1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
243 /// Number of bytes in the id.
244 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
247 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
253 impl Readable for PaymentId {
254 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
255 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
260 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
261 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
262 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
266 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
269 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
270 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278 impl Readable for InterceptId {
279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
286 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
287 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
288 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
289 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
292 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
295 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
296 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
299 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
303 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
304 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
305 (0, short_channel_id, required),
306 (2, htlc_id, required),
308 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
309 (0, session_priv, required),
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
318 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
321 session_priv: SecretKey,
322 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
323 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
325 payment_id: PaymentId,
328 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
329 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
330 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
339 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
340 payment_id.hash(hasher);
341 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
347 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
350 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
351 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
352 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
353 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
354 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
359 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
360 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
361 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
362 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
363 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
371 struct InboundOnionErr {
377 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
378 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
381 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
382 pub enum FailureCode {
383 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
384 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
385 TemporaryNodeFailure,
386 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
387 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
388 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
389 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
390 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
391 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
392 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
393 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
394 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
395 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
398 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
399 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
402 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
403 fn into(self) -> u16 {
405 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
406 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
407 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
413 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
414 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
415 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
416 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
417 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
420 err: msgs::LightningError,
421 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
422 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
423 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
429 err: LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
440 channel_capacity: None,
444 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
445 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
448 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 err: LightningError {
452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
459 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
460 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
461 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
465 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
468 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
470 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
471 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
475 log_level: Level::Warn,
478 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
493 shutdown_finish: None,
494 channel_capacity: None,
499 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
500 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
501 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
502 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
503 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
505 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
506 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
507 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
508 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
509 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
510 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
511 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
513 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
517 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
518 struct ClaimingPayment {
520 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
521 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
522 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
523 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
526 (0, amount_msat, required),
527 (2, payment_purpose, required),
528 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
529 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
530 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
533 struct ClaimablePayment {
534 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
535 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
536 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
539 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
540 struct ClaimablePayments {
541 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
542 /// failed/claimed by the user.
544 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
545 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
547 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
548 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
549 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
552 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
553 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
554 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
557 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
558 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
559 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
560 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
561 enum BackgroundEvent {
562 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
563 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
564 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
565 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
570 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
571 /// channel to continue normal operation.
573 /// In general this should be used rather than
574 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
575 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
576 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
578 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
579 /// are regenerated on startup.
580 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
581 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
582 funding_txo: OutPoint,
583 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
585 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
586 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
588 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
589 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
590 channel_id: [u8; 32],
595 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
596 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
597 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
598 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
599 /// event can be generated.
600 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
601 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
602 /// operation of another channel.
604 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
605 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
606 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
607 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
609 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
610 event: events::Event,
611 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
616 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
617 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
618 (0, event, upgradable_required),
619 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
620 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
621 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
622 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
623 // downgrades to prior versions.
624 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
629 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
630 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
632 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
635 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
636 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
637 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
638 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
642 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
643 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
644 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
645 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
646 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
647 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
649 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
651 channel_id: [u8; 32],
652 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
657 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
676 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
680 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
681 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
683 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
684 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
686 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
687 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
689 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
690 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
692 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
693 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
694 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
695 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
696 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundChannelRequest>,
697 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
698 latest_features: InitFeatures,
699 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
700 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
701 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
702 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
703 /// user but which have not yet completed.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel.
708 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
709 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
710 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
712 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
713 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
714 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
715 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
717 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
718 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
719 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
720 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
721 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
722 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
723 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
724 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
725 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
726 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
727 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
728 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
729 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
730 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
731 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
735 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
736 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
737 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
738 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
739 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
740 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
743 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
744 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
747 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
748 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
749 self.channel_by_id.len() +
750 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
751 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
752 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
755 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
756 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
757 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
758 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
759 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
760 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
764 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
765 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
766 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
767 /// The original OpenChannel message.
768 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
769 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
770 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
773 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
774 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
775 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
777 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
778 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
780 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
783 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
784 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
785 struct PendingInboundPayment {
786 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
787 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
788 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
789 /// this payment being removed.
791 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
792 user_payment_id: u64,
793 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
794 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
795 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
798 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
799 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
800 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
801 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
802 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
803 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
804 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
805 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
807 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
808 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
816 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
818 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
819 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
820 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
826 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
827 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
828 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
829 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
830 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
831 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
832 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
833 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
835 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
836 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
845 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
847 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
848 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
849 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
854 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
855 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
856 $vis trait AChannelManager {
857 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
858 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
859 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
860 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
861 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
862 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
863 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
864 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
865 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
866 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
867 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
868 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
869 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
871 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
872 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
873 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
874 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
879 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
880 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
881 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
882 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
884 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
886 ES::Target: EntropySource,
887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
888 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
893 type Watch = M::Target;
895 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
897 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
899 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
901 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
902 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
904 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
906 type Router = R::Target;
908 type Logger = L::Target;
910 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
913 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
914 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
916 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
917 /// to individual Channels.
919 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
920 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
921 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
922 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
924 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
925 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
926 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
927 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
928 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
929 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
930 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
932 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
933 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
934 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
936 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
938 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
939 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
940 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
942 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
943 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
944 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
945 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
947 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
948 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
949 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
951 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
952 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
953 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
954 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
955 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
957 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
958 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
959 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
960 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
961 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
962 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
963 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
964 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
967 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
968 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
969 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
970 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
971 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
975 // `total_consistency_lock`
977 // |__`forward_htlcs`
979 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
981 // |__`per_peer_state`
983 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
985 // | |__`claimable_payments`
987 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
993 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
995 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
999 // | |__`pending_events`
1001 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1003 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1014 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1015 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1016 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1026 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1027 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1029 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1030 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1031 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1032 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1034 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1037 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1038 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1039 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1040 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1041 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1042 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1043 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1044 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1046 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1051 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1053 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1054 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1055 /// and via the classic SCID.
1057 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1058 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1060 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1062 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1064 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1065 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1066 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1071 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1072 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1074 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1075 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1077 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1078 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1079 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1080 /// active channel list on load.
1082 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1083 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1085 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1087 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1088 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1089 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1091 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1092 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1093 /// the handling of the events.
1095 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1096 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1099 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1100 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1101 /// would break backwards compatability.
1102 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1103 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1104 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1106 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1109 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1111 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1112 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1113 /// confirmation depth.
1115 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1116 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1117 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1119 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1123 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1125 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1127 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1129 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1130 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1131 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1133 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1134 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1136 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1137 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1138 /// keeping additional state.
1139 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1141 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1142 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1143 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1144 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1146 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1147 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1149 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1150 /// are currently open with that peer.
1152 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1153 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1156 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1158 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1159 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1160 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1162 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1165 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1166 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1167 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1168 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1170 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1171 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1173 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1174 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1175 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1177 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1180 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1182 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1183 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1184 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1185 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1186 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1188 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1190 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1192 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1193 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1194 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1195 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1196 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1197 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1198 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1199 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1200 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1202 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1204 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1208 signer_provider: SP,
1213 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1215 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1216 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1217 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1218 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1219 pub struct ChainParameters {
1220 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1221 pub network: Network,
1223 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1225 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1226 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1229 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1236 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1237 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1238 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1239 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1240 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1241 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1243 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1244 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1245 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1246 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1247 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1249 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1250 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1253 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1254 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1255 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1256 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1258 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1259 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1260 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1261 _read_guard: read_guard,
1266 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1267 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1268 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1269 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1271 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1272 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1273 should_persist: persist_check,
1274 _read_guard: read_guard,
1279 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1280 fn drop(&mut self) {
1281 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1282 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1287 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1288 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1290 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1292 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1293 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1294 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1295 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1296 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1298 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1299 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1301 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1303 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1304 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1305 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1306 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1307 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1308 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1309 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1310 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1311 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1312 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1313 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1314 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1315 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1317 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1318 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1320 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1321 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1322 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1323 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1325 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1326 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1327 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1328 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1329 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1330 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1333 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1335 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1336 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1339 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1341 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1342 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1344 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1345 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1346 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1347 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1349 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1350 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1351 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1353 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1354 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1355 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1357 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1358 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1359 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1360 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1362 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1363 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1364 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1366 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1367 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1368 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1370 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1371 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1372 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1373 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1374 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1375 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1376 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1377 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1378 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1379 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1380 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1383 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1384 /// to better separate parameters.
1385 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1386 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1387 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1388 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1389 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1390 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1391 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1392 pub features: InitFeatures,
1393 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1394 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1395 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1397 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1399 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1400 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1401 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1402 /// payments to us through this channel.
1403 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1404 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1405 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1406 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1407 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1408 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1409 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1412 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1414 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1415 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1418 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1419 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1420 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1421 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1422 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1423 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1424 /// lifetime of the channel.
1425 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1426 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1427 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1428 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1429 /// our counterparty already.
1431 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1432 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1433 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1434 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1436 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1437 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1438 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1439 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1441 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1442 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1444 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1445 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1447 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1448 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1449 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1450 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1451 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1452 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1453 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1454 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1455 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1458 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1460 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1461 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1462 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1463 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1464 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1465 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1466 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1468 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1469 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1471 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1472 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1473 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1474 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1475 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1476 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1477 /// this value on chain.
1479 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1481 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1483 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1484 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1485 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1486 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1487 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1488 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1489 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1491 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1492 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1493 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1494 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1495 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1496 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1498 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1499 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1500 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1501 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1502 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1503 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1505 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1506 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1507 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1508 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1509 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1510 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1511 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1512 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1514 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1515 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1516 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1517 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1518 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1519 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1520 /// route which is valid.
