1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1228 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1229 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1230 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1231 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1232 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1233 /// as documented by those traits
1234 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1236 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1237 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1238 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1241 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1243 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1244 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1245 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1246 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1250 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1251 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1252 /// currently open channels.
1255 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1257 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1258 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1259 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1260 /// for details in channels {
1261 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1267 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1268 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1269 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1271 /// ## Opening Channels
1273 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1274 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1275 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1278 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1279 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1280 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1281 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1283 /// # trait Wallet {
1284 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1285 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1286 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1289 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1290 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1291 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1292 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1293 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1294 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1295 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1298 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1299 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1300 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1301 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1302 /// user_channel_id, ..
1304 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1305 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1306 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1308 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1309 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1311 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1312 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1315 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1316 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1318 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1319 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1322 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1323 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1324 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1332 /// ## Accepting Channels
1334 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1336 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1339 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1340 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1341 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1343 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1345 /// # unimplemented!()
1348 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1349 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1350 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1351 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1352 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1353 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1354 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1356 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1357 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1363 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1376 /// ## Closing Channels
1378 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1379 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1380 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1381 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1382 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1385 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1387 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1388 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1390 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1391 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1393 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1394 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1395 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1396 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1399 /// // On the event processing thread
1400 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1401 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1402 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1403 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1414 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1415 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1416 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1417 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1420 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1421 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1422 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1423 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1425 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1427 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1428 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1429 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1430 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1431 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1432 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1434 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1435 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1436 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1439 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1440 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1442 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1443 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1444 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1445 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1446 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1448 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1449 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1452 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1455 /// // On the event processing thread
1456 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1457 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1458 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1459 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1460 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1461 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1463 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1464 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1466 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1467 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1468 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1469 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1473 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1474 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1482 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1483 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1486 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1487 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1488 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1489 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1491 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1492 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1493 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1495 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1496 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1497 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1498 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1499 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1500 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1502 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1503 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1506 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1507 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1509 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1511 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1512 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1513 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1519 /// // On the event processing thread
1520 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1521 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1522 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1531 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1532 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1533 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1534 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1536 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1537 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1539 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1540 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1541 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1542 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1543 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1544 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1546 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1547 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1548 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1550 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1552 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1553 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1554 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1555 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1556 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1558 /// # DoS Mitigation
1560 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1561 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1562 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1563 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1565 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1566 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1567 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1571 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1572 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1573 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1574 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1575 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1577 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1578 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1579 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1580 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1581 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1582 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1583 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1584 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1585 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1586 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1587 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1588 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1589 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1590 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1591 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1592 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1593 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1594 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1595 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1596 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1597 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1598 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1599 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1600 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1601 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1602 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1603 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1604 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1605 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1606 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1607 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1608 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1609 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1610 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1613 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1614 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1615 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1616 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1617 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1621 // `pending_offers_messages`
1623 // `total_consistency_lock`
1625 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1627 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1629 // |__`per_peer_state`
1631 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1633 // |__`claimable_payments`
1635 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1639 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1641 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1643 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1647 // |__`pending_events`
1649 // |__`pending_background_events`
1651 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1653 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1655 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1656 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1657 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1658 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1662 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1663 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1664 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1670 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1672 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1674 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1675 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1677 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1678 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1679 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1680 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1682 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1683 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1685 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1686 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1687 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1688 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1689 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1690 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1691 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1692 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1694 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1696 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1697 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1699 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1701 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1702 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1703 /// and via the classic SCID.
1705 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1706 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1708 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1710 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1712 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1713 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1714 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1716 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1717 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1719 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1720 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1723 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1728 /// active channel list on load.
1730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1731 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1733 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1735 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1736 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1737 /// the handling of the events.
1739 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1740 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1743 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1744 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1745 /// would break backwards compatability.
1746 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1747 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1748 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1750 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1752 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1754 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1756 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1758 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1759 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1760 /// confirmation depth.
1762 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1763 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1764 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1766 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1768 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1770 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1772 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1774 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1776 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1777 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1778 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1780 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1781 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1783 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1784 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1785 /// keeping additional state.
1786 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1788 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1789 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1790 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1791 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1793 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1794 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1796 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1797 /// are currently open with that peer.
1799 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1800 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1803 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1806 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1807 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1808 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1809 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1811 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1812 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1813 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1814 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1815 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1817 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1818 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1820 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1821 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1822 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1823 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1824 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1826 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1827 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1829 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1830 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1831 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1832 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1833 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1835 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1839 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1840 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1841 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1842 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1843 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1844 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1845 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1846 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1847 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1848 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1849 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1851 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1852 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1853 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1855 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1857 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1858 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1860 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1864 signer_provider: SP,
1869 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1871 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1872 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1873 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1874 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1875 pub struct ChainParameters {
1876 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1877 pub network: Network,
1879 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1881 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1882 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1885 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1889 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1890 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1893 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1894 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1895 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1896 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1897 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1898 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1900 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1901 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1902 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1903 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1904 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1905 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1907 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1908 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1911 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1912 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1913 /// events to handle.
1915 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1916 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1918 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1919 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1922 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1923 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1924 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1925 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1927 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1928 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1929 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1930 should_persist: move || {
1931 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1932 // processing and return that.
1933 let notify = persist_check();
1934 match (notify, force_notify) {
1935 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1936 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1937 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1938 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1939 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1942 _read_guard: read_guard,
1946 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1947 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1948 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1949 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1950 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1951 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1953 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1954 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1955 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1956 should_persist: persist_check,
1957 _read_guard: read_guard,
1962 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1963 fn drop(&mut self) {
1964 match (self.should_persist)() {
1965 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1966 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1967 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1969 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1970 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1971 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1976 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1977 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1979 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1981 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1982 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1983 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1984 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1985 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1987 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1988 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1990 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1992 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1993 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1994 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1995 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1996 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1997 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1998 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1999 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2000 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2001 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2002 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2003 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2004 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2006 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2007 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2009 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2010 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2011 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2012 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2014 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2015 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2016 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2017 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2018 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2019 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2021 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2023 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2024 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2026 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2028 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2029 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2031 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2032 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2033 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2035 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2036 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2037 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2039 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2040 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2041 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2042 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2044 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2045 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2046 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2048 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2049 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2050 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2052 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2053 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2054 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2055 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2056 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2057 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2058 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2059 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2060 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2061 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2062 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2065 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2066 /// to better separate parameters.
2067 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2068 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2069 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2070 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2071 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2072 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2073 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2074 pub features: InitFeatures,
2075 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2076 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2077 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2079 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2081 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2082 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2083 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2084 /// payments to us through this channel.
2085 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2086 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2087 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2088 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2089 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2090 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2091 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2094 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2095 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2096 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2097 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2098 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2099 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2100 /// lifetime of the channel.
2101 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2102 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2103 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2104 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2105 /// our counterparty already.
2106 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2107 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2109 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2110 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2111 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2112 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2114 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2115 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2117 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2118 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2120 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2121 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2122 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2123 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2124 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2125 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2126 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2127 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2128 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2131 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2133 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2134 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2135 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2136 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2137 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2138 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2139 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2141 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2142 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2144 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2145 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2146 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2147 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2148 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2149 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2150 /// this value on chain.
2152 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2154 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2156 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2157 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2158 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2159 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2160 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2161 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2162 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2164 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2165 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2166 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2167 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2168 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2169 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2171 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2172 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2173 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2174 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2175 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2177 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2178 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2179 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2180 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2182 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2183 pub balance_msat: u64,
2184 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2185 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2186 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2187 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2189 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2191 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2192 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2193 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2194 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2195 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2196 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2197 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2198 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2200 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2201 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2202 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2203 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2204 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2205 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2206 /// route which is valid.
2207 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2208 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2209 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2210 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2211 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2212 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2214 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2215 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2216 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2217 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2218 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2219 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2220 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2221 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2222 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2224 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2226 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2227 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2228 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2229 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2230 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2232 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2233 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2234 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2235 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2236 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2237 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2238 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2240 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2241 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2242 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2243 pub is_outbound: bool,
2244 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2245 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2246 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2247 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2248 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2250 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2251 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2252 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2253 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2254 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2255 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2256 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2258 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2259 pub is_usable: bool,
2260 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2261 pub is_public: bool,
2262 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2263 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2264 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2265 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2266 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2267 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2269 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2270 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2271 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2273 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2274 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2275 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2277 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2278 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2281 impl ChannelDetails {
2282 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2283 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2284 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2286 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2287 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2288 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2289 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2292 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2293 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2294 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2296 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2297 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2298 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2299 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2302 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2303 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2304 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2307 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2308 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2310 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2311 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2312 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2314 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2315 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2316 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2317 features: latest_features,
2318 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2319 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2320 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2321 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2322 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2323 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2324 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2325 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2326 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2327 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2329 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2330 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2331 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2332 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2333 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2334 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2335 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2336 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2337 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2338 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2339 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2340 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2341 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2342 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2343 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2344 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2345 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2346 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2347 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2348 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2349 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2350 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2351 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2352 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2353 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2354 config: Some(context.config()),
2355 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2356 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2357 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2362 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2363 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2364 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2365 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2366 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2367 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2368 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2369 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2370 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2372 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2374 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2375 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2377 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2378 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2379 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2380 /// to drop the channel.
2384 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2385 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2386 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2387 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2388 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2390 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2391 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2392 payment_id: PaymentId,
2394 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2396 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2397 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2398 payment_id: PaymentId,
2399 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2401 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2402 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2403 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2406 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2407 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2408 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2410 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2411 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2412 payment_id: PaymentId,
2413 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2414 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2415 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2417 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2418 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2419 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2421 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2422 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2423 payment_id: PaymentId,
2424 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2425 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2429 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2431 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2433 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2434 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2435 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2436 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2438 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2439 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2440 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2443 macro_rules! handle_error {
2444 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2445 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2446 // entering the macro.
