network_key,
1675 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1678 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1679 let mut res = Vec::new();
1681 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1682 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1683 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1684 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1685 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1686 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1687 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1688 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1689 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1690 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1691 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1692 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1693 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1694 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1695 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1696 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1697 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1698 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1699 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1700 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1701 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1703 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1704 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1705 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1706 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1707 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1708 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1709 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1710 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1711 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1712 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1713 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1714 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1715 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1716 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1717 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1718 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1719 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1720 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1721 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1722 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1723 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1728 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1729 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1730 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1736 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1737 /// more information.
1738 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1739 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1742 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1743 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1745 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1746 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1748 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1749 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1750 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1751 // really wanted anyway.
1752 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1755 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1756 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1757 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1758 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1759 Some(transaction) => {
1760 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1764 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1765 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1766 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1767 reason: closure_reason
1771 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1774 let counterparty_node_id;
1775 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1776 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1781 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1783 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1784 Some(peer_state) => {
1785 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1786 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1787 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1789 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1791 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1793 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1794 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1795 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1796 let (result, is_permanent) =
1797 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1799 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1806 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1810 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1811 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1812 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1817 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1829 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1833 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1834 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1835 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1837 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1838 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1840 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1841 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1842 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1843 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1845 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1847 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1848 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1849 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1850 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1851 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1854 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1855 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1856 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1858 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1859 /// the channel being closed or not:
1860 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1861 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1862 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1863 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1864 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1865 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1866 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1868 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1870 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1871 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1872 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1873 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1874 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1878 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1879 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1880 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1881 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1884 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1885 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1886 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1887 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1888 // ignore the result here.
1889 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1893 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1894 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1895 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1897 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1899 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1900 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1901 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1902 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1905 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1906 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1907 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1910 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1912 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1914 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1917 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1918 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1919 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1920 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1926 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1929 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1930 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1931 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1933 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1934 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1935 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1936 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1937 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1938 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1939 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1949 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1950 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1951 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1952 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1953 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1957 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1958 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1960 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1961 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1962 return Err(ReceiveError {
1963 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1965 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1968 // final_expiry_too_soon
1969 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1970 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1971 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1972 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1973 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1974 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1975 return Err(ReceiveError {
1977 err_data: Vec::new(),
1978 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1981 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1982 return Err(ReceiveError {
1984 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1985 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1989 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1990 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1991 return Err(ReceiveError {
1992 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1993 err_data: Vec::new(),
1994 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1997 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1998 return Err(ReceiveError {
1999 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2000 err_data: Vec::new(),
2001 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2004 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2005 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2006 return Err(ReceiveError {
2007 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2008 err_data: Vec::new(),
2009 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2011 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2012 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2014 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2015 phantom_shared_secret,
2017 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2018 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2019 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2020 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2021 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2022 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2023 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2024 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2025 return Err(ReceiveError {
2026 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2027 err_data: Vec::new(),
2028 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2032 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2034 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2037 return Err(ReceiveError {
2038 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2039 err_data: Vec::new(),
2040 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2045 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2048 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2049 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2050 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2054 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2055 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2056 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2058 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2059 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2060 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2061 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2062 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2063 failure_code: $err_code,
2064 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2069 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2070 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2073 let shared_secret = {
2074 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2075 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2079 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2080 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2081 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2082 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2083 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2084 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2085 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2086 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2089 let mut channel_state = None;
2090 macro_rules! return_err {
2091 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2093 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2094 if channel_state.is_none() {
2095 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2097 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2098 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2099 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2100 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2101 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2106 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2108 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2109 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2111 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2112 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2116 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2117 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2119 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2121 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2122 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2123 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2124 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2125 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2127 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2130 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2131 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2133 let blinding_factor = {
2134 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2135 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2136 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2137 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2140 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2142 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2144 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2147 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2148 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2151 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2152 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2153 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2154 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2155 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2159 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2160 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2161 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2164 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2165 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2166 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2167 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2172 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2173 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2174 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2175 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2176 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2177 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2178 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2179 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2180 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2181 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2182 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2184 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2187 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2190 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2192 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2193 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2194 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2195 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2196 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2197 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2198 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2200 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2201 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2202 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2203 // we don't have the channel here.
2204 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2206 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2208 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2209 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2210 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2211 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2212 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2213 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2214 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2216 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2217 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2219 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2220 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2221 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2222 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2223 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2225 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2226 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2228 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2229 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2231 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2232 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2233 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2234 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2235 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2236 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2238 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2239 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2241 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2242 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2243 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2244 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2245 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2246 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2247 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2248 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2249 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2250 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2256 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2257 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2258 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2259 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2261 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2262 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2264 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2265 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2266 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2268 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2269 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2271 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2276 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2279 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2280 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2281 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2283 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2284 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2285 if !chan.should_announce() {
2286 return Err(LightningError {
2287 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2288 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2292 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2295 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2296 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2297 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2298 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2299 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2300 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2302 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2303 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2307 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2309 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2311 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2313 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2314 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2316 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2317 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2318 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2319 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2320 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2321 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2322 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2323 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2326 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2327 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2329 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2335 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2336 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2338 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2339 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2340 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2342 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2343 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2344 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2345 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2346 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2348 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2352 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2353 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2355 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2356 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2357 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2358 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2359 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2360 err: "Payment already completed"
2365 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2366 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2367 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2370 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2372 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2373 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2374 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2375 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2376 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2377 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2378 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2379 total_msat: total_value,
2381 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2388 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2389 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2391 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2392 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2394 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2395 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2397 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2398 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2400 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2401 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2402 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2403 channel_state, chan)
2405 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2406 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2407 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2408 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2409 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2410 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2411 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2412 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2413 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2414 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2416 insert_outbound_payment!();
2418 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2419 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2420 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2421 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2422 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2423 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2424 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2425 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2431 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2433 } else { unreachable!(); }
2437 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2438 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2440 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2445 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2447 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2448 /// fields for more info.