1521 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1522 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1523 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1524 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1525 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1526 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1528 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1529 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1530 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1531 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1532 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1533 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1534 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1535 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1538 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1540 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1541 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1542 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1543 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1544 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1546 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1547 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1548 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1549 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1550 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1551 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1552 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1554 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1555 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1556 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1557 pub is_outbound: bool,
1558 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1559 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1560 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1561 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1562 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1564 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1565 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1566 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1567 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1568 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1569 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1570 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1572 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1573 pub is_usable: bool,
1574 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1575 pub is_public: bool,
1576 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1577 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1578 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1579 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1580 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1581 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1583 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1584 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1587 impl ChannelDetails {
1588 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1589 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1590 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1592 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1593 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1594 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1595 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1598 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1599 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1600 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1602 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1603 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1604 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1605 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1608 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1609 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1610 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1613 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1614 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1616 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1617 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1618 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1620 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1621 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1622 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1623 features: latest_features,
1624 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1625 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1626 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1627 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1628 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1629 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1630 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1631 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1632 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1633 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1635 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1636 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1637 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1638 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1639 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1640 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1641 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1642 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1643 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1644 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1645 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1646 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1647 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1648 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1649 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1650 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1651 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1652 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1653 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1654 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1655 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1656 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1657 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1658 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1659 config: Some(context.config()),
1660 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1665 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1666 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1667 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1668 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1669 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1670 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1671 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1672 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1673 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1675 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1677 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1678 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1680 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1681 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1682 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1683 /// to drop the channel.
1687 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1688 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1689 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1690 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1691 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1693 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1695 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1696 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1697 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1700 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1701 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1702 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1704 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1705 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1706 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1708 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1709 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1710 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1712 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1713 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1717 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1719 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1721 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1722 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1723 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1724 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1726 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1727 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1728 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1731 macro_rules! handle_error {
1732 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1733 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1734 // entering the macro.
1735 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1736 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1740 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1741 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1743 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1744 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1745 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1746 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1750 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1751 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1752 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1753 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1754 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1755 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1760 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1761 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1763 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1764 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1765 action: err.action.clone()
1769 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1770 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1771 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1777 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1782 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1785 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1786 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1787 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1793 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1794 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1795 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1796 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1797 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1798 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1800 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1801 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1802 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1803 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1804 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1806 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1807 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1809 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1813 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1814 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1815 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1817 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1818 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1820 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1821 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1823 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1824 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1825 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1826 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1827 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1828 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1832 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1834 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1835 // In any case, just close the channel.
1836 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1837 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1838 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1839 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1840 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1841 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1847 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1848 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1852 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1854 $entry.remove_entry();
1862 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1863 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1867 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1869 $entry.remove_entry();
1877 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1878 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1882 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1884 $entry.remove_entry();
1892 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1893 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1895 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1896 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1902 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1903 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1904 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1905 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1906 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1908 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1909 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1910 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1911 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1912 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1913 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1914 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1915 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1916 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1917 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1922 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1923 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1924 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1925 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1926 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1927 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1928 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1929 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1930 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1932 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1937 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1938 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1939 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1940 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1941 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1942 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1943 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1944 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1945 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1947 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1952 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1953 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1954 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1955 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1956 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1957 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1958 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1959 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1960 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1961 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1962 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1964 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1965 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1966 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1972 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1973 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1975 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1976 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1977 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1978 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1979 updates.announcement_sigs);
1980 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1981 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1984 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1985 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1986 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1988 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1990 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1991 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1993 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1994 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1995 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1996 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2001 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2002 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2003 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2004 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2005 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2006 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2008 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2009 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2010 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2013 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2014 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2015 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
2016 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2017 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2018 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2019 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2020 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2024 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2030 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2031 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2032 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2033 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2035 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2036 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2038 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2039 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2040 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2041 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2042 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2043 // filter for uniqueness here.
2044 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2045 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2046 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2047 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2049 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2050 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2051 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2053 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2054 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2055 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2059 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2060 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2064 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2065 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2066 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2067 while !processed_all_events {
2068 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2072 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2075 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2076 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2077 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2079 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2080 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2081 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2083 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2084 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2085 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2086 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2090 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2091 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2092 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2093 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2096 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2098 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2099 $event_to_handle = event;
2101 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2102 post_event_actions.push(action);
2107 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2108 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2109 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2110 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2111 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2112 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2115 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2116 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2117 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2118 processed_all_events = false;
2121 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2122 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2128 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2130 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2131 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2132 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2133 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2134 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2135 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2139 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2141 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2143 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2144 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2146 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2148 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2149 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2150 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2153 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2154 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2155 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2157 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2158 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2159 current_timestamp: u32,
2161 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2162 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2163 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2164 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2166 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2167 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2168 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2173 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2175 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2176 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2177 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2178 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2179 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2180 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2181 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2182 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2184 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2187 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2188 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2190 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2192 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2194 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2196 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2197 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2198 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2199 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2200 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2201 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2211 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2212 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2213 &self.default_configuration
2216 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2217 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2218 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2221 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2222 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2224 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2226 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2230 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2235 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2237 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2238 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2239 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2240 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2241 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2243 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2244 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2246 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2247 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2248 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2250 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2251 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2252 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2254 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2255 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2256 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2257 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2258 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2259 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2261 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2262 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2263 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2264 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2265 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2266 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2270 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2271 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2275 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2276 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2278 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2280 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2281 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2282 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2283 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2284 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2285 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2289 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2294 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2296 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2297 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2300 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2302 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2308 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2309 node_id: their_network_key,
2312 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2315 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2316 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2317 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2318 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2319 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2320 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2321 // the same channel.
2322 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2324 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2326 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2329 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2330 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2331 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2332 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2340 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2341 /// more information.
2342 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2343 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2344 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2345 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2346 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2347 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2348 // the same channel.
2349 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2353 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2356 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2357 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2358 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2361 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2362 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2363 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2366 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2367 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2368 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2376 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2377 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2379 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2380 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2382 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2383 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2384 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2385 // really wanted anyway.
2386 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2389 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2390 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2394 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2397 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2398 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2399 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2401 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2403 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2404 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2405 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2406 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2412 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2413 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2415 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2416 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2417 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2419 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2420 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2421 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2422 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2423 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2424 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2425 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2426 total_msat: *total_msat,
2429 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2430 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2432 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2433 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2435 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2440 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2441 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2442 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2443 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2444 Some(transaction) => {
2445 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2446 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2451 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2452 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2453 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2454 reason: closure_reason,
2455 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2456 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2460 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2463 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2464 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2468 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2469 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2474 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2476 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2477 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2478 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2479 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2480 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2482 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2483 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2484 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2486 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2490 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2491 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2492 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2493 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2496 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2497 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2498 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2503 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2510 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2511 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2513 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2514 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2515 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2516 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2519 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2520 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2521 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2522 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2525 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2529 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2530 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2531 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2533 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2534 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2536 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2537 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2538 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2539 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2541 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2543 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2544 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2545 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2548 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2549 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2550 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2551 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2552 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2553 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2556 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2557 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2558 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2560 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2561 /// the channel being closed or not:
2562 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2563 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2564 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2565 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2566 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2567 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2568 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2570 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2571 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2572 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2573 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2575 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2577 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2578 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2579 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2582 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2583 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2584 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2585 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2586 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2587 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2591 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2592 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2593 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2594 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2595 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2596 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2597 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2600 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2601 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2602 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2603 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2604 // ignore the result here.
2605 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2609 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2610 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2611 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2612 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2613 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2614 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2615 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2616 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2619 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2620 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2622 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2624 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2625 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2626 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2627 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2628 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2629 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2630 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2631 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2632 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2633 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2635 // Unfunded channel has no update
2636 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2637 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2638 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2639 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2640 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2641 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2642 // Unfunded channel has no update
2643 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2644 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2645 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2646 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2647 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2649 (None, *peer_node_id)
2651 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2654 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2655 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2656 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2661 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2664 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2666 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2667 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2668 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2669 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2670 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2671 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2672 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2673 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2674 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2675 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2686 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2687 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2688 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2690 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2691 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2692 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2695 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2696 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2697 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2699 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2700 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2701 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2702 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2703 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2706 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2707 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2708 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2709 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2710 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2714 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2715 /// local transaction(s).
2716 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2717 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2718 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2722 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2723 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2724 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2725 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2726 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2727 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2728 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2730 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2731 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2735 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2736 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2737 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2738 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2739 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2740 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2741 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2742 err_data: Vec::new(),
2746 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2747 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2748 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2751 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2752 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2753 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2754 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2755 outgoing_cltv_value,
2756 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2760 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2761 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2762 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2763 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2764 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2765 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2766 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2767 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2769 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2771 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2772 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2773 err_data: Vec::new(),
2774 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2777 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2778 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2779 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2780 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2782 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2785 // final_expiry_too_soon
2786 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2787 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2789 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2790 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2791 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2792 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2793 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2794 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2795 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2796 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2797 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2798 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2799 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2802 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2803 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2804 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2806 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2808 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2809 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2813 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2814 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2815 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2816 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2817 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2818 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2819 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2820 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2821 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2822 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2823 err_data: Vec::new(),
2824 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2827 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2828 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2829 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2830 err_data: Vec::new(),
2831 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2834 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2838 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2841 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2842 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2845 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2846 phantom_shared_secret,
2850 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2851 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2852 err_data: Vec::new(),
2853 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2856 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2859 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2860 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2861 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2862 outgoing_cltv_value,
2863 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2867 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2868 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2869 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2870 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2871 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2873 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2874 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2875 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2876 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2877 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2878 failure_code: $err_code,
2884 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2885 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2888 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2889 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2890 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2892 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2893 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2894 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2895 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2896 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2897 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2898 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2899 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2901 macro_rules! return_err {
2902 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2904 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2905 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2906 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2907 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2908 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2909 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2915 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2917 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2918 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2920 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2921 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2924 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2925 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2926 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2927 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2930 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2931 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2932 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2934 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2935 // inbound channel's state.
