1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: &msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
452 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
453 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
454 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
457 struct ClaimableHTLC {
458 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
461 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
465 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
466 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
467 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
468 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
470 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
471 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
476 impl Readable for PaymentId {
477 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
478 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
482 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
483 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
484 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
485 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
486 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
489 session_priv: SecretKey,
490 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
491 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
492 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
493 payment_id: PaymentId,
494 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
495 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
498 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
499 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
500 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
502 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
504 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
506 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
509 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
510 payment_id.hash(hasher);
511 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
512 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
513 payment_params.hash(hasher);
520 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
521 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
523 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
524 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
525 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
526 payment_secret: None,
527 payment_params: None,
532 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
533 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
535 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
543 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
544 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
546 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
551 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
553 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
554 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
555 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
556 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
557 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
559 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
560 err: msgs::LightningError,
561 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
562 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
564 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
566 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
568 err: LightningError {
570 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
571 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
578 shutdown_finish: None,
582 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
584 err: LightningError {
586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
589 shutdown_finish: None,
593 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
594 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
597 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 err: LightningError {
601 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
602 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
608 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
609 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
613 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
616 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
618 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
619 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
623 log_level: Level::Warn,
626 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
630 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
632 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
633 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
639 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
650 shutdown_finish: None,
655 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
656 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
657 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
658 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
659 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
661 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
662 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
663 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
664 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
665 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
666 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
667 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
669 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
673 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
674 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
675 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
676 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
677 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
678 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
679 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
680 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
681 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
682 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
683 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
684 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
686 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
687 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
688 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
689 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
692 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
693 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
694 /// quite some time lag.
695 enum BackgroundEvent {
696 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
697 /// commitment transaction.
698 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
701 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
702 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
704 latest_features: InitFeatures,
707 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
708 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
710 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
713 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
714 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
715 struct PendingInboundPayment {
716 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
717 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
718 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
719 /// this payment being removed.
721 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
722 user_payment_id: u64,
723 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
724 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
725 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
728 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
729 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
730 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
732 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
735 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
736 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
737 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
738 pending_amt_msat: u64,
739 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
740 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
741 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
743 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
744 starting_block_height: u32,
746 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
747 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
748 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
750 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
751 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
753 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
754 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
755 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
756 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
757 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
759 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
761 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
762 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
766 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
767 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
769 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
773 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
775 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
779 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
785 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
787 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
792 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
795 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
796 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
797 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
801 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
802 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
803 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
807 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
810 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
811 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
814 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
815 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
816 let our_payment_hash;
817 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
818 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
819 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
823 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
827 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
831 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
832 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
833 let remove_res = match self {
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
836 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
837 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
838 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
842 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
843 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
844 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
845 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
846 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
847 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
854 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
855 let insert_res = match self {
856 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
857 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
858 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
860 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
861 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
864 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
865 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
866 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
867 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
868 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
875 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
877 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
878 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
879 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
880 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
887 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
888 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
889 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
890 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
891 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
892 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
893 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
894 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
896 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
897 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
898 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
899 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
900 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
901 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
902 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
903 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
904 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
906 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
907 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
909 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
910 /// to individual Channels.
912 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
913 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
914 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
915 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
917 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
918 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
919 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
920 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
921 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
922 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
923 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
925 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
926 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
927 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
928 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
931 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
932 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
933 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
934 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
935 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
937 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
938 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
939 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
940 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
941 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
942 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
943 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
944 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
945 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
949 default_configuration: UserConfig,
950 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
956 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
958 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
959 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
961 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
962 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
963 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
964 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
966 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
967 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
968 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
969 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
970 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
971 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
973 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
974 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
975 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
976 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
977 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
978 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
979 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
980 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
982 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
984 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
985 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
987 our_network_key: SecretKey,
988 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
990 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
992 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
993 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
994 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
996 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
997 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
998 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
999 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1001 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1002 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1003 /// are currently open with that peer.
1004 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1005 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1008 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1009 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1011 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1012 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1013 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1014 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1015 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1016 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1017 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1018 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1019 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1021 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1028 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1030 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1031 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1032 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1033 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1034 pub struct ChainParameters {
1035 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1036 pub network: Network,
1038 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1040 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1041 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1044 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1050 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1051 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1052 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1053 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1054 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1055 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1057 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1058 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1059 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1060 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1061 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1063 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1064 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1067 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1068 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1069 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1072 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1073 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1075 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1076 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1077 should_persist: persist_check,
1078 _read_guard: read_guard,
1083 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1084 fn drop(&mut self) {
1085 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1086 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1091 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1092 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1094 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1096 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1097 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1098 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1099 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1100 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1102 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1103 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1105 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1107 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1108 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1109 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1110 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1111 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1112 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1113 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1115 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1116 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1118 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1119 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1120 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1121 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1123 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1124 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1125 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1126 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1127 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1128 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1131 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1133 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1134 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1137 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1139 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1140 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1141 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1143 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1144 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1145 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1146 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1147 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1148 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1149 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1150 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1151 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1152 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1153 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1156 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1157 /// to better separate parameters.
1158 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1159 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1160 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1161 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1162 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1163 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1164 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1165 pub features: InitFeatures,
1166 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1167 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1168 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1170 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1172 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1173 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1174 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1175 /// payments to us through this channel.
1176 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1179 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1181 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1182 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1183 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1184 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1185 /// lifetime of the channel.
1186 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1187 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1188 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1189 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1190 /// our counterparty already.
1192 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1193 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1194 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1195 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1196 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1197 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1198 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1199 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1200 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1201 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1202 /// this value on chain.
1204 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1206 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1208 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1209 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1210 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1211 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1212 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1213 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1214 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1216 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1217 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1218 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1219 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1221 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1222 pub balance_msat: u64,
1223 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1224 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1225 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1226 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1228 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1230 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1231 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1232 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1233 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1234 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1235 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1236 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1237 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1238 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1240 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1241 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1242 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1243 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1244 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1245 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1246 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1248 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1250 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1252 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1253 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1254 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1255 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1256 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1257 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1258 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1259 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1260 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1262 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1263 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1264 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1265 pub is_outbound: bool,
1266 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1267 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1268 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1269 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1270 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1272 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1273 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1274 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1275 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1277 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1278 pub is_usable: bool,
1279 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1280 pub is_public: bool,
1283 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1284 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1285 /// states for more.