2450 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2451 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2452 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2453 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2454 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2455 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2457 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2459 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2460 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2461 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2463 /// In general, a path may raise:
2464 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2465 /// node public key) is specified.
2466 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2467 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2469 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2470 /// relevant updates.
2472 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2473 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2474 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2476 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2477 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2478 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2479 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2481 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2482 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2483 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2484 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2485 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2488 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2489 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2490 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2492 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2493 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2494 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2495 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2496 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2498 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2499 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2501 let mut total_value = 0;
2502 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2503 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2504 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2505 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2506 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2507 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2508 continue 'path_check;
2510 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2511 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2512 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2513 continue 'path_check;
2516 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2517 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2519 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2520 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2522 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2523 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2524 total_value = amt_msat;
2527 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2528 let mut results = Vec::new();
2529 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2530 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2532 let mut has_ok = false;
2533 let mut has_err = false;
2534 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2535 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2536 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2537 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2538 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2539 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2540 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2544 } else if res.is_err() {
2545 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2546 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2549 if has_err && has_ok {
2550 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2553 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2554 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2555 Some(RouteParameters {
2556 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2557 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2558 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2564 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2565 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2566 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2567 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2573 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2575 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2576 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2577 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2578 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2579 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2581 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2582 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2583 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2584 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2585 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2586 if path.len() == 0 {
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2588 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2593 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2594 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2595 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2597 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2598 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2600 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2601 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2602 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2603 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2606 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2608 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2609 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2610 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2614 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2615 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2618 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2619 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2620 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2625 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2626 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2630 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2633 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2635 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2636 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2637 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2638 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2640 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2641 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2642 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2644 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2645 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2646 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2647 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2650 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2651 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2652 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2653 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2654 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2656 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2664 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2665 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2666 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2667 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2668 /// never reach the recipient.
2670 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2672 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2673 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2675 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2677 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2678 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2679 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2681 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2683 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2684 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2685 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2690 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2691 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2692 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2693 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2695 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2697 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2699 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2700 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2701 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2702 } else { unreachable!(); })
2705 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2707 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2708 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2711 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2712 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2717 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2718 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2719 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2722 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2723 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2724 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2734 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2735 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2736 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2740 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2742 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2743 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2745 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2746 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2748 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2749 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2750 /// keys per-channel).
2752 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2753 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2754 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2756 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2757 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2758 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2760 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2761 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2762 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2765 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2766 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2768 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2772 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2773 let mut output_index = None;
2774 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2775 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2776 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2777 if output_index.is_some() {
2778 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2779 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2782 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2783 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2784 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2787 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2790 if output_index.is_none() {
2791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2792 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2795 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2800 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2801 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2802 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2804 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2807 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2808 // smaller than 500:
2809 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2811 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2812 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2813 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2814 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2815 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2816 /// our network addresses.
2818 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2819 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2821 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2822 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2823 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2824 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2826 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2828 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2829 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2832 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2833 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2836 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2837 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2838 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2840 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2841 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2842 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2843 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2844 rgb, alias, addresses,
2845 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2846 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2848 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2849 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2852 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2854 let mut announced_chans = false;
2855 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2856 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2859 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2864 announced_chans = true;
2866 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2867 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2868 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2872 if announced_chans {
2873 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2874 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2875 signature: node_announce_sig,
2876 contents: announcement
2882 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2884 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2885 /// Will likely generate further events.
2886 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2889 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2890 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2891 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2892 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2894 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2895 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2897 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2898 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2899 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2900 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2902 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2903 match forward_info {
2904 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2905 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2906 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2907 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2908 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2910 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2911 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2912 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2913 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2914 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2915 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2916 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2918 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2919 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2925 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2926 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2927 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2928 let phantom_shared_secret = {
2929 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2930 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
2933 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2935 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2936 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2937 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2938 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2939 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2941 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2943 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2944 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2948 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2949 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2950 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2951 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2957 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2960 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2963 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2964 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2965 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2966 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2967 // problem, not ours.
2974 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2975 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2976 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2977 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2978 match forward_info {
2979 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2980 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2982 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2983 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2985 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2986 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2987 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2988 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2989 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2990 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2991 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2993 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2995 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2998 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3000 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3001 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3002 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3008 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3010 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3011 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3012 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3013 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3014 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3015 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3016 // this channel currently :/.
3022 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3023 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3025 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3026 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3027 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3029 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3032 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3034 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3035 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3036 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3039 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3041 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3042 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3043 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3044 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3045 // messages when we can.