2936 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2937 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2938 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2942 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2943 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2944 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2945 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2946 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2947 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2948 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2949 // phantom or an intercept.
2950 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2951 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2952 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2956 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2959 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2961 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2963 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2964 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2965 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2969 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2971 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2972 // have no consistency guarantees.
2973 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2977 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2978 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2979 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2980 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2981 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2983 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2984 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2985 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2986 // we don't have the channel here.
2987 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2989 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2991 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2992 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2993 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2994 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2995 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2996 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2997 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2998 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2999 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3000 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3001 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3003 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3006 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3007 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3009 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3010 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3014 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3015 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3016 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3017 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3019 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3026 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3027 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3028 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3029 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3030 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3031 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3033 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3034 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3036 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3037 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3038 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3039 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3040 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3041 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3042 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3043 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3044 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3045 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3051 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3052 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3053 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3054 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3056 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3057 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3059 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3060 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3061 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3063 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3064 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3065 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3066 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3067 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3068 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3069 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3073 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3075 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3078 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3079 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3080 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3081 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3082 macro_rules! return_err {
3083 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3085 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3086 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3087 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3088 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3089 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3090 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3096 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3098 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3099 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3102 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3103 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3104 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3105 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3106 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3108 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3111 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3112 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3113 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3114 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3115 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3121 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3122 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3123 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3125 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3126 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3127 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3129 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3130 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3131 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3132 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3133 return Err(LightningError {
3134 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3135 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3138 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3139 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3141 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3142 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3145 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3146 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3147 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3148 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3150 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3151 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3152 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3154 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3155 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3156 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3158 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3159 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3163 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3166 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3168 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3170 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3171 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3172 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3173 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3174 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3177 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3178 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3180 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3181 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3182 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3183 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3184 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3185 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3186 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3187 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3189 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3190 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3191 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3193 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3195 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3202 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3203 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3204 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3205 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3210 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3211 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3212 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3215 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3216 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3218 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3219 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3220 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3222 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3223 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3224 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3226 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3227 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3229 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3230 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3231 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3232 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3236 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3237 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3240 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3241 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3242 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3244 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3245 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3246 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3248 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3249 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3251 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3252 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3253 Some(monitor_update) => {
3254 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3255 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3257 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3258 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3259 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3260 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3261 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3262 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3263 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3271 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3272 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3273 // `channel_by_id` map.
3274 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3275 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3280 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3281 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3283 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3288 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3290 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3291 /// fields for more info.
3293 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3294 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3296 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3298 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3299 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3300 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3301 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3302 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3304 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3305 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3306 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3307 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3308 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3310 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3311 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3312 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3313 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3315 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3317 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3318 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3319 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3321 /// In general, a path may raise:
3322 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3323 /// node public key) is specified.
3324 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3325 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3327 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3328 /// relevant updates.
3330 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3331 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3332 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3334 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3335 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3336 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3337 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3338 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3339 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3340 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3343 self.pending_outbound_payments
3344 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3345 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3346 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3349 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3350 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3351 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3352 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3354 self.pending_outbound_payments
3355 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3356 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3357 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3358 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3362 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3363 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3365 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3366 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3367 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3371 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3372 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3373 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3377 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3378 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3382 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3383 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3384 /// retries are exhausted.
3386 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3387 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3389 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3390 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3391 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3393 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3394 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3396 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3397 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3398 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3399 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3400 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3403 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3404 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3405 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3406 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3407 /// never reach the recipient.
3409 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3410 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3412 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3413 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3415 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3416 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3417 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3419 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3420 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3421 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3424 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3425 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3427 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3430 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3431 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3432 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3434 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3435 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3436 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3437 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3440 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3441 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3442 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3443 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3444 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3447 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3448 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3451 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3454 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3455 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3458 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3459 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3460 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3461 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3462 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3464 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3465 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3469 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3471 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3473 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3474 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3475 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3476 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3477 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3478 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3479 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3480 } else { unreachable!(); });
3482 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3483 Err((chan, err)) => {
3484 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3485 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3487 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3488 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3489 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3495 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3497 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3498 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3503 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3504 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3507 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3509 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3512 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3513 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3514 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3523 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3524 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3525 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3529 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3531 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3532 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3534 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3535 /// across the p2p network.
3537 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3538 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3540 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3541 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3542 /// keys per-channel).
3544 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3545 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3546 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3548 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3549 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3550 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3552 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3553 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3554 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3555 /// for more details.
3557 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3558 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3559 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3562 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3563 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3564 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3565 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3570 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3571 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3572 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3573 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3574 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3575 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3577 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3581 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3582 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3584 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3588 let mut output_index = None;
3589 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3590 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3591 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3592 if output_index.is_some() {
3593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3594 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3597 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3600 if output_index.is_none() {
3601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3602 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3605 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3609 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3611 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3612 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3613 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3614 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3616 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3617 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3619 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3620 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3622 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3624 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3625 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3626 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3627 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3628 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3629 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3630 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3631 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3632 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3633 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3634 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3635 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3636 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3640 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3641 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3642 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3643 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3646 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3647 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3648 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3649 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3653 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3654 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3655 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3656 config.apply(config_update);
3657 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3660 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3661 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3662 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3663 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3664 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3671 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3672 &mut channel.context
3673 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3674 &mut channel.context
3676 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3677 debug_assert!(false);
3678 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3680 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3681 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3684 let mut config = context.config();
3685 config.apply(config_update);
3686 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3687 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3688 context.update_config(&config);
3693 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3695 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3696 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3697 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3698 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3700 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3701 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3703 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3704 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3706 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3708 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3709 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3710 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3711 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3712 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3713 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3714 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3715 pub fn update_channel_config(
3716 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3717 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3718 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3721 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3722 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3724 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3725 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3727 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3728 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3729 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3730 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3731 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3733 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3734 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3735 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3738 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3741 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3742 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3743 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3744 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3745 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3746 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3749 let next_hop_scid = {
3750 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3751 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3752 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3755 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3757 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3758 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3759 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3762 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3764 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3765 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3766 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3771 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3772 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3773 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3776 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3777 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3778 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3780 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3782 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3783 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3784 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3785 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3786 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3789 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3790 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3791 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3792 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3793 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3795 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3799 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3800 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3802 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3805 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3806 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3809 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3810 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3811 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3814 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3815 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3816 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3817 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3818 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3819 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3820 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3821 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3824 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3825 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3827 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3832 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3834 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3835 /// Will likely generate further events.
3836 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3839 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3840 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3841 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3843 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3844 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3846 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3847 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3848 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3850 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3851 match forward_info {
3852 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3853 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3854 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3855 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3856 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3859 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3860 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3861 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3863 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3864 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3865 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3866 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3867 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3868 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3869 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3872 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3873 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3875 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3878 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3879 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3885 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3886 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3888 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3892 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3893 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3895 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3899 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3900 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3901 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3902 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3903 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3905 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3906 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3907 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3908 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3909 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3911 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3913 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3914 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3918 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3919 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3920 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3921 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3923 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3924 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3930 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3933 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3936 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3937 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3938 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3939 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3940 // problem, not ours.
3946 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3947 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3949 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3953 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3954 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3955 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3956 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3961 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3963 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3967 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3968 match forward_info {
3969 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3970 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3971 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3972 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3973 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3977 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3978 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3979 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3980 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3981 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3982 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3983 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3984 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3986 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3987 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3988 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3991 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
3994 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3996 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3997 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3998 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3999 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4004 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4005 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4007 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4009 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
4010 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4012 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4015 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4017 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4018 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4019 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4028 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4029 match forward_info {
4030 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4031 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4032 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4033 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4034 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4037 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4038 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4039 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4040 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4041 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4042 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4043 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4045 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4046 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4047 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4051 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4052 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4055 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4058 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4059 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4060 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4061 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4062 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4063 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4064 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4065 phantom_shared_secret,
4067 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4068 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4069 // if routing nodes overpay
4070 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4071 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4073 total_value_received: None,
4074 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4077 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4080 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4082 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4083 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4084 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4085 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4086 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4087 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4089 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4090 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4091 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4092 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4093 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4094 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4095 phantom_shared_secret,
4097 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4098 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4100 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4103 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4104 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4105 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4106 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4107 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4110 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4111 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4112 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4113 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4114 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4115 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4117 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4118 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4119 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4121 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4122 .entry(payment_hash)
4123 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4124 .or_insert_with(|| {
4125 committed_to_claimable = true;
4127 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4130 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4131 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4133 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4135 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4137 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4139 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4140 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4144 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4146 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4147 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4148 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4149 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4150 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4151 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4152 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4154 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4155 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4157 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4159 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4160 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4161 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4162 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4163 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4166 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4167 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4168 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4169 committed_to_claimable = true;
4171 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4172 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4173 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4174 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4175 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4176 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4177 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4178 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4179 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4180 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4184 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4185 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4186 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4187 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4188 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4190 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4192 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4193 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4195 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4196 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4197 committed_to_claimable = true;
4200 payment_claimable_generated
4204 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4205 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4206 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4207 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4208 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4209 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4210 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4211 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4213 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4214 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4215 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4216 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4217 Ok(result) => result,
4219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4220 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4223 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4224 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4225 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4227 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4228 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4231 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4232 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4233 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4235 check_total_value!(purpose);
4237 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4238 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4239 check_total_value!(purpose);
4243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4244 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4245 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4246 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4248 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4249 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4251 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4252 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4254 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4255 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4257 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4258 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4259 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4261 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4262 if payment_claimable_generated {
4263 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4269 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4270 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4278 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4279 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4280 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4281 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4283 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4284 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4286 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4288 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4289 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4290 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4292 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4294 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4295 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4296 events.append(&mut new_events);
4299 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4301 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4302 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4303 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4305 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4307 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4308 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4309 if background_events.is_empty() {
4310 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4313 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4315 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4316 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4317 // monitor updating completing.