2447 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2448 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2452 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2453 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2455 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2456 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2457 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2458 let logger = WithContext::from(
2459 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2461 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2463 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2464 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2465 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2470 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2473 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2475 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2476 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2477 action: err.action.clone()
2481 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2482 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2483 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2484 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2485 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2489 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2496 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2497 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2498 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2499 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2501 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2502 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2503 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2505 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2506 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2507 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2508 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2509 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2511 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2512 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2514 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2518 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2519 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2520 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2522 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2523 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2525 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2526 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2528 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2529 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2530 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2531 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2532 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2533 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2535 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2540 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2541 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2543 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2544 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2546 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2547 match $channel_phase {
2548 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2549 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2551 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2552 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2554 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2555 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2557 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2558 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2559 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2561 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2562 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2563 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2569 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2570 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2574 let key = *$entry.key();
2575 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2577 $entry.remove_entry();
2585 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2586 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2590 let key = *$entry.key();
2591 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2593 $entry.remove_entry();
2601 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2602 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2604 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2605 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2611 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2612 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2613 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2614 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2615 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2617 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2618 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2619 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2620 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2621 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2622 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2623 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2624 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2625 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2626 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2631 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2632 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2633 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2634 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2635 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2636 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2637 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2638 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2639 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2640 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2642 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2647 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2648 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2649 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2650 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2651 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2652 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2653 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2654 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2655 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2657 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2662 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2663 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2664 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2665 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2666 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2667 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2668 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2669 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2670 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2671 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2672 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2673 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2675 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2676 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2677 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2683 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2684 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2686 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2687 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2688 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2689 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2690 updates.announcement_sigs);
2691 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2692 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2695 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2696 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2697 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2698 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2700 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2701 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2702 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2703 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2704 let mut batch_completed = false;
2705 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2706 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2707 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2708 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2710 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2711 channel_state.2 = true;
2713 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2715 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2717 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2720 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2721 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2722 if batch_completed {
2723 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2724 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2725 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2726 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2727 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2728 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2729 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2730 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2731 chan.set_batch_ready();
2732 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2733 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2737 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2738 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2739 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2744 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2746 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2747 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2749 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2750 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2751 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2752 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2757 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2758 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2759 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2760 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2762 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2763 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2764 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2765 panic!("{}", err_str);
2767 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2768 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2769 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2772 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2778 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2779 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2780 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2782 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2783 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2784 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2785 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2786 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2787 // filter for uniqueness here.
2788 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2789 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2790 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2791 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2793 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2794 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2796 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2797 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2798 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2804 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2805 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2806 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2807 while !processed_all_events {
2808 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2815 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2816 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2817 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2819 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2820 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2821 result = $self.process_background_events();
2823 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2824 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2825 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2826 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2830 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2831 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2832 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2833 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2836 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2838 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2839 $event_to_handle = event;
2841 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2842 post_event_actions.push(action);
2847 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2848 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2849 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2850 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2851 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2852 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2855 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2856 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2857 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2858 processed_all_events = false;
2862 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2863 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2864 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2866 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2867 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2868 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2874 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2876 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2878 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2879 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2880 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2885 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2887 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2889 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2890 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2892 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2894 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2895 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2896 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2899 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2900 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2901 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2903 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2904 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2905 current_timestamp: u32,
2907 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2908 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2909 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2910 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2912 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2913 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2914 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2919 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2921 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2922 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2923 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2924 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2925 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2926 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2927 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2928 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2930 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2933 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2934 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2936 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2938 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2940 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2942 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2943 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2944 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2945 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2946 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2947 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2948 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2949 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2951 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2961 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2962 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2963 &self.default_configuration
2966 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2967 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2968 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2971 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2972 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2974 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2976 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2980 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2985 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2987 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2988 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2989 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2990 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2991 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2993 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2994 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2996 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2997 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2998 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3000 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3001 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3002 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3004 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3005 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3007 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3008 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3009 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3010 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3011 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3012 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3014 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3015 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3016 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3017 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3018 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3023 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3024 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3029 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3031 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3033 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3034 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3035 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3040 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3041 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3042 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3043 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3044 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3045 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3049 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3054 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3056 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3057 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3060 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3062 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3068 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3069 node_id: their_network_key,
3072 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3075 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3076 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3077 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3078 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3079 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3080 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3081 // the same channel.
3082 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3084 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3085 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3086 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3089 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3090 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3091 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3092 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3096 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3097 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3098 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3106 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3107 /// more information.
3108 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3109 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3110 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3111 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3112 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3113 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3114 // the same channel.
3115 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3117 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3119 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3122 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3123 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3124 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3132 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3133 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3135 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3136 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3138 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3139 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3140 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3141 // really wanted anyway.
3142 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3145 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3146 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3147 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3148 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3150 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3151 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3152 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3153 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3154 let context_to_details = |context| {
3155 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3157 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3159 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3160 .map(context_to_details)
3166 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3167 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3169 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3170 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3171 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3173 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3174 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3175 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3176 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3177 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3178 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3180 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3181 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3182 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3184 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3185 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3186 payment_id: *payment_id,
3187 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3188 total_msat: *total_msat,
3191 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3192 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3194 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3195 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3197 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3202 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3205 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3206 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3211 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3212 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3214 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3215 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3217 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3219 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3220 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3221 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3222 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3223 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3224 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3226 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3227 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3228 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3229 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3230 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3234 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3235 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3237 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3238 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3239 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3240 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3243 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3244 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3248 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3250 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3251 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3258 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3259 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3260 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3264 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3265 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3271 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3272 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3273 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3275 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3276 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3278 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3279 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3280 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3281 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3283 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3285 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3286 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3287 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3290 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3291 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3292 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3293 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3294 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3295 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3298 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3299 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3300 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3302 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3303 /// the channel being closed or not:
3304 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3305 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3306 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3307 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3308 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3309 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3310 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3312 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3313 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3314 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3315 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3317 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3319 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3320 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3321 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3324 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3325 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3326 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3327 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3328 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3331 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3332 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3333 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3334 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3335 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3338 let logger = WithContext::from(
3339 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3342 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3343 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3344 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3345 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3346 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3347 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3350 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3351 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3352 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3353 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3354 // ignore the result here.
3355 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3357 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3358 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3359 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3360 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3362 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3363 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3364 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3365 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3366 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3367 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3368 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3371 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3374 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3375 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3381 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3382 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3383 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3384 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3385 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3386 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3387 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3390 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3391 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3392 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3396 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3397 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3401 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3402 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3403 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3404 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3406 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3407 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3408 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3409 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3410 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3411 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3413 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3415 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3416 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3417 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3418 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3419 mem::drop(peer_state);
3420 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3422 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3423 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3424 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3426 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3427 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3428 // Unfunded channel has no update
3429 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3431 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3432 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3433 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3434 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3435 // Unfunded channel has no update
3436 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3439 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3440 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3441 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3442 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3444 (None, *peer_node_id)
3446 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3449 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3450 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3451 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3452 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3453 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3454 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3455 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3456 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3457 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3463 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3466 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3468 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3469 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3471 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3472 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3474 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3475 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3477 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3488 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3489 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3490 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3492 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3493 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3494 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3497 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3498 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3499 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3501 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3502 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3503 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3504 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3505 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3508 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3509 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3510 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3511 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3512 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3516 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3517 /// local transaction(s).
3518 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3519 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3520 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3524 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3525 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3527 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3529 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3530 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3533 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3534 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3535 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3536 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3542 macro_rules! return_err {
3543 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3546 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3547 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3549 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3550 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3551 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3552 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3553 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3554 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3555 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3559 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3560 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3561 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3562 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3563 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3564 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3565 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3566 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3572 let NextPacketDetails {
3573 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3574 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3575 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3576 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3577 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3580 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3581 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3582 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3583 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3584 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3585 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3586 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3587 // phantom or an intercept.
3588 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3589 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3590 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3594 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3597 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3599 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3601 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3602 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3603 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3605 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3606 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3607 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3608 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3611 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3612 // have no consistency guarantees.
3613 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3617 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3618 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3619 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3620 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3621 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3623 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3624 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3625 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3626 // we don't have the channel here.
3627 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3629 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3631 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3632 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3633 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3634 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3635 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3636 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3637 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3638 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3639 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3640 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3641 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3643 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3646 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3647 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3649 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3650 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3657 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3659 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3660 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3662 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3663 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3664 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3665 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3666 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3668 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3669 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3675 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3676 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3677 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3678 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3680 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3681 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3683 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3684 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3685 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3687 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3688 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3689 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3690 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3691 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3692 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3693 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3697 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3699 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3702 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3703 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3704 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3705 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3706 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3707 macro_rules! return_err {
3708 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3710 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3711 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3712 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3713 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3714 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3715 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3716 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3717 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3718 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3722 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3723 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3724 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3725 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3726 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3732 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3734 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3735 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3736 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3737 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3740 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3741 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3742 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3743 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3744 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3746 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3749 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3750 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3751 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3752 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3753 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3759 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3760 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3761 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3763 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3764 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3765 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3767 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3768 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3769 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3770 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3771 return Err(LightningError {
3772 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3773 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3776 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3777 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3779 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3780 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3781 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3784 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3785 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3786 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3787 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3789 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3790 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3791 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3793 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3794 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3795 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3796 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3797 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3798 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3799 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3803 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3806 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3807 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3808 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3809 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3811 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3812 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3813 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3814 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3815 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3818 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3819 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3821 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3822 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3823 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3824 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3825 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3826 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3827 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3828 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3830 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3831 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3832 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3834 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3836 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3843 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3844 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3845 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3846 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3851 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3852 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3853 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3856 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3857 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3858 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3859 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3861 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3862 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3863 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3865 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3866 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3870 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3871 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3873 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3874 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3875 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3877 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3880 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3882 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3883 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3887 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3890 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3891 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3892 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3893 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3894 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3896 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3897 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3898 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3899 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3901 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3902 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3904 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3905 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3906 Some(monitor_update) => {
3907 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3909 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3910 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3911 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3912 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3913 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3914 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3915 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3923 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3926 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3927 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3928 // `channel_by_id` map.
3929 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3930 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3934 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3935 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3937 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3942 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3944 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3945 /// fields for more info.
3947 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3948 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3950 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3952 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3953 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3954 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3955 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3956 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3958 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3959 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3960 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3961 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3962 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3964 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3965 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3966 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3967 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3969 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3971 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3972 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3973 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3975 /// In general, a path may raise:
3976 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3977 /// node public key) is specified.
3978 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3979 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3980 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3981 /// relevant updates.
3983 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3984 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3985 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3987 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3988 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3989 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3990 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3991 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3992 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3993 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3994 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3996 self.pending_outbound_payments
3997 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3998 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3999 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4002 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4003 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4004 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4005 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4006 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4007 self.pending_outbound_payments
4008 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4009 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4010 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4011 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4015 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4016 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4018 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4019 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4020 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4024 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4025 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4026 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4030 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4031 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4034 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4035 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4037 self.pending_outbound_payments
4038 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4039 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4040 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4041 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4042 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4046 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4047 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4048 /// retries are exhausted.
4050 /// # Event Generation
4052 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4053 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4055 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4056 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4057 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4059 /// # Requested Invoices
4061 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4062 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4063 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4064 /// once the invoice has been received.
4066 /// # Restart Behavior
4068 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4069 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4070 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4072 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4073 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4075 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4078 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4079 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4080 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4081 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4082 /// never reach the recipient.