3046 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3047 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3048 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3055 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3056 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3059 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3060 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3061 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3062 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3063 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3064 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3066 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3067 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3068 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3069 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3070 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3072 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3074 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3078 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3079 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3082 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3083 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3084 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3085 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3086 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3087 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3088 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3089 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3090 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3092 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3100 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3101 match forward_info {
3102 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3103 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3104 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3105 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3106 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3107 let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
3108 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3110 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3111 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3113 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3116 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3117 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3118 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3119 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3120 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3122 phantom_shared_secret,
3124 value: amt_to_forward,
3126 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3131 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3133 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3134 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3135 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3137 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3138 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3139 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3140 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3141 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3142 phantom_shared_secret,
3144 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3149 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3150 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3151 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3152 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3153 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3154 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3155 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3157 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3161 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3162 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3163 total_value += htlc.value;
3164 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3165 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3166 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3168 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3169 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3171 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3173 _ => unreachable!(),
3176 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3177 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3178 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3179 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3180 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3181 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3182 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3184 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3185 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3186 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3190 payment_received_generated = true;
3192 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3193 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3195 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3197 payment_received_generated
3201 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3202 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3203 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3204 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3205 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3206 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3207 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3208 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3210 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3211 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3212 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3213 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3214 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3216 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3220 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3222 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3223 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3225 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3226 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3228 amt: amt_to_forward,
3229 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3232 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3240 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3241 if payment_data.is_none() {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3243 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3246 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3247 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3249 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3250 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3252 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3253 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3255 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3256 if payment_received_generated {
3257 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3263 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3264 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3272 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3273 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3275 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3277 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3278 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3281 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3282 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3283 events.append(&mut new_events);
3286 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3288 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3289 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3291 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3292 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3293 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3294 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3295 if background_events.is_empty() {
3299 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3301 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3302 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3303 // monitor updating completing.
3304 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3311 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3312 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3313 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3314 self.process_background_events();
3317 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3318 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3319 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3320 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3322 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3323 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3325 if !chan.is_live() {
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3327 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3328 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3331 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3333 let mut retain_channel = true;
3334 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3337 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3338 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3342 let ret_err = match res {
3343 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3344 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3345 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3346 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3350 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3351 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3352 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3353 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3354 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3356 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3366 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3370 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3371 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3372 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3373 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3374 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3375 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3376 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3378 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3380 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3382 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3383 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3384 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3385 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3386 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3387 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3388 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3390 handle_errors.push(err);
3400 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3402 /// This currently includes:
3403 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3404 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3405 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3408 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3409 /// estimate fetches.
3410 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3411 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3412 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3413 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3415 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3417 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3418 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3420 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3421 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3422 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3423 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3425 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3426 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3427 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3429 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3431 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3433 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3434 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3435 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3436 if needs_close { return false; }
3439 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3440 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3441 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3442 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3443 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3444 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3445 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3446 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3450 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3451 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3453 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3454 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3455 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3459 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3460 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3468 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3469 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3470 // This should be unreachable
3471 debug_assert!(false);
3474 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3475 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3476 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3477 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3479 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3480 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3481 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3483 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3491 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3492 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3495 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3496 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3502 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3503 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3504 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3505 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3506 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3507 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3510 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3511 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3512 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3513 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3514 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3515 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3516 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3517 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3518 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3519 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3520 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3526 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3527 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3529 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3531 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3532 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3533 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3534 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3535 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3536 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3537 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3539 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3541 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3542 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3544 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3549 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3550 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3551 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3552 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3553 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3554 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3555 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3556 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3557 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3559 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3560 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3561 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3563 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3564 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3565 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3566 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3567 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3571 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3572 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3573 // be surfaced to the user.
3574 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3575 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3577 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3578 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3579 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3581 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3585 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3586 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3587 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3589 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3590 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3591 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3592 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3593 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3594 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3595 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3596 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3597 Some(RouteParameters {
3598 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3599 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3600 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3603 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3604 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3605 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3607 rejected_by_dest: false,
3608 network_update: None,
3609 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3611 short_channel_id: None,
3618 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3619 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3621 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3634 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3635 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3636 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3637 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3638 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3639 /// still-available channels.
3640 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3641 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3642 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3643 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3646 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3647 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3648 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3650 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3651 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3652 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3653 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3654 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3655 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3656 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3657 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3661 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3665 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3666 all_paths_failed = true;
3667 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3668 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3670 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3676 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3679 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3680 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3681 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3682 Some(RouteParameters {
3683 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3684 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3685 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3688 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3690 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3691 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3693 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3695 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3696 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3697 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3698 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3699 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3700 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3701 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3702 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3709 error_code: onion_error_code,
3711 error_data: onion_error_data
3714 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3720 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3721 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3722 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3723 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3725 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3726 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3727 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3728 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3729 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3730 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3731 network_update: None,
3734 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3737 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3739 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3743 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3744 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3745 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3747 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3748 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3749 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3750 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3751 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3752 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3753 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3754 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3756 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3757 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3760 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3762 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3766 let mut forward_event = None;
3767 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3768 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3770 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3771 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3772 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3774 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3775 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3778 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3779 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3780 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3781 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3782 time_forwardable: time
3789 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3790 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3792 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3793 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3794 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3795 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3797 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3798 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3800 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3801 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3802 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3803 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3804 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3805 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3809 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3810 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3811 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3812 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3814 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3815 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3816 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3817 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3819 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3820 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3821 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3822 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3823 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3825 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3826 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3827 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3833 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3834 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3835 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3837 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3838 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3839 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3840 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3841 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3842 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3843 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3845 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3846 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3847 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3848 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3849 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3850 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3851 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3852 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3854 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3855 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3856 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3857 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3858 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3859 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3861 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3866 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3867 // which were generated.