4318 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4320 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4321 let mut updated_chan = false;
4323 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4324 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4326 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4327 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4329 updated_chan = true;
4330 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4331 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4338 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4339 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4341 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4342 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4343 // however, ensure that.
4345 log_error!(self.logger,
4346 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4348 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4350 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4351 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4352 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4355 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4356 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4358 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4359 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4360 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4361 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4362 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4368 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4371 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4372 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4373 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4374 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4375 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4378 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4379 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4380 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4381 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4383 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4384 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4386 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4388 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4389 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4392 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4394 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4395 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4399 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4400 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4401 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4402 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4403 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4404 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4405 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4407 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4408 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4410 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4411 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4414 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4415 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4420 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4421 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4429 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4431 /// This currently includes:
4432 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4433 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4434 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4436 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4437 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4438 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4439 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4441 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4442 /// estimate fetches.
4444 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4445 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4446 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4447 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4448 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4450 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4451 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4453 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4454 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4455 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4457 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4458 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4459 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4460 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4461 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4462 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4463 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4464 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4469 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4470 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4472 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4473 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4474 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4475 if needs_close { return false; }
4478 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4479 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4480 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4481 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4482 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4483 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4484 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4485 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4487 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4488 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4489 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4494 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4496 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4499 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4501 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4502 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4503 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4508 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4510 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4516 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4518 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4519 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4520 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4521 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4522 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4523 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4524 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4525 channel_id: *chan_id,
4526 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4535 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4537 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4538 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4539 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4541 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4542 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4543 log_error!(self.logger,
4544 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4545 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4546 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4547 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4548 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4549 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4550 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4551 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4552 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4553 channel_id: *chan_id,
4554 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4563 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4564 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4565 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4566 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4568 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4569 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4570 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4571 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4572 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4573 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4574 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4575 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4581 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4583 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4584 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4589 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4590 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4591 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4592 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4593 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4594 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4595 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4596 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4597 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4598 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4599 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4601 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4602 // have no channels to the peer.
4603 let remove_entry = {
4604 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4605 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4608 entry.remove_entry();
4611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4616 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4617 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4618 // This should be unreachable
4619 debug_assert!(false);
4622 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4623 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4624 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4625 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4626 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4627 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4628 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4631 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4632 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4633 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4635 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4636 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4643 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4644 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4645 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4646 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4650 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4651 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4654 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4656 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4657 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4658 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4659 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4660 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4667 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4668 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4669 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4671 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4672 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4673 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4674 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4676 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4677 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4678 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4679 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4680 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4684 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4685 /// reason for the failure.
4687 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4688 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4691 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4692 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4693 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4694 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4695 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4696 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4702 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4703 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4704 match failure_code {
4705 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4706 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4707 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4708 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4709 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4710 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4712 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4713 let fail_data = match data {
4714 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4717 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4722 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4723 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4725 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4727 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4728 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4729 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4730 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4731 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4732 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4733 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4735 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4737 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4738 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4740 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4745 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4746 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4747 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4748 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4749 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4750 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4751 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4752 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4753 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4754 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4756 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4757 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4758 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4759 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4761 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4762 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4763 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4764 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4765 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4769 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4770 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4771 // be surfaced to the user.
4772 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4773 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4774 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4776 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4778 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4781 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4783 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4787 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4790 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4791 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4792 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4797 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4798 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4799 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4800 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4801 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4802 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4803 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4804 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4805 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4808 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4809 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4810 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4813 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4814 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4815 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4817 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4818 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4819 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4820 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4821 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4823 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4825 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4827 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4828 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4829 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4830 push_forward_ev = true;
4832 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4833 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4834 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4836 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4837 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4840 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4841 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4842 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4843 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4844 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4845 failed_next_destination: destination,
4851 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4852 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4854 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4855 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4856 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4857 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4859 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4860 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4861 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4862 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4864 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4865 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4866 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4868 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4869 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4870 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4871 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4872 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4873 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4874 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4875 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4876 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4879 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4880 /// even type numbers.
4884 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4885 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4887 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4888 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4889 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4892 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4893 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4898 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4899 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4900 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4901 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4902 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4903 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4904 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4905 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4910 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4911 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4912 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4913 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4914 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4916 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4917 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4918 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4922 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4923 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4924 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4925 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4926 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4927 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4928 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4929 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4930 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4931 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4932 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4941 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4943 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4944 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4945 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4946 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4947 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4948 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4949 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4950 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4951 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4953 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4954 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4955 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4956 debug_assert!(false);
4960 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4962 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4963 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4964 debug_assert!(false);
4968 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4969 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4971 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4972 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4973 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4974 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4977 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4978 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4979 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4980 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4984 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4985 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4986 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4987 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4989 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4990 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4991 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4992 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4993 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4998 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4999 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5000 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5001 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5002 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5003 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5004 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5006 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5009 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5010 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5011 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5012 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5016 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5017 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5018 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5019 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5021 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5022 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5023 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5024 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5028 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5029 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5030 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5034 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5035 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5036 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5039 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5042 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5043 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5044 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5046 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5047 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5048 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5049 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
5050 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5053 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5054 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5055 if let Err(e) = res {
5056 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5057 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5058 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5059 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5060 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5063 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5064 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5065 // monitor update as a background event.
5066 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5067 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5068 counterparty_node_id,
5069 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5070 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5078 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5079 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5080 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5086 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5087 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5088 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5089 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5090 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5091 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5092 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5093 // again on restart.
5094 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5095 payment_preimage, update_res);
5098 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5099 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5101 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5102 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5103 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5104 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5105 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5106 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5107 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5108 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5109 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5110 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5113 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5114 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5115 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5116 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5117 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5118 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5122 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5123 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5126 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5128 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5129 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5130 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5131 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5132 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5133 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5135 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5136 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5139 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5140 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5141 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5142 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5143 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5144 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5145 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5148 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5149 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5151 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5152 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5153 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5154 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5156 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5160 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5161 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5162 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5168 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5169 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5170 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5173 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5174 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5176 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5177 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5178 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5180 payment_purpose: purpose,
5183 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5185 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5189 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5191 sender_intended_total_msat,
5195 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5196 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5198 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5199 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5200 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5207 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5208 /// update completion.
5209 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5210 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5211 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5212 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5213 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5214 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5215 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5216 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5217 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5218 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5219 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5220 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5221 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5223 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5225 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5226 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5227 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5228 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5231 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5232 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5234 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5236 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5241 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5242 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5244 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5249 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5250 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5252 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5253 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5258 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5262 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5268 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5269 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5270 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5274 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5275 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5276 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5282 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5283 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5285 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5286 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5288 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5289 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5290 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5291 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5292 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5298 let mut peer_state_lock;
5299 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5300 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5301 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5304 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5307 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5308 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5309 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5310 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5311 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5314 let remaining_in_flight =
5315 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5316 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5319 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5320 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5321 remaining_in_flight);
5322 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5325 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5328 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5330 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5331 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5334 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5335 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5336 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5338 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5339 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5340 /// used to accept such channels.
5342 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5343 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5344 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5345 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5348 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5349 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5351 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5352 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5353 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5355 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5356 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5358 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5359 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5361 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5362 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5364 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5365 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5366 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5367 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5370 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5373 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5374 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5380 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5382 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5383 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5384 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5386 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5387 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5388 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5389 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5390 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5391 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5392 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5394 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5398 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5399 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5400 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5401 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5402 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5404 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5407 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5410 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5411 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5412 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5413 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5414 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5415 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5417 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5420 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5425 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5426 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5427 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5429 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5430 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5431 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5434 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5439 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5440 /// or 0-conf channels.