4084 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4085 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4087 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4088 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4090 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4091 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4092 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4094 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4095 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4096 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4099 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4100 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4102 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4105 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4106 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4107 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4109 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4110 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4111 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4112 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4115 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4116 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4117 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4118 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4119 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4121 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4122 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4123 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4126 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4129 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4130 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4133 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4134 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4136 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4137 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4138 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4139 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4140 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4141 let payment_params =
4142 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4144 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4146 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4149 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4150 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4152 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4153 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4154 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4155 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4157 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4158 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4159 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4160 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4161 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4162 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4163 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4164 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4165 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4166 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4168 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4169 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4170 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4171 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4175 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4177 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4178 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4181 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4183 let mut res = Vec::new();
4185 for mut path in route.paths {
4186 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4187 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4188 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4189 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4190 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4193 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4196 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4197 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4199 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4201 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4202 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4207 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4210 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4215 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4216 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4217 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4219 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4220 let used_liquidity =
4221 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4223 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4224 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4226 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4229 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4234 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4235 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4236 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4243 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4244 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4245 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4246 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4247 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4248 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4249 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4250 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4251 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4256 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4257 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4258 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4260 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4261 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4262 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4263 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4264 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4265 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4266 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4267 } else { unreachable!(); });
4269 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4270 Err((chan, err)) => {
4271 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4272 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4273 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4274 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4275 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4281 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4282 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4284 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4285 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4288 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4289 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4290 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4294 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4295 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4296 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4300 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4302 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4305 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4306 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4310 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4311 funding_txo, o.get()
4313 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4314 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4315 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4316 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4317 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4318 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4321 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4328 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4329 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4330 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4334 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4336 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4337 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4339 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4340 /// across the p2p network.
4342 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4343 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4345 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4346 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4347 /// keys per-channel).
4349 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4350 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4351 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4353 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4354 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4355 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4357 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4358 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4359 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4360 /// for more details.
4362 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4363 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4364 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4365 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4368 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4370 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4371 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4373 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4374 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4375 /// signature for each channel.
4377 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4378 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4379 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4380 let mut result = Ok(());
4382 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4383 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4384 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4385 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4386 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4391 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4392 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4393 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4397 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4398 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4399 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4400 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4401 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4402 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4403 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4404 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4406 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4407 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4412 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4413 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4414 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4415 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4419 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4420 match states.entry(txid) {
4421 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4422 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4423 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4427 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4430 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4431 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4432 temporary_channel_id,
4433 counterparty_node_id,
4434 funding_transaction.clone(),
4437 let mut output_index = None;
4438 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4439 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4440 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4441 if output_index.is_some() {
4442 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4443 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4446 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4449 if output_index.is_none() {
4450 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4451 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4454 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4455 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4456 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4457 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4458 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4459 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4465 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4466 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4467 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4468 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4469 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4470 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4471 .into_iter().flatten()
4472 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4474 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4475 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4477 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4480 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4481 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4482 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4483 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4485 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4486 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4487 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4491 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4492 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4493 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4499 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4501 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4502 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4503 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4504 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4506 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4507 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4509 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4510 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4512 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4514 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4515 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4516 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4517 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4518 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4519 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4520 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4521 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4522 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4523 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4524 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4526 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4533 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4534 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4535 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4536 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4537 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4538 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4539 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4543 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4544 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4545 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4546 config.apply(config_update);
4547 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4550 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4551 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4552 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4553 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4554 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4555 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4562 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4563 debug_assert!(false);
4564 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4566 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4567 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4574 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4576 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4577 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4578 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4579 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4581 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4582 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4584 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4585 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4587 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4589 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4590 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4591 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4592 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4593 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4594 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4595 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4596 pub fn update_channel_config(
4597 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4598 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4599 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4602 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4603 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4605 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4606 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4608 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4609 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4610 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4611 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4612 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4614 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4615 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4616 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4619 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4622 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4623 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4624 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4625 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4626 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4627 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4630 let next_hop_scid = {
4631 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4632 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4633 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4636 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4637 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4638 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4639 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4640 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4643 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4645 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4646 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4647 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4650 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4651 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4652 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4653 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4654 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4661 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4662 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4663 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4666 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4667 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4668 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4669 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4672 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4674 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4675 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4676 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4677 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4678 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4681 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4682 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4683 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4684 payment.prev_channel_id,
4685 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4686 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4688 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4692 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4693 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4695 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4698 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4699 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4700 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4702 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4703 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4704 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4707 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4708 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4709 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4710 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4711 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4712 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4713 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4714 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4715 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4716 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4719 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4720 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4721 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4722 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4727 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4729 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4730 /// Will likely generate further events.
4731 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4734 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4735 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4736 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4738 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4739 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4741 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4742 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4743 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4744 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4746 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4747 match forward_info {
4748 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4749 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4750 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4751 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4752 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4755 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4756 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4757 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4758 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4760 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4761 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4762 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4763 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4764 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4765 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4766 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4767 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4768 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4771 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4772 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4774 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4777 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4778 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4784 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4785 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4787 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4791 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4792 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4794 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4798 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4799 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4800 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4801 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4802 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4803 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4804 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4807 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4808 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4809 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4810 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4811 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4813 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4815 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4816 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4820 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4821 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4822 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4823 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4824 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4825 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4827 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4828 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4834 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4837 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4840 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4841 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4842 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4843 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4844 // problem, not ours.
4850 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4851 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4852 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4854 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4858 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4860 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4861 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4862 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4867 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4868 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4869 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4870 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4871 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4872 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4873 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4874 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4875 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4876 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4877 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4880 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4881 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4882 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4883 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4884 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4885 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4886 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4887 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4888 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4889 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4890 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4892 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4893 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4894 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4895 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4896 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4897 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4900 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4901 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4902 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4905 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4906 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4908 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4910 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4911 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4912 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4913 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4919 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4920 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4922 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4923 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4924 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4926 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4927 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4928 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4929 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4931 Some((res, htlc_id))
4934 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4935 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4936 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4937 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4939 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4941 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4942 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4943 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4949 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4953 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4954 match forward_info {
4955 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4956 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4957 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4958 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4959 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4962 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4963 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4964 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4965 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4966 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4968 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4969 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4970 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4971 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4972 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4974 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4975 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4976 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4978 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4979 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4983 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4984 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4987 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4990 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4991 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4992 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4993 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4994 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4995 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4996 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4997 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4998 phantom_shared_secret,
5001 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5002 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5003 // if routing nodes overpay
5004 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5005 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5007 total_value_received: None,
5008 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5011 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5014 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5016 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5017 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5018 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5019 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5020 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5021 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5023 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5024 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5025 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5026 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5027 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5028 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5029 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5030 phantom_shared_secret,
5033 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5034 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5036 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5039 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5040 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5041 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5042 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5043 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5046 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5047 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5048 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5049 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
5050 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
5051 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
5053 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5054 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5055 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5057 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5058 .entry(payment_hash)
5059 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5060 .or_insert_with(|| {
5061 committed_to_claimable = true;
5063 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5066 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5067 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5069 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5071 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5072 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5073 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5075 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5076 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5077 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5080 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5082 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5083 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5084 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5085 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5086 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5087 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5088 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5090 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5091 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5093 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5095 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5096 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5097 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5098 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5099 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5102 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5103 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5104 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5105 committed_to_claimable = true;
5107 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5108 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5109 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5110 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5111 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5112 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5113 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5114 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5115 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5119 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5120 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5121 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5122 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5123 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5125 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5127 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5128 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5130 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5131 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5132 committed_to_claimable = true;
5135 payment_claimable_generated
5139 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5140 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5141 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5142 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5143 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5144 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5145 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5146 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5147 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5148 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5149 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5150 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5151 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5152 Ok(result) => result,
5154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5158 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5159 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5160 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5162 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5163 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5166 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5167 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5168 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5170 check_total_value!(purpose);
5172 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5173 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5174 check_total_value!(purpose);
5178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5179 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5181 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5183 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5184 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5186 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5187 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5189 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5190 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5192 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5193 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5194 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5196 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5197 if payment_claimable_generated {
5198 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5204 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5205 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5213 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5214 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5215 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5216 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5218 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5219 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5221 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5223 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5224 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5225 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5227 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5229 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5230 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5231 events.append(&mut new_events);
5234 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5236 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5237 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5238 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5240 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5242 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5243 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5244 if background_events.is_empty() {
5245 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5248 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5250 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5251 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5252 // monitor updating completing.
5253 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5255 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5256 let mut updated_chan = false;
5258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5259 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5260 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5261 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5262 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5264 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5265 updated_chan = true;
5266 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5267 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5269 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5277 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5278 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5281 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5282 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5283 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5284 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5285 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5286 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5287 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5289 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5290 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5291 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5292 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5293 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5299 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5302 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5303 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5304 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5305 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5306 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5309 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5310 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5312 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5314 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5315 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5316 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5318 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5319 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5320 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5321 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5323 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5324 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5326 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5327 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5331 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5332 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5333 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5334 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5335 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5336 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5337 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5339 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5340 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5343 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5344 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5346 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5347 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5349 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5354 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5355 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5363 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5365 /// This currently includes:
5366 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5367 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5368 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5370 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5371 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5372 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5373 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5374 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5375 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5376 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5377 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5379 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5380 /// estimate fetches.
5382 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5383 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5384 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5385 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5386 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5388 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5389 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5391 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5392 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5393 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5394 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5396 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5397 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5398 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5399 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5400 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5401 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5403 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5404 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5405 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5407 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5408 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5409 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5410 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5411 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5412 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5413 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5414 channel_id: *chan_id,
5415 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5427 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5430 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5431 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5432 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5434 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5435 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5440 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5441 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5443 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5444 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5445 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5446 if needs_close { return false; }
5449 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5450 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5451 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5452 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5453 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5454 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5455 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5456 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5458 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5459 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5460 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5461 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5465 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5467 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5470 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5472 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5473 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5474 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5475 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5479 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5481 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5487 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5489 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5490 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5491 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5492 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5493 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5494 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5496 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5497 channel_id: *chan_id,
5498 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5506 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5507 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5508 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5510 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5511 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5512 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5514 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5515 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5516 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5517 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5519 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5520 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5521 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5522 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5527 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5528 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5529 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5530 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5532 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5533 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5534 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5535 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5541 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5543 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5544 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5549 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5550 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5551 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5552 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5553 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5554 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5555 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5556 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5557 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5558 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5559 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5561 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5562 // have no channels to the peer.
5563 let remove_entry = {
5564 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5565 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5568 entry.remove_entry();
5571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5576 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5577 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5578 // This should be unreachable
5579 debug_assert!(false);
5582 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5583 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5584 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5585 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5586 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5587 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5588 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5591 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5592 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5593 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5595 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5596 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5603 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5604 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5605 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5606 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5607 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5610 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5611 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5614 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5615 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5618 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5619 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5620 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5621 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5622 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5623 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5624 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5627 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5628 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5631 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5632 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5633 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5634 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5635 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5642 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5643 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5644 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5646 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5647 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5648 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5649 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5651 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5652 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5653 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5654 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5655 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5659 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5660 /// reason for the failure.
5662 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5663 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5666 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5667 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5668 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5669 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5670 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5671 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5677 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5678 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5679 match failure_code {
5680 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5681 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5682 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5683 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5684 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5685 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5687 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5688 let fail_data = match data {
5689 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5692 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5697 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5698 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5700 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5702 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5703 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5704 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5705 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5706 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5707 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5708 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5710 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5712 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5713 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5715 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5720 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5721 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5722 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5723 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5724 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5725 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5726 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5727 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5728 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5729 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5731 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5732 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5733 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5734 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5736 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5737 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5738 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5739 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5740 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5744 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5745 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5746 // be surfaced to the user.