3868 channel_state.take();
3870 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3871 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3872 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3879 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3880 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3881 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3882 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3883 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3885 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3889 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3890 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3891 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3892 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3893 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3894 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3895 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3896 payment_preimage, e);
3897 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3898 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3899 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3900 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3903 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3904 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3905 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3907 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3908 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3909 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3910 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3911 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3912 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3918 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3920 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3923 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3924 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3925 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3926 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3927 payment_preimage, e);
3929 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3930 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3932 chan.remove_entry();
3934 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3937 } else { unreachable!(); }
3940 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3941 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3942 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3943 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3944 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3945 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3946 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3947 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3948 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3949 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3950 pending_events.push(
3951 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3953 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3958 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3966 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3968 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3969 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3970 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3971 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3972 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3973 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3974 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3975 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3976 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3977 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3978 pending_events.push(
3979 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3980 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3986 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3990 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3991 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3992 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3994 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3995 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3996 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3997 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3998 pending_events.push(
3999 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4007 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4012 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4015 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4016 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4017 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4018 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4019 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4020 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4021 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4024 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4025 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4026 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4027 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4028 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4031 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4032 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4033 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4034 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4035 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4036 payment_preimage, e);
4038 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4039 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4040 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4041 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4044 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4045 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4046 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4047 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4051 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4052 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4053 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4056 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4058 let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4059 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4062 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4070 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4071 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4072 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4075 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4078 let chan_restoration_res;
4079 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4080 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4081 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4082 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4083 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4086 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4090 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4091 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4092 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4093 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4094 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4095 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4097 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4098 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4099 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4104 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4105 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4108 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4110 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4111 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4112 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4113 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4117 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4120 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4122 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4123 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4124 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4126 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4127 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4128 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4131 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4132 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4133 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4135 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4136 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4138 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4139 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4140 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4143 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4150 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4151 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4155 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4159 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4160 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4161 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4162 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4165 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4170 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4171 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4174 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4178 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4179 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4180 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4181 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4184 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4185 pending_events.push(
4186 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4187 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4188 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4189 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4190 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4191 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4196 entry.insert(channel);
4202 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4203 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4204 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4208 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4211 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4212 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4217 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4218 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4219 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4220 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4222 user_channel_id: user_id,
4227 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4228 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4229 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4230 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4232 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4234 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4237 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4242 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4243 // lock before watch_channel
4244 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4246 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4247 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4248 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4249 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4250 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4251 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4252 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4253 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4254 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4255 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4256 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4258 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4259 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4260 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4261 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4262 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4263 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4267 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4274 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4275 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4284 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4286 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4287 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4288 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4289 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4291 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4292 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4294 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4295 Ok(update) => update,
4296 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4298 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4299 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4300 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4301 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4302 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4303 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4304 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4305 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4312 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4315 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4316 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4320 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4321 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4322 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4325 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4328 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4329 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4330 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4332 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4333 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4334 msg: announcement_sigs,
4336 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4337 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4338 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4339 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4340 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4341 // announcement_signatures.
4342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4343 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4344 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4345 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4352 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4356 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4357 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4358 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4359 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4364 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4365 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4368 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4369 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4370 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4371 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4374 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4375 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4377 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4378 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4379 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4380 let (result, is_permanent) =
4381 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4383 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4389 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4391 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4401 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4402 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4405 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4409 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4410 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4415 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4418 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4419 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4420 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4421 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4426 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4427 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4428 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4429 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4430 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4431 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4432 } else { (tx, None) }
4434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4437 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4438 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4439 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4441 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4442 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4443 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4448 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4453 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4454 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4455 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4456 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4458 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4459 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4460 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4461 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4463 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4464 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4466 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4468 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4472 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4473 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4474 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4475 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4476 match pending_forward_info {
4477 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4478 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4479 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4480 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4482 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4484 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4485 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4486 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4489 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4491 _ => pending_forward_info
4494 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4501 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4502 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4503 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4504 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4505 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4507 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4510 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4515 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4519 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4520 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4521 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4522 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4524 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4525 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4527 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4529 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4534 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4535 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4536 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4537 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4538 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4539 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4542 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4543 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4544 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4546 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4553 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4554 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4561 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4562 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4563 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4564 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4565 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4566 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4567 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4572 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4573 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4576 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4577 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4579 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4580 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4581 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4582 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4583 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4584 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4585 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4586 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4588 commitment_signed: msg,
4594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4599 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4600 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4601 let mut forward_event = None;
4602 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4603 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4604 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4605 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4607 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4608 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4609 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4610 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4611 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4614 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4615 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4618 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4619 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4624 match forward_event {
4626 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4627 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4628 time_forwardable: time
4636 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4637 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4639 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4640 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4641 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4643 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4644 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4646 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4647 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4648 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4649 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4650 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4651 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4652 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4653 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4654 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4655 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4656 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4658 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4659 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4660 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4661 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4662 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4664 } else { unreachable!(); }