5442 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5443 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5444 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5445 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5446 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5447 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5449 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5450 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5451 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5452 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5453 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5454 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5455 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5459 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5462 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5463 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5465 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5466 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5467 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5468 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5469 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5470 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5472 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5475 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5476 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5477 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5480 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5483 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5484 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5488 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5492 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5493 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5494 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5495 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5496 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5501 debug_assert!(false);
5502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5507 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5508 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5509 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5510 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5511 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5512 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5515 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5519 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5520 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5522 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5523 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5526 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5527 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5532 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5533 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5534 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5535 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5536 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5537 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5538 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5539 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5540 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5542 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5543 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5544 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5549 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5550 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5551 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5552 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5553 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5554 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5555 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5563 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5564 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5565 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5567 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5571 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5572 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5574 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5575 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5576 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5578 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5582 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5583 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5584 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5585 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5587 debug_assert!(false);
5588 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5592 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5593 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5594 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5595 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5600 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5601 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5602 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5603 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5604 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5606 user_channel_id: user_id,
5611 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5612 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5614 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5615 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5617 debug_assert!(false);
5618 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5621 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5623 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5624 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5625 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5626 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5628 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5629 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5630 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5631 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5632 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5633 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5634 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5636 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5640 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5643 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5645 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5648 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5650 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5651 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5652 funding_msg.channel_id))
5654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5655 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5659 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5660 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5661 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5662 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5663 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5665 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5669 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5671 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5672 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5673 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5674 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5676 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5677 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5678 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5679 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5680 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5681 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5682 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5683 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5691 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5692 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5694 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5696 debug_assert!(false);
5697 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5702 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5704 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5705 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5706 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5707 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5708 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5709 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5710 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5711 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5712 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5713 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5722 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5726 debug_assert!(false);
5727 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5731 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5733 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5734 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5735 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5738 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5739 msg: announcement_sigs,
5741 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5742 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5743 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5744 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5745 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5746 // announcement_signatures.
5747 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5748 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5749 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5750 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5757 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5758 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5763 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5767 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5768 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5769 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5770 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5771 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5773 debug_assert!(false);
5774 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5776 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5777 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5778 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5779 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5780 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5781 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5782 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5783 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5784 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5786 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5787 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5788 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5789 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5790 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5792 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5793 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5794 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5795 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5796 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5799 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5800 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5801 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5802 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5804 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5805 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5806 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5807 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5808 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5809 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5814 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5815 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5816 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5817 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5821 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5824 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5825 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5826 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5833 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5837 debug_assert!(false);
5838 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5840 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5843 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5845 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5846 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5847 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5848 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5853 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5854 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5855 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5856 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5857 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5858 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5859 } else { (tx, None) }
5861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5864 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5865 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5866 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5868 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5869 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5872 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5876 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5881 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5882 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5883 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5884 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5886 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5887 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5888 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5889 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5891 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5893 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5895 debug_assert!(false);
5896 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5900 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5903 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5904 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5905 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5906 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5907 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5909 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5910 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5911 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5912 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5913 match pending_forward_info {
5914 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5915 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5916 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5917 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5919 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5920 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5921 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5922 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5923 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5926 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5928 _ => pending_forward_info
5931 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5938 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5940 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5942 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5944 debug_assert!(false);
5945 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5949 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5951 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5952 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5958 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5962 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5964 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5966 debug_assert!(false);
5967 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5969 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5971 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5973 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5975 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5980 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5982 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5984 debug_assert!(false);
5985 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5987 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5988 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5989 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5991 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5992 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5993 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5995 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6002 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6004 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6006 debug_assert!(false);
6007 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6011 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6013 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6014 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6015 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6016 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6017 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6025 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6026 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6027 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6028 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6029 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6030 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6031 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6032 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6033 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6034 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6035 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6037 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6038 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6040 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6041 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6042 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6044 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6045 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6048 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6049 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6051 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6052 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6053 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6055 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6056 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6057 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6058 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6059 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6062 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6063 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6066 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6067 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6068 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6069 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6070 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6071 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6072 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6073 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6076 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6077 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6078 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6083 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6084 // payments are being processed.
6085 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6086 push_forward_event = true;
6088 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6089 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6096 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6100 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6101 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6102 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6104 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6108 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6110 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6111 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6112 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6114 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6115 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6116 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6117 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6118 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6119 // real by taking more time.
6120 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6121 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6122 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6127 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6128 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6129 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6130 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6131 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6132 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6133 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6135 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6136 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6137 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6138 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6139 channel_funding_outpoint,
6140 counterparty_node_id,
6145 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6146 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6148 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6150 debug_assert!(false);
6151 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6152 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6154 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6156 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6157 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6158 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6159 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6160 *counterparty_node_id)
6162 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6163 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6164 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6165 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6166 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6167 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6168 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6170 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6175 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6179 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6180 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6181 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6183 debug_assert!(false);
6184 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6188 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6189 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6190 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6197 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6199 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6201 debug_assert!(false);
6202 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6206 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6208 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6212 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6213 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6214 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6215 msg, &self.default_configuration
6217 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6218 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6219 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6227 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6228 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6229 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6230 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6232 // It's not a local channel
6233 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6237 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6238 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6239 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6243 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6245 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6246 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6247 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6248 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6249 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6250 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6252 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6254 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6255 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6256 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6257 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6260 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6263 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6265 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6268 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6270 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6271 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6273 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6275 debug_assert!(false);
6276 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6280 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6282 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6283 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6284 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6285 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6286 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6287 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6288 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6289 let mut channel_update = None;
6290 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6291 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6292 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6295 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6296 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6297 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6298 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6299 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6300 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6301 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6306 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6307 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6308 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6309 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6310 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6319 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6320 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6323 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6324 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6329 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6330 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6331 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6333 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6334 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6335 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6336 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6337 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6338 match monitor_event {
6339 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6340 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6342 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6345 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6346 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6347 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6350 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6351 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6352 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6353 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6355 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6356 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6357 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6358 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6361 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6363 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6364 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6365 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6366 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6367 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6368 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6369 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6370 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6371 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6375 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6376 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6378 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6380 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6381 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6382 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6384 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6391 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6392 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6398 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6399 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6402 has_pending_monitor_events
6405 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6406 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6407 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6409 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6411 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6414 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6415 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6416 /// update was applied.
6417 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6418 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6419 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6420 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6422 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6423 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6424 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6425 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6428 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6431 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6432 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6433 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6434 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6435 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6436 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6437 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6438 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6440 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6441 has_monitor_update = true;
6443 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6444 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6445 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6446 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6448 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6450 continue 'peer_loop;
6459 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6460 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6461 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6464 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6465 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6471 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6472 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6473 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6474 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6475 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6476 let mut has_update = false;
6478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6480 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6483 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6484 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6485 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6486 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6487 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6490 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6493 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6494 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6495 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6496 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6502 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6504 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6505 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6506 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6512 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6513 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6521 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6522 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6528 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6529 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6531 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6532 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6533 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6534 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6535 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6536 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6537 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6538 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6539 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6540 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6541 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6542 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6543 assert!(should_broadcast);
6544 } else { unreachable!(); }
6545 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6546 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6547 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6550 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6554 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6557 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6558 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6560 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6561 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6562 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6563 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6565 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6567 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6568 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6572 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6573 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6575 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6577 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6578 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6580 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6581 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6582 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6583 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6584 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6585 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6586 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6587 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6588 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6589 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6590 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6593 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6594 /// stored external to LDK.
6596 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6597 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6598 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6600 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6601 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6604 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6605 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6606 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6607 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6609 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6610 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6611 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6612 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6613 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6615 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6616 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6617 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6618 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6619 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6621 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6622 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6624 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6625 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6629 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6630 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6632 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6634 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6635 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6637 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6638 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6639 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6640 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6641 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6642 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6643 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6646 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6647 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6649 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6650 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6651 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6654 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6655 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6657 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6658 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6659 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6660 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6662 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6663 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6664 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6665 Some(_) => continue,
6666 None => return scid_candidate
6671 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6673 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6674 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6676 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6677 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6678 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6682 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6683 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6684 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6686 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6687 /// times to get a unique scid.
6688 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6689 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6690 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6692 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6693 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6694 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6695 return scid_candidate
6699 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6700 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6701 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6702 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6705 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6708 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6709 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6710 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6711 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6720 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6721 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6722 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6723 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6724 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6728 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6729 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6730 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6731 events.push_back((event, None));
6735 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6736 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6737 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6741 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6742 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6746 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6747 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6750 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6751 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6752 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6753 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6754 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6755 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6758 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6759 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6762 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6763 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6764 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6765 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6767 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6771 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6772 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6773 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6774 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6775 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6776 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6777 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6781 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6782 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6783 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6784 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6785 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6786 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6787 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6789 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6791 if further_update_exists {
6792 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6798 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6802 log_debug!(self.logger,
6803 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6804 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6808 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6809 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6810 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6814 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6815 for action in actions {
6817 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6818 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6820 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6826 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6827 /// using the given event handler.
6829 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6830 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6834 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6838 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6840 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6841 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6842 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6843 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6844 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6845 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6849 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6850 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6851 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6852 /// is always placed next to each other.
6854 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6855 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6856 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6857 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6859 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6860 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6861 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6862 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6863 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6864 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6865 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6867 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6868 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6869 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6870 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6873 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6874 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6876 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6877 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6880 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6882 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6885 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6886 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6890 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6891 events.replace(pending_events);
6900 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6902 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6904 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6905 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6906 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6911 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6913 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6914 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6915 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6917 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6921 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6932 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6934 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6935 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6936 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6937 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6938 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6941 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6942 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6945 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6947 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6948 let new_height = height - 1;
6950 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6951 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6952 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6953 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6954 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6955 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6958 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6962 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6964 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6965 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6966 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6967 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6968 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6973 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6974 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6975 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6976 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6978 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6979 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6982 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6983 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6984 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6986 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6987 if height < last_best_block_height {
6988 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6989 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6993 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6994 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6995 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6996 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6998 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6999 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7002 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7003 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7005 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7007 macro_rules! max_time {
7008 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7010 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7011 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7012 // having an explicit local time source.