5747 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5748 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5749 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5751 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5753 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5756 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5757 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5758 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5759 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5761 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5762 debug_assert!(false);
5763 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5768 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5771 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5772 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5774 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5778 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5779 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5780 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5781 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5782 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5783 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5784 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5785 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5786 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5787 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5790 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5791 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5792 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5795 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5796 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5797 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5799 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5800 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5801 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5802 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5803 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5805 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5806 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5807 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5810 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5811 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5812 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5814 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5815 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5816 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5817 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5818 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5820 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5822 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5823 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5825 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5826 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5830 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5831 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5833 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5837 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5838 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5839 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5840 push_forward_ev = true;
5842 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5844 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5847 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5850 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5851 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5852 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5853 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5854 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5855 failed_next_destination: destination,
5861 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5862 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5864 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5865 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5866 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5867 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5869 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5870 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5871 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5872 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5874 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5875 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5876 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5878 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5879 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5880 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5881 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5882 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5883 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5884 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5885 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5886 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5889 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5890 /// even type numbers.
5894 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5895 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5897 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5898 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5899 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5902 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5903 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5908 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5909 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5910 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5911 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5912 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5913 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5914 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5915 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5920 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5921 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5922 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5923 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5924 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5926 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5927 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5928 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5932 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5933 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5934 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5935 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5936 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5937 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5938 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5939 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5940 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5941 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5942 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5951 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5953 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5954 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5955 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5956 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5957 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5958 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5959 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5960 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5961 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5963 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5964 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5965 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5966 debug_assert!(false);
5970 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5972 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5973 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5974 debug_assert!(false);
5978 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5979 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5981 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5982 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5983 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5984 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5987 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5988 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5989 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5990 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5994 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5995 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5996 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5997 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5998 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5999 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6000 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6003 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6004 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6005 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6006 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6007 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6008 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6013 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6016 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6017 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6018 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6019 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6021 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6024 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6025 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6026 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6027 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6031 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6032 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6033 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6034 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6036 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6037 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6038 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6039 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6041 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6042 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6043 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6044 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6048 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6049 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6050 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6054 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6055 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6056 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6059 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6060 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6062 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6063 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6064 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6065 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6066 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6069 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6070 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6071 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6073 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6076 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6077 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6079 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6080 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6081 // monitor update as a background event.
6082 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6083 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6084 counterparty_node_id,
6085 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6086 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6087 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6091 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6092 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6097 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6099 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6101 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6102 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6103 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6104 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6105 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6107 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6109 debug_assert!(false,
6110 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6113 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6114 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6115 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6116 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6117 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6119 let mut found_blocker = false;
6120 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6121 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6122 // which case we need to only remove the one
6123 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6124 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6125 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6126 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6128 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6131 debug_assert!(false);
6140 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6141 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6142 counterparty_node_id: None,
6143 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6146 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6150 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6151 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6152 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6153 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6154 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6155 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6156 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6157 // again on restart.
6158 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6159 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6160 payment_preimage, update_res);
6163 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6164 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6166 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6167 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6168 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6169 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6170 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6171 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6172 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6173 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6174 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6175 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6178 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6179 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6180 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6181 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6182 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6183 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6187 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6188 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6191 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6192 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6193 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6194 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6197 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6198 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6199 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6200 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6201 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6203 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6204 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6205 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6207 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6208 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6211 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6212 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6213 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6214 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6215 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6216 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6217 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6218 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6219 let chan_to_release =
6220 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6221 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6223 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6224 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6225 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6226 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6231 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6232 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6233 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6234 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6235 // in the background.
6236 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6237 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6238 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6239 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6241 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6242 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6243 funding_txo, update, ..
6245 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6246 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6247 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6248 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6250 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6256 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6257 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6258 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6260 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6261 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6263 monitor_update.updates[0],
6264 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6269 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6270 // immediately once we get going.
6271 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6274 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6276 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6279 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6280 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6281 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6282 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6283 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6284 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6285 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6289 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6290 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6291 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6294 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6295 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6296 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6297 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6298 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6299 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6300 prev_user_channel_id,
6301 next_user_channel_id,
6302 total_fee_earned_msat,
6304 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6305 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6307 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6311 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6312 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6313 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6319 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6320 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6321 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6324 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6325 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6326 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6327 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6329 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6331 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6332 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6333 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6335 payment_purpose: purpose,
6338 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6340 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6344 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6346 sender_intended_total_msat,
6350 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6351 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6353 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6354 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6355 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6358 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6359 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6361 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6362 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6363 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6364 downstream_channel_id,
6365 Some(blocking_action),
6372 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6373 /// update completion.
6374 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6375 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6376 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6377 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6378 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6379 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6380 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6381 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6382 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6383 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6384 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6385 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6386 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6387 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6389 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6391 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6392 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6393 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6394 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6397 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6398 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6400 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6401 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6402 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6407 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6408 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6409 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6410 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6415 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6416 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6417 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6418 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6419 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6424 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6428 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6434 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6435 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6436 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6440 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6441 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6442 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6448 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6449 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6451 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6452 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6454 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6455 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6456 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6457 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6458 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6464 let mut peer_state_lock;
6465 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6466 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6467 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6470 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6473 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6474 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6475 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6476 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6477 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6480 let remaining_in_flight =
6481 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6482 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6485 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6486 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6487 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6488 remaining_in_flight);
6489 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6492 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6495 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6497 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6498 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6501 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6502 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6503 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6505 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6506 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6507 /// used to accept such channels.
6509 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6510 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6511 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6512 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6515 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6516 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6518 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6519 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6520 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6522 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6523 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6525 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6526 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6528 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6529 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6531 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6532 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6533 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6534 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6537 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6539 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6542 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6543 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6544 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6545 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6547 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6548 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6550 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6552 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6554 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6556 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6557 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6558 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6560 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6561 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6562 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6563 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6564 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6565 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6566 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6569 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6570 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6572 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6578 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6579 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6580 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6581 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6583 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6587 Ok(mut channel) => {
6589 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6590 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6591 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6592 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6593 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6594 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6595 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6598 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6599 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6600 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6602 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6604 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6605 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6606 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6607 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6608 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6609 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6611 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6614 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6615 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6616 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6618 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6622 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6623 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6624 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6626 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6627 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6628 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6631 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6638 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6639 /// or 0-conf channels.
6641 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6642 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6643 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6644 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6645 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6648 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6649 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6650 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6651 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6652 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6653 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6654 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6658 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6661 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6662 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6664 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6665 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6667 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6668 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6669 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6670 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6671 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6673 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6676 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6677 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6678 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6681 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6682 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6683 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6684 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6685 // included in the unfunded count.
6686 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6687 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6688 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6691 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6692 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6695 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6696 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6697 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6698 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6703 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6706 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6707 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6708 // likely to be lost on restart!
6709 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6710 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6711 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6714 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6716 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6719 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6720 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6721 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6722 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6723 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6726 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6728 debug_assert!(false);
6729 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6730 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6731 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6733 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6736 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6737 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6738 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6739 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6740 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6741 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6744 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6745 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6748 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6749 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6751 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6752 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6755 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6756 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6759 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6760 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6763 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6764 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6765 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6766 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6768 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6771 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6772 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6773 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6774 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6775 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6778 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6779 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6780 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6785 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6786 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6787 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6788 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6789 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6790 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6791 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6799 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6800 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6802 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6803 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6805 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6807 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6808 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6811 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6812 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6814 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6815 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6816 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6818 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6822 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6823 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6824 // likely to be lost on restart!
6825 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6827 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6829 debug_assert!(false);
6830 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6834 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6836 match phase.get_mut() {
6837 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6838 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6839 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6849 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6850 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6851 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6852 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6853 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6855 user_channel_id: user_id,
6860 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6861 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6864 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6866 debug_assert!(false);
6867 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6872 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6873 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6874 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6875 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6876 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6878 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6879 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6880 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6881 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6882 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6883 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6884 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6885 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6886 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6890 Some(mut phase) => {
6891 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6892 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6893 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6895 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6898 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6900 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6901 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6902 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6903 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6904 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6905 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6907 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6908 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6909 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6912 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6914 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6917 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6918 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6920 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6923 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6924 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6925 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6926 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6928 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6929 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6930 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6931 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6932 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6933 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6934 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6939 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6940 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6941 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6943 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6947 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6948 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6949 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6957 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6958 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6960 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6962 debug_assert!(false);
6963 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6968 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6970 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6971 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6972 let logger = WithContext::from(
6974 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6975 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6978 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6980 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6981 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6982 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6983 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6984 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6985 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6986 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6987 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6988 } else { unreachable!(); }
6991 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6992 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6993 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6994 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6995 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6996 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6997 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7001 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7002 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7003 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7004 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7005 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7006 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7010 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7017 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7018 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7019 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7021 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7023 debug_assert!(false);
7024 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7030 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7031 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7032 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7033 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7034 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7035 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7037 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7038 msg: announcement_sigs,
7040 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7041 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7042 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7043 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7044 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7045 // announcement_signatures.
7046 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7047 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7048 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7049 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7056 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7057 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7062 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7063 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7066 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7067 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7072 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7073 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7074 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7077 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7079 debug_assert!(false);
7080 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7084 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7085 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7087 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7088 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7089 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7090 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7092 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7095 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7096 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7097 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7098 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7100 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7101 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7102 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7103 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7105 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7109 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7110 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7111 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7112 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7115 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7116 let context = phase.context_mut();
7117 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7118 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7119 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7120 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7122 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7123 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7124 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7125 let context = phase.context_mut();
7126 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7127 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7128 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7135 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7136 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7137 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7138 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7140 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7141 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7147 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7148 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7149 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7151 debug_assert!(false);
7152 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7154 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7157 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7158 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7159 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7160 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7161 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7162 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7163 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7164 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7169 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7170 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7171 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7172 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7173 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7174 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7175 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7177 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7178 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7184 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7185 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7186 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7187 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7189 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7191 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7192 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7193 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7198 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7199 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7200 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7205 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7206 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7207 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7208 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7210 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7211 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7212 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7213 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7215 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7216 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7218 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7219 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7220 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7222 debug_assert!(false);
7223 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7227 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7229 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7230 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7231 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7232 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7233 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7234 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7236 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7238 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
7239 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7240 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7241 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7242 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7243 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7244 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7245 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7249 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7250 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7251 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7252 match pending_forward_info {
7253 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7254 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7256 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7257 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7258 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7259 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7260 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7262 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7263 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7264 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7265 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7266 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7269 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
7271 _ => pending_forward_info
7274 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7275 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7277 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7278 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7281 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7286 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7288 let next_user_channel_id;
7289 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7291 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7293 debug_assert!(false);
7294 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7298 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7300 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7301 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7302 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7303 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7305 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7307 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7308 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7309 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7311 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7312 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7313 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7314 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7315 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7316 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7317 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7318 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7321 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7322 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7328 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7329 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7330 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7336 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7337 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7338 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7340 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7342 debug_assert!(false);
7343 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7345 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7346 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7347 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7349 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7350 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7352 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7353 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7361 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7362 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7363 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7364 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7365 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7367 debug_assert!(false);
7368 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7372 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7374 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7375 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7376 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7378 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7379 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7381 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7382 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7390 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7392 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7394 debug_assert!(false);
7395 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7397 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7398 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7399 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7400 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7401 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7402 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7403 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7404 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7405 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7406 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7407 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7411 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7412 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7420 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7421 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7422 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7423 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7424 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7425 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7426 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7427 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7428 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7429 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7430 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7432 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7433 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7435 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7436 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7437 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7439 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7440 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7443 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7444 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7446 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7447 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7448 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7450 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7451 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7452 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7453 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7454 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7457 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7458 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7461 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7462 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7463 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7464 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7465 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7466 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7467 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7468 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7470 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7471 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7474 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7475 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7476 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7481 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7482 // payments are being processed.