4667 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4669 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4673 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4674 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4675 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4676 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4677 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4682 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4684 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4685 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4687 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4690 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4691 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4698 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4699 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4700 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4703 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4706 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4713 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4714 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4717 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4719 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4720 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4722 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4723 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4727 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4728 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4729 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4730 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4731 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4739 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4740 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4743 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4744 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4746 // It's not a local channel
4747 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4752 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4753 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4754 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4755 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4756 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4757 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4759 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4761 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4762 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4763 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4764 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4766 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4771 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4774 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4775 let chan_restoration_res;
4776 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4780 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4782 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4785 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4786 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4787 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4788 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4789 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4790 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4791 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4792 let mut channel_update = None;
4793 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4795 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4798 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4799 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4800 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4801 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4802 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4803 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4804 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4809 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4810 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4811 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4812 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4813 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4816 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4821 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4822 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4824 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4825 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4830 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4831 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4832 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4833 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4834 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4835 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4836 match monitor_event {
4837 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4838 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4839 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4840 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4842 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4846 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4847 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4848 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4850 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4851 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4852 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4853 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4854 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4855 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4856 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4860 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4861 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4863 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4865 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4866 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4867 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4868 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4869 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4874 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4875 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4880 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4881 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4884 has_pending_monitor_events
4887 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4888 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4889 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4891 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4892 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4895 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4896 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4897 /// update was applied.
4899 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4900 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4901 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4902 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4903 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4904 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4905 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4906 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4909 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4910 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4911 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4912 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4914 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4915 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4916 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4917 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4918 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4920 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4921 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4922 has_monitor_update = true;
4923 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4924 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4925 if close_channel { return false; }
4927 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4928 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4929 updates: commitment_update,
4936 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4937 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4938 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4945 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4946 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4947 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4950 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4951 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4957 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4958 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4959 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4960 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4961 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4962 let mut has_update = false;
4964 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4966 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4967 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4968 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4970 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4971 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4972 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4973 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4976 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4979 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4980 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4981 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4982 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4988 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4990 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4991 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4992 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
4998 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4999 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5006 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5007 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5013 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5014 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5016 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5017 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5018 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5019 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5020 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5021 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5022 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5023 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5024 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5025 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5026 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5027 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5028 assert!(should_broadcast);
5029 } else { unreachable!(); }
5030 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5032 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5036 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5037 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5039 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5040 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5043 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5046 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5047 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5048 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5049 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5050 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5051 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5052 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5053 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5054 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5055 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5056 // never fail a payment too early.
5057 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5059 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5067 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5070 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5071 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5073 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5074 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5075 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5077 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5079 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5080 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5084 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5085 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5087 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5089 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5090 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5091 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5092 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5093 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5094 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5097 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5098 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5100 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5103 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5105 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5107 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5108 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5109 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5110 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5111 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5114 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5115 /// stored external to LDK.
5117 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5118 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5119 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5121 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5122 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5125 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5126 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5127 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5128 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5130 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5131 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5132 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5133 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5134 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5136 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5137 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5138 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5139 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5140 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5142 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5143 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5145 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5146 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5150 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5151 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5153 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5155 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5156 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5157 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5158 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5161 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5162 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5164 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5167 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5169 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5171 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5172 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5175 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5176 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5178 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5179 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5180 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5183 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5184 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5186 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5187 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5188 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5189 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5191 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5192 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5193 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5194 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5200 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5202 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5203 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5205 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5206 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5207 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5212 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5213 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5214 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5215 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5220 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5221 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5225 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5226 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5230 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5231 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5233 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5234 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5237 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5238 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5239 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5240 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5242 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5243 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5244 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5245 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5248 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5249 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5251 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5252 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5255 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5256 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5257 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5259 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5260 events.replace(pending_events);
5269 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5271 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5273 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5277 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5279 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5280 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5282 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5283 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5284 /// restarting from an old state.
5285 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5286 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5287 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5289 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5290 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5291 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5292 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5295 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5296 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5297 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5300 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5301 handler.handle_event(&event);
5309 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5311 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5312 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5313 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5314 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5317 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5319 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5320 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5321 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5322 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5323 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5326 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5327 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5330 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5332 let new_height = height - 1;
5334 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5335 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5336 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5337 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5338 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5339 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5342 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5346 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5348 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5350 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5354 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5355 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5356 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5357 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5359 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5360 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5363 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5364 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5366 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5367 if height < last_best_block_height {
5368 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5369 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5373 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5374 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5375 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5376 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5378 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5379 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5383 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5385 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5387 macro_rules! max_time {
5388 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5390 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5391 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5392 // having an explicit local time source.