7013 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7014 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7015 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7016 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7017 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7023 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7024 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7025 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7026 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7030 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7031 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7032 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7035 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7036 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7037 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7044 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7046 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7047 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7048 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7049 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7050 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7051 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7052 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7057 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7059 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7060 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7061 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7062 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7063 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7068 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7069 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7071 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7072 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7073 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7074 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7075 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7077 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7078 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7081 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7084 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7085 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7086 let res = f(channel);
7087 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7088 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7089 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7090 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7091 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7093 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7094 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7095 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7097 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7098 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7099 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7110 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7113 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
7115 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7116 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7117 msg: announcement_sigs,
7119 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7120 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7123 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7124 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7125 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7130 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7131 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7132 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7133 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7134 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7135 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7136 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7137 // is always consistent.
7138 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7139 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7140 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7141 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7142 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7145 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7146 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7147 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7148 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7149 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7150 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7151 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7155 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7156 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7157 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7158 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7159 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7160 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7161 data: reason_message,
7171 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7172 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7173 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7174 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7175 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7176 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7177 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7178 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7179 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7180 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7182 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7183 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7184 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7188 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7191 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7192 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7193 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7194 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7195 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7196 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7197 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7198 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7199 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7200 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7203 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7204 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7205 _ => unreachable!(),
7207 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7208 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7209 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7216 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7218 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7219 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7223 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7225 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7226 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7228 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7229 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7232 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7233 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7234 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7237 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7238 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7239 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7240 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7243 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7244 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7245 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7246 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7249 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7250 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7252 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7253 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7254 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7255 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7256 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7259 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7260 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7261 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7262 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7265 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7266 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7267 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7268 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7271 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7272 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7273 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7274 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7278 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7279 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7281 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7283 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7284 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7285 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7290 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7295 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7296 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7297 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7298 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7301 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7306 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7307 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7308 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7309 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7312 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7314 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7317 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7319 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7322 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7323 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7324 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7327 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7329 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7332 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7334 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7337 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7339 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7342 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7344 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7347 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7349 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7352 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7354 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7357 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7358 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7359 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7362 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7364 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7367 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7368 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7369 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7372 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7374 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7377 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7378 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7379 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7380 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7381 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7383 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7388 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7390 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7393 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7394 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7395 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7396 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7398 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7399 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7400 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7401 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7402 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7403 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7404 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7405 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7406 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7407 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7408 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7413 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7414 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7415 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7418 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7419 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7420 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7423 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7424 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7425 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7426 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7428 // V1 Channel Establishment
7429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7431 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7432 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7433 // V2 Channel Establishment
7434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7436 // Common Channel Establishment
7437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7439 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7440 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7441 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7442 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7443 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7445 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7446 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7447 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7448 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7449 // Channel Operations
7450 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7453 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7454 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7455 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7457 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7458 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7459 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7460 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7461 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7462 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7463 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7464 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7465 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7468 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7469 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7470 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7471 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7474 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7476 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7478 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7479 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7483 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7484 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7485 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7491 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7492 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7493 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7494 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7495 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7496 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7499 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7500 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7502 if inbound_peer_limited {
7505 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7506 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7507 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7508 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7509 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7510 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7511 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7512 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7513 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7514 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7519 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7520 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7522 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7523 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7524 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7525 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7530 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7531 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7536 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7539 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7542 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7544 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7545 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7546 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7547 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7548 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7550 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7551 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7555 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7559 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7562 match &msg.data as &str {
7563 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7564 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7566 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7567 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7568 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7569 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7570 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7571 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7572 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7573 if msg.channel_id != [0; 32] {
7574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7575 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7576 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7577 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7578 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7579 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7581 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7585 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7586 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7587 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7588 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7589 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7590 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7592 log_level: Level::Trace,
7602 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7603 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7605 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7606 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7609 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7610 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7611 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7612 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7613 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7614 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7616 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7617 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7618 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7622 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7623 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7624 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7625 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7626 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7627 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7628 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7629 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7630 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7631 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7639 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7640 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7644 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7645 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7648 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7649 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7652 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7653 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7656 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7657 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7658 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7659 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7662 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7663 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7664 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7665 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7668 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7669 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7670 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7671 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7674 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7675 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7676 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7677 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7680 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7681 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7682 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7683 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7686 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7687 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7688 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7689 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7692 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7693 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7694 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7695 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7698 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7699 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7700 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7701 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7704 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7705 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7706 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7707 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7711 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7712 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7713 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7714 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7715 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7719 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7720 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7722 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7723 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7724 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7725 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7726 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7729 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7730 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7731 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7732 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7735 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7736 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7737 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7738 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7741 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7742 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7743 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7744 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7745 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7746 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7747 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7748 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7749 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7750 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7751 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7752 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7753 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7754 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7755 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7756 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7757 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7758 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7759 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7760 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7765 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7766 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7768 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7769 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7770 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7771 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7774 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7775 (2, node_id, required),
7776 (4, features, required),
7777 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7778 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7779 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7780 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7783 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7784 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7785 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7786 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7787 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7788 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7789 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7790 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7791 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7792 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7793 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7794 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7795 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7796 (7, self.config, option),
7797 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7798 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7799 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7800 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7801 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7802 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7803 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7804 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7805 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7806 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7807 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7808 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7809 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7810 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7811 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7812 (32, self.is_public, required),
7813 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7814 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7815 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7816 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7817 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7823 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7824 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7825 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7826 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7827 (2, channel_id, required),
7828 (3, channel_type, option),
7829 (4, counterparty, required),
7830 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7831 (6, funding_txo, option),
7832 (7, config, option),
7833 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7834 (9, confirmations, option),
7835 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7836 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7837 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7838 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7839 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7840 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7841 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7842 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7843 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7844 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7845 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7846 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7847 (26, is_outbound, required),
7848 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7849 (30, is_usable, required),
7850 (32, is_public, required),
7851 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7852 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7853 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7854 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7855 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7858 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7859 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7860 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7861 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7862 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7864 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7868 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7870 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7871 outbound_scid_alias,
7875 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7876 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7878 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7879 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7880 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7881 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7882 confirmations_required,
7884 force_close_spend_delay,
7885 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7886 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7887 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7888 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7889 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7890 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7891 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7892 channel_shutdown_state,
7897 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7898 (2, channels, required_vec),
7899 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7900 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7903 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7905 (0, onion_packet, required),
7906 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7909 (0, payment_data, required),
7910 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7911 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7912 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7913 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7915 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7916 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7917 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7918 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7919 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7920 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7924 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7925 (0, routing, required),
7926 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7927 (4, payment_hash, required),
7928 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7929 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7930 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7931 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7935 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7936 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7938 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7940 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7941 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7942 reason.write(writer)?;
7944 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7945 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7948 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7949 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7950 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7951 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7958 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7959 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7960 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7963 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7964 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7965 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7966 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7970 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7971 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7972 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7973 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7974 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7977 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7978 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7979 // messages contained in the variants.
7980 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7981 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7982 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7984 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7986 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7987 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7988 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7991 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7992 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7993 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7994 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7995 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7997 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8002 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8007 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8008 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8009 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8010 (2, outpoint, required),
8011 (4, htlc_id, required),
8012 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8013 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8016 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8018 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8019 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8020 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8022 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8023 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8024 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8025 (2, self.value, required),
8026 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8027 (4, payment_data, option),
8028 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8029 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8030 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8031 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8037 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8038 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8039 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8040 (0, prev_hop, required),
8041 (1, total_msat, option),
8042 (2, value_ser, required),
8043 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8044 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8045 (5, total_value_received, option),
8046 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8047 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8048 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8050 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8051 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8052 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8054 if payment_data.is_some() {
8055 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8057 if total_msat.is_none() {
8058 total_msat = Some(value);
8060 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8063 if total_msat.is_none() {
8064 if payment_data.is_none() {
8065 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8067 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8069 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8073 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8076 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8077 total_value_received,
8078 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8080 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8081 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8086 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8087 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8088 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8091 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8092 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8093 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8094 let mut payment_id = None;
8095 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8096 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8097 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8098 (0, session_priv, required),
8099 (1, payment_id, option),
8100 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8101 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8102 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8103 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8105 if payment_id.is_none() {
8106 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8108 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8110 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8111 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8112 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8114 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8115 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8116 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8117 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8121 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8122 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8123 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8125 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8128 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8129 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8134 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8135 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8137 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8139 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8140 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8141 (0, session_priv, required),
8142 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8143 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8144 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8145 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8146 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8147 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8150 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8152 field.write(writer)?;
8159 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8160 (0, forward_info, required),
8161 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8162 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8163 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8164 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8167 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8169 (0, htlc_id, required),
8170 (2, err_packet, required),
8175 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8176 (0, payment_secret, required),
8177 (2, expiry_time, required),
8178 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8179 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8180 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8183 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8185 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8186 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8187 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8188 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8189 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8190 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8194 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8195 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8197 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8199 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8201 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8202 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8203 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8206 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8208 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8209 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8210 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8211 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8214 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8215 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8217 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8218 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8219 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8220 unfunded_channels += 1;
8225 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8227 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8228 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8229 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8230 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8231 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8232 channel.write(writer)?;
8239 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8240 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8241 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8242 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8243 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8244 for forward in pending_forwards {
8245 forward.write(writer)?;
8250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8252 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8253 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8254 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8256 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8257 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8258 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8259 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8260 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8261 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8262 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8263 htlc.write(writer)?;
8265 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8266 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8269 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8270 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8271 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8272 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8273 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8274 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8275 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8278 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8279 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8280 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8281 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8282 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8284 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8285 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8286 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8287 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8288 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8289 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8290 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8295 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8296 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8297 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8298 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8299 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8300 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8301 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8302 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8303 0u64.write(writer)?;
8305 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8306 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8307 event.write(writer)?;
8311 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8312 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8313 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8314 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8315 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8316 0u64.write(writer)?;
8318 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8319 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8320 // likely to be identical.