1286 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1287 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1288 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1289 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1290 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1291 ParameterError(APIError),
1292 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1293 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1294 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1295 /// payment in full.
1297 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1299 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1300 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1301 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1302 /// paths than the ones selected).
1303 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1304 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1305 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1306 /// in over-/re-payment.
1308 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1309 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1310 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1312 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1313 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1314 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1315 /// with the latest update_id.
1317 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1318 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1319 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1320 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1321 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1322 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1323 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1324 payment_id: PaymentId,
1328 macro_rules! handle_error {
1329 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1332 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1333 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1335 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1336 // entering the macro.
1337 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1338 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1341 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1343 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1344 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1345 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1346 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1350 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1351 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1352 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1353 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1358 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1359 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1361 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1362 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1363 action: err.action.clone()
1367 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1368 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1371 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1378 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1379 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1382 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1383 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1385 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1386 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1388 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1389 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1390 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1391 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1393 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1394 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1395 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1397 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1398 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1399 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1400 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1402 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1403 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1404 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1410 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1411 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1415 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1417 $entry.remove_entry();
1425 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1426 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1430 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1432 $entry.remove_entry();
1440 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1441 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1443 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1444 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1445 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1452 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1453 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1454 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1456 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1458 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1459 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1460 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1461 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1463 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1464 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1465 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1466 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1467 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1468 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1469 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1470 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1471 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1472 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1473 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1476 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1477 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1478 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1479 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1480 match $action_type {
1481 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1482 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1484 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1485 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1487 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1488 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1489 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1490 if !$resend_commitment {
1491 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1494 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1496 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1497 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1501 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1502 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1504 $entry.remove_entry();
1508 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1509 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1513 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1514 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1515 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1517 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1518 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1522 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1523 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1524 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1525 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1526 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1529 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1534 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1535 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1536 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1537 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1538 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1539 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1541 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1542 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1544 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1545 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1546 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1547 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1550 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1551 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1552 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1553 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1554 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1555 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1556 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1557 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1558 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1559 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1560 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1561 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1564 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1565 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1566 // before it should be allowed to.
1567 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1568 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1569 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1572 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1573 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1574 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1575 msg: announcement_sigs,
1578 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1581 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1582 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1583 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1584 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1585 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1586 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1587 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1588 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1589 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1590 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1591 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1592 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1593 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1594 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1595 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1596 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1597 let mut order = $order;
1599 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1601 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1605 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1606 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1607 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1608 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1613 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1614 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1615 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1617 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1622 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1626 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1631 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1632 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1633 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1638 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1639 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1640 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1641 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1642 assert!(res.is_ok());
1645 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1649 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1650 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1651 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1653 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1655 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1656 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1661 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1662 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1663 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1664 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1668 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1670 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1671 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1673 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1675 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1677 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1678 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1679 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1680 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1681 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1682 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1683 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1684 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1686 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1687 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1688 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1692 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1694 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1695 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1696 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1697 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1698 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1699 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1701 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1702 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1704 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1705 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1708 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1710 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1711 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1713 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1715 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1716 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1717 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1718 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1726 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1727 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1728 &self.default_configuration
1731 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1733 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1734 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1735 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1736 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1737 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1740 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1741 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1743 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1744 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1745 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1747 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1748 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1749 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1750 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1751 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1752 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1754 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1755 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1756 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1757 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1758 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1759 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1764 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1765 Some(peer_state) => {
1766 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1767 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1768 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1769 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1770 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1772 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1775 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1778 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1779 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1781 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1782 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1785 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1788 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1793 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1794 node_id: their_network_key,
1797 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1800 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 let mut res = Vec::new();
1803 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1804 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1805 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1806 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1807 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1808 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1809 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1810 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1811 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1812 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1813 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1814 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1815 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1816 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1818 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1819 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1820 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1821 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1823 inbound_capacity_msat,
1824 outbound_capacity_msat,
1825 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1826 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1827 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1828 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1829 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1830 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1831 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1836 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1837 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1838 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1844 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1845 /// more information.
1846 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1847 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1850 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1851 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1853 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1854 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1856 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1857 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1858 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1859 // really wanted anyway.
1860 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1863 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1864 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1865 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1866 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1867 Some(transaction) => {
1868 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1872 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1873 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1874 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1875 reason: closure_reason
1879 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1882 let counterparty_node_id;
1883 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1884 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1885 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1886 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1889 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1890 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1891 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1892 Some(peer_state) => {
1893 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1894 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1895 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1897 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1899 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1901 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1902 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1903 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1904 let (result, is_permanent) =
1905 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1907 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1914 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1918 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1919 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1920 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1921 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1925 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1933 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1934 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1937 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1941 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1942 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1943 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1945 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1946 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1948 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1949 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1950 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1951 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1953 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1955 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1956 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1957 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1958 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1959 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1962 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1963 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1964 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1966 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1967 /// the channel being closed or not:
1968 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1969 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1970 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1971 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1972 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1973 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1974 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1976 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1978 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1979 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1980 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1981 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1982 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1986 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1987 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1988 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1989 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1990 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1992 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1993 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1994 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1995 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1996 // ignore the result here.