5393 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5394 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5395 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5396 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5397 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5403 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5404 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5405 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5406 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5407 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5410 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5411 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5412 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5413 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5414 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5415 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5416 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5417 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5418 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5426 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5427 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5428 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5429 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5430 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5431 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5437 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5439 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5440 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5441 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5442 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5443 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5444 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5449 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5451 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5452 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5453 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5454 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5457 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5458 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5460 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5461 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5462 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5463 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5464 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5466 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5467 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5469 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5471 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5472 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5473 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5474 let res = f(channel);
5475 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5476 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5477 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5478 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5482 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5483 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5484 if channel.is_usable() {
5485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5486 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5488 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5496 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5497 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5498 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5499 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5500 msg: announcement_sigs,
5502 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5503 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5506 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5507 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5508 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5513 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5514 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5515 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5516 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5517 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5518 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5519 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5523 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5524 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5526 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5527 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5528 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5529 data: reason_message,
5537 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5538 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5539 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5540 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5541 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5542 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5543 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5544 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5545 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5546 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5547 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5548 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5549 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5554 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5559 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5561 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5566 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5567 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5568 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5571 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5572 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5573 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5574 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5577 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5578 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5580 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5581 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5584 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5585 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5586 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5587 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5588 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5592 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5593 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5594 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5595 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5599 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5600 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5601 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5602 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5603 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5604 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5607 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5612 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5617 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5622 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5627 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5632 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5637 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5642 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5647 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5652 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5657 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5659 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5662 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5664 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5667 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5668 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5669 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5672 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5677 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5679 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5682 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5683 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5684 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5687 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5692 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5694 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5697 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5699 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5700 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5704 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5705 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5706 if no_connection_possible {
5707 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5708 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5709 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5710 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5711 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5713 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5717 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5724 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5725 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5726 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5727 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5728 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5729 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5730 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5733 no_channels_remain = false;
5739 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5742 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5743 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5744 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5745 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5746 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5747 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5748 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5749 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5750 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5751 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5752 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5753 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5754 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5755 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5756 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5757 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5758 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5759 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5760 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5764 if no_channels_remain {
5765 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5768 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5769 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5773 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5774 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5779 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5780 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5782 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5783 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5787 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5794 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5795 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5796 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5797 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5798 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5799 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5800 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5805 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5806 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5812 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5815 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5818 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5819 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5820 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5821 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5822 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5827 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5828 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5829 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5830 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5833 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5834 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5835 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5843 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5844 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5849 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5850 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5851 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5852 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5853 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5854 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5857 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5860 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5866 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5867 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5872 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5873 let result = *guard;
5881 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5882 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5883 let current_time = Instant::now();
5885 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5886 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5891 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5892 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5893 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5894 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5895 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5897 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5898 let result = *guard;
5899 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5903 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5904 None => return result,
5910 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5912 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5913 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5914 *persistence_lock = true;
5915 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5920 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5921 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5923 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5924 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5925 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5926 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5929 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5930 (2, node_id, required),
5931 (4, features, required),
5932 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5933 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5934 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5935 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5938 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5939 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5940 (2, channel_id, required),
5941 (3, channel_type, option),
5942 (4, counterparty, required),
5943 (6, funding_txo, option),
5944 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5945 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5946 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5947 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5948 (16, balance_msat, required),
5949 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5950 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
5951 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
5952 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
5953 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5954 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5955 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5956 (26, is_outbound, required),
5957 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5958 (30, is_usable, required),
5959 (32, is_public, required),
5960 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
5961 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
5964 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5965 (2, channels, vec_type),
5966 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5967 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5970 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5972 (0, onion_packet, required),
5973 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5976 (0, payment_data, required),
5977 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5978 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5980 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5981 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5982 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5986 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5987 (0, routing, required),
5988 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5989 (4, payment_hash, required),
5990 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5991 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5995 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5996 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5998 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6000 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6001 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6002 reason.write(writer)?;
6004 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6005 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6008 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6009 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6010 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6011 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6018 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6019 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6020 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6023 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6024 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6025 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6026 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6030 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6031 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6032 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6033 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6034 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6037 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6038 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6039 // messages contained in the variants.