7483 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7484 push_forward_event = true;
7486 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7487 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7494 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7495 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7498 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7499 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7500 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7502 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7506 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7507 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7508 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7509 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7510 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7512 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7513 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7514 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7515 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7516 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7517 // real by taking more time.
7518 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7519 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7520 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7525 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7526 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7527 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7528 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7529 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7530 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7531 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7533 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7534 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7535 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7536 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7537 channel_funding_outpoint,
7539 counterparty_node_id,
7544 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7545 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7546 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7549 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7550 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7553 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7554 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7555 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7561 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7562 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7563 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7564 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7566 debug_assert!(false);
7567 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7568 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7569 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7570 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7572 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7573 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7574 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7575 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7576 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7577 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7578 *counterparty_node_id)
7580 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7581 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7582 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7583 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7584 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7585 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7586 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7590 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7591 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7594 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7597 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7601 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7605 debug_assert!(false);
7606 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7610 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7613 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7614 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7616 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7617 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7625 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7627 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7629 debug_assert!(false);
7630 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7636 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7637 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7642 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7643 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7644 msg, &self.default_configuration
7645 ), chan_phase_entry),
7646 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7647 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7648 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7651 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7652 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7660 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7661 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7662 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7663 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7665 // It's not a local channel
7666 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7669 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7670 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7671 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7672 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7676 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7678 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7679 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7680 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7681 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7682 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7683 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7684 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7686 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7688 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7689 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7690 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7691 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7693 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7694 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7695 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7696 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7699 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7703 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7704 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7709 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7712 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7714 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7719 debug_assert!(false);
7720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7721 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7725 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7731 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7732 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7733 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7734 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7735 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7736 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7737 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7738 let mut channel_update = None;
7739 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7741 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7744 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7745 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7746 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7747 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7748 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7749 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7750 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7755 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7756 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7757 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7758 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7759 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7760 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7764 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7765 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7769 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7771 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7772 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7773 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7774 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7775 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7776 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7778 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7779 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7780 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7781 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7782 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7783 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7784 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7786 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7787 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7788 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7789 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7790 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7791 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7792 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7793 next_funding_txid: None,
7796 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7797 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7798 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7804 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7805 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7806 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7807 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7810 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7811 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7816 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7817 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7818 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7820 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7821 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7822 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7823 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7824 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7825 match monitor_event {
7826 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7827 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7828 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7829 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7830 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7831 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7832 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7834 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7835 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7836 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7837 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7840 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7841 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7842 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7844 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7845 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7846 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7847 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7850 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7852 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7855 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7856 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7857 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7858 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7861 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7863 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7864 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7865 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7869 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7870 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7871 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7872 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7880 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7881 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7887 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7888 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7891 has_pending_monitor_events
7894 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7895 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7896 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7898 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7900 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7903 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7904 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7905 /// update was applied.
7906 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7907 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7908 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7910 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7911 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7912 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7913 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7916 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7919 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7920 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7921 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7923 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7924 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7925 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7926 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7927 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7928 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7930 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7931 has_monitor_update = true;
7933 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7934 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7935 continue 'peer_loop;
7944 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7945 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7946 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7952 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7953 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7955 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7956 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7958 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7959 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7960 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7963 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7964 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7966 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7967 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7968 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7974 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7980 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7981 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7984 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7985 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7992 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7997 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7998 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8001 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8002 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8006 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8009 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8010 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8016 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8017 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8018 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8019 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8020 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8021 let mut has_update = false;
8022 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8026 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8029 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8030 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8032 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8033 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8034 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8035 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8036 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8038 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8039 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8042 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8043 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8044 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8046 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8047 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8048 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8049 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8050 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8055 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8056 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8057 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8063 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8064 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8069 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8075 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8076 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8079 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8080 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8086 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8087 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8089 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8090 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8091 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8092 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8093 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8094 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8095 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8096 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8097 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8098 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8099 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8100 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8101 assert!(should_broadcast);
8102 } else { unreachable!(); }
8103 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8104 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8105 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8108 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8113 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8114 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8115 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8116 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8120 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8121 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8122 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8123 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8124 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8126 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8130 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8135 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8137 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8139 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8140 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8141 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8142 &$self, description: String
8143 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8144 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8145 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8146 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8147 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8149 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8150 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8151 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8153 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8160 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8161 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8162 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8166 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8167 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8169 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8170 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8171 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8174 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8175 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8176 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8178 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8179 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8183 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8184 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8185 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8186 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8187 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8189 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8193 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8194 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8199 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8200 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8201 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8203 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8205 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8206 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8207 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8208 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8209 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8210 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8211 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8212 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8213 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8214 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8215 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8216 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8218 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8219 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8220 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8222 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8223 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8228 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8229 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8230 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8231 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8233 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8250 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8251 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8252 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8253 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8256 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8258 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8260 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8261 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8262 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8264 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8265 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8266 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8267 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8268 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8269 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8270 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8272 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8273 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8277 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8278 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8281 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8282 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8283 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8287 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8288 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8289 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8290 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8294 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8295 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8296 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8301 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8302 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8303 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8304 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8307 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8308 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8309 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8310 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8311 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8312 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8313 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8314 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8315 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8316 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8317 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8318 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8319 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8320 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8321 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8323 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8324 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8326 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8328 let builder = match quantity {
8330 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8332 let builder = match amount_msats {
8334 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8336 let builder = match payer_note {
8338 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8340 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8341 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8343 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8345 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8346 self.pending_outbound_payments
8347 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8348 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8350 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8352 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8353 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8354 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8355 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8356 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8359 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8361 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8362 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8363 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8364 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8365 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8366 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8367 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8368 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8369 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8371 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8378 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8381 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8382 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8383 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8387 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8388 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8389 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8390 /// received and no retries will be made.
8395 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8396 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8399 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8400 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8401 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8402 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8403 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8405 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8406 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8408 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8409 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8412 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8414 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8415 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8416 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8417 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8419 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8420 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8421 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8423 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8424 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8425 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8427 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8428 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8429 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8431 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8432 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8433 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8434 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8436 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8437 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8438 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8439 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8440 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8443 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8445 for path in refund.paths() {
8446 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8447 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8448 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8449 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8451 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8457 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8461 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8464 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8465 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8467 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8468 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8469 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8470 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8472 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8474 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8475 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8479 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8480 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8482 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8484 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8485 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8487 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8488 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8489 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8490 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8491 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8492 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8493 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8494 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8495 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8496 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8497 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8500 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8501 /// stored external to LDK.
8503 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8504 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8505 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8507 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8508 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8511 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8512 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8513 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8514 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8516 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8517 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8518 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8519 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8520 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8522 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8523 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8524 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8525 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8526 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8528 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8529 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8531 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8532 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8536 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8537 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8539 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8541 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8542 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8544 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8545 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8546 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8547 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8548 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8549 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8550 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8553 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8554 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8556 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8557 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8558 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8561 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8563 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8564 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8565 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8566 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8568 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8570 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8571 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8572 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8575 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8576 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8579 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8580 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8581 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8582 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8583 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8584 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8586 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8587 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8588 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8589 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8590 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8592 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8594 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8597 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8598 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8602 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8603 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8605 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8606 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8607 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8608 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8610 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8611 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8612 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8613 Some(_) => continue,
8614 None => return scid_candidate
8619 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8621 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8622 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8624 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8625 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8626 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8630 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8631 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8632 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8634 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8635 /// times to get a unique scid.
8636 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8637 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8638 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8640 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8641 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8642 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8643 return scid_candidate
8647 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8648 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8649 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8650 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8653 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8656 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8657 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8659 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8660 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8661 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8670 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8671 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8672 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8673 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8674 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8678 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8679 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8680 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8681 events.push_back((event, None));
8685 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8686 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8687 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8691 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8692 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8696 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8697 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8700 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8701 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8702 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8703 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8704 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8705 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8706 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8708 let logger = WithContext::from(
8709 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8713 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8714 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8716 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8717 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8718 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8719 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8721 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8725 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8726 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8727 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8728 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8729 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8730 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8735 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8737 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8738 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8739 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8740 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8742 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8743 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8744 if further_update_exists {
8745 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8750 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8757 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8758 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8764 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8765 for action in actions {
8767 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8768 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8770 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8776 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8777 /// using the given event handler.
8779 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8780 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8784 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8788 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8790 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8791 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8792 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8793 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8794 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8795 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8799 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8800 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8801 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8802 /// is always placed next to each other.
8804 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8805 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8806 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8807 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8809 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8810 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8811 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8812 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8813 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8814 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8815 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8817 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8818 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8819 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8820 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8823 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8824 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8826 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8827 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8830 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8832 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8835 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8836 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8840 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8841 events.replace(pending_events);
8850 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8852 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8853 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8854 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8855 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8856 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8857 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8861 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8863 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8864 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8865 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8867 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8871 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8882 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8884 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8885 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8886 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8887 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8888 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8891 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8892 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8895 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8896 let _persistence_guard =
8897 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8898 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8899 let new_height = height - 1;
8901 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8902 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8903 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8904 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8905 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8906 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8909 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8913 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8915 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8916 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8917 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8918 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8919 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8920 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8924 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8925 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8926 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8927 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8929 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8930 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8932 let _persistence_guard =
8933 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8934 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8935 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8936 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8938 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8939 if height < last_best_block_height {
8940 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8941 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8945 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8946 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8947 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8948 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8950 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8951 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8953 let _persistence_guard =
8954 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8955 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8956 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8958 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8960 macro_rules! max_time {
8961 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8963 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8964 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8965 // having an explicit local time source.
8966 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8967 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8968 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8969 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8970 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8976 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8977 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8978 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8979 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8983 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8984 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8985 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8986 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8988 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8989 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8990 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8991 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8992 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8993 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9000 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9001 let _persistence_guard =
9002 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9003 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9004 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9005 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9006 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9007 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9008 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9009 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9014 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9016 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9017 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9018 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9019 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9020 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9025 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9026 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9028 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9029 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9030 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9031 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9032 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9034 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9035 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9038 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9041 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9042 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9044 // Retain unfunded channels.