1997 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2001 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2002 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2003 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2007 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2008 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2009 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2013 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2014 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2016 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2017 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2018 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2021 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2023 chan.remove_entry().1
2025 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2028 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2029 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2030 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2031 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2032 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2037 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2040 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2041 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2042 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2043 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2044 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2045 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2046 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2050 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2060 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2061 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2062 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2063 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2064 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2068 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2069 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2070 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2072 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2073 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2074 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2075 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2076 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2077 failure_code: $err_code,
2078 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2083 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2084 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2087 let shared_secret = {
2088 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2089 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2092 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2094 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2095 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2096 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2097 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2098 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2099 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2100 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2101 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2104 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2105 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2106 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2107 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2108 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2111 let mut channel_state = None;
2112 macro_rules! return_err {
2113 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2115 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2116 if channel_state.is_none() {
2117 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2119 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2120 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2121 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2122 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2123 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2128 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2129 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2130 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2131 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2133 let error_code = match err {
2134 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2135 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2136 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2137 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2138 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2140 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2143 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2144 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2145 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2152 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2155 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2156 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2157 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2158 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2159 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2160 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2161 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2162 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2163 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2164 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2165 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2166 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2170 // final_expiry_too_soon
2171 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2172 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2173 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2174 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2175 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2176 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2177 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2179 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2180 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2181 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2183 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2184 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2185 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2188 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2189 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2190 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2191 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2192 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2193 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2194 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2195 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2197 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2199 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2200 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2201 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2202 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2203 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2204 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2205 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2206 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2207 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2210 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2212 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2215 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2220 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2221 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2222 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2223 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2225 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2227 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2228 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2229 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2230 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2233 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2234 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2235 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2237 // Check two things:
2238 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2239 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2240 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2242 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2244 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2245 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2246 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2248 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2250 let blinding_factor = {
2251 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2252 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2253 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2254 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2257 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2259 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2261 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2264 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2265 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2268 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2269 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2270 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2271 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2272 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2276 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2277 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2278 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2281 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2282 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2283 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2284 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2288 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2289 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2290 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2291 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2292 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2293 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2294 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2295 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2296 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2297 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2298 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2300 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2303 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2305 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2306 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2307 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2308 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2309 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2313 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2314 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2315 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2316 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2317 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2318 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2320 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2321 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2323 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2324 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2325 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2326 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2327 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2329 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2330 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2332 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2333 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2334 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2335 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2336 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2337 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2339 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2340 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2342 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2343 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2344 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2345 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2346 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2347 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2348 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2349 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2350 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2351 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2357 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2358 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2359 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2360 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2362 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2363 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2365 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2366 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2367 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2369 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2371 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2376 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2379 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2380 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2381 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2383 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2384 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2385 if !chan.should_announce() {
2386 return Err(LightningError {
2387 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2388 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2392 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2395 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2396 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2397 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2398 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2399 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2400 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2402 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2403 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2407 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2409 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2410 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2412 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2413 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2414 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2415 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2416 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2417 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2418 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2419 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2422 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2423 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2425 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2431 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2432 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2434 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2435 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2436 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2438 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2439 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2440 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2441 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2442 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2444 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2448 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2449 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2451 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2452 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2453 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2454 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2455 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2456 err: "Payment already completed"
2461 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2462 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2463 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2466 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2468 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2469 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2470 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2471 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2472 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2473 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2474 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2475 total_msat: total_value,
2477 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2481 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2482 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2484 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2485 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2487 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2488 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2490 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2491 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2493 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2494 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2496 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2497 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2498 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2499 channel_state, chan)
2501 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2502 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2503 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2504 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2505 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2506 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2507 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2508 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2509 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2510 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2512 insert_outbound_payment!();
2514 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2516 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2517 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2518 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2519 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2520 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2521 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2527 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2529 } else { unreachable!(); }
2533 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2534 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2536 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2541 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2543 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2544 /// fields for more info.
2546 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2547 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2548 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2549 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2550 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2551 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2553 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2555 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2556 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2557 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2559 /// In general, a path may raise:
2560 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2561 /// node public key) is specified.
2562 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2563 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2565 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2566 /// relevant updates.
2568 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2569 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2570 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2572 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2573 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2574 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2575 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2577 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2578 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2579 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2580 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2581 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2584 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2585 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2586 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2588 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2589 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2590 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2591 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2592 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2594 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2595 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2597 let mut total_value = 0;
2598 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2599 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2600 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2601 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2602 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2603 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2604 continue 'path_check;
2606 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2607 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2608 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2609 continue 'path_check;
2612 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2613 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2615 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2616 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2618 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2619 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2620 total_value = amt_msat;
2623 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2624 let mut results = Vec::new();
2625 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2626 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2628 let mut has_ok = false;
2629 let mut has_err = false;
2630 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2631 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2632 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2633 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2634 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2635 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2636 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2640 } else if res.is_err() {
2641 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2642 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2645 if has_err && has_ok {
2646 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2649 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2650 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2651 Some(RouteParameters {
2652 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2653 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2654 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2660 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2661 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2662 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2663 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2669 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2671 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2672 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2673 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2674 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2675 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2677 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2678 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2679 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2680 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2681 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2682 if path.len() == 0 {
2683 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2684 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2689 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2690 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2691 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2693 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2694 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2696 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2697 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2698 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2699 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2702 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2704 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2705 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2706 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2709 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2710 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2711 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2714 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2715 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2716 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2721 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2722 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2726 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2729 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2731 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2732 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2733 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2734 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2736 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2737 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2738 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2740 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2741 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2742 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2743 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2746 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2747 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2748 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2749 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2750 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2752 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2760 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2761 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2762 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2763 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2764 /// never reach the recipient.
2766 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2768 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2769 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2771 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2773 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2774 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2775 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2777 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2779 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2780 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2781 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2786 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2787 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2788 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2789 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2791 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2793 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2795 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2796 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2797 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2798 } else { unreachable!(); })
2801 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2803 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2804 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2807 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2808 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2813 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2814 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2815 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2818 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2820 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2830 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2831 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2832 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2836 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2838 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2839 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2841 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2842 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2844 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2845 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2846 /// keys per-channel).
2848 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2849 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2850 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2852 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2853 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2854 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2856 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2857 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2858 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2861 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2862 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2864 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2868 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2869 let mut output_index = None;
2870 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2871 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2872 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2873 if output_index.is_some() {
2874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2875 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2878 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2879 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2880 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2883 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2886 if output_index.is_none() {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2891 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2895 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2896 if !chan.should_announce() {
2897 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2901 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2903 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2905 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2906 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2908 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2909 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2910 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2911 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2912 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2917 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2918 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2919 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2921 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2924 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2925 // smaller than 500:
2926 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2928 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2929 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2930 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2931 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2932 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2933 /// our network addresses.