6040 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6041 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6042 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6044 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6045 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6046 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6047 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6048 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6051 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6052 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6053 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6054 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6055 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6057 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6062 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6067 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6068 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6069 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6070 (2, outpoint, required),
6071 (4, htlc_id, required),
6072 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6075 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6076 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6077 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6078 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
6081 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6082 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
6083 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6085 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6086 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6087 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6088 (2, self.value, required),
6089 (4, payment_data, option),
6090 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6091 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6097 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6098 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6099 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6101 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6102 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6103 let mut total_msat = None;
6104 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6105 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6106 (0, prev_hop, required),
6107 (1, total_msat, option),
6108 (2, value, required),
6109 (4, payment_data, option),
6110 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6111 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6113 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6115 if payment_data.is_some() {
6116 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6118 if total_msat.is_none() {
6119 total_msat = Some(value);
6121 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6124 if payment_data.is_none() {
6125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6127 if total_msat.is_none() {
6128 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6130 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
6134 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6137 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6144 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6145 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6146 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6149 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6150 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6151 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6152 let mut payment_id = None;
6153 let mut payment_secret = None;
6154 let mut payment_params = None;
6155 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6156 (0, session_priv, required),
6157 (1, payment_id, option),
6158 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6159 (3, payment_secret, option),
6160 (4, path, vec_type),
6161 (5, payment_params, option),
6163 if payment_id.is_none() {
6164 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6166 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6168 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6169 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6170 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6171 path: path.unwrap(),
6172 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6177 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6178 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6183 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6184 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6186 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6188 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6189 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6190 (0, session_priv, required),
6191 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6192 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6193 (3, payment_secret, option),
6194 (4, path, vec_type),
6195 (5, payment_params, option),
6198 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6200 field.write(writer)?;
6207 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6208 (0, LightningError) => {
6212 (0, failure_code, required),
6213 (2, data, vec_type),
6217 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6219 (0, forward_info, required),
6220 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6221 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6222 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6225 (0, htlc_id, required),
6226 (2, err_packet, required),
6230 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6231 (0, payment_secret, required),
6232 (2, expiry_time, required),
6233 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6234 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6235 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6238 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6240 (0, session_privs, required),
6243 (0, session_privs, required),
6244 (1, payment_hash, option),
6247 (0, session_privs, required),
6248 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6249 (2, payment_hash, required),
6250 (4, payment_secret, option),
6251 (6, total_msat, required),
6252 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6253 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6256 (0, session_privs, required),
6257 (2, payment_hash, required),
6261 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6262 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6263 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6264 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6265 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6268 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6269 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6271 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6273 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6275 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6276 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6277 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6280 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6281 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6282 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6283 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6284 unfunded_channels += 1;
6287 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6288 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6289 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6290 channel.write(writer)?;
6294 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6295 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6296 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6297 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6298 for forward in pending_forwards {
6299 forward.write(writer)?;
6303 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6304 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6305 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6306 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6307 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6308 htlc.write(writer)?;
6312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6313 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6314 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6315 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6316 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6317 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6320 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6321 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6322 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6323 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6324 for event in events.iter() {
6325 event.write(writer)?;
6328 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6329 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6330 for event in background_events.iter() {
6332 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6334 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6335 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6340 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6341 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6343 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6344 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6345 hash.write(writer)?;
6346 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6349 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6350 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6351 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6352 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6353 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6356 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6357 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6359 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6360 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6361 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6362 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6365 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6366 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6370 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6371 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6372 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6374 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6375 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6376 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6381 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6382 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6383 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6384 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6385 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6392 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6394 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6396 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6397 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6398 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6399 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6400 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6401 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6402 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6403 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6404 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6405 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6406 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6407 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6408 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6410 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6411 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6413 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6414 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6416 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6417 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6418 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6419 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6420 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6421 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6423 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6424 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6425 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6426 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6427 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6431 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6432 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6434 pub keys_manager: K,
6436 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6438 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6439 pub fee_estimator: F,
6440 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6442 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6443 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6444 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6445 pub chain_monitor: M,
6447 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6448 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6449 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6450 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6451 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6452 /// deserialization.
6454 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6455 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6456 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6458 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6459 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6461 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6462 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6463 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6464 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6466 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6469 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6470 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6473 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6474 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6475 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6477 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6481 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6482 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6483 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6484 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6485 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6487 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6488 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6493 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6494 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6495 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6496 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6497 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6499 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6503 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6504 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6505 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6509 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6510 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6511 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6513 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6514 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6517 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6518 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6520 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6526 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6527 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6528 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6529 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6530 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6531 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6532 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6533 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6534 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6535 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6536 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6537 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6538 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6539 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6540 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6541 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6542 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6543 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6544 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6545 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6546 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6547 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6548 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6549 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6550 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6551 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6552 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6553 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6554 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6555 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6556 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6557 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6558 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6559 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6560 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6561 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6562 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6563 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6564 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6567 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6568 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6569 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6571 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6574 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6575 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6576 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6577 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6578 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6583 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6584 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6585 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6586 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6590 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6591 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6593 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6594 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6595 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6597 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6598 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6600 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6603 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6604 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6605 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6606 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6607 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6609 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6610 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6612 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6615 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6617 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6618 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6619 let peer_state = PeerState {
6620 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6622 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6625 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6627 for _ in 0..event_count {
6628 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6629 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6633 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6634 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6635 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6636 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6637 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6638 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6639 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6640 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6644 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6646 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6647 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6648 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6649 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6653 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6657 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6658 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6659 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6660 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6664 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6666 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6667 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6668 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6669 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6670 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6672 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6677 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6678 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6679 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6680 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6681 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6682 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6683 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6684 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6685 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6686 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6688 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6689 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6692 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6693 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6694 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6695 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6696 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6697 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6699 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6701 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6702 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6703 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6704 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6705 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6706 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6707 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6709 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6710 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6711 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6712 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6713 if path.is_empty() {
6714 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6715 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6717 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6718 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6719 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6720 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6722 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6723 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6724 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6727 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6728 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6729 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6730 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6732 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6733 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6734 total_msat: path_amt,
6735 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6737 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6738 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6747 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6748 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6750 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6751 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6754 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6756 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6758 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6759 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6760 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6761 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6766 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6767 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6768 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6769 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6771 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6772 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6773 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6775 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6776 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6777 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6778 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6779 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6780 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6782 if chan.is_usable() {
6783 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6784 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6785 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6786 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6792 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6793 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6794 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6796 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6797 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6798 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6800 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6802 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6807 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6809 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6810 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6811 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6813 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6814 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6820 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6821 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6823 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6825 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6826 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6827 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6828 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6830 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6831 logger: args.logger,
6832 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6835 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6836 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6839 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6840 //connection or two.