9045 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9046 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9047 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9048 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9049 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9050 let res = f(channel);
9051 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9052 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9053 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9054 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9055 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9057 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9058 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9059 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9060 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9061 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9062 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9064 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9069 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9074 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9075 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9078 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9079 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9080 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9081 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9082 msg: announcement_sigs,
9084 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9085 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9086 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9088 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9089 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9090 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9095 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9096 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9097 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9098 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9099 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9100 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9101 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9102 // is always consistent.
9103 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9104 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9105 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9106 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9107 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9110 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9111 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9112 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9113 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9114 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9115 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9116 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9117 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9121 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9122 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9123 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9124 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9125 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9126 data: reason_message,
9139 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9140 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9141 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9142 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9143 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9144 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9145 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9146 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9147 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9148 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9150 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9151 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9152 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9156 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9159 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9160 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9161 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9162 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9163 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9164 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9165 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9166 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9167 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9168 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9169 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9170 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9173 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9174 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9175 _ => unreachable!(),
9177 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9178 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9179 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9180 let logger = WithContext::from(
9181 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9183 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9189 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9191 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9192 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9196 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9197 /// may have events that need processing.
9199 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9200 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9202 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9203 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9204 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9205 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9208 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9210 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9211 /// indicates this should be checked.
9212 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9213 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9216 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9217 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9218 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9221 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9222 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9223 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9224 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9227 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9228 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9229 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9230 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9233 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9234 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9236 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9237 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9238 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9239 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9240 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9243 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9244 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9245 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9246 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9249 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9250 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9251 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9252 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9255 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9256 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9257 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9258 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9261 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9262 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9263 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9264 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9268 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9269 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9271 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9273 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9274 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9275 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9280 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9281 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9282 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9283 // change to the contents.
9284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9285 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9286 let persist = match &res {
9287 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9288 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9289 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9291 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9293 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9298 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9299 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9300 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9301 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9304 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9305 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9306 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9307 // change to the contents.
9308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9309 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9310 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9314 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9315 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9316 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9317 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9320 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9325 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9330 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9331 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9332 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9333 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9334 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9336 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9337 let persist = match &res {
9338 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9339 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9341 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9346 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9347 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9348 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9349 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9352 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9353 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9354 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9355 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9358 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9359 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9360 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9361 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9364 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9365 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9366 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9367 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9370 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9372 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9375 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9380 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9381 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9382 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9383 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9385 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9386 let persist = match &res {
9387 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9388 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9389 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9391 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9396 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9397 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9398 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9401 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9402 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9403 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9404 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9406 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9407 let persist = match &res {
9408 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9409 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9410 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9412 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9417 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9418 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9419 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9420 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9421 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9422 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9423 let persist = match &res {
9424 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9425 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9426 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9428 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9433 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9434 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9435 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9438 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9440 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9443 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9444 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9445 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9446 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9447 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9448 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9449 let persist = match &res {
9450 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9451 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9452 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9454 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9459 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9464 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9465 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9466 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9469 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9474 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9476 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9477 let persist = match &res {
9478 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9479 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9480 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9482 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9487 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9488 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9489 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9490 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9491 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9494 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9495 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9496 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9498 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9501 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9502 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9503 let context = match phase {
9504 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9505 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9506 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9507 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9512 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9513 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9514 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9517 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9518 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9521 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9522 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9525 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9526 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9530 // Clean up for removal.
9531 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9532 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9535 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9536 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9537 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9538 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9540 // V1 Channel Establishment
9541 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9542 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9543 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9544 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9545 // V2 Channel Establishment
9546 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9547 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9548 // Common Channel Establishment
9549 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9550 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9552 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9554 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9555 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9556 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9557 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9558 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9559 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9560 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9561 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9564 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9566 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9567 // Channel Operations
9568 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9570 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9573 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9575 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9576 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9577 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9578 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9580 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9581 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9583 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9586 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9587 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9588 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9589 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9592 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9594 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9596 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9597 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9601 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9602 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9603 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9604 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9608 let mut res = Ok(());
9610 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9611 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9612 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9613 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9614 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9615 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9616 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9619 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9620 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9622 if inbound_peer_limited {
9624 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9626 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9627 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9628 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9629 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9630 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9631 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9632 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9633 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9637 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9638 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9639 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9641 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9642 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9643 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9644 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9647 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9650 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9651 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9656 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9659 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9662 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9664 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9666 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9667 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9669 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9670 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9674 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9676 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9677 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9681 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9682 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9683 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9685 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9686 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9690 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9691 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9692 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9693 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9694 debug_assert!(false);
9697 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9698 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9699 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9700 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9701 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9702 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9703 debug_assert!(false);
9709 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9710 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9715 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9716 match &msg.data as &str {
9717 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9718 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9720 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9721 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9722 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9723 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9724 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9725 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9726 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9727 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9728 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9730 || -> NotifyOption {
9731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9732 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9733 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9734 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9735 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9736 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9737 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9738 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9743 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9744 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9745 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9746 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9747 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9749 log_level: Level::Trace,
9752 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9753 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9754 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9756 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9765 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9767 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9768 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9770 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9771 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9774 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9775 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9776 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9777 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9779 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9780 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9781 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9785 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9787 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9788 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9792 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9793 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9794 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9795 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9801 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9802 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9803 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9804 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9805 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9811 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9812 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9813 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9817 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9818 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9822 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9823 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9826 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9827 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9830 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9831 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9834 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9835 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9836 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9837 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9840 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9841 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9842 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9843 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9846 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9847 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9848 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9849 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9852 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9853 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9854 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9855 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9858 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9859 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9860 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9861 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9864 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9865 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9866 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9867 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9870 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9871 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9872 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9873 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9876 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9877 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9878 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9879 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9882 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9883 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9884 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9885 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9890 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9892 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9894 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9896 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9901 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9902 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9903 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9906 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9907 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9910 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9911 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9913 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9914 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9916 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9917 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9921 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9922 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9923 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9925 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9927 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9928 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9932 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9933 amount_msats, payment_secret
9935 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9937 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9938 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9942 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9943 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9944 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9947 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9948 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9949 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9950 payment_paths, payment_hash
9952 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9953 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9954 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9956 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9957 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9958 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9959 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9960 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9963 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9964 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9965 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9966 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9967 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9969 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9970 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9971 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9972 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9973 .and_then(|invoice| {
9975 let mut invoice = invoice;
9976 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9977 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9979 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9980 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9981 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9983 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9984 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9989 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9990 Err(error) => Some(error),
9994 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9995 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9997 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9999 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
10000 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
10002 Ok(payment_id) => {
10003 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
10004 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10005 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
10012 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10019 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10020 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10024 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10025 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10026 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10027 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10028 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10032 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10033 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10035 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10036 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10037 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10038 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10039 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10042 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10043 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10044 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10045 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10048 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10049 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10050 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10051 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10054 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10055 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10056 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10057 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10060 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10061 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10062 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10063 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10064 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10065 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10066 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10067 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10068 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10069 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10070 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10071 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10072 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10073 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10074 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10075 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10076 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10077 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10078 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10079 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10080 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10085 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10086 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10088 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10089 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10090 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10091 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10094 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10095 (2, node_id, required),
10096 (4, features, required),
10097 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10098 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10099 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10100 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10103 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10105 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10106 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10107 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10108 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10109 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10110 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10111 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10112 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10113 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10114 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10115 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10116 (7, self.config, option),
10117 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10118 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10119 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10120 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10121 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10122 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10123 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10124 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10125 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10126 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10127 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10128 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10129 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10130 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10131 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10132 (32, self.is_public, required),
10133 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10134 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10135 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10136 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10137 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10138 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10139 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10145 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10146 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10147 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10148 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10149 (2, channel_id, required),
10150 (3, channel_type, option),
10151 (4, counterparty, required),
10152 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10153 (6, funding_txo, option),
10154 (7, config, option),
10155 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10156 (9, confirmations, option),
10157 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10158 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10159 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10160 (16, balance_msat, required),
10161 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10162 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10163 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10164 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10165 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10166 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10167 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10168 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10169 (26, is_outbound, required),
10170 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10171 (30, is_usable, required),
10172 (32, is_public, required),
10173 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10174 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10175 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10176 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10177 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10178 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10179 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10182 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10183 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10184 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10185 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10186 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10189 inbound_scid_alias,
10190 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10192 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10193 outbound_scid_alias,
10197 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10198 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10200 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10201 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10202 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10203 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10204 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10205 confirmations_required,
10207 force_close_spend_delay,
10208 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10209 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10210 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10211 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10212 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10213 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10214 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10215 channel_shutdown_state,
10216 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10217 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10222 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10223 (2, channels, required_vec),
10224 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10225 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10228 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10229 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10230 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10233 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10235 (0, onion_packet, required),
10236 (1, blinded, option),
10237 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10240 (0, payment_data, required),
10241 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10242 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10243 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10244 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10245 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10247 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10248 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10249 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10250 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10251 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10252 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10253 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10258 (0, routing, required),
10259 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10260 (4, payment_hash, required),
10261 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10262 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10263 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10264 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10268 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10269 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10271 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10272 0u8.write(writer)?;
10273 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10274 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10275 reason.write(writer)?;
10277 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10278 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10280 1u8.write(writer)?;
10281 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10282 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10283 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10284 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10291 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10292 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10293 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10296 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10297 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10298 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10299 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10303 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10304 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10305 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10306 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10307 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10310 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10311 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10312 // messages contained in the variants.
10313 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10314 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10315 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10317 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10318 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10319 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10320 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10321 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10324 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10325 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10326 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10327 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10328 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10330 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10335 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10340 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10341 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10342 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10345 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10346 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10347 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10348 (2, outpoint, required),
10349 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10350 (4, htlc_id, required),
10351 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10352 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10353 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10354 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10355 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10358 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10359 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10360 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10361 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10362 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10364 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10365 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10366 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10367 (2, self.value, required),
10368 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10369 (4, payment_data, option),
10370 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10371 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10372 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10373 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10379 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10380 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10381 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10382 (0, prev_hop, required),
10383 (1, total_msat, option),
10384 (2, value_ser, required),
10385 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10386 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10387 (5, total_value_received, option),
10388 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10389 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10390 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10392 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10393 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10394 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10396 if payment_data.is_some() {
10397 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10399 if total_msat.is_none() {
10400 total_msat = Some(value);
10402 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10405 if total_msat.is_none() {
10406 if payment_data.is_none() {
10407 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10409 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10411 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10415 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10418 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10419 total_value_received,
10420 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10422 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10423 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10428 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10429 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10430 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10433 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10434 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10435 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10436 let mut payment_id = None;
10437 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10438 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10439 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10440 (0, session_priv, required),
10441 (1, payment_id, option),
10442 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10443 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10444 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10445 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10447 if payment_id.is_none() {
10448 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10450 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10452 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10453 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10456 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10457 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10458 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10459 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10463 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10464 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10465 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10467 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10470 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10471 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10476 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10477 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10479 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10480 0u8.write(writer)?;
10481 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10482 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10483 (0, session_priv, required),
10484 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10485 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10486 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10487 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10488 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10489 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10492 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10493 1u8.write(writer)?;
10494 field.write(writer)?;
10501 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10502 (0, forward_info, required),
10503 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10504 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10505 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10506 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10507 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10508 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10509 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10512 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10514 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10516 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10520 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10521 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10522 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10523 (0, htlc_id, required),
10524 (2, err_packet, required),
10527 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10528 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10529 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10530 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10531 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10532 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10533 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10534 (0, htlc_id, required),
10535 (1, failure_code, required),
10536 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10537 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10545 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10546 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10547 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10549 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10551 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10552 (0, htlc_id, required),
10553 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10554 (2, err_packet, required),
10555 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10557 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10558 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10559 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10561 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10565 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10566 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10575 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10576 (0, payment_secret, required),
10577 (2, expiry_time, required),
10578 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10579 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10580 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10583 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10585 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10586 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10587 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10588 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10589 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10590 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10594 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10595 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10597 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10599 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10601 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10602 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10603 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10606 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10609 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10610 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10613 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10614 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10617 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10618 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10622 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10624 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10627 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10628 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10629 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10632 channel.write(writer)?;
10638 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10639 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10640 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10641 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10642 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10643 for forward in pending_forwards {
10644 forward.write(writer)?;
10649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10651 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10652 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10653 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10655 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10656 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10657 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10658 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10659 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10660 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10661 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10662 htlc.write(writer)?;
10664 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10665 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10668 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10669 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10670 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10671 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10672 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10673 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10674 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10677 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10678 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10679 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10680 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10681 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10683 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10684 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10685 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10686 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10687 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10688 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10689 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10694 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10695 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10696 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10697 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10698 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10699 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10700 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10701 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10702 0u64.write(writer)?;
10704 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10705 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10706 event.write(writer)?;
10710 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10711 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10712 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10713 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10714 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10715 0u64.write(writer)?;
10717 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10718 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10719 // likely to be identical.