2935 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2936 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2938 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2939 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2940 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2941 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2943 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2945 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2946 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2949 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2950 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2953 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2954 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2955 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2957 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2958 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2959 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2960 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2961 rgb, alias, addresses,
2962 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2963 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2965 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2966 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2968 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2971 let mut announced_chans = false;
2972 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2973 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2974 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2976 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2981 announced_chans = true;
2983 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2984 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2985 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2989 if announced_chans {
2990 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2991 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2992 signature: node_announce_sig,
2993 contents: announcement
2999 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3001 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3002 /// Will likely generate further events.
3003 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3006 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3007 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3008 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3010 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3013 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3014 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3015 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3016 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3018 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
3019 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3020 match forward_info {
3021 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3022 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3023 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3024 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3025 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3026 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3027 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3029 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3030 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3033 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3034 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3035 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3036 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3037 // problem, not ours.
3044 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3045 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3046 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3047 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3048 match forward_info {
3049 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3050 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3052 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3053 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3055 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3056 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3057 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3058 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3059 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3061 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3063 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3066 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3068 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3069 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3070 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3076 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3078 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3079 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3080 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3081 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3082 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3083 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3084 // this channel currently :/.
3090 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3091 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3093 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3095 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3100 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3102 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3103 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3104 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3107 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3109 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3110 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3111 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3112 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3113 // messages when we can.
3114 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3115 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3116 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3123 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3124 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3127 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3128 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3129 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3130 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3131 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3132 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3134 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3135 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3136 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3137 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3138 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3140 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3141 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3143 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3145 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3149 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3150 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3153 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3154 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3155 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3156 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3157 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3158 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3159 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3160 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3161 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3163 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3171 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3172 match forward_info {
3173 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3174 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3175 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3176 let (cltv_expiry, total_msat, onion_payload) = match routing {
3177 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3178 (incoming_cltv_expiry, payment_data.total_msat, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
3179 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3180 (incoming_cltv_expiry, amt_to_forward, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
3182 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3185 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3186 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3187 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3188 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3189 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3190 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3192 value: amt_to_forward,
3198 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3200 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3201 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3202 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3204 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3205 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3206 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3207 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3208 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3210 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3215 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3216 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3217 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3218 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3219 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3220 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3221 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3223 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3227 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3228 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3229 total_value += htlc.value;
3230 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3231 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
3232 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3233 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3234 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3235 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3237 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3239 _ => unreachable!(),
3242 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3244 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, claimable_htlc.total_msat);
3245 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3248 } else if total_value == claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3249 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3251 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3252 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3253 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3257 payment_received_generated = true;
3259 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3260 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3263 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3264 payment_received_generated
3268 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3269 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3270 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3271 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3272 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3273 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3274 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3275 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3277 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3278 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3279 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3280 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3282 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3286 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3287 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3288 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3290 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3291 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3293 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3294 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3296 amt: amt_to_forward,
3297 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3302 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3310 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3313 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3317 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3319 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3320 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3322 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3323 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3325 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3326 if payment_received_generated {
3327 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3333 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3334 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3342 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3343 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3346 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3347 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3350 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3351 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3352 events.append(&mut new_events);
3355 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3357 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3358 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3360 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3361 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3362 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3363 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3364 if background_events.is_empty() {
3368 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3370 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3371 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3372 // monitor updating completing.
3373 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3380 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3381 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3382 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3383 self.process_background_events();
3386 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3387 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3388 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3389 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3391 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3392 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3394 if !chan.is_live() {
3395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3396 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3397 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3400 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3402 let mut retain_channel = true;
3403 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3406 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3407 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3411 let ret_err = match res {
3412 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3413 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3414 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3415 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3419 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3420 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3421 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3422 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3423 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3424 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3425 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3435 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3439 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3440 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3441 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3442 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3443 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3444 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3445 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3447 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3449 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3453 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3454 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3455 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3456 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3457 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3459 handle_errors.push(err);
3469 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3471 /// This currently includes:
3472 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3473 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3474 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3477 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3478 /// estimate fetches.
3479 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3480 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3481 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3482 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3484 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3486 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3488 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3490 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3491 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3492 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3493 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3494 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3495 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3497 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3499 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3501 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3502 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3503 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3504 if needs_close { return false; }
3507 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3508 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3509 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3510 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3511 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3512 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3513 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3514 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3518 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3519 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3521 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3522 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3527 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3528 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3537 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3538 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3544 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3545 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3546 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3547 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3548 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3549 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3552 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3553 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3554 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3555 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3556 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3557 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3558 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3559 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3560 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3561 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3562 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3568 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3569 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3570 // be surfaced to the user.
3571 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3572 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3574 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3575 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3576 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3578 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3579 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3581 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3586 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3588 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3590 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3591 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3592 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3593 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3594 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3595 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3596 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3597 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3598 Some(RouteParameters {
3599 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3600 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3601 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3604 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3605 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3606 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3608 rejected_by_dest: false,
3609 network_update: None,
3610 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3612 short_channel_id: None,
3619 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3620 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3622 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3628 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3635 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3636 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3637 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3638 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3639 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3640 /// still-available channels.
3641 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3642 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3643 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3644 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3647 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3648 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3649 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3651 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3652 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3653 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3654 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3655 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3656 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3657 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3658 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3662 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3666 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3667 all_paths_failed = true;
3668 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3669 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3671 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3680 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3681 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3682 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3683 Some(RouteParameters {
3684 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3685 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3686 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3691 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3692 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3694 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3696 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3697 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3698 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3699 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3700 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3701 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3702 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3703 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3710 error_code: onion_error_code,
3712 error_data: onion_error_data
3715 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3721 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3722 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3723 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3724 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3726 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3727 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3728 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3729 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3730 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3731 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3732 network_update: None,
3735 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3738 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3740 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3745 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3746 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3748 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3749 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3750 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3751 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3752 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3753 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3755 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3757 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3761 let mut forward_event = None;
3762 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3763 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3765 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3767 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3770 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3773 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3774 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3775 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3776 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3777 time_forwardable: time
3784 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3785 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3787 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3788 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3789 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3790 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3792 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3793 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3795 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3796 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3797 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3798 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3799 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3800 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3804 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3805 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3806 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3807 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3809 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3810 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3811 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3812 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3814 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3815 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3816 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3817 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3818 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3820 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3821 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3822 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3828 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3829 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3830 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3832 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3833 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3834 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3835 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3836 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3837 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3838 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3840 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3841 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3842 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3843 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3844 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3845 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3846 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3847 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3849 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3850 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3851 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3852 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3853 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3854 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3856 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3861 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3862 // which were generated.