6842 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6848 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6849 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6850 use core::time::Duration;
6851 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6852 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6853 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6854 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6855 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6856 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6858 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6859 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6860 use util::errors::APIError;
6861 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6862 use util::test_utils;
6863 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6865 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6867 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6868 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6870 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6873 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6874 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6876 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6877 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6878 thread::spawn(move || {
6880 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6881 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6882 *persistence_lock = true;
6885 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6891 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6892 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6894 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6897 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6902 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6904 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6907 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6914 fn test_notify_limits() {
6915 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6916 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6920 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6922 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6923 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6924 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6925 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6926 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6928 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6930 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6931 // to connect messages with new values
6932 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6933 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6934 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6935 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6937 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6938 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6939 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6940 // ... but the last node should not.
6941 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6942 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6943 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6944 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6946 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6947 // about the channel.
6948 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6949 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6950 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6952 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6954 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6955 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6956 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6957 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6958 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6959 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6961 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6962 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6963 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6965 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6966 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6967 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6968 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6969 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6970 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6972 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6973 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6974 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6975 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6976 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6977 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6979 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6981 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6982 // the channel info has updated.
6983 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6984 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6985 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6986 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6987 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6988 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6992 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6993 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6995 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6996 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6997 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6998 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7001 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7002 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7003 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7004 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7005 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7006 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7007 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7009 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7011 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7013 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7014 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7016 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7018 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7019 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7020 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7026 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7027 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7028 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7029 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7030 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7031 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7032 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7033 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7034 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7036 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7037 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7039 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7041 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7043 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7044 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7045 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7046 // lightning messages manually.
7047 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7049 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7051 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7054 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7056 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7057 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7059 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7060 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7061 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7063 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7064 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7065 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7067 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7069 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7071 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7072 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7075 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7076 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7077 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7080 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7081 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7082 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7083 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7088 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7089 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7090 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7091 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7093 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7097 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7098 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7099 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7101 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7106 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7107 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7108 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7109 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7110 // fails as expected.
7111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7114 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7115 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7116 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7117 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7119 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7120 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7121 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7123 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7124 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7125 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7126 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7127 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7129 let route = find_route(
7130 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7131 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7133 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7135 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7137 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7138 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7141 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7145 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7146 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7147 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7148 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7149 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7150 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7151 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7155 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7158 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7159 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7160 let route = find_route(
7161 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7162 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7164 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7166 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7167 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7168 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7169 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7170 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7172 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7173 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7174 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7176 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7178 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7179 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7180 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7184 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7186 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7187 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7188 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7189 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7190 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7192 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7193 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7194 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7196 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7197 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7201 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7202 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7203 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7207 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7209 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7210 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7211 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7212 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7214 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7215 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7216 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7217 final_value_msat: 10000,
7218 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7220 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7221 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7222 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7223 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7224 let route = find_route(
7225 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7226 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7229 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7230 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7231 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7234 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7235 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7236 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7237 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7238 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7239 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7240 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7242 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7246 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7247 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7251 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7253 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7254 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7255 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7256 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7258 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7259 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7260 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7261 final_value_msat: 10000,
7262 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7264 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7265 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7266 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7267 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7268 let route = find_route(
7269 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7270 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7273 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7274 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7275 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7276 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7279 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7280 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7281 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7282 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7283 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7284 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7285 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7287 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7291 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7295 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7297 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7298 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7299 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7300 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7302 // Marshall an MPP route.
7303 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7304 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7305 route.paths.push(path);
7306 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7307 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7308 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7309 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7310 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7311 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7313 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7314 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7315 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7316 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7321 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7322 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7328 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7329 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7331 total_msat: 100_000,
7334 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7335 // payment verification fails as expected.
7336 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7337 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7338 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7339 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7341 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7345 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7346 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7350 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7353 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7354 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7355 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7356 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7357 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7358 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7359 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7360 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7361 use util::test_utils;
7362 use util::config::UserConfig;
7363 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7365 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7366 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7367 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7369 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7373 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7374 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7375 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7376 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7377 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7378 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7379 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7384 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7385 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7388 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7389 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7390 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7392 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7393 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7395 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7396 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7398 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7399 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7401 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7402 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7403 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7404 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7405 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7407 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7409 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7411 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7412 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7413 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7414 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7415 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7417 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7419 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7421 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7422 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7423 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7424 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7425 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7428 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7429 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7430 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7432 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7433 } else { panic!(); }
7435 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7436 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7438 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7441 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7444 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7445 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7447 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7448 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7449 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7450 match msg_events[0] {
7451 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7452 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7453 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7457 match msg_events[1] {
7458 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7462 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7464 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7465 macro_rules! send_payment {
7466 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7467 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7468 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7469 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7470 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7471 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7472 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7473 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7474 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7475 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7477 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7478 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7480 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7481 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7483 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7484 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7485 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7486 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7487 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7488 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7489 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7490 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7493 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7494 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7496 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7497 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7498 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7499 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7500 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7502 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7505 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7506 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7507 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7508 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7510 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7515 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7516 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);