8321 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8322 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8324 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8325 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8326 hash.write(writer)?;
8327 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8330 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8331 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8332 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8333 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8334 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8337 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8338 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8340 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8341 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8342 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8343 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8346 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8347 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8351 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8352 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8353 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8355 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8356 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8357 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8363 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8364 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8365 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8366 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8369 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8370 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8371 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8372 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8373 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8376 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8377 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8378 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8379 if !updates.is_empty() {
8380 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8381 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8386 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8387 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8388 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8389 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8390 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8391 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8392 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8393 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8394 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8395 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8396 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8397 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8398 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8405 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8407 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8408 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8411 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8412 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8413 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8414 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8415 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8416 // check that the event is sane here.
8417 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8418 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8419 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8420 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8426 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8427 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8428 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8429 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8430 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8431 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8434 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8435 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8436 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8437 events.push_back((ev, action));
8438 } else if action.is_some() {
8439 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8446 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8447 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8448 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8449 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8450 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8451 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8454 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8456 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8458 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8459 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8460 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8461 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8462 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8463 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8464 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8465 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8466 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8467 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8468 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8469 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8470 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8472 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8473 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8475 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8476 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8478 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8479 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8480 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8481 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8482 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8483 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8485 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8486 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8488 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8489 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8490 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8491 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8493 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8497 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8498 pub entropy_source: ES,
8500 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8501 pub node_signer: NS,
8503 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8504 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8506 pub signer_provider: SP,
8508 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8510 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8511 pub fee_estimator: F,
8512 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8514 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8515 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8516 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8517 pub chain_monitor: M,
8519 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8520 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8521 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8522 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8523 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8524 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8526 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8528 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8529 /// deserialization.
8531 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8532 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8533 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8535 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8536 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8538 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8539 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8540 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8541 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8543 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8546 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8547 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8550 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8551 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8553 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8554 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8555 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8556 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8557 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8558 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8562 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8563 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8564 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8565 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8566 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8568 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8569 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8574 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8575 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8576 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8577 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8579 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8581 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8582 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8583 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8584 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8588 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8589 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8590 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8594 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8595 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8597 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8598 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8599 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8600 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8601 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8606 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8607 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8609 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8610 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8611 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8613 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8615 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8616 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8617 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8618 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8619 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8620 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8621 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8622 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8623 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8624 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8626 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8627 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8628 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8629 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8630 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8631 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8632 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8633 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8634 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8635 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8636 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8637 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8638 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8639 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8640 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8641 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8644 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8645 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8646 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8647 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8648 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8649 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8650 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8652 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8653 let mut found_htlc = false;
8654 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8655 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8658 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8659 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8660 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8661 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8662 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8663 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8664 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8665 log_info!(args.logger,
8666 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8667 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), &payment_hash);
8668 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8672 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8673 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8674 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8675 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8676 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8678 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8679 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8681 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8683 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8684 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8687 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8688 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8689 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8693 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8694 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8695 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8696 // safely discard the channel.
8697 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8698 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8699 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8700 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8701 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8702 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8703 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8706 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8707 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8708 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8709 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8710 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8711 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8715 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8716 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8717 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8718 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8719 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8720 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8721 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8723 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8727 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8728 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8729 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8730 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8731 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8732 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8733 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8734 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8735 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8737 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8740 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8741 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8742 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8743 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8744 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8745 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8746 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8747 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8749 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8752 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8755 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8756 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8757 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8758 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8759 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8760 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8761 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8762 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8763 is_connected: false,
8767 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8768 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8769 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8770 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8773 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8774 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8777 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8778 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8779 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8780 for _ in 0..event_count {
8781 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8782 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8787 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8788 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8789 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8791 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8792 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8793 // on-startup monitor updates.
8794 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8795 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8801 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8802 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8804 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8805 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8806 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8807 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8812 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8813 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8814 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8815 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8816 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8817 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8818 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8820 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8821 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8825 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8826 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8827 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8828 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8829 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8830 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8831 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8832 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8833 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8834 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8835 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8836 let mut events_override = None;
8837 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8838 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8839 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8840 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8841 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8842 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8843 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8844 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8845 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8846 (8, events_override, option),
8847 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8848 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8849 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8850 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8852 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8853 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8856 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8857 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8860 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8861 pending_events_read = events;
8864 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8865 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8868 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8869 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8870 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8871 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8872 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8873 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8875 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8877 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8878 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8879 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8882 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8883 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8884 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8885 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8886 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8888 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8889 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8890 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8892 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8893 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8894 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8895 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8896 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8898 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8899 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8900 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8901 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8902 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8903 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8904 pending_background_events.push(
8905 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8906 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8907 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8908 update: update.clone(),
8911 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8912 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8913 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8914 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8915 pending_background_events.push(
8916 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8917 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8918 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8921 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8922 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8923 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8925 max_in_flight_update_id
8929 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8932 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8933 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8935 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8936 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8937 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8938 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8939 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8940 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8941 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8942 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8943 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8946 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8947 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8948 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8949 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8950 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8951 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8952 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8953 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8954 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8955 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8956 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8961 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8962 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8963 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8964 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8965 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8966 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8968 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8970 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8971 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8972 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8974 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8975 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8976 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8977 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8978 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8979 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8980 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8981 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8986 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8987 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8989 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8990 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8991 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8992 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8995 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8996 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8997 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8998 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8999 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9000 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9001 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9003 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9004 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9005 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9006 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9007 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9008 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9009 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9010 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9013 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9014 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9015 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9016 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9018 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9019 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9020 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9023 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9024 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9025 retry_strategy: None,
9026 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9027 payment_params: None,
9028 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9029 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9030 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9031 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9032 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9033 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9034 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9035 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9036 total_msat: path_amt,
9037 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9039 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9040 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9045 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9047 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9048 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9049 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9050 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9052 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9053 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9054 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9055 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9056 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9057 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9058 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9059 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9060 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9061 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9062 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9067 !forwards.is_empty()
9069 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9070 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9071 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9072 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
9073 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9074 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9075 intercepted_id != ev_id
9082 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9083 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9084 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9085 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9086 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9087 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9088 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9089 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9090 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9091 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9092 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9094 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9095 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9096 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9098 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9099 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9100 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9107 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9108 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9110 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9112 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9113 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9114 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9115 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9116 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9117 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9118 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9119 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9120 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9123 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9124 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9125 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9126 // channel still live case here.
9130 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9131 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9136 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9137 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9138 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9139 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9140 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9141 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9142 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9143 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9147 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9148 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9150 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9151 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9152 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9153 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9155 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9156 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9159 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9160 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9162 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9163 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9165 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9168 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9169 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9170 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9172 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9176 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9177 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9178 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9179 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9180 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9182 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9183 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9184 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9185 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9186 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9187 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9188 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9189 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9191 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9192 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9196 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9198 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9200 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9201 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9203 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9204 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9209 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9210 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9212 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9214 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9216 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9217 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9218 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9219 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9223 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9224 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9227 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9228 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9229 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9231 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9232 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9233 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9235 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9236 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9237 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9238 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9239 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9240 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9242 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9243 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9244 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9245 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9246 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9247 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9253 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9255 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9256 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9257 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9258 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9259 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9260 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9261 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9262 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9263 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9264 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9265 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9267 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9268 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9270 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9271 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9272 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9273 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9275 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9276 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9277 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9278 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9280 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9281 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9282 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9283 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9285 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9286 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9287 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9288 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9289 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9290 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9291 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9294 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9295 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9298 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9301 purpose: payment.purpose,
9302 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9303 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9304 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9310 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9311 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9312 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9313 for action in actions.iter() {
9314 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9315 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9316 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9318 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9319 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9320 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9321 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9323 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9324 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9325 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9326 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9332 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9334 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9335 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9339 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9341 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9342 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9343 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9344 router: args.router,
9346 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9348 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9349 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9350 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9351 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9353 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9354 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9355 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9356 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9357 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9358 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9360 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9365 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9367 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9369 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9370 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9371 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9372 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9373 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9374 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9376 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9377 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9378 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9380 logger: args.logger,
9381 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9384 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9385 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9386 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9387 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9388 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9391 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9392 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9393 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9394 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9395 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9396 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9399 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9400 //connection or two.
9402 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9408 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9409 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9410 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9411 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9412 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9413 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9414 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9415 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9416 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9417 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9418 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9419 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9420 use crate::util::test_utils;
9421 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9422 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9425 fn test_notify_limits() {
9426 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9427 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9431 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9433 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9434 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9436 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9437 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9439 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9441 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9442 // to connect messages with new values
9443 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9444 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9445 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9446 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9447 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9448 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9450 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9452 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9453 // ... but the last node should not.
9454 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9455 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9456 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9457 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9459 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9460 // about the channel.
9461 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9462 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9463 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9465 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9467 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9468 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9469 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9470 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9471 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9472 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9474 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9475 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9476 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9478 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9479 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9480 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9481 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9482 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9483 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9485 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9486 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9487 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9488 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9489 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9490 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9491 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9492 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9494 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9495 // the channel info has updated.