3863 channel_state.take();
3865 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3866 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3867 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3874 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3875 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3876 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3877 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3878 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3880 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3884 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3885 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3886 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3887 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3888 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3889 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3890 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3891 payment_preimage, e);
3892 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3893 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3894 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3895 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3898 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3899 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3900 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3901 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3902 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3903 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3904 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3905 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3906 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3907 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3913 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3915 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3918 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3919 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3920 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3921 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3922 payment_preimage, e);
3924 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3925 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3927 chan.remove_entry();
3929 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3932 } else { unreachable!(); }
3935 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3936 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3937 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3938 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3939 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3940 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3941 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3942 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3943 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3944 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3945 pending_events.push(
3946 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3948 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3953 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3961 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3963 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3964 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3965 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3966 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3967 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3968 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3969 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3970 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3971 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3972 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3973 pending_events.push(
3974 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3975 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3981 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3985 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3986 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3987 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3989 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3990 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3991 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3992 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3993 pending_events.push(
3994 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4002 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4007 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4010 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4011 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4012 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4013 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4014 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4015 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4016 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4019 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4020 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4021 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4022 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4023 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4026 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4027 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4028 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4029 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4030 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4031 payment_preimage, e);
4033 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4034 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4035 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4036 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4039 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4040 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4041 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4042 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4046 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4047 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4048 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4051 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4052 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4054 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4062 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4063 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4064 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4067 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4070 let chan_restoration_res;
4071 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4072 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4073 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4074 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4078 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4082 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4083 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4084 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4085 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4086 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4087 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4088 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4089 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4090 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4093 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4094 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4097 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4099 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4100 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4101 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4102 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4106 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4107 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4111 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4115 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4116 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4117 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4118 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4119 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4120 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4122 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4123 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4124 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4125 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4127 entry.insert(channel);
4133 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4134 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4135 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4139 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4142 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4143 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4148 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4149 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4150 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4151 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4153 user_channel_id: user_id,
4158 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4159 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4160 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4161 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4162 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4163 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4165 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4168 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4173 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4174 // lock before watch_channel
4175 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4177 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4178 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4179 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4180 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4181 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4182 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4183 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4184 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4185 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4186 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4189 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4190 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4191 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4192 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4193 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4194 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4198 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4202 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4206 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4215 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4217 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4218 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4222 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4225 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4226 Ok(update) => update,
4227 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4229 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4230 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4231 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4232 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4233 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4234 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4235 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4236 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4246 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4247 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4251 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4252 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4253 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4254 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4256 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4257 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4259 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4260 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4262 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4263 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4264 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4265 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4266 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4267 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4268 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4269 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4270 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4271 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4272 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4273 msg: announcement_sigs,
4275 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4276 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4277 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4278 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4287 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4288 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4289 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4293 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4294 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4295 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4296 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4299 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4300 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4301 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4302 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4305 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4306 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4308 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4309 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4310 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4311 let (result, is_permanent) =
4312 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4314 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4320 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4321 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4322 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4332 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4333 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4336 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4340 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4341 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4342 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4343 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4344 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4346 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4347 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4349 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4350 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4352 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4357 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4358 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4359 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4360 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4361 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4362 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4363 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4365 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4366 } else { (tx, None) }
4368 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4371 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4372 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4373 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4375 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4376 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4377 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4378 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4382 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4387 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4388 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4389 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4390 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4392 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4393 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4394 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4395 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4397 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4398 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4400 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4401 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4402 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4403 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4406 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4407 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4408 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4409 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4410 match pending_forward_info {
4411 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4412 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4413 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4414 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4415 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4416 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4417 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4418 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4422 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4423 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4424 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4425 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4426 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4427 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4428 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4429 // no problem just calling this
4430 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4431 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4434 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4436 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4437 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4438 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4441 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4443 _ => pending_forward_info
4446 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4453 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4454 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4455 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4456 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4457 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4459 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4460 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4462 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4467 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4471 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4472 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4474 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4476 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4479 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4486 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4487 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4488 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4489 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4491 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4492 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4494 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4495 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4496 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4498 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4505 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4506 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4507 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4508 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4510 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4513 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4514 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4515 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4516 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4517 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4518 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4519 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4524 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4525 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4528 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4529 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4531 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4532 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4533 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4534 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4535 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4536 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4537 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4538 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4540 commitment_signed: msg,
4546 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4551 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4552 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4553 let mut forward_event = None;
4554 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4555 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4556 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4557 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4559 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4560 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4561 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4562 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4563 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4566 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4567 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4570 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4571 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4576 match forward_event {
4578 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4579 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4580 time_forwardable: time
4588 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4589 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4591 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4592 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4593 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4594 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4595 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4596 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4598 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4599 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4600 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4601 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4602 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4603 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4604 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4605 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4606 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4607 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4608 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4610 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4611 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4612 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4613 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4614 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4616 } else { unreachable!(); }
4619 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4620 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4621 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4625 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4626 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4627 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4628 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4629 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4634 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4636 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4637 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4639 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4640 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4642 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4643 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4650 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4651 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4652 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4653 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4655 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4658 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4665 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4666 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4667 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4669 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4671 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4674 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4678 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4679 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4680 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4681 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4682 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4685 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4690 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4691 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4692 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4693 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4694 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4695 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4697 // It's not a local channel
4698 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4703 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4704 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4705 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4706 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4707 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4708 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4712 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4713 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4714 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4715 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4717 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4722 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4725 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4726 let chan_restoration_res;
4727 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4728 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4729 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4733 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4734 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4736 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4737 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4738 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4739 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4740 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4741 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4742 let mut channel_update = None;
4743 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4744 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4745 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4748 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4749 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4750 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4751 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4752 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4753 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4754 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4757 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4758 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4759 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4762 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4767 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4768 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4770 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4771 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4776 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4777 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4778 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4779 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4780 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4781 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4782 match monitor_event {
4783 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4784 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4785 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4786 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4788 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4789 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4792 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4793 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4794 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4796 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4797 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4798 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4799 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4800 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4801 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4803 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4804 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4805 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4809 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4810 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4812 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4814 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4816 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4817 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4818 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4823 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4824 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4829 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4830 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4833 has_pending_monitor_events
4836 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4837 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4838 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4839 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4840 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4841 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4844 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4845 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4846 /// update was applied.