10720 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10721 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10723 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10724 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10725 hash.write(writer)?;
10726 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10729 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10730 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10731 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10732 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10733 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10736 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10737 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10739 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10740 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10741 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10742 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10745 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10746 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10747 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10748 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10752 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10753 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10754 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10756 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10758 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10764 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10765 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10766 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10767 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10770 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10771 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10772 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10773 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10774 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10777 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10778 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10779 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10780 if !updates.is_empty() {
10781 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10782 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10787 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10788 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10789 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10790 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10791 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10792 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10793 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10794 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10795 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10796 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10797 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10798 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10799 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10806 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10807 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10808 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10809 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10812 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10813 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10814 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10815 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10816 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10817 // check that the event is sane here.
10818 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10819 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10820 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10821 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10827 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10828 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10829 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10830 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10831 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10832 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10835 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10836 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10837 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10838 events.push_back((ev, action));
10839 } else if action.is_some() {
10840 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10847 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10848 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10849 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10850 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10851 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10852 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10855 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10857 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10859 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10860 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10861 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10862 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10863 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10864 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10865 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10866 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10867 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10868 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10869 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10870 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10871 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10873 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10874 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10876 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10877 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10879 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10880 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10881 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10882 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10883 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10884 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10886 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10887 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10898 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10899 pub entropy_source: ES,
10901 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10902 pub node_signer: NS,
10904 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10905 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10907 pub signer_provider: SP,
10909 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10911 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10912 pub fee_estimator: F,
10913 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10915 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10916 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10917 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10918 pub chain_monitor: M,
10920 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10921 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10922 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10923 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10924 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10925 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10927 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10929 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10930 /// deserialization.
10932 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10933 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10934 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10936 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10937 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10939 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10940 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10941 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10942 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10944 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10947 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10948 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10951 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10952 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10954 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10955 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10956 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10957 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10958 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10959 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10963 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10964 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10965 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10966 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10967 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10969 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10970 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10971 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10977 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10978 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10979 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10980 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10982 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10983 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10984 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10985 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10986 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10987 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10991 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10992 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10993 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10997 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10998 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11000 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11001 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11002 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11003 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11004 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11005 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11009 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11010 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11012 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11013 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11014 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11016 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11018 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11019 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11020 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11021 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11022 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11023 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11024 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11025 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11026 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11027 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11028 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11030 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11031 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11032 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11033 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11034 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11035 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11036 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11037 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11038 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11039 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11040 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11041 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11042 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11043 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11044 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11046 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11047 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11048 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11050 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11051 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11052 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11054 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11055 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11056 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11058 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11059 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11062 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11063 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11064 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11067 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11068 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11069 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11070 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11071 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11072 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11073 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11074 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11076 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11077 let mut found_htlc = false;
11078 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11079 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11082 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11083 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11084 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11085 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11086 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11087 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11088 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11090 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11091 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11092 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11096 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11097 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11098 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11099 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11100 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11102 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11103 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11105 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11107 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11108 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11111 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11112 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11113 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11117 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11118 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11119 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11120 // safely discard the channel.
11121 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11122 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11123 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11124 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11125 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11126 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11127 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11128 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11131 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11132 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11133 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11134 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11135 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11136 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11140 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11141 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11142 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11143 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11144 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11146 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11147 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11148 counterparty_node_id: None,
11149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11150 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11152 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11156 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11157 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11158 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11159 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11160 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11161 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11162 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11163 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11164 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11166 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11169 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11170 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11171 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11172 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11173 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11174 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11175 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11176 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11178 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11181 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11184 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11185 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11186 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11187 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11188 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11189 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11190 is_connected: false,
11194 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11195 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11196 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11197 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11198 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11199 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11200 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11201 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11204 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11205 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11206 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11207 for _ in 0..event_count {
11208 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11209 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11214 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11215 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11216 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11218 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11219 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11220 // on-startup monitor updates.
11221 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11222 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11224 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11228 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11229 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11231 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11232 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11233 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11234 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11235 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11239 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11240 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11241 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11242 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11243 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11244 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11245 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11247 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11248 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11252 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11253 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11254 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11255 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11256 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11257 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11258 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11259 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11260 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11261 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11262 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11263 let mut events_override = None;
11264 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11265 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11266 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11267 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11268 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11269 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11270 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11271 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11272 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11273 (8, events_override, option),
11274 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11275 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11276 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11277 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11279 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11280 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11283 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11284 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11287 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11288 pending_events_read = events;
11291 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11292 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11295 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11296 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11297 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11298 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11299 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11300 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11302 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11304 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11305 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11306 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11309 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11310 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11311 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11312 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11313 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11315 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11316 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11317 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11319 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11320 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11321 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11322 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11323 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11325 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11326 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11327 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11328 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11329 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11330 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11331 pending_background_events.push(
11332 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11333 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11334 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11335 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11336 update: update.clone(),
11339 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11340 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11341 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11342 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11343 pending_background_events.push(
11344 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11345 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11346 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11349 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11350 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11353 max_in_flight_update_id
11357 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11360 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11361 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11362 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11364 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11366 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11367 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11368 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11369 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11370 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11371 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11372 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11373 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11374 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11377 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11378 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11379 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11380 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11381 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11382 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11383 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11384 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11385 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11386 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11387 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11390 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11391 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11392 debug_assert!(false);
11393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11398 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11399 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11400 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11401 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11402 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11403 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11404 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11405 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11406 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11407 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11409 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11410 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11411 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11413 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11414 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11415 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11416 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11417 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11418 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11419 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11425 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11426 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11428 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11429 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11430 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11431 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11434 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11435 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11436 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11437 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11438 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11439 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11440 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11442 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11443 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11444 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11445 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11446 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11447 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11448 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11449 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11450 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11453 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11454 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11455 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11456 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11458 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11459 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11460 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11463 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11464 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11465 retry_strategy: None,
11466 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11467 payment_params: None,
11468 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11469 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11470 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11471 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11472 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11473 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11474 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11475 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11476 total_msat: path_amt,
11477 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11478 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11480 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11481 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11486 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11487 match htlc_source {
11488 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11489 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11490 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11491 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11493 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11494 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11495 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11496 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11497 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11498 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11499 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11500 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11501 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11502 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11503 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11508 !forwards.is_empty()
11510 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11511 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11512 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11513 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11514 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11515 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11516 intercepted_id != ev_id
11523 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11524 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11525 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11526 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11527 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11528 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11529 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11530 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11531 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11532 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11533 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11535 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11536 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11537 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11538 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11540 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11541 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11542 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11549 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11550 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11552 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11554 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11555 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11556 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11557 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11558 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11559 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11560 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11561 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11562 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11563 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11566 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11567 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11568 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11569 // channel still live case here.
11573 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11574 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11579 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11580 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11581 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11582 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11583 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11584 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11585 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11586 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11590 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11591 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11593 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11594 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11595 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11598 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11599 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11600 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11602 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11603 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11605 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11606 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11608 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11611 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11612 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11613 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11615 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11619 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11620 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11621 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11622 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11623 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11625 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11626 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11627 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11628 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11629 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11630 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11631 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11632 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11634 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11635 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11639 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11641 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11643 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11644 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11646 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11647 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11652 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11653 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11655 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11657 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11659 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11660 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11661 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11662 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11666 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11667 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11670 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11671 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11672 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11673 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11674 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11676 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11677 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11678 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11680 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11681 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11682 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11683 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11684 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11685 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11687 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11688 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11689 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11690 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11691 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11696 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11697 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11698 debug_assert!(false);
11699 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11704 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11706 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11707 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11708 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11709 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11710 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11711 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11712 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11713 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11714 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11715 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11716 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11718 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11719 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11721 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11722 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11723 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11724 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11726 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11727 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11728 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11729 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11731 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11732 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11733 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11734 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11736 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11737 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11738 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11739 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11740 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11741 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11742 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11743 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11746 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11747 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11750 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11753 purpose: payment.purpose,
11754 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11755 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11756 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11762 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11763 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11764 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11765 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11766 for action in actions.iter() {
11767 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11768 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11769 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11771 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11773 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11774 blocked_channel_id);
11775 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11776 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11777 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11779 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11780 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11781 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11782 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11786 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11787 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11791 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11793 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11798 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11800 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11801 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11802 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11803 router: args.router,
11805 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11807 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11808 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11809 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11810 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11812 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11813 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11814 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11815 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11816 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11817 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11819 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11821 our_network_pubkey,
11824 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11826 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11828 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11829 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11830 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11831 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11832 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11834 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11835 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11837 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11839 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11841 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11842 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11843 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11845 logger: args.logger,
11846 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11849 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11850 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11851 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11852 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11853 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11856 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11857 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11858 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11859 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11860 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11861 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11862 downstream_channel_id, None
11866 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11867 //connection or two.
11869 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11875 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11876 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11877 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11878 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11879 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11880 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11881 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11882 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11883 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11884 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11885 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11886 use crate::prelude::*;
11887 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11888 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11889 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11890 use crate::util::test_utils;
11891 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11892 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11895 fn test_notify_limits() {
11896 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11897 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11898 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11901 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11903 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11904 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11905 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11906 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11907 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11909 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11911 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11912 // to connect messages with new values
11913 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11914 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11915 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11916 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11917 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11918 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11920 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11921 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11922 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11923 // ... but the last node should not.