9496 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9497 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9498 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9499 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9500 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9501 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9505 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9506 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9512 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9514 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9515 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9516 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9517 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9519 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9520 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9521 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9522 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9523 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9524 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9525 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9526 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9528 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9530 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9532 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9533 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9534 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9536 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9537 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9538 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9539 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9540 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9542 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9543 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9544 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9546 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9547 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9548 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9549 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9550 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9551 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9552 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9553 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9554 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9556 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9557 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9558 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9560 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9562 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9564 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9565 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9566 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9567 // lightning messages manually.
9568 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9569 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9572 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9573 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9574 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9575 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9577 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9578 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9580 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9581 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9583 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9584 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9585 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9587 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9588 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9589 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9591 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9593 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9595 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9596 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9599 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9600 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9601 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9602 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9604 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9605 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9606 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9607 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9612 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9613 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9614 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9615 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9622 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9623 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9624 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9627 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9628 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9629 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9630 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9631 // fails as expected.
9632 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9633 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9634 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9635 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9636 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9637 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9640 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9641 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9645 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9646 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9648 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9649 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9650 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9652 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9653 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9654 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9655 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9657 let route = find_route(
9658 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9659 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9661 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9662 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9664 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9666 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9667 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9671 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9672 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9676 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9678 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9679 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9680 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9681 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9684 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9686 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9687 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9689 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9690 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9691 let route = find_route(
9692 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9693 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9695 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9696 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9700 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9701 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9702 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9704 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9705 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9706 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9707 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9709 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9710 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9711 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9712 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9716 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9717 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9719 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9720 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9721 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9722 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9723 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9724 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9725 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9726 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9727 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9729 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9730 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9732 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9733 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9734 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9735 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9737 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9739 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9740 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9741 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9743 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9744 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9745 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9746 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9748 let route = find_route(
9749 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9750 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9752 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9753 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9754 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9756 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9757 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9758 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9759 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9760 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9762 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9763 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9764 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9766 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9767 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9768 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9769 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9770 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9771 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9772 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9773 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9774 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9776 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9777 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9781 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9782 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9783 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9787 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9789 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9790 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9792 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9793 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9794 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9795 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9797 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9798 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9799 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9800 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9801 let route = find_route(
9802 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9803 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9806 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9807 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9808 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9809 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9810 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9811 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9814 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9815 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9816 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9817 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9818 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9819 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9820 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9822 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9826 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9827 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9828 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9829 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9830 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9836 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9837 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9839 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9840 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9841 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9842 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9844 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9845 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9846 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9847 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9848 let route = find_route(
9849 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9850 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9853 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9854 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9855 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9856 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9857 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9858 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9859 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9860 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9863 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9864 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9865 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9866 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9867 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9868 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9869 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9871 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9875 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9879 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9881 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9882 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9883 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9884 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9886 // Marshall an MPP route.
9887 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9888 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9889 route.paths.push(path);
9890 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9891 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9892 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9893 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9894 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9895 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9897 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9898 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9900 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9901 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9903 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9908 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9914 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9916 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9917 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9919 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9920 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9922 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9925 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9926 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9927 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9928 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9929 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9930 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9933 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9936 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9937 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9942 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9943 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9944 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9945 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9946 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9947 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9949 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9950 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9952 total_msat: 100_000,
9955 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9956 // payment verification fails as expected.
9957 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9958 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9959 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9960 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9962 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9966 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9967 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9971 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9972 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9973 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9974 // the channel is successfully closed.
9975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9978 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9980 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9981 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9982 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9983 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9984 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9986 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9987 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9989 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9990 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9992 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9995 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9997 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9998 // as it has the funding transaction.
9999 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10000 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10001 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10004 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10006 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10008 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10010 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10011 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10012 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10014 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10017 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10018 // as it has the funding transaction.
10019 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10020 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10021 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10024 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10025 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10027 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10028 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10029 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10030 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10032 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10033 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10034 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10035 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10037 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10038 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10040 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10041 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10042 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10043 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10044 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10045 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10046 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10050 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10051 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10052 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10053 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10054 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10055 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10056 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10059 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10061 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10062 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10063 // closing transaction).
10064 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10065 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10066 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10068 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10069 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10070 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10071 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10072 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
10075 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10077 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10079 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10080 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10081 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10083 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10085 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10089 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10090 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10091 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10094 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10095 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10096 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10099 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10101 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10102 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10104 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10105 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10107 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10108 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10113 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10114 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10115 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10116 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10117 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10118 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10119 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10120 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10123 let channel_id = [4; 32];
10124 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10125 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10127 // Test the API functions.
10128 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10130 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10132 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10134 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10136 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10138 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10140 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10144 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10145 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10151 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10153 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10154 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10156 let mut funding_tx = None;
10157 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10158 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10159 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10162 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10163 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10164 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10165 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10166 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10168 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10170 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10172 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10174 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10176 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10178 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10181 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10182 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10183 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10184 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10185 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10187 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10188 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10190 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10191 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10192 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10193 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10194 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10195 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10196 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10199 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10200 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10201 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10202 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10203 }, true).unwrap_err();
10205 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10206 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10207 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10208 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10209 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10210 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10211 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10213 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10214 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10216 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10217 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10218 }, true).unwrap_err();
10220 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10221 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10222 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10223 }, false).unwrap();
10224 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10226 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10227 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10229 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10230 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10231 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10232 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10233 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10235 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10236 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10237 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10239 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10240 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10241 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10243 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10244 // "protected" and can connect again.
10245 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10246 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10247 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10249 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10251 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10253 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10254 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10258 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10259 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10263 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10265 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10267 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10268 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10270 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10271 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10272 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10273 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10276 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10278 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10279 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10280 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10282 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10283 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10284 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10286 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10287 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10288 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10289 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10293 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10294 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10295 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10298 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10299 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10301 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10303 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10305 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10306 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10308 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10309 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10310 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10311 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10313 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10316 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10317 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10319 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10320 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10324 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10325 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10328 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10329 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10330 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10331 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10332 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10335 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10337 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10338 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10339 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10340 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10346 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10347 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10349 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10350 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10351 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10353 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10354 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10358 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10362 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10363 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10364 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10365 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10366 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10367 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10368 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10369 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10371 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10372 payment_metadata: None,
10373 keysend_preimage: None,
10374 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10375 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10377 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10379 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10380 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10381 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10382 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10383 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10385 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10386 } else { panic!(); }
10388 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10389 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10391 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10392 payment_metadata: None,
10393 keysend_preimage: None,
10394 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10395 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10397 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10399 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10400 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10404 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10405 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10406 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10407 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10408 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10410 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10411 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10416 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10417 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10419 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10420 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10422 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10423 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10424 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10425 match &msg_events[0] {
10426 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10427 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10429 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10430 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10431 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10437 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10438 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10440 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10441 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10444 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10448 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10449 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10450 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10451 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10452 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10454 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10455 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10456 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10458 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10460 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10461 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10462 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10464 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10467 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10468 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10470 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10473 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10474 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10476 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10477 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10479 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10480 // not have generated any events.
10481 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10485 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10486 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10487 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10488 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10489 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10490 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10491 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10492 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10494 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10495 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10496 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10498 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10499 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10500 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10501 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10502 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10504 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10505 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10508 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10509 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10512 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10513 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10514 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10515 ..Default::default()
10517 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10518 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10521 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10522 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10525 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10526 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10527 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10528 ..Default::default()
10530 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10531 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10532 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10535 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10536 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10539 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10540 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10541 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10542 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10543 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10546 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10547 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10548 ..Default::default()
10550 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10553 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10554 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10555 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10560 fn test_payment_display() {
10561 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10562 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10563 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10564 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10565 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10566 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10572 use crate::chain::Listen;
10573 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10574 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10575 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10576 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10577 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10578 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10579 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10580 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10581 use crate::util::test_utils;
10582 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10584 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10585 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10586 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10588 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10590 use criterion::Criterion;
10592 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10593 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10594 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10595 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10596 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10597 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10598 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10600 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10601 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10603 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10604 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10606 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10608 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10611 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10612 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10615 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10616 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10617 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10619 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10620 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10622 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10623 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10624 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10625 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10626 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10628 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10629 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10630 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10632 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10633 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10634 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10635 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10637 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10638 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10639 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10641 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10642 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10643 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10644 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10645 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10647 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10648 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10649 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10651 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10652 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10654 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10655 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10656 }, false).unwrap();
10657 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10658 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10659 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10662 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10663 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10664 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10666 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10667 } else { panic!(); }
10669 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10670 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10671 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10672 match events_b[0] {
10673 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10674 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10679 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10680 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10681 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10682 match events_a[0] {
10683 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10684 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10689 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10691 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10692 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10693 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10695 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10696 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10697 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10698 match msg_events[0] {
10699 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10700 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10701 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10705 match msg_events[1] {
10706 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10710 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10711 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10712 match events_a[0] {
10713 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10714 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10719 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10720 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10721 match events_b[0] {
10722 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10723 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10725 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10728 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10729 macro_rules! send_payment {
10730 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10731 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10732 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10733 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10734 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10735 payment_count += 1;
10736 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10737 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10739 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10740 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10741 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10742 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10743 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10744 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10745 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10746 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10747 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10748 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10749 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10751 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10752 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10753 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10754 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10756 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10757 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10758 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10759 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10760 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10762 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10765 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10766 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10767 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10768 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10770 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10774 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10775 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10776 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);