4848 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4849 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4850 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4851 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4852 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4853 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4854 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4855 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4857 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4858 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4859 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4860 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4861 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4863 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4864 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4865 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4866 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4867 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4869 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4870 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4871 has_monitor_update = true;
4872 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4873 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4874 if close_channel { return false; }
4876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4877 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4878 updates: commitment_update,
4885 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4886 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4887 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4894 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4895 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4896 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4899 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4900 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4906 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4907 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4908 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4909 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4910 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4911 let mut has_update = false;
4913 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4915 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4916 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4917 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4919 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4920 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4921 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4922 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4924 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4925 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4928 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4929 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4930 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4931 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4932 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4935 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4936 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4941 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4943 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4944 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4950 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4951 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4958 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4959 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4965 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4966 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4968 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4969 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4970 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4971 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4972 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4973 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4974 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4975 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4976 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4977 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4978 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4979 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4980 assert!(should_broadcast);
4981 } else { unreachable!(); }
4982 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4984 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4988 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4989 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4991 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
4995 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4998 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4999 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5001 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5002 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5003 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5004 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5005 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5006 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5007 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5008 // never fail a payment too early.
5009 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5011 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5019 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5022 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5023 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5025 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5026 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5027 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5029 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5031 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5032 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5036 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5037 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5039 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5041 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5042 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5043 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5044 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5045 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5046 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5049 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5050 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5053 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5055 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5057 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5058 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5059 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5060 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5061 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5064 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5065 /// stored external to LDK.
5067 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5068 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5069 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5071 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5072 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5075 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5076 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5077 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5078 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5080 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5081 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5082 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5083 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5084 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5086 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5087 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5088 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5089 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5090 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5092 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5094 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5095 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5097 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5098 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5102 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5103 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5105 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5107 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5108 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5109 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5110 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5113 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5114 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5117 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5119 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5121 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5122 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5125 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5126 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5128 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5129 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5130 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5133 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5134 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5135 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5136 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5137 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5142 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5143 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5147 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5148 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5152 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5153 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5155 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5159 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5160 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5161 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5162 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5164 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5165 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5166 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5167 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5170 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5171 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5173 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5174 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5177 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5178 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5179 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5181 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5182 events.replace(pending_events);
5191 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5193 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5194 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5195 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5199 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5201 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5202 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5204 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5205 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5206 /// restarting from an old state.
5207 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5208 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5209 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5211 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5212 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5213 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5214 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5217 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5218 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5219 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5222 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5223 handler.handle_event(&event);
5231 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5233 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5234 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5235 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5239 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5241 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5242 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5243 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5244 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5245 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5248 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5249 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5250 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5253 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5255 let new_height = height - 1;
5257 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5258 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5259 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5260 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5261 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5262 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5265 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5269 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5271 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5273 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5274 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5277 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5278 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5279 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5280 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5282 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5283 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5286 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5289 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5290 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5291 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5292 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5294 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5295 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5299 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5301 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5303 macro_rules! max_time {
5304 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5306 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5307 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5308 // having an explicit local time source.
5309 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5310 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5311 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5312 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5313 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5319 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5320 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5321 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5322 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5323 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5326 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5327 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5328 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5329 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5330 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5331 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5332 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5333 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5334 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5342 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5343 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5344 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5345 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5346 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5347 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5353 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5354 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5355 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5356 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5357 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5358 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5359 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5360 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5365 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5367 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5368 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5369 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5373 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5374 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5376 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5377 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5378 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5379 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5380 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5382 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5383 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5385 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5386 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5387 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5388 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5389 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5390 let res = f(channel);
5391 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5392 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5393 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5394 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5395 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5399 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5401 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5402 msg: funding_locked,
5404 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5407 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5408 msg: announcement_sigs,
5410 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5413 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5414 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5419 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5421 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5422 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5423 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5425 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5426 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5427 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5428 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5433 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5434 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5436 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5438 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5439 data: reason_message,
5447 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5448 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5449 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5450 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5451 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5452 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5453 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5454 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5455 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5456 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5457 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5458 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5459 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5464 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5469 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5471 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5472 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5476 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5477 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5478 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5481 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5482 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5483 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5484 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5487 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5488 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5490 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5491 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5494 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5495 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5496 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5497 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5498 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5502 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5503 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5504 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5505 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5509 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5510 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5511 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5513 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5514 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5517 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5519 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5522 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5527 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5532 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5537 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5542 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5544 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5547 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5552 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5557 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5562 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5567 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5572 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5577 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5582 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5587 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5589 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5592 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5593 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5594 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5597 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5602 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5607 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5609 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5610 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5612 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5614 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5615 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5616 if no_connection_possible {
5617 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5618 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5619 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5620 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5621 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5623 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5624 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5625 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5629 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5636 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5637 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5638 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5639 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5640 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5641 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5642 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5644 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5647 no_channels_remain = false;
5653 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5660 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5668 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5670 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5677 if no_channels_remain {
5678 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5681 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5682 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5686 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5687 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5693 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5695 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5696 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5700 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5705 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5707 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5708 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5709 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5710 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5711 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5712 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5713 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5717 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5718 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5719 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5725 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5728 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5729 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5731 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5732 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5733 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5734 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5735 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5739 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5740 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5745 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5746 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5747 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5748 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5749 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5750 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5753 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5756 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5762 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5763 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5768 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5769 let result = *guard;
5777 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5778 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5779 let current_time = Instant::now();
5781 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5782 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5787 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5788 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5789 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5790 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5791 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5793 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5794 let result = *guard;
5795 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5799 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5800 None => return result,
5806 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5808 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5809 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5810 *persistence_lock = true;
5811 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5816 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5817 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5821 (0, onion_packet, required),
5822 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5825 (0, payment_data, required),
5826 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5828 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5829 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5830 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5835 (0, routing, required),
5836 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5837 (4, payment_hash, required),
5838 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5839 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5843 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5844 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5846 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5848 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5849 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5850 reason.write(writer)?;
5852 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5853 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5856 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5857 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5858 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5859 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5866 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5867 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5868 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5871 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5872 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5873 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5874 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5878 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5879 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5880 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5881 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5882 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5885 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5886 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5887 // messages contained in the variants.