11924 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11925 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11926 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11927 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11929 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11930 // about the channel.
11931 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11932 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11933 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11935 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11937 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11938 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11939 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11940 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11941 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11942 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11944 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11945 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11946 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11948 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11949 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11950 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11951 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11952 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11953 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11955 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11956 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11957 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11958 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11959 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11960 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11961 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11962 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11964 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11965 // the channel info has updated.
11966 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11967 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11969 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11970 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11971 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11975 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11976 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11981 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11982 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11984 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11985 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11986 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11987 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11989 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11990 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11991 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11992 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11993 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11994 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11995 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11996 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12000 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12002 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12003 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12004 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12008 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12009 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12016 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12017 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12018 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12019 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12020 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12021 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12022 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12023 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12024 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12026 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12027 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12028 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12030 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12032 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12034 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12035 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12036 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12037 // lightning messages manually.
12038 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12039 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12042 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12043 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12044 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12045 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12047 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12048 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12050 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12051 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12053 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12055 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12057 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12058 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12059 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12063 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12065 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12066 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12069 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12070 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12071 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12074 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12075 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12076 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12077 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12082 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12083 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12084 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12085 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12092 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12093 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12094 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12097 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12098 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12099 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12100 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12101 // fails as expected.
12102 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12103 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12104 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12105 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12106 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12107 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12108 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12109 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12110 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12111 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12114 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12115 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12116 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12118 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12119 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12120 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12122 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12123 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12124 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12125 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12126 let route = find_route(
12127 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12128 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12130 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12131 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12135 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12136 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12140 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12141 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12145 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12146 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12147 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12148 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12149 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12150 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12151 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12153 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12155 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12158 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12159 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12160 let route = find_route(
12161 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12162 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12164 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12165 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12169 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12170 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12171 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12173 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12174 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12175 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12176 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12178 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12180 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12181 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12183 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12186 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12188 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12189 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12190 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12191 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12192 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12193 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12194 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12195 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12196 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12198 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12199 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12201 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12202 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12203 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12204 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12206 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12208 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12209 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12210 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12212 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12213 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12214 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12217 let route = find_route(
12218 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12219 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12221 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12222 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12223 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12227 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12228 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12235 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12236 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12237 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12238 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12239 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12240 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12243 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12245 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12246 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12250 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12251 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12252 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12258 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12259 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12261 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12262 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12263 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12264 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12265 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12266 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12267 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12268 let route = find_route(
12269 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12270 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12273 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12274 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12275 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12276 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12277 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12278 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12281 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12282 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12283 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12284 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12285 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12286 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12289 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12293 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12294 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12295 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12296 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12297 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12301 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12303 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12304 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12306 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12307 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12308 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12309 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12310 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12311 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12312 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12313 let route = find_route(
12314 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12315 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12318 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12319 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12320 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12321 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12322 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12323 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12324 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12325 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12328 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12329 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12330 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12331 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12332 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12333 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12334 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12336 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12340 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12344 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12346 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12347 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12348 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12349 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12351 // Marshall an MPP route.
12352 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12353 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12354 route.paths.push(path);
12355 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12356 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12357 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12358 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12359 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12360 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12362 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12363 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12365 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12366 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12368 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12373 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12379 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12381 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12385 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12387 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12390 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12391 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12392 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12393 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12394 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12395 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12398 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12401 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12402 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12407 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12408 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12409 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12410 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12411 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12412 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12414 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12415 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12417 total_msat: 100_000,
12420 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12421 // payment verification fails as expected.
12422 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12423 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12424 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12425 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12427 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12431 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12432 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12436 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12437 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12438 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12439 // the channel is successfully closed.
12440 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12441 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12442 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12443 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12445 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12446 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12448 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12449 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12451 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12452 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12454 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12455 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12456 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12457 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12460 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12462 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12463 // as it has the funding transaction.
12464 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12465 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12466 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12469 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12471 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12473 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12475 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12476 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12477 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12479 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12482 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12483 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12484 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12485 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12486 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12489 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12490 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12492 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12493 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12494 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12495 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12497 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12498 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12499 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12500 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12502 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12503 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12505 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12506 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12507 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12508 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12509 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12510 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12511 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12515 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12516 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12517 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12518 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12519 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12520 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12521 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12524 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12526 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12527 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12528 // closing transaction).
12529 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12530 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12531 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12533 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12534 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12535 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12536 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12537 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12540 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12542 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12544 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12545 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12546 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12548 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12551 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12554 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12555 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12556 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12559 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12560 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12561 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12564 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12565 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12566 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12569 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12570 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12571 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12574 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12576 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12577 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12579 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12580 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12582 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12583 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12588 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12589 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12590 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12591 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12592 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12593 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12594 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12598 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12599 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12600 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12602 // Test the API functions.
12603 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12605 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12607 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12609 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12611 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12613 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12615 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12619 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12620 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12621 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12622 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12623 // the given `channel_id`.
12624 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12625 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12626 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12629 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12632 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12634 // Test the API functions.
12635 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12637 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12639 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12641 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12643 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12645 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12649 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12650 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12651 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12656 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12658 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12659 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12661 let mut funding_tx = None;
12662 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12664 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12667 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12668 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12669 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12670 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12671 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12673 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12675 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12677 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12679 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12681 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12683 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12686 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12687 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12688 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12689 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12690 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12691 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12693 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12694 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12696 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12697 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12698 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12699 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12700 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12701 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12702 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12705 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12706 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12707 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12708 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12709 }, true).unwrap_err();
12711 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12712 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12713 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12714 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12715 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12716 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12717 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12719 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12720 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12722 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12723 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12724 }, true).unwrap_err();
12726 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12727 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12728 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12729 }, false).unwrap();
12730 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12732 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12733 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12735 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12736 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12737 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12738 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12739 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12741 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12742 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12743 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12745 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12746 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12747 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12749 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12750 // "protected" and can connect again.
12751 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12752 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12753 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12755 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12757 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12759 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12760 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12764 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12765 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12769 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12771 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12773 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12774 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12776 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12777 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12778 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12779 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12782 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12785 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12786 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12788 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12789 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12790 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12792 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12793 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12794 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12795 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12799 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12800 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12801 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12802 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12803 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12804 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12805 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12806 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12807 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12809 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12811 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12812 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12814 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12815 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12816 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12817 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12818 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12819 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12822 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12823 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12825 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12826 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12830 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12831 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12834 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12835 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12836 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12837 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12838 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12840 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12841 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12843 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12844 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12845 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12846 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12852 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12853 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12855 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12856 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12859 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12860 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12864 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12868 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12869 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12870 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12871 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12872 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12873 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12874 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12875 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12876 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12877 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12878 payment_metadata: None,
12879 keysend_preimage: None,
12880 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12881 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12883 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12885 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12886 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12887 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12888 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12889 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12890 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12891 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12893 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12894 } else { panic!(); }
12896 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12897 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12898 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12899 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12900 payment_metadata: None,
12901 keysend_preimage: None,
12902 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12903 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12905 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12907 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12908 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12909 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12910 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12914 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12915 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12916 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12917 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12918 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12920 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12921 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12922 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12923 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12924 payment_metadata: None,
12925 keysend_preimage: None,
12926 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12927 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12929 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12930 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12931 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12933 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12934 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12935 // is not satisfied.
12936 assert!(result.is_ok());
12940 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12941 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12942 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12943 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12944 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12946 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12947 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12949 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12950 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12951 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12952 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12953 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12955 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12956 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12958 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12959 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12960 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12961 match &msg_events[0] {
12962 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12963 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12965 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12966 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12967 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12970 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12973 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12974 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12976 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12977 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12980 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12984 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12985 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12986 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12987 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12990 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12991 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12992 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12994 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12996 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12997 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12998 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13000 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13001 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13003 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13004 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13009 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13010 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13012 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13013 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13015 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13016 // not have generated any events.
13017 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13021 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13022 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13023 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13024 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13025 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13026 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13027 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13028 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13030 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13031 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13034 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13035 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13037 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13038 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13040 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13041 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13044 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13045 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13048 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13049 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13050 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13051 ..Default::default()
13053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13054 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13057 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13058 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13061 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13062 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13063 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13064 ..Default::default()
13066 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13067 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13071 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13072 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13075 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13076 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13077 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13078 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13079 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13082 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13083 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13084 ..Default::default()
13086 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13089 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13090 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13091 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13096 fn test_payment_display() {
13097 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13098 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13099 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13100 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13101 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13102 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13106 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13107 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13108 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13109 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13110 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13111 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13113 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13114 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13115 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13116 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13117 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13118 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13119 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13120 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13122 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13123 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13124 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13127 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13128 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13130 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13131 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13133 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13134 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13135 }, false).unwrap();
13136 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13137 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13138 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13140 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13142 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13143 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13144 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13145 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13146 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13147 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13148 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13149 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13150 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13151 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13152 } else { panic!() };
13153 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13154 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13155 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13156 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13158 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13160 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13161 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13162 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13167 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13168 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13169 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13170 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13173 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13174 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13175 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13177 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13178 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13180 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13181 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13184 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13185 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13186 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13188 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13192 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13193 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13194 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13196 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13201 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13202 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13203 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13204 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13206 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13207 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13208 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13210 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13212 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13213 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13214 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13215 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13217 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13218 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13226 use crate::chain::Listen;
13227 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13228 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13229 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13230 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13231 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13232 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13233 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13234 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13235 use crate::util::test_utils;
13236 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13238 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13239 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13240 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13241 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13243 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13245 use criterion::Criterion;
13247 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13248 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13249 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13250 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13251 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13252 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13253 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13255 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13256 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13258 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13259 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13261 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13263 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13266 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13267 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13270 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13271 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13272 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13274 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13275 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13277 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13278 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13279 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13280 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13281 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13283 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13284 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13285 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13287 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13288 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13289 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13290 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13292 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13293 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13294 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13296 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13297 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13298 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13299 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13300 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13302 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13303 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13304 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13306 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13307 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13309 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13310 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13311 }, false).unwrap();
13312 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13313 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13314 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13317 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13318 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13319 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13321 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13322 } else { panic!(); }
13324 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13325 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13326 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13327 match events_b[0] {
13328 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13329 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13331 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13334 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13335 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13336 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13337 match events_a[0] {
13338 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13339 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13344 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13346 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13347 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13348 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13350 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13351 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13352 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13353 match msg_events[0] {
13354 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13355 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13356 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13360 match msg_events[1] {
13361 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13365 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13366 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13367 match events_a[0] {
13368 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13369 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13374 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13375 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13376 match events_b[0] {
13377 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13378 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13380 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13383 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13384 macro_rules! send_payment {
13385 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13386 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13387 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13388 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13389 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13390 payment_count += 1;
13391 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13392 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13394 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13395 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13396 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13397 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13398 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13399 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13400 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13401 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13402 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13403 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13404 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13406 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13407 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13408 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13409 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13411 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13413 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13414 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13415 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13417 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13420 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13421 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13422 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13423 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13425 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13429 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13430 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13431 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);