5888 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5889 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5890 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5892 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5893 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5894 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5895 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5896 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5899 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5900 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5901 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5902 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5903 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5905 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5910 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5915 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5916 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5917 (2, outpoint, required),
5918 (4, htlc_id, required),
5919 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5922 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5923 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5924 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5925 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5928 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5929 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5930 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5932 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5933 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
5934 (1, self.total_msat, required),
5935 (2, self.value, required),
5936 (4, payment_data, option),
5937 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5938 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5944 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5945 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5946 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5948 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5949 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5950 let mut total_msat = None;
5951 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5952 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5953 (0, prev_hop, required),
5954 (1, total_msat, option),
5955 (2, value, required),
5956 (4, payment_data, option),
5957 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5958 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5960 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5962 if payment_data.is_some() {
5963 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5965 if total_msat.is_none() {
5966 total_msat = Some(value);
5968 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5971 if payment_data.is_none() {
5972 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5974 if total_msat.is_none() {
5975 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
5977 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5981 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5983 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
5990 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5991 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5992 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5995 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5996 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5997 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5998 let mut payment_id = None;
5999 let mut payment_secret = None;
6000 let mut payment_params = None;
6001 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6002 (0, session_priv, required),
6003 (1, payment_id, option),
6004 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6005 (3, payment_secret, option),
6006 (4, path, vec_type),
6007 (5, payment_params, option),
6009 if payment_id.is_none() {
6010 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6012 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6014 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6015 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6016 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6017 path: path.unwrap(),
6018 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6023 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6024 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6029 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6030 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6032 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6034 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6035 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6036 (0, session_priv, required),
6037 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6038 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6039 (3, payment_secret, option),
6040 (4, path, vec_type),
6041 (5, payment_params, option),
6044 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6046 field.write(writer)?;
6053 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6054 (0, LightningError) => {
6058 (0, failure_code, required),
6059 (2, data, vec_type),
6063 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6065 (0, forward_info, required),
6066 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6067 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6068 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6071 (0, htlc_id, required),
6072 (2, err_packet, required),
6076 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6077 (0, payment_secret, required),
6078 (2, expiry_time, required),
6079 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6080 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6081 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6084 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6086 (0, session_privs, required),
6089 (0, session_privs, required),
6090 (1, payment_hash, option),
6093 (0, session_privs, required),
6094 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6095 (2, payment_hash, required),
6096 (4, payment_secret, option),
6097 (6, total_msat, required),
6098 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6099 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6102 (0, session_privs, required),
6103 (2, payment_hash, required),
6107 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6108 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6109 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6110 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6111 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6114 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6115 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6117 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6119 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6121 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6122 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6123 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6126 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6127 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6128 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6129 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6130 unfunded_channels += 1;
6133 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6134 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6135 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6136 channel.write(writer)?;
6140 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6141 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6142 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6143 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6144 for forward in pending_forwards {
6145 forward.write(writer)?;
6149 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6150 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6151 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6152 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6153 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6154 htlc.write(writer)?;
6158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6159 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6160 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6161 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6162 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6163 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6166 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6167 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6168 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6169 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6170 for event in events.iter() {
6171 event.write(writer)?;
6174 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6175 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6176 for event in background_events.iter() {
6178 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6180 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6181 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6186 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6187 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6189 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6190 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6191 hash.write(writer)?;
6192 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6195 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6196 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6197 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6198 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6199 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6202 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6203 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6205 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6206 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6207 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6208 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6211 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6212 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6216 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6217 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6218 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6220 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6221 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6222 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6227 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6228 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6229 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6230 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6237 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6239 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6241 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6242 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6243 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6244 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6245 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6246 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6247 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6248 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6249 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6250 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6251 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6252 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6253 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6255 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6256 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6258 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6259 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6261 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6262 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6263 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6264 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6265 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6266 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6268 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6269 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6270 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6271 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6272 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6276 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6277 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6279 pub keys_manager: K,
6281 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6283 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6284 pub fee_estimator: F,
6285 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6287 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6288 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6289 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6290 pub chain_monitor: M,
6292 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6293 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6294 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6295 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6296 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6297 /// deserialization.
6299 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6300 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6301 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6303 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6304 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6306 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6307 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6308 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6309 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6311 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6314 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6315 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6318 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6319 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6320 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6321 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6322 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6323 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6326 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6327 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6328 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6329 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6330 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6332 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6333 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6338 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6339 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6340 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6341 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6342 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6343 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6344 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6345 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6348 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6349 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6350 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6354 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6355 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6356 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6357 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6358 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6359 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6362 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6363 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6365 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6367 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6369 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6371 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6372 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6373 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6374 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6375 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6376 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6377 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6378 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6379 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6380 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6381 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6382 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6383 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6384 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6385 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6386 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6387 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6388 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6389 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6390 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6391 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6392 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6394 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6395 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6396 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6397 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6398 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6399 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6400 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6401 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6402 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6403 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6404 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6405 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6406 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6407 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6408 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6409 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6412 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6413 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6414 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6416 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6419 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6420 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6421 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6422 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6423 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6428 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6429 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6430 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6431 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6435 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6436 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6437 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6438 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6439 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6442 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6443 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6445 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6448 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6449 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6450 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6451 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6452 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6454 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6455 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6457 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6460 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6462 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6463 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let peer_state = PeerState {
6465 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6467 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6470 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6472 for _ in 0..event_count {
6473 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6474 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6478 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6479 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6480 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6481 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6482 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6483 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6484 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6485 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6489 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6491 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6492 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6493 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6498 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6499 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6503 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6504 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6509 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6510 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6511 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6512 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6513 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6515 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6517 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6518 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6522 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6523 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6524 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6525 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6526 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6527 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6528 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6529 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6532 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6533 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6534 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6535 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6536 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6537 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6539 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6541 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6542 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6543 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6544 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6545 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6546 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6547 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6549 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6550 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6551 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6552 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6553 if path.is_empty() {
6554 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6557 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6558 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6559 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6560 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6562 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6563 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6564 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6566 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6567 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6568 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6569 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6570 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6572 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6573 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6574 total_msat: path_amt,
6575 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6577 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6578 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6587 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6588 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6590 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6591 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6594 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret());
6595 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6596 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6597 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6602 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6603 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6604 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6606 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6607 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6608 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6610 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6612 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6617 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6619 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6620 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6621 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6623 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6627 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6628 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6630 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6632 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6633 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6634 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6635 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6637 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6638 logger: args.logger,
6639 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6642 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6643 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6646 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6647 //connection or two.
6649 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6655 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6656 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6657 use core::time::Duration;
6658 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6659 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6660 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6661 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6662 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6663 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6665 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6666 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6667 use util::errors::APIError;
6668 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6669 use util::test_utils;
6671 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6673 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6674 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6676 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6679 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6680 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6682 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6683 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6684 thread::spawn(move || {
6686 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6687 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6688 *persistence_lock = true;
6691 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6697 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6698 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6700 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6703 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6708 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6710 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6713 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6720 fn test_notify_limits() {
6721 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6722 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6726 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6729 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6730 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6731 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6732 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6734 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6736 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6737 // to connect messages with new values
6738 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6739 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6740 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6741 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6743 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6744 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6745 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6746 // ... but the last node should not.
6747 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6748 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6749 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6750 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6752 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6753 // about the channel.
6754 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6755 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6756 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6758 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6760 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6761 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6762 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6763 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6764 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6765 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6767 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6768 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6769 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6771 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6772 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6773 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6774 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6775 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6776 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6778 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6779 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6780 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6781 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6782 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6783 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6784 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6785 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6787 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6788 // the channel info has updated.
6789 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6790 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6791 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6792 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6793 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6794 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6798 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6799 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6805 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6807 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6808 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6809 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6810 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6811 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6812 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6813 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6815 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6816 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6817 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6819 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6820 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6822 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6823 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6824 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6825 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6826 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6828 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6830 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6832 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6834 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6835 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6836 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6837 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6838 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6839 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6840 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6842 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6843 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6846 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6847 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6849 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6850 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6851 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6852 // lightning messages manually.
6853 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6855 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6856 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6857 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6859 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6860 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6862 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6863 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6865 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6866 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6867 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6869 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6870 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6871 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6873 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6877 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6878 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6881 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6882 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6883 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6884 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6886 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6887 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6888 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6889 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6894 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6895 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6896 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6897 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6902 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6903 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6904 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6905 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6912 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6913 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6914 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6915 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6916 // fails as expected.
6917 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6918 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6919 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6920 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6921 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6922 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6924 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6925 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6926 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6928 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6929 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6930 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6931 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6932 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6934 let route = find_route(
6935 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6936 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6938 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6940 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6942 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6943 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6946 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6950 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6951 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6952 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6954 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6955 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6956 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6957 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6958 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6960 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6961 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6963 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6964 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6965 let route = find_route(
6966 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6967 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6969 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6973 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6974 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6975 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6977 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6978 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6979 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6983 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6984 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6991 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6992 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6993 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6994 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6995 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6996 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6997 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6999 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7001 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7006 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7007 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7008 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7009 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7010 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7011 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7012 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7014 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7015 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7016 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7017 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7019 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7020 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7021 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7022 final_value_msat: 10000,
7023 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7025 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7026 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7027 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7028 let route = find_route(
7029 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7030 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7033 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7034 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7035 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7038 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7039 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7040 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7041 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7042 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7043 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7046 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7050 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7051 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7057 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7058 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7059 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7060 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7062 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7063 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7064 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7065 final_value_msat: 10000,
7066 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7068 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7069 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7070 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7071 let route = find_route(
7072 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7073 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7076 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7077 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7078 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7079 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7082 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7083 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7084 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7085 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7086 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7087 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7090 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7094 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7098 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7100 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7101 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7102 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7103 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7105 // Marshall an MPP route.
7106 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7107 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7108 route.paths.push(path);
7109 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7110 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7111 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7112 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7113 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7114 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7116 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7117 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7118 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7119 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7124 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7125 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7131 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7132 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7134 total_msat: 100_000,
7137 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7138 // payment verification fails as expected.
7139 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7140 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7141 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7142 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7144 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7148 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7149 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7153 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7156 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7157 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7158 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7159 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7160 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7161 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7162 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7163 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7164 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7165 use util::test_utils;
7166 use util::config::UserConfig;
7167 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7169 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7170 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7171 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7173 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7177 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7178 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7179 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7180 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7181 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7182 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7183 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7188 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7189 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7192 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7193 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7194 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7196 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7197 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7199 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7200 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7202 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7203 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7205 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7206 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7207 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7208 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7209 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7211 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7213 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7215 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7216 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7217 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7218 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7219 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7221 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7223 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7225 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7226 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7227 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7228 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7229 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7232 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7233 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7234 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7236 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7237 } else { panic!(); }
7239 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7240 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7242 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7245 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7248 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7249 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7251 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7252 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7253 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7254 match msg_events[0] {
7255 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7256 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7257 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7261 match msg_events[1] {
7262 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7266 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7268 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7269 macro_rules! send_payment {
7270 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7271 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7272 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7273 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7274 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7275 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7276 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7278 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7279 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7281 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7282 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7284 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7285 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7286 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7287 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7288 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7289 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7290 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7291 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7293 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7294 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7295 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7297 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7298 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7299 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7300 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7301 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7303 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7306 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7307 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7308 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7309 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7311 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7316 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7317